Moral Development and Reality
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Moral Development and Reality

Beyond the Theories of Kohlberg, Hoffman, and Haidt

Third Edition

John C. Gibbs

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Dedicated to the memory of J. Lowell Gibbs
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# CONTENTS

*Foreword by David Moshman* ix  
*Personal Preface and Acknowledgments* xi  
*About the Author* xvii  

1. Introduction 1  
   Social Perspective-Taking, Reversibility, and Morality 2  
   The Right and the Good: The Moral Domain 6  
   Introducing Chapters 3 through 10 10  

2. Beyond Haidt’s New Synthesis 17  
   Three Themes 17  
   Conclusion and Critique 31  

   Themes of Kohlberg’s Cognitive Developmental Approach 41  
   Early Childhood Superficiality 50  
   Beyond Early Childhood Superficiality 60  
   Stages of Moral Judgment Development 79  
   Evaluating Haidt’s Challenge 80  

4. Kohlberg’s Theory: A Critique and New View 81  
   Background 81  
   Kohlberg’s Overhaul of Piaget’s Phases 84  
   Adult Moral Development in Kohlberg’s Theory 91  
   A Critique and New View 93  
   Conclusion 97  

   The Empathic Predisposition 99  
   Modes and Stages of Empathy 101  
   Empathy and Prosocial Behavior: Cognitive Complications and Empathy’s Limitations 113  
   Empathy, Its Cognitive Regulation, and Affective Primacy 121  
   The Empathic Predisposition, Socialization, and Moral Internalization 123  
   Conclusion and Critique 130
   Prosocial Behavior: The Rescue 133
   Individual Differences in Prosocial Behavior 137
   Conclusion: A Spurious “Moral Exemplar” 148

7. Understanding Antisocial Behavior
   Limitations of Antisocial Youths 152
   A Case Study 169

8. Treating Antisocial Behavior
   The Mutual Help Approach 175
   Remedying the Limitations and Generating Synergy:
       The Cognitive Behavioral Approach 184
       Social Perspective-Taking for Severe Offenders 203

9. Beyond the Theories: A Deeper Reality?
   Two Case Studies 206
   A Deeper Reality? 215
   Moral Insight, Inspiration, and Transformation 230
   Conclusion 236

10. Conclusion
    Revisiting the Issue of Moral Motivation and Knowledge 241
    Moral Perception and Reality 249

    Appendix 257
    Notes 265
    References 283
    Author Index 329
    Subject Index 341
Moral Development and Reality is serious about morality, development, and even reality. John Gibbs is not just out to explain moral development: he is out to explain morality itself. Morality, he argues, is not just whatever we happen to like or whatever our cultures happen to favor. Morality is rooted in the reality of social interconnections and develops as we come to understand that reality.

This advanced text, now in its third edition, is not just a systematic overview of the literature on moral development; it is also an original theoretical contribution to that literature. In fact, I would go so far as to call it the most important contribution to the study of moral development since the turn of the century. Gibbs has recognized what is most fundamental in the contributions of Lawrence Kohlberg, Martin Hoffman, and Jonathan Haidt. These are not just three theorists he happens to like. (In fact, he finds plenty to criticize in all of their theories, especially Haidt’s.) Rather, they represent three distinct theoretical traditions that usually either ignore or actively disparage each other. Integrating their complementary insights and contributions makes this a unique and indispensable book.

Gibbs takes from Kohlberg a Piagetian conception of moral rationality and objectivity that allows for genuine developmental change. This moral epistemology draws strongly on the ethics of philosopher Immanuel Kant. Gibbs is far from alone among current developmentalists in his rationalist moral epistemology. Cognitive social domain theory—as seen in the work of Elliot Turiel, Larry Nucci, Judith Smetana, Melanie Killen, Charles Helwig, Cecilia Wainryb, and many others—shares with Gibbs his Piagetian moral epistemology. Social domain theorists, however, reject Kohlberg’s stages of moral development, whereas Gibbs believes a modified version of them provides the cognitive core of any viable theory of moral development. Gibbs is not only neo-Piagetian, as was Kohlberg and as are the social domain theorists; Gibbs is specifically neo-Kohlbergian, in contrast to the social domain theorists. This is reflected in the fact that he has far more to say about moral development beyond the preschool years than most current developmentalists.

But morality, Gibbs insists, is not just about what is right and not just a matter of knowledge and reasoning. Morality also concerns the good, and owes as much to emotion as to cognition. Here Gibbs draws on Hoffman, who highlighted the emotional side of moral development, including our deepening empathy for others. Intimately interrelating Hoffman’s theory with that of Kohlberg produces a theory that transcends either. Moral perspective-taking is recognized as simultaneously cognitive and emotional. Moral development represents progress in both justice and care.

But there’s more. Moral behavior is a function of many factors and cannot be predicted simply from developmental status. In the complex realm of social behavior, moreover, theorists do not always agree on what counts as moral behavior.
Foreword

Since the turn of the century, moral psychology has broadened to concerns far beyond the central issues of moral development. In recent years, Jonathan Haidt has emerged as perhaps the major proponent of what are generally seen as alternatives to traditional developmental perspectives, and especially to the rationalist views of Piaget and Kohlberg. The first two editions of this text already addressed such matters.

The major innovation of the third edition is to consider Haidt’s new theory systematically. There is much in Haidt’s theory for a developmentalist to disagree with, and Gibbs is clear about his disagreements. In typical fashion, however, he finds much to agree with and manages, instead of simply refuting Haidt, to appreciate many of his theoretical insights. The result is a new edition that is not only updated throughout but makes a further theoretical contribution.

And what about reality? Gibbs clearly sees morality as rational and even objective, raising the question of moral “objects.” If morality is knowledge, what is it we know about? At the very least, Gibbs’ Piagetian and Kantian answer is that morality involves truths about “oughts” inherent in the reciprocity of human relations. Toward the end of the book he goes further, suggesting that the moral salience of human relations lies in a deeper reality of human interconnection that can be glimpsed occasionally in near-death experiences.

One need not go as far as Gibbs on questions of moral ontology, however, to recognize the vital importance of moral epistemology. Philosophers, psychologists, and educators will profit from this broad-ranging examination of the epistemology, development, and promotion of morality. But the book is aimed no less at students, and succeeds in this respect, too. Through careful organization, clear presentation, and vivid examples, Gibbs advances the state of the art in the study of moral development in a manner accessible to readers with little or no background in psychology or philosophy.

A background in morality, however, may be required. Fortunately, we all have a background in morality, rooted in social realities we have increasingly understood since our preschool years, with enduring potential for further progress. Reading this book will help you understand better what morality is, really, and how we can promote its development.

David Moshman, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska at Lincoln
November, 2012
First among my acknowledgments in this personal preface are the three names in the title: the late Lawrence Kohlberg, Martin L. Hoffman, and Jonathan Haidt. The works of all three have been at the forefront of major (if disparate) movements in the field of moral psychology; accordingly, I am fortunate indeed to have known and dialogued with all three thinkers for decades. Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s works were already prominent in 1971. In that year I asked Kohlberg and Hoffman (whose works I knew from my undergraduate psychology courses) to contribute to my doctoral study of social influences upon children’s resistance to temptation (Gibbs, 1972). Hoffman mailed, from the University of Michigan, his measure of parental nurturance, and Kohlberg, on my graduate campus (Harvard University), participated as a member of my reading committee.

After completing my dissertation in 1972, I continued collegial interaction with both Kohlberg and Hoffman, especially with Kohlberg. In 1975, Larry, as everyone called him, invited me to join him at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. This I did gladly, collaborating as a research faculty member in the completion of his longitudinal moral judgment project (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Gibbs, Kohlberg, Colby, & Speicher-Dubin, 1976) and assessment manual (Colby, Kohlberg, Speicher, Hewer, Candee, Gibbs, & Power, 1987). In the free atmosphere of Harvard, I also was encouraged to develop certain theoretical and empirical contributions. After reading the page proofs of my 1977 *Harvard Educational Review* revisionist critique of his stage typology, Larry told me that I “could be right.”

I remain deeply appreciative that Larry continued to support and encourage my work in moral development even after I left Harvard (in 1979) for a faculty appointment at The Ohio State University. He wrote the foreword to an early group-administrable moral judgment assessment instrument that colleagues and I developed (Gibbs, Widaman, & Colby, 1982). He also continued to consider sympathetically my revisionist argument, even proposing (in part along the lines of that argument) a reconceptualization of adult moral development (Kohlberg, 1984). He appreciated our (Gibbs & Schnell, 1984) juxtaposition of his moral developmental approach with socialization approaches such as Hoffman’s. He was interested in our work on exemplary prosocial behavior (see Chapter 6). He even shared my interest in the near-death experience and the question of a deeper reality of human existence (see Chapters 9 and 10). Hence, although he died in 1987, years before the emergence of this book, Larry Kohlberg, in effect, nurtured its advance shoots. I know that Larry would have nurtured the book’s progress as well, along with our (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007) “revisiting” with new data his universality claims for moral development (see Chapters 3 and 4 of this third edition of *Moral Development and Reality*).
I have also kept in touch with Martin Hoffman, for whose continued encouragement and help I am also grateful. Like Larry, Marty appreciated our (Gibbs & Schnell, 1984) overview of his and Kohlberg’s approaches to moral development (indeed, he had provided helpful comments on a preliminary version). He also constructively commented on a subsequent chapter and article of mine (Gibbs, 1991a, 1991b) that proposed an integration of his and Kohlberg’s theories. He even wrote a commentary (Hoffman, 1991) on that article. (Remarkably, Marty’s commentary began, “The last time I saw Larry Kohlberg, about a year before he died, we decided to get together some day soon and try to integrate our theories. We never did” [p. 105].)

Especially appreciated have been Marty’s encouragement and help with this book. He has provided valuable feedback for two of this book’s chapters, and even developed with me a summary table of his typology of empathy-related modes, stages, and attributions for Chapter 5. His consultation was invaluable as I refined—based on the most recent research—my presentation of his theory of empathy-based moral development and socialization. In his own book (Hoffman, 2000), Marty commented that he was “impressed with the variety of [social perspective-taking] methods” (p. 293) used in our intervention program for antisocial youth (see Chapter 8). Marty provided crucial consultation as my graduate students Julie Krevans and, subsequently, Renee Patrick fashioned their respective dissertations chiefly concerning the impact of inductive discipline (one of Hoffman’s most important contributions to moral socialization; see Chapter 5).

Marty’s first “encouragement” was actually a one-word challenge. At the 1987 American Educational Research Association meeting in Washington, D.C., Martin Hoffman and Nancy Eisenberg presented an “Invited Dialogue.” As the discussant for their presentations, I commented that Hoffman’s theory presumed “affective primacy” (empathic affect as the exclusive source) in moral motivation and behavior. Marty replied, “So?” Unpacked, that meant, I think: So what’s wrong with that? A fair question, I thought. (Marty has since come to agree with much of my argument that moral motivation entails not only affective but also cognitive primacy; see Chapters 5 and 6).

Ten years later, that “fair question” and challenge of affective primacy surfaced again, this time in more extreme form. At a 1997 Association for Moral Education meeting in Atlanta, I again served as a discussant, this time for a symposium in which a young scholar named Jonathan Haidt launched a bold and broad challenge. Beyond Hoffman’s mere “what’s wrong with that?” Haidt argued that “intuition” is so strongly primary in morality and everyday social behavior that “cognition,” “rationality,” or “development” is, in the main, epiphenomenal. My discussant comments suggested that cognition, too, warrants a primary role in moral psychology. I pointed, for example, to evidence that developmental delay in basic moral judgment is an important factor in antisocial behavior (see Chapter 7). My suggestion had little or no impact—at least none that I could discern in a subsequent paper Jon sent me with a friendly and low-key note (“Dear John—I thought you might be interested in this. Best wishes, Jon”). That paper, then already in press, was to become Haidt’s (2001) landmark Psychological Review statement. In a subsequent chapter with Selin Kesebir (2010), and then in his impressive book Righteous Mind
Personal Preface and Acknowledgments

(2012), Jon declared a “new synthesis” concerning the primary roles of biology, fast affect or emotion, and diverse cultures in the formation of morality. He cited my *Moral Development and Reality* as depicting the status quo, vulnerable to the major challenge of the new synthesis.

Jon's challenge, then, was more than one word; it was in 1997 a major declaration, to be followed by many elaborations from this brilliant thinker, innovative researcher, and prolific writer. Most recently, I have appreciated Jon's feedback concerning my coverage of his work in the early chapters of this edition as well as our direct intellectual exchanges during his speaking engagements at Ohio State and at conferences (most recently, at the American Psychological Society conference in Chicago, in June of 2012; and at the Association for Moral Education Conference in San Antonio, in November of that year). Despite our disagreements, we do appreciate aspects of one another's work and remain cordial colleagues.

Beyond containing my answers to Marty and Jon, this book addresses the full sweep of moral development and reality. Writing the book has meant for me the thrilling opportunity to seek closure concerning questions that have consumed my interest over the decades since 1971: What is morality? Can we speak validly of moral development, as Kohlberg and Hoffman claim, or is morality—as in Haidt's broad descriptivist view—relative to the particular values and virtues emphasized in particular cultures? Is the moral motivation of behavior primarily affective (early Hoffman, Haidt), or cognitive, a matter of justice (Kohlberg, Piaget)? Are Kohlberg's and Hoffman's theories integrable? Can they adequately account for exemplary prosocial—and, for that matter, antisocial—behavior? What are their implications for treating antisocial behavior? Finally, going beyond the theories: Does moral development, including moments of moral insight, inspiration, and transformation, reflect a deeper reality?

This book seeks to answer these questions. I have been deeply gratified by the praise elicited by the book's earlier editions (Gibbs, 2003, 2010) from reviewers, colleagues, and students. In the years since the second edition, I have conducted extensive research, corresponded with national and international colleagues, and kept up with the remarkably diverse literature of moral psychology; hence, this third edition features over 200 new or updated references. In addition to the new chapter on Haidt's theory, every extant chapter has been updated and refined. I have especially benefited from Dave Moshman's recent work, along with that of (among others) Kwame Appiah, Karl Aquino, Bill Arsenio, Dan Batson, Roy Baumeister, Gus Blasi, Paul Bloom, Larry Brendtro, Jean Decety, Frans de Waal, David Eagleman, Ken Fujita, Alison Gopnik, Joshua Greene, Sam Harris, Susan Harter, Tobias Krettenauer, Derek Parfit, Sam Parnia, Steven Pinker, Michael Sandel, Bob Selman, Bob Siegler, Peter Singer, Pim van Lommel, Robert Wright, and Carolyn Zahn-Waxler.

My hope is that this new edition will find its place, not only as a supplementary text in graduate and advanced undergraduate courses pertinent to one or more of these questions (facilitating this role are chapter summaries and study questions, provided in the Appendix), but also as a contribution to the broader dialogues in the academic and intellectual community.

I will use “we”—as in, “we will explore moral development through the theories of Kohlberg, Hoffman, and Haidt”—frequently throughout this book. At some
points, the pronoun may seem odd, but its use is quite intentional. In part, “we” is used for ordinary reasons: “to secure an impersonal style and tone” and cultivate a “considered together” quality (The Oxford English Dictionary, 2012); specifically, a presumed partnership with the reader. A special reason, however, is that at many points I do mean we, not in some impersonal sense but, instead, quite literally and personally. I did write this book and do accept any credit or blame that may ensue. Fundamentally, however, not “I” but we accomplished this book. It exists only because of the collaboration, critiques, and encouragement of so many: not only mentors such as Larry Kohlberg and Marty Hoffman (and, as late as 2002, my former Harvard Graduate School advisor Herb Kelman), and challengers such as Jon Haidt, but also so many other good and thoughtful people: coauthors, other colleagues, graduate students, advanced undergraduates, friends, and family.

Let me express first my appreciation to my coauthors over the years. In addition to my abiding appreciation of Larry Kohlberg (qua coauthor as well as mentor), I thank, most notably, Helen Ahlborn, Kevin Arnold, Alvaro Barriga, Karen Basinger, George Bear, Daan Brugman, Kate Brusten, Marvin Berkowitz, Matt Blount, Larry Brendtro, Henri Chabrol, Phil Clark, Anne Colby, Marc Daigle, Renee Devlin, Ann-Marie DiBlase, Jim DuBois, Dick Fuller (now deceased), Lance Garmon, Barry Glick, Arnie Goldstein (now deceased), Ginny Gregg (Jelinek), Patrick Grim, Becca Grime, Petra Helmond, Mary Horn, Keith Kaufman, Julie Krevans, Jennifer Landau (Harrold), Leonard Leeman, Albert Liu, Marion Mason, Fara McCrady, Dave Moshman, Renee Patrick, Bud Potter, Sarajane Rowland, Steve Schnell, Randy Shively, Susan Simonian, John Snarey, Geert Jan Stams, Bobby Lee Stinson, Ann Swillinger, Kevin van der Meulen, Eveline van Vugt, and Keith Widaman.

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Other contributors and supporters include the members of my family. This book is dedicated to the memory of my father, John Lowell Gibbs, the first great love of my life, with whom I first discovered the joy and deep connection of true dialogue (as well as the fun of trading puns and other half-witticisms). I also thank Jonathan Lowell Gibbs, Louise B. Gibbs (now deceased), Stephanie Gibbs Kamath, Sophia Gibbs Kim, Sung Clay Kim, Lea Queener, Llewelyn Queener (now deceased), Carol Gibbs Stover, JohnAlexis Viereck, and Peter Viereck (now deceased). Lastly, I thank Valerie V. Gibbs, my life’s greatest love, my co-adventurer, my wife and partner in the most personal sense of “we” of all.
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John C. Gibbs, Ph.D. (Harvard University, 1972), is Professor of Developmental Psychology at Ohio State University. His work on moral judgment and cognitive distortion assessment and on interventions with antisocial youth has not only seen widespread use in the United States and Great Britain but has also been translated and adapted for use in France, Germany, Italy, Taiwan, Spain, the Netherlands, and other countries. Dr. Gibbs and coauthors’ EQUIP intervention program won the 1998 Reclaiming Children and Youth Spotlight on Excellence Award. He has served as a member of the Ohio Governor’s Council on Juvenile Justice, as well as the Social Cognitive Training Study Group of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Division of Violence Prevention). He also serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Near-Death Studies. His previous books include Moral Maturity: Measuring the Development of Sociomoral Reflection (with coauthors Karen Basinger and Dick Fuller) and The EQUIP Program: Teaching Youth to Think and Act Responsibly Through a Peer-Helping Approach (with coauthors Granville Bud Potter and Arnold P. Goldstein). In addition to his books, Dr. Gibbs has published (alone or with coauthors) more than 80 book chapters and articles pertaining to the topics involved in Moral Development and Reality.
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Moral Development and Reality
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Certain campers one summer repeatedly pulled a prank on Edward. Ed was a small, uneven-legged, mildly mentally challenged adult who was the basic maintenance staffer for the camp. He was kind, conscientious in his duties, and proud that he was earning his way in life. There was just one thing: At a point of frustration or moment of embarrassment, Ed would invariably unleash a torrent of profanities that was surprising and, to some campers, entertaining. Several campers had devised a way to set off this “entertainment.” Ed worked hard mowing and doing other chores on the campgrounds and would sometimes take a nap during the day. His bed was located in the boys’ wing of the campers’ open barracks–style sleeping quarters. Seeing Ed asleep, the plotters would move in. They would gently sink one of Ed’s hands into a pail of water. Ed would wet his pants in bed and awaken, swearing madly and running frantically after the hysterically laughing campers.

Imaginatively putting oneself in the place of another, or social perspective-taking, is central to moral development and behavior. Social perspective-taking relates to the right and the good of morality; that is, to justice or mutual respect and to empathy or caring. What if the plotters that summer had adequately taken Ed’s perspective, including Ed’s limited ability to take such a prank in stride? Might they have anticipated a certain unfairness to their planned act, a certain violation of justice or respect? Might they have anticipated feeling a certain empathy-based guilt? Had the campers been less self-centered—that is, had put themselves in Ed’s place—the y might have successfully resisted their temptation to tease and humiliate him.

This book mainly addresses the development of justice and caring, especially as seen through the works of their preeminent theorists, Lawrence Kohlberg and Martin Hoffman. Their works identify certain progressive trends: Human moral understanding as well as feeling grows beyond the superficial. A morality of mutual respect and caring becomes increasingly evident—if not always in social behavior, at least in competence. A Kohlberg colleague, Elliot Turiel, posits an objective right and wrong definitive of the moral domain. Kohlberg even posited a deeper reality, a cosmic perspective that can affirm the moral life of love and respect for persons.

Fundamentally, Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories imply that acts such as the campers’ against Edward are morally wrong and harmful. Morality and its development have an objective basis; a more mature morality is a more adequate morality. But let us step back a bit. Aren’t evaluations of moral right and wrong basically subjective? Aren’t they relative to the values and virtues approved of and inculcated in this or that particular culture? And if there is no objectively “right” or more adequate morality, then isn’t it of overriding importance not to impose our own subjective morality upon others?

William Damon (2006) noted that precisely such questions have led to challenges to the legitimacy of studying “broad concerns of development”; indeed, to
the very “notion of development itself” (p. xv). “To develop is to make progress” (Moshman, 2011a, p. xviii). Yet challenges to broad concerns of human moral progress, greater adequacy, or development—and even to objectivity or rationality—continue to abound in the social and behavioral sciences. These relativistic challenges—most formidably, from the “new synthesis” proclaimed by Jonathan Haidt, the third name in the title of this book—prompt us to ponder the basis for moral developmental theories such as Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s, as well as the nature of the moral domain. In so stepping back, we will present an objective basis for morality as well as for moral development in a non-relative sense. This presentation will serve as a prelude to the chapters to follow. In these chapters, we will ponder first Haidt’s and then Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories. We will extend mainly from Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories to explore moral development, social behavior, and reality.

### Social Perspective—Taking, Reversibility, and Morality

“Social perspective—taking” can mean mentally adopting, understanding, or considering another’s thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, emotions, desires, preferences, perceptual point of view, motives, goals, opportunities, intentions (see Davis, 2005; Kane, 1994), and even what Hoffman calls the other’s “life condition.” In Edward’s case, adequate social perspective-taking would include taking into account Edward’s limited mental and emotional ability to take a prank in stride. This the campers did not do; instead, they indulged their self-centered desire for “entertainment.” They treated Edward merely as an object, using their knowledge of his vulnerability to serve their exploitative purpose. Their act was morally wrong.

The campers’ act can be evaluated as objectively wrong because it was not reversible. In victimizing Edward, the campers’ behavior failed to satisfy what Kurt Baier (1965) called “the condition of reversibility, that is, that the behavior in question must be acceptable to a [mentally and emotionally healthy as well as adequately informed] person whether he is at the ‘giving’ or ‘receiving’ end of it” (p. 108). The appeal is to consistency: The campers’ behavior would not have been acceptable to them had they been in Edward’s place, at the receiving end of it.

Steven Pinker (2011) related the condition of reversibility (his phrase was “interchangeability of perspectives”) to “the moral principle that no person has grounds for privileging his or her interests over others’… I can’t act as if my interests are special just because I’m me and you’re not. Self-centered or “privileged” acts, interests, and appeals are one-sided or inconsistent and unfair:

> If I appeal to you to do something that affects me—to get off my foot, or not to stab me for the fun of it, or to save my child from drowning—then I can’t do it in a way that privileges my interests over yours… say, by retaining my right to stand on your foot, or to stab you, or to let your children drown. (Pinker, 2011, pp. 182–183; emphases added)

A self-centered social act or appeal is objectively and intrinsically wrong or “wrong in itself” (Baier, 1965, p. 108), reflecting an unjust and selfish point of view not worthy of continued “tolerance” or moral respect (Kane, 1994, p. 14).
In positive terms, reversible, intrinsically right, and morally respectable acts, interests, and appeals relate to the moral point of view—a perspective that is more adequate insofar as it is “independent, unbiased, impartial, objective, disinterested, ... and in the interest of everyone alike” (Baier, 1965, p. 107). The moral point of view is, in Adam Smith’s (1759/1976) famous phrase, that of a hypothetical “impartial spectator”—a stance toward “right or wrong regardless of what’s in it for ourselves” (de Waal, 2013, p. 176). Robert Selman (1980, 2008) described the moral point of view as a “third-person,” or overall, perspective, typically constructed through the mental coordination of social perspectives in late childhood or early adolescence. This point of view is implicit in the morality of mutual respect and justice, of reciprocity and equality—not of one person’s using (or exploiting) others as means to attain his or her selfish (even if “entertaining”) ends. The moral point of view also pertains to the morality of “reciprocity as an ideal” (Piaget, 1932/1965; see our Chapter 3), as well as the situation of “ideal speech” and conflict resolution (Habermas, 1991).

Pinker (2011) suggested that reversibility, the moral point of view, or ideal reciprocity constitutes a “foundation of morality” that can be seen in the many versions of the Golden Rule that have been discovered by the world’s major religions, and also in Spinoza’s Viewpoint of Eternity, Kant’s Categorical Imperative,...and Jefferson’s self-evident truth that all people are created equal. (p. 182)

Derek Parfit (2011) concluded: “[B]y requiring us to imagine ourselves in other people’s positions, the Golden Rule may provide what is psychologically the most effective way of making us more impartial, and morally motivating us” (p. 330). Parfit’s connection of social perspective-taking and impartiality to moral motivation is especially noteworthy. Golden Rule reversibility can generate cognitive primacy in moral motivation—a key point emphasized throughout this book.

This objective basis for morality can be compared with the stances taken in other views in moral psychology and cognate fields. An objective stance is also championed by social domain theorists such as Turiel (e.g., Helwig, Turiel, & Nucci, 1996; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006a), although their referent for “objective” does not emphasize the condition of reversibility. Utilitarian philosophers have sought to establish objective morality by formulating and additively computing putatively equal units of consequence, utility, or collective good along a uniform scale (the effort is laudatory, but problematic; see Sandel, 2009). Generally taking issue with the tenability of objective morality and leaving “little room for rational agency or developmental change” (Moshman, 2008, p. 280) are views such as post-modernism (e.g., Gergen, 2001); personological, virtue, identity, or communitarian ethics (e.g., Campbell & Christopher, 1996; MacIntyre, 1981, 1988; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009; Sandel, 2009; Walker, in press); “narrative” or Vygotskian psychology (e.g., Day & Tappan, 1996; Tappan, 2006); pragmatic accounts (Krebs, 2008; Krebs & Denton, 2005, 2006; critiqued by Gibbs, 2006b); aspects of neo-nativist or social intuitionist theory (e.g., Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008a, 2008b; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Wilson, 1993); and cultural psychology (e.g., Shweder, 1990, 2000; Shweder et al., 2006). Arguably the best presented of these
Moral Development and Reality

non-objectivist views—Haidt’s social intuitionist theory or “new synthesis”—is considered more fully in the next chapter.

Such views commonly argue that morality—even the right and wrong of justice—is basically pre-rational, its formation largely relative to diverse personal, cultural, and historical contexts. In such contextually relativistic views, a judgment about moral right and wrong cannot be valid “without qualifying ‘for whom,’ or ‘when,’ or ‘from what point of view’” (Kane, 1994, p. 9; cf. Nietzschean perspectivism). On a group level, morality is “viewed in relation to… the specific customs and conventions, as well as the unique needs, of the society that produced the values” (Damon, 1977, p. 13).

Cross-cultural universals or broad themes in moral and cognitive development have generally been neglected in this focus on particular contexts and directions of moral socialization. For example, Jonathan Haidt and Frederick Bjorklund (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008a, 2008b) claimed that a fully moral or virtuous individual is typically one who has been fully enculturated into the norms and values of his or her particular culture. What are we to make of such a claim? Is morality simply a matter of fully internalizing and enacting this or that character virtue or value, such as loyalty? Consider the case of a physician who acts loyally by not reporting the incompetence of a fellow physician (cf. Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). The physician is enacting the virtue of loyalty, and in that context, might he not think himself (or herself) to be moral, his character good? How can others impose their views by judging him (or her) to be otherwise? Yet if the non-reporting physician were to put himself in the place of his incompetent colleague’s patients—innocent, suffering, perhaps permanently harmed—he might have second thoughts about his “loyalty.” Insofar as it is not reversible, the non-reporting physician’s complicit inaction is morally wrong—his loyalty notwithstanding.

But what about the contexts of other cultures’ established beliefs, values, traditions, and practices? Well taken are Haidtian social intuitionists’ and cultural psychologists’ assertions that one’s own culture is not always right, that diversity should be appreciated and even celebrated, and that one must make every effort to understand and respect the morality of a particular cultural context. Respecting and appreciating the other person or group, after all, is certainly in the spirit of taking into account others’ (or other groups’) perspectives. Such expanded social understanding “may not come until you travel, or become a parent, or perhaps just read a good novel about the traditional society” (Haidt, 2012, p. 109). The application of moral principles (such as, presumably, the condition of reversibility) to the global evaluation of other cultures can undermine one’s proper humility and appreciation of human diversity: “When you have a… principle, you can begin making judgments across cultures. Some cultures get a higher score than others, which means that they are morally superior” (p. 271).

We must indeed expand our social understanding and beware self-righteous or ethnocentric conceits. Nonetheless, although the issues may be more complex, we can justifiably engage in valid moral evaluation even of a different cultural practice. Might not a given tradition, custom, or practice be morally wrong? Consider, for example, the cultural custom of female genital mutilation. It has continued to be part of a girl’s traditional upbringing in the village of Kisii, Kenya, although it is
conducted secretly because of its having been declared illegal by Kenya’s parliament (Lacey, 2002). It should be clear that the accurate term for this practice is *mutilating*, not merely “altering” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008a, p. 191; see Chapter 2; cf. Jacobson, 2008); nor is the practice comparable to male circumcision: The custom involves removal of all or part of the girl’s clitoris and labia minora (thereby diminishing or eliminating her capacity for sexual sensation) and, in some cases, severe constriction through suturing of the vaginal opening. The custom is intended to promote (by discouraging promiscuity) values of sexual purity and family honor. The practice can lead to infection, infertility, and even life-threatening complications. It can also be excruciatingly painful as it is often conducted without anesthesia; some girls cannot stand the pain and resist so much that they must be held down by men (Ali, 2007; Edgerton, 1992; Kopelman, 2001; Sinclair, January 20, 2008; cf. Moshman, 2011a, pp. 65–66).

Given that the custom is still widely approved in the cultural context of the village of Kisii (although the practice is controversial in many villages), are these villagers right to persist in its practice? On what basis are the Kenyan lawmakers, representing the national culture, right to impose their views on this village subculture? Haidt (2012) warned against decrying “oppression and inequality even where the apparent victims see nothing wrong” (p. 109) with the practice. One might presumably find, in the village of Kisii, women (themselves “altered” in this fashion) who “see nothing wrong” with the practice and prescribe it for their daughters.

Nonetheless, this practice can be validly judged to be morally wrong. Like the acts of the campers and the physician, the acts of these practitioners fail the condition of reversibility. As Pinker (2011) argued, objective morality is not “the custom of a particular culture” but rather “a consequence of the interchangeability of perspectives” or violation of the reversibility condition. Female genital mutilation—even if endorsed by practitioners, afflicted members of that culture, or others—is clearly identifiable as objectively wrong upon “scrutiny by disinterested, rational, and informed thinkers”; i.e., mature and informed individuals who have adopted the moral point of view (pp. 180, 182). If the practitioners of this mutilation were adequately informed and in the place of their vulnerable, innocent, suffering victims, the mutilators would not wish the act done to them.

But might female genital mutilation be functionally necessary to protect the village’s communal solidarity, cultural identity, and traditional values? It is true that Durkheimian values of group solidarity or community merit moral consideration (Haidt, 2012; what we will call “the good”: see below). Nonetheless, such values and considerations are “not enough to override…basic fairness” (Moshman, 2011a, p. 68; see also Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). Respecting cultural traditions and practices, in other words, should not require one to “condone the subjugation and brutalization of women” (Fowers & Richardson, 1996, p. 615; cf. Appiah, 2010). As anthropologist Robert Edgerton (1992) noted dryly, “most societies in the world…have managed to cherish female purity and family honor without practicing [clitorectomy and] infibulation” (pp. 9–10).
Once we have objectively justified an evaluation that the acts of the campers, the physician, or the mutilators are morally wrong, is our moral evaluation complete? Generally, does morality consist exclusively of fairness-based right or wrong? What are the foundations of ethics? There is clearly more to the moral domain than right or wrong based on reversibility. What fundamentally completes the core of the moral domain? We have already alluded to some candidates. Note, for example, that sentiments pertaining to loyalty, group identity, purity, and honor figured into our evaluation of the acts of the complicit physician and the genital mutilator. And consider our disgust at the self-soiling inflicted on Edward; our revulsion at impurity surely intensified our condemnation of the campers’ act.

Values pertaining to in-group solidarity, loyalty, tradition, and conformity; respect for, honoring of, or obedience to authority; and purity (or disgust at impurity) are widely evident around the world. It is certainly true that such broadly evident values and sentiments influence our moral evaluations. As we will see, Haidt (2003, Haidt & Kesebir; Chapter 2) has even claimed a primary or foundational status for each of these values or affectively based “intuitions” (along with justice or fairness and the value of liberty or freedom from oppression; see Haidt, 2012).

This claim is dubious. Consider again our reaction to Edward’s soiling. Our emotional reaction of disgust might intensify our empathic distress at the harm to Edward and our empathic anger at the tormentors. Does that reaction make disgust (or its positive side, purity) in its own right a basic foundation of morality? Although it is true that values, virtues, or sentiments of loyalty, tradition, honor, and purity may be moralized (cf. Pinker, 2011) in a particular culture, they are not by that token made moral (even though they may relate to the moral domain in terms of caring, welfare, or “the good”; see below). Although our feeling of impurity or disgust at the victim’s soiling surely intensified our negative moral evaluation, it was the victimization itself—its self-centered, exploitative, non-reversible nature—that permits identification of the act as immoral.

Similarly dubious are moral foundational claims for loyalty or authority. “The greatest problem today,” asserted Frans de Waal (2009), “with so many groups rubbing shoulders on a crowded planet, is excessive loyalty to one’s own nation, group, or religion” (p. 203; emphasis added). Of course, in-group solidarity and loyalty do promote the sense of belonging or personal security of in-group members (and do contribute to the community’s “moral fabric”; de Waal, 2013, p. 184; cf. Brewer, 2007). And surely there are limits to how far we can extend ideals of impartiality and equality (see Chapter note 3). But what about excessive, illegitimate loyalty? Doesn’t it matter how a nation, religion, or peer group treats out-group members, such as Edward (see Jacobson, 2008; and our Chapter 2)?

Again (recall the complicit physician), loyalty per se is off the mark. Consider, in the late twentieth century in Africa, the mass murders by Hutus of certain outsiders (out of a feeling of loyalty to the in-group Hutu culture). Like the complicit physician’s inaction, the Hutus’ “loyal” acts were morally wrong—and morally right were the just and caring efforts of some individuals to defend or protect
those victimized outsiders (see Moshman, 2011a). Similarly, respect for authority is better framed as respect for and obedience to legitimate authority (see Damon, 1977, for the role of reciprocity in the mature understanding of authority), which again returns us to considerations of the right or fairness. This crucial qualifier was noted by Haidt (2012) himself: “[T]riggers [for the authority intuition] …include anything that is construed as an act of obedience, disobedience, respect, disrespect, submission, or rebellion, with regard to authorities perceived to be legitimate” (p. 144, emphasis added). Pinker (January 13, 2008) suggested that criteria of rationality, justice, or fairness (e.g., interchangeability of perspectives) may “provide a benchmark for determining” whether a moral evaluation or intuition is “aligned with morality itself” (p. 56). In-group loyalty, obedience to authority, and “purity” too often fail Pinker’s benchmark to merit individual foundational status in ethics. In short, “a morality defined by loyalty, obedience, duty, law, or convention” is not necessarily “morally defensible” (Pinker, 2011, p. 641).

Feelings of impurity or disgust warrant further discussion as we seek to complete the basic core of the moral domain. Granted, disgust “can be a cruel and stupid emotion” (Bloom, 2004, p. 175). Although the disgust involved in our reaction to Edward’s victimization aligned with morality (and, as noted, intensified our evaluation of moral wrong), consider the disgust that ostensibly justifies the persecution of so-called “untouchables” in India. Indeed, given how often manipulations of disgust have led to “extreme in-group–out-group divisions followed by inhumane treatment” (see Chapter 2), this feeling “wins the award as the single most irresponsible emotion” (Hauser, 2006, p. 199).

Nonetheless, the evolutionary function of this emotion points to an aspect of morality that may indeed assume a primary or foundational status alongside “the right” of impartiality, justice, or fairness. Disgust does prompt us to avoid contact with rotten meat, decaying flesh, vermin, vomit, feces, urine, or other “potential disease vectors” (Pinker, 2008, p. 37; cf. Bloom, 2004). “Individuals who had a properly calibrated sense of disgust” survived, reproduced, and even prospered (Haidt, 2012, p. 148). So the original environmental stimulus for disgust or revulsion did (and still does in part) serve the function of protecting our bodies from harm.

What about considerations not specifically of infection to oneself or others, but of harm—or benefit—in general? Often complementary to the intrinsic right or wrong of an act are its good or bad effects or consequences for oneself and others. Edward, for example, was not only wronged; he was harmed. He suffered, as did the village girls and the incompetent doctor’s patients. And we care about their suffering. “Of the emotions that one could use as a moral guide,” wrote Paul Bloom (2004), “I would prefer [over disgust] sympathy, compassion, and pity” (p. 175).

Although it can be misguided, sympathy or caring in general is a worthy companion to fairness. Indeed, it is comparably fundamental in the moral domain. Just as it is generally immoral to inflict harm, it is generally moral to promote welfare or human flourishing (Lourenco, 2000; although ingredients of the good life or eudaimonia extend beyond ethics; see Appiah, 2008); that is, the greater good of participants in the moral sphere. Although our disgust at Edward’s soiling was not itself morally foundational, it did contribute to our evaluation of harm. Feelings of
purity, loyalty, obedience, etc., pertain to the moral domain proper insofar as they promote judgments and actions serving individual or collective good (welfare, solidarity, security, etc.). Differentiating these feelings may “needlessly parcel what is, at bottom, a more general concern about harm” or the greater good (Harris, 2010, p. 254; cf. Suhler & Churchland, 2011; vs. Haidt & Joseph, 2011). Nor should social conventions be divorced from group-welfare concerns (see Gibbs, 2010a). These feelings can be considered morally foundational insofar as they pertain to a basic concern for human welfare.

An adequate morality requires both the right and the good. Taken together, these basic considerations capture the moral domain and define the primary strands of moral development. These “two foundations are deemed part of the moral domain by virtually all individuals, cultures, and theorists because they represent the core of any justifiable morality” (Moshman, 2011a, p. 85). Haidt’s broader or more differentiated and relativistic (his preferred term is pluralistic) conceptualization of the moral domain is further considered in Chapter 2. Hoffman’s developmental theory of the good (in terms of the empathic predisposition) is considered in Chapter 5.

Largely consistent with our twofold representation is Beauchamp and Childress’s (2009) conceptualization of morality in terms of two primary principles: first, justice (cf. constructed knowledge with its corresponding virtue, the character ideal of fair-mindedness) and respect for the person (autonomy), and, second, non-maleficence or beneficence (cf. the empathic predisposition with its corresponding virtue, the character ideal of benevolence). William Frankena (1973) argued that justice and beneficence together sufficiently define the moral domain. Beauchamp and Childress (2009) defined beneficence as “all forms of action intended to benefit other persons” (p. 197). Moral appeals to promotion of the good—not only for individuals but also for groups—are typically driven by empathy (see Chapter 5; see also note 9 for this chapter).

The right and the good strands of morality and moral development, although distinct, intimately interrelate and complement one another. The paradox is worth contemplating: The strands of morality are distinguishable yet inextricable. The “right” is the right of something. What is “the right” if not the right expression of love, the right balance of goods, the right (or equitable) sharing or reciprocating among people? Does not the right “presuppose” the good (Frankena, 1973, p. 44)? And the converse is also true: One can scarcely refer to the good in the absence of the right. Utilitarian and other consequentialist theories of the good prescribe not just the “greatest good” but the greatest good for the greatest number—an implicit appeal to equality. Indeed, “much of the appeal” of these theories lies in their “non-judgmental spirit” that “everyone’s preferences” should “count equally” (Sandel, 2009, p. 41, emphasis added). Although doing so mixes the two foundations, it does seem appropriate to include considerations of equity or fairness in promotions of the general good. No wonder Jean Piaget (1932/1965) concluded that “between the more refined forms of justice…and love properly so called, there is no longer any real conflict” (p. 324; cf. Barry, 1995).

Yet for all their intimacy (and perhaps ultimate compatibility), the right and the good do remain distinct and mutually irreducible: There simply is no way to
Introduction

assimilate justice into beneficence, nor beneficence into justice. We cannot say that the right reduces to the good any more than we can say that the good reduces to the right.11

The mutual irreducibility of the right and the good is not problematic for moral evaluations or decisions so long as these strands interweave compatibly. The campers’ act was clearly immoral in that Edward was both wronged and harmed; much the same can be said for the medical patient and the child victims in Kisii, Kenya. In general, the case for objective morality is strongest where the strands are complementary. Moral judgments or obligations to intervene that “follow . . . from both principles” thereby gain “a kind of priority” (Frankena, 1973, p. 52, emphasis added). An intended act of both harm and wrong (“intentionally harming someone who is innocent and undeserving of such treatment”) can even be called “evil” (Baumeister, 2012, p. 368).

But what about cases where the good and the right would seem to be unavoidably in conflict and have equal weight? After all, “caring and justice are powerful, legitimate principles and both are valid” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 270). As Jean Decety and Daniel Batson (2009) concluded from research findings: “Empathy-induced altruism and the desire to uphold a moral principle of fairness are independent motives that can at times conflict” (p. 122). Piaget’s optimistic declaration of ultimate compatibility notwithstanding, then, the good and the right can be at loggerheads. In such cases, how does one decide whether caring or fairness takes precedence?

Hoffman (2000) provided a real-life case of conflict for us to consider. In Hoffman’s psychology department, “an esteemed faculty member died and his wife, a part-time adjunct instructor with much-below-average teacher ratings, wanted to keep her job.” The department faculty members were for a while at loggerheads: “The faculty who supported retaining the widowed part-time instructor were passionate about the matter and found it hard to believe that their colleagues could be so callous as to want to add to this woman’s grief. [But] the other faculty were equally passionate [that] allowing a poor teacher to stay on” was unfair (and uncaring) to the students, who pay tuition and have a right to expect to learn from the best available teachers; to more competent and available prospective instructors who would be more deserving of the job; and to the meritocratic standards and legitimate expectations of the university (Hoffman, 2000, pp. 269–270). What to do?

Frankena (1980) suggested that, in cases of conflict between the right and the good, one might weigh the two sides (for more complex cases, see Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, pp. 19–25). Perhaps the right and the good are not after all comparably substantial in the given case. Then one could justifiably give precedence to whichever side is more substantial. “A considerable amount of good may outweigh a small inequality of treatment or a considerable gain in equality [or in fairness] may outweigh a small amount of good” (Frankena, 1980, p. 69). In terms of Hoffman’s example: Is the good of not adding to the widow’s grief and letting her keep her job “considerable” or substantial and the attendant inequities of doing so “small”? Or does the right (fairness to the students, prospective teachers, university standards) outweigh the good?
In the end, the faculty decided to replace the widow with a more competent instructor (Hoffman, personal communication, November 15, 2007), but perhaps not without some reluctance. Empathy for her plight was outweighed but not eliminated in the moral decision-making. Precisely because the lesser consideration remains, its subordination often leaves in the judge a trace of sorrow, a residual regret that the less substantial (in this case)—yet also valid—consideration had to be overridden (cf. Hill, 1996). Both cognitive and affective primacy in moral motivation remain relevant.

The right and the good not only capture much of the moral domain but also represent the main strands of moral development. After appreciating the neo-nativist and enculturative themes of Haidt’s theory (Chapter 2), we will largely focus on moral development (as well as compatible socialization) and its relation to reality in the other remaining chapters (3 through 10) of this book. To explore the development of the right and the good, we will use as vehicles the theories of Lawrence Kohlberg and Martin Hoffman. Like the right and the good, these theories of moral development are distinct yet interrelated, and generally complementary.

**Introducing Chapters 3 through 10**

Both Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories posit that we develop morally in part as we take and coordinate with the perspectives of others and thereby go (or, perhaps better, grow) beyond the superficial. Young children might laugh at Ed because they would attend mainly to the salient or “surface” features of his colorful reaction: Ed’s reddened face; the blaring and astonishing fluency of his blue streak; his odd, off-kilter way of running; and his ineffectual attempts to catch the culprits. More mature and accurate observers would have grown beyond this superficial laughter. They would deeply and truly take Ed’s perspective. They would understand and object to the unfairness against him (cognitive primacy), discern and feel his suffering (affective primacy), and—one would hope—act on their moral motivation to help him. Their moral perception would be profound.

We emphasize that moral perception can be profound in understanding (an unfairness, the right) as well as empathic feeling (another’s suffering, the good). The development from superficial perception to a deeper understanding of right and wrong is addressed in Kohlberg’s theoretical approach, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, we discuss the fundamental themes of Kohlberg’s theory or, more broadly, the cognitive developmental approach to morality. We revisit the works of Kohlberg’s predecessor, Jean Piaget, as we consider the phenomenological world of the young child. Because preschoolers generally find it difficult to keep in mind and work with multiple sources of information, their moral understanding or moral judgment tends to be superficial. Broadly speaking, their attention is readily captured by or centered on that which is momentarily immediate and salient in their social and nonsocial worlds. Spontaneous altruistic thoughts do occur even in the young child’s mind, and the child may act on those thoughts and feelings for others. Nonetheless, highly salient is the chatter of one’s own desires or impulses, and the immediate needs of one’s own body; that is to say, one’s egocistic perspective. Although Piaget’s original concept of egocentrism as an incapacity did
not prove to be valid, “egocentric bias,” a tendency to center on one’s own immediate perspective, lives on in the literature today.

Fortunately, egocentric bias can diminish to some extent with cognitive development: “reason allows us to extricate ourselves from our parochial vantage points” (Pinker, 2011, p. xxv). Just as centration and superficiality characterize early childhood moral judgment, “decentration” and depth can be said to characterize moral understanding and perception in the school years and beyond. Social interaction, taking into account others’ perspectives (i.e., decentering from one’s egoistic perspective through mental coordination and reflection), and thereby growing beyond the superficial in a cognitive sense have much to do with the emergence of reason in human development and social perception. We describe in this chapter the construction of moral understanding and judgment, of reciprocity as an ideal or the moral point of view. Again, mature persons would understand that the prank played upon Ed was unfair, that they—especially if they were Ed with his intellectual disability—would not wish to be treated that way. And out of that understanding, they might act, to refrain or intervene. In other words, the cognitive-developmental claim is that there is a primarily cognitive motive in morality. The motive is not insurmountable, to be sure; but it is there nonetheless.

In the course of our Chapter 3 discussion of this primarily cognitive strand of moral development, we do a number of things. We relate morality to logic; explain that the ideals of fairness or moral reciprocity are constructed, not merely socialized, internalized, or intuited; explicate the role of peer interaction and perspective-taking opportunities in this moral constructive process; argue that reciprocity can be a moral motive in its own right; trace across diverse cultures the construction of moral judgment through social perspective coordination during and beyond the years of childhood; and ponder issues in the concept and assessment of “stages” in the development of moral judgment. We interpret the stages as frameworks or “schemas,” a construct that will evolve in the subsequent chapters of our exploration. We conclude by evaluating the cognitive developmental theme of cross-culturally evident growth beyond the superficial as pervasive and stable enough in morality to support our argument for moral development as not reducible to (although supportable by) socialization or enculturation.

Given this Piagetian cognitive-developmental concern with superficiality-to-depth in moral judgment or understanding, Kohlberg was particularly concerned to identify an age trend and possible sequence of developmental advances or stages that may be universal. Although we argue in Chapter 4 that Kohlberg’s specific stage typology was misguided and accordingly propose a new view, we stress Kohlberg’s awesome achievements: This man almost single-handedly put cognitive moral development on the map of American psychology. He encouraged attention to the continued development of moral judgment beyond the childhood years. And he speculated from case studies of mature moral thinkers in existential crisis that there may be a deeper reality, a “cosmic perspective” that underlies profound moral perception and that can support the moral life (see Chapters 9 and 10).

Profound moral perception also entails caring or feeling. Accordingly, in Chapter 5, our focus shifts from the right to the good, from justice to empathy, from
Moral Development and Reality

the primarily cognitive to the primarily affective strand of moral motivation and development. We examine the systematic, research-based theory of empathy and moral development articulated over the past three decades by Martin Hoffman and others. As is Kohlberg’s, Hoffman’s work is represented in virtually every current developmental psychology textbook. Although we will articulate our caveats, we do—at the very least—second Haidt’s acknowledgment of Hoffman’s “important work on the development of empathy” (Haidt, 2012, p. 325). We draw heavily in Chapter 5 from Hoffman’s integration of his impressive contributions to the field, even as we also consider expansions or elaborations by Frans de Waal, Jean Decety, and others—as well as a criticism by Carolyn Zahn-Waxler and colleagues.

Hoffman has focused our attention on the key role of empathy in moral development. Thanks to cognitive development, social perspective-taking, language development, and moral socialization, empathy evolves from simple, biologically based responses to surface cues to a more complex, subtle, and veridical emotional responsiveness to the joys, sufferings, and life situations of others—even the plight of oppressed groups. Because Ed’s “funny” displays of agitation were so salient for them, young children might attend only to those cues and ignore cues of distress. Surface responding tends to be displaced in moral development by subtler and more profound discernments: of the hurt behind Ed’s anger, of his utter shame and humiliation at having wet himself, and of his distress at perhaps not quite knowing what to do or whom to tell about what was happening.

Beyond the contribution of general cognitive and language development, moral socialization (featuring social perspective-taking in the service of the child’s internalization of prosocial norms) is crucial if empathy is to grow and motivate appropriate prosocial behavior. Within moral socialization, Hoffman focuses on parental practices of discipline. Through “inductions,” or disciplinary teaching that makes salient the perspectives of others hurt by the child’s transgression, the parent can elicit and cultivate a key psychological resource brought by the child to the disciplinary encounter: the empathic predisposition and its derivatives (chiefly, the potential for empathy-based guilt).

In the course of our Chapter 5 discussion of Hoffman’s theory of empathy development and socialization, we address a number of topics: the complex nature of the empathic predisposition; an adequate distinction between self and other as a prerequisite for mature empathy (challenged in some studies and criticism); the use of both self-focused and other-focused perspective-taking in mature empathy; the roles of causal attribution, inference, principles, and other cognitive processes in the formation of empathic anger, empathy-based guilt, and other empathic aff ects; the limitations of empathic bias and empathic over-arousal; the roles of parental warmth and optimal arousal of attention in moral socialization; and the favorable impact, found for example in our research (Krevans & Gibbs, 1996; Patrick & Gibbs, 2007, 2012), of parental expression of disappointed expectations in the discipline encounter. The chapter concludes with our argument that the motivation to correct an injustice is, at least in part, cognitive. In other words, empathic affect stands not alone in moral motivation; the special structures constructed within the cognitive strand of moral development can also impel action. The most plausible position in moral motivation is neither “affective primacy” (early Hoffman, Haidt)
nor “cognitive primacy” (Kohlberg, cf. Piaget) but co-primacy (both empathy and justice as primary motives; in effect a dual process model).

In Chapters 6 through 8, we apply Kohlberg's and Hoffman's theories to social behavior and, in the process, expand certain variables—most notably, moral identity, self-serving cognitive distortion, and social skills—that neither Kohlberg nor Hoffman adequately developed. Chapter 6 focuses on some of the variables accounting for individual differences in the likelihood of prosocial behavior, where “prosocial behavior” can range from a particular intervention to a lifetime dedicated to just and good causes. Ed needed someone to intervene on his behalf against his tormentors. I know. As one of the campers, I witnessed Ed's torment on at least one occasion. Although I did not intervene (I feared sinking from anonymity into downright unpopularity, an excuse that even today fails to neutralize my guilt), I have learned since then (Gibbs et al., 1986) that there are those who would intervene. Our account of prosocial behavior in Chapter 6 includes the case of a White youth who surprised even himself as he intervened against his peers to save an African American youth from imminent attack.

Individuals who seem primed to discern and act against unfairness and harm amid the complexities of social conformity, ideology, and distorted thinking in the “field” of human social situations (discussed in Chapter 6) tend to be those for whom morality is central to their sense of self (that is, they tend to be high in “moral identity”). Moral identity can join the main primary (affective and cognitive) sources of moral motivation. Individuals differ markedly in moral identity: Some individuals, called “moral exemplars” by Anne Colby and William Damon (1992), achieve a life characterized by almost total integration of self and morality. Finally, to take effective sustained action, even those high in moral identity need “ego strength,” which we define in terms of affect-regulating goal-attainment skills or attributes. Distinguishing features of genuine versus spurious “moral exemplars” are considered at the end of Chapter 6.

Chapters 7 and 8 apply Kohlberg's and Hoffman's moral developmental theories to the understanding and treatment of antisocial behavior. Kohlberg's and Hoffman's theories primarily use the concept of developmental delay in perspective-taking to account for antisocial behavior. One conjures the stereotype of children growing up in the conditions typical of inner cities, victims of abuse and neglect. The picture is one of children managing to survive and cope as best they can, taking no one's perspective except their own, still superficial even as adolescents in their moral judgment and empathy, and accordingly acting in a manner that is unfair and unfeeling toward others. Abuse and neglect are in fact associated with developmental delays and other risk factors for antisocial behavior. Yet the adolescents who tormented Edward were not from a high-risk inner-city environment but instead were largely from the relatively affluent suburbs of northern New Jersey in the 1960s.

Here we have an apparent anomaly: How do we account for antisocial behavior among those who, at least at the first blush of Kohlberg's and Hoffman's theories, should have gone beyond pronounced egocentric bias and other superficialities of centration to reach deeper, more mature levels of moral functioning? Why didn't they adequately take Edward's perspective? Weren't they capable of adopting the
moral point of view or ideal reciprocity, of according to another the same treat-
ment they would expect for themselves? Weren’t they capable of empathy, caring
about others, beneficence? Why didn’t their performance at the camp live up to
their overall sociomoral competence? Let us suggest three possible answers.

The first answer is that Ed was not among the campers’ small circle of friends.
The middle-class suburbs of northern New Jersey were rather exclusively White,
mainstream neighborhoods. To the parochial members of that rather homoge-
neous culture, the relatively few individuals of other ethnic groups, and certainly
disabled individuals, were, so to speak, invisible. Although Ed was similar in one
salient respect (racially), he was different in other respects. The perpetrators were
friendly enough with their peers but cared little about the feelings of those who
were “different.” To use Hoffman’s term, their perspective-taking was quite empath-
ically biased (Chapter 5) in favor of their narrowly defined, familiar in-group at
the expense of dissimilar others such as Edward. He was small, yet an adult; they
were neither. He had an intellectual disability; they did not. His legs were dispa-
rate; theirs were not. His occupational orientation was that of manual labor; theirs
(or their parents’) for the most part was not. It was as if Ed were too different
to qualify as a referent for perspective-taking, for decent (fair and caring) treat-
ment, for inclusion within their “moral circle” (Singer, 1981). Haidt’s functional
description of group loyalty and solidarity (Chapter 2) notwithstanding, robust
in-group identity can prompt far more immoral than moral behavior; indeed, “is a
major cause of strife and suffering in the world today” (Tomasello, May 25, 2008;

Our second answer to the question of why the campers did not take Ed’s per-
spective refers, not to their in-group empathic bias, but instead to their egois-
tic motives or desires. Ed was not simply different, but different and vulnerable.
Although vulnerability can elicit empathy, it can also invite exploitation, and the
latter motive can overpower empathy and preempt adequate perspective-taking.
Hoffman (Chapter 5) is correct that Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental approach
under-appreciates the egoistic desires or motives that must be constrained,
modulated, or overcome through moral development and socialization:

> Humans….have a desire for….dominance [power or control over others, superiority to
> them in a status hierarchy] that has deep biological roots. Sociobiologists trace it to
> the drive to maximize reproduction of one’s genes. But whatever the source, it plays
> important social roles and is deeply embedded in primate behavior generally. (Kane,
> 1994, p. 55)

Might the campers have been motivated in part to assert their power, their superi-
ority over Ed, an ostensibly higher status but vulnerable adult? Ed may have been
a tempting target among the adults in the campers’ world. Ed was an adult, and
hence occupied higher status and authority in the social hierarchy. The campers
knew they should respect adults or others in authority (at least legitimate author-
ity). But because Edward was mentally challenged, he could readily be outma-
neuvered and dominated—in Kant’s words, used as a means instead of respected
as an end. To overcome such egoistic motives, moral socialization must cultivate
children’s fairness (Chapter 3) and empathy (Chapter 5). Broadly, culture must support morality and moral development.

There is a third possible answer. Perhaps the campers were on the verge of adequate perspective-taking, with its attendant intimations of wrong and harm, of unfairness and empathy-based guilt. But perhaps they used cognitive distortions to sabotage that incipient perspective-taking so that they could continue to tease and humiliate. After all, although their sphere of morality was small, they did not generally act like bullies or “proactive” aggressors (Chapter 7). Consider Hoffman’s (and others’) suggestion that empathy-based motives are just as much a part of human nature as egoistic ones; that the empathic predisposition is broadly evident (Chapter 5). Perhaps the campers were not so in-groupish and egoistically motivated as to preclude all empathy for Edward. Perhaps, indeed, precisely because of some degree of perspective-taking and empathy, they needed to neutralize their incipient moral understanding and feelings by rationalizing their actions. I do remember how the campers who were engaged in tormenting Ed seemed motivated to talk about how much they needed “entertainment”: “This camp is so boring, you see, that it forces you to think up things to do for kicks. You just have to get some relief.” “Everybody pulls pranks, that’s just what happens at any summer camp. And, you know, Ed’s so funny when he’s mad—you just can’t help setting him off; it’s sort of his own fault.”

Blaming the victim and other rationalizing distortions neutralized the good and right of adequately taking Ed’s perspective. Accordingly, the campers failed to live up to their cognitive and empathic sociomoral competence. They failed to take into account that Ed was mentally challenged; that Ed had done nothing to them; that, in fact, he had shown them little kindnesses from time to time and tried to be their friend; and that their “entertainment” inflicted humiliation and distress on him.

We spend considerable space in Chapter 7 analyzing such self-serving cognitive distortions. And we do mean distortions: wrong judgments, errors, inaccuracies, mistakes, or departures from veridical perception. It is not sufficient in moral psychology simply to “describe what people happen to think is moral” (Haidt, 2012, p. 270); rather, we must recognize that morality in its higher reaches can specify what is right, true, or valid—and what isn’t. As Sam Harris (2010) put it, “Many people are simply wrong about morality—just as many people are wrong about physics, biology, history, and everything else worth understanding” (p. 87). Pinker (2011) suggested that “unless one is a radical moral relativist [believing that there is no basis for judging any morality to be better than any other], one believes that people can in some sense be mistaken about their moral convictions, that their justifications of genocide, rape, honor killings, and the torture of heretics are erroneous, not just distasteful to our sensibilities” (p. 623; second emphasis added; cf. Moshman, 2011a).

In this connection, we will in Chapter 7 examine the erroneous “moral” convictions and pseudo-justifications of a notoriously antisocial individual; namely, Timothy McVeigh. This case makes particularly clear how cognitive distortions can insulate a self-centered worldview (itself a primary distortion, linked to feeling superior or insufficiently respected); that is, how they can preempt or neutralize social perspective-taking, moral understanding, and veridical empathy.
Again, we ask: What if the campers had adequately taken Ed’s perspective? What if they had seen his common humanity with them and had thereby sensed the unfairness and felt the harm of their prospective act? Then they might have gained the ego strength to refrain from “setting him off” for the purpose of their self-centered and egoistically motivated entertainment. Most offenders, from petty pranksters to ideological terrorists, fail (except for self-serving purposes) to take the perspectives of their victims. Hence, the attainment of adequate social perspective-taking—perspective-taking that is profound or mature; rationalization-busting, adequately informed, subtle or discerning; reciprocally ideal and balanced; and socially expansive or inclusive—should be a basic theme pervasive across the components of any effective treatment program. As we move from understanding to treating antisocial behavior (Chapter 8), we will focus on a multi-component treatment program that incorporates a wide variety of social perspective-taking opportunities: namely, our EQUIP program (e.g., Gibbs, Potter, & DiBiase, 2013). Chapter 8 concludes with illustrations of social perspective-taking treatments available for severe offenders.

Although this book addresses Kohlberg’s, Hoffman’s, and Haidt’s theories, we do go beyond those theories in Chapter 9 to consider the question of a deeper reality. As noted, Kohlberg argued that existential thinkers in their soul-searching sometimes discern such a reality; that is, come to see their earthly moral life from an inspiring “cosmic perspective.” If there is such a deeper reality, perhaps it is sometimes glimpsed through physically life-threatening as well as existential crises. Accordingly, we study in this chapter cases of persons who have had a so-called near-death experience, or a set of “profound psychological events with transcendental and mystical elements, typically occurring to individuals close to death or in situations of intense physical or emotional danger” (Greyson, 2000b, p. 316). Concerning the ontological significance of this phenomenon, a review of the literature—especially, recent medical research literature—leads us to the tentative conclusion that it is not entirely a matter of subjective projection, that the experience involves something real. To some extent, then, we corroborate Kohlberg’s suggestion that a cosmic reality underlies moral development and inspiration. In this light, “growing beyond the superficial” and “taking the perspectives of others” take on radical new meaning.

In our final chapter (Chapter 10), we conclude our use of Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories to explore growth beyond the superficial in morality. We refer to our critique of Haidt’s theory. We culminate our argument for a co-primacy in moral motivation by relating Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s (as well as Haidt’s) theories to motivationally and qualitatively distinct categories of knowledge. We conclude the chapter with some final thoughts on moral development, perception, and behavior vis-à-vis a deeper reality of human interconnectedness. If we are deeply connected, then acts that wrong and harm one individual—Edward, a medical patient, a young girl in Kisii, Kenya—ultimately wrong and harm us all.
According to Jonathan Haidt, the social psychologist whose relativistic view was briefly considered in the last chapter, the field of moral development and education has benefited of late from a good dose of reality. In the early decades of the twenty-first century, the field has ostensibly gained a broader, truer depiction of morality thanks to what Haidt called a “new synthesis” in the social, behavioral, and biological sciences. Championing congruent trends in areas ranging from evolutionary and comparative psychology, to human infant studies, to cognitive neuroscience, Haidt has sought thereby to describe and “explain what morality really is” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 797, italics added; cf. Haidt, 2007, 2012)...and isn’t. Haidt’s explanation—featuring three key themes of in-group solidarity (“morality binds and builds”), intuitive primacy, and social persuasion 1—in effect says “not really” to our claims, introduced in Chapter 1, concerning the right (justice) and the good (care). Justice is not really some objective ideal of reversibility, constructed as morality grows beyond superficial notions and actions. Rather, justice, fairness, or “the right” in Haidt’s view is but one of a number of primary intuitions—biologically prepared, culturally shaped, and automatic or “fast.” Caring or “the good” doesn’t really represent the only other foundational pillar of morality. As we saw in Chapter 1, besides justice and care are posited intuitions of (at the least) loyalty, authority, and sanctity (or purity)—representing ingredients for diverse moralities of in-group solidarity and success. Whereas Western cultures shape (along with individualistic rights and freedom) mainly justice and care, many non-Western, traditional, or rural cultures emphasize other intuitions such as loyalty and purity. Whatever the cultural emphasis, these intuitions are primary. They are characterized as “modules”; that is, as “domain-specific processing system[s]” that are “innately specified” (Gottschling, 2009, p. 297). The intuitive modules are cultivated and verbally articulated as the “rational” moral judgments of everyday life—judgments devoted, in this view, not to truth so much as to self-serving rationalization and social persuasion.

Although we will largely move beyond Haidt’s theory in subsequent chapters, Haidt’s (and his colleagues’) view of morality warrants more consideration than it received in Chapter 1. Accordingly, we devote this chapter to the work of this third name in the title of this edition. Haidt’s ostensibly new synthesis—or more specifically, his social intuitionist and moral foundations theory—encompasses his and colleagues’ many innovative research studies and draws upon compatible findings and theories from an impressively broad array of disciplines. By the early twenty-first century, the impact of Haidt’s and related work on the field arguably was already superseding that of prior works by Kohlberg and Hoffman.

### THREE THEMES

To consider the themes of Haidt’s new synthesis, this chapter uses as its heuristic vehicle an account found in Robert Coles’s (1986) *Moral Life of Children.* The
account is of an incident in which one youth suddenly rescued another from an imminent group assault. Our narrative journey in this vehicle will enable us to survey the three thematic “principles” or “unifying ideas” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 798) of Haidt’s new synthesis. The context of the narration is the desegregation movement in the United States in the 1970s. The rescuer (White) and rescued (African-American) were both students at a previously segregated high school in Atlanta, Georgia.

**Hostility in Prior Weeks: In-Group Solidarity**

We start at the weeks prior to the rescue—and, correspondingly, the first and second unifying ideas of the new synthesis. The White youth, an “ordinary” 14-year-old in a so-called redneck family, had joined his segregationist buddies in shouting taunts and epithets at the African-American students who had joined the school in accordance with a federal court order:

> I didn't want any part of them here. They belong with their own, and we belong with our own—that's what we all said. . . . The school had to get police protection for them. We didn't want them, and they knew it. But we told them so, in case they were slow to get the message. I didn't hold back, no more than anyone else. I said, “go, nigger, go,” with all the others. And I meant it. (Coles, 1986, p. 27)

Note the intermingling of “I” and “we” in the hostile rejection of “they” and “them.” Out-group hostility pertains to Haidt's first unifying idea: although morality may “blind” us against “them” (Haidt, 2012, p. 187), it also “binds and builds” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 798) the “we” into group solidarity. Egoistic or selfish tendencies are biologically and evolutionarily based, but so are counteracting intuitions such as loyalty to one's in-group. As the culture cultivates the rudimentary intuitions, the child internalizes the group’s “custom complex” (p. 817) or “dense webs of shared meaning” (Graham & Haidt, 2012, p. 13). The self “begins to be crafted in accordance with a…framework [of] cultural roles, institutions, and values” (Harter, 2012, p. 50). Indeed, the growing child comes to identify with and derive self-esteem as well as a sense of personal security from his or her group (Brewer, 2007; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Haidt (2001) even posited a possible late-childhood “sensitive period” for optimal internalization of the custom complex and identification with the in-group. Morality, then, serves to bind the individual to his or her social group, culture, or “moral system.” Such systems are “interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make coordinated social life possible” (Graham & Haidt, 2012, p. 14).

Basic to Haidt’s “morality binds and builds” theme (and introducing his second theme, below) are biologically prepared intuitions such as loyalty. These intuitions are seen as providing the foundations of morality and group identity as well as solidarity. Haidt's “moral foundations” theory posits at least five such intuitions, briefly: justice, care, loyalty, (respect for) authority, and sanctity (or purity). Especially important for the theme of group solidarity (morality as...
binding, building, blinding) is loyalty to one’s group. A foundation for loyalty may be evident in infancy: Infants and young children prefer to look at and learn from others who speak with familiar accents (e.g., Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011; Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2012; Kinzler, Shutts, & Spelke, 2012; cf. Hoffman’s similarity-familiarity bias, Chapter 5). “Put crudely,” wrote Paul Bloom (2012), “babies prefer their own kind” (p. 82; cf. Hamlin, Mahajan, Liberman, & Wynn, 2013). Even in yawn contagion, “both chimpanzees and people join the yawns of familiar individuals more readily than those of strangers” (de Waal, 2013, p. 141). Such inborn preferences and tendencies can be cultivated into a sense of loyalty to the norms, traditions, and values of one’s group. Socialization is “moral” insofar as it suppresses selfishness and promotes in-group solidarity or identification with the culture (enculturation).

Haidt’s argument not only relates morality to in-group solidarity and enculturation but also emphasizes the diverse meanings of “culture” or “group” around the world. In many parts of the world, the individual’s in-group is a relatively small and enduring community, perhaps a tribe or ethnic group of “shared blood, shared place, and shared mind or belief” as well as a shared heritage of traditions and historical narratives. “Just a few miles” from urban cultures, for example, may be “enclaves with honor codes, arranged marriages, and patriarchal families” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 799). The 14-year-old and his peers in our narrative identified with a subculture of homogeneous race or ethnicity (Caucasian), place (“the South” or southern United States), history (former slave-based economy), and mindset or belief (e.g., segregationist ideology; as expressed by the White youth in the above passage, “They belong with their own, and we belong with our own”).

Whatever the nature of one’s group, in-group solidarity, preference, and loyalty mean that (in Haidt’s view) love for others scarcely extends beyond its confines. As Frans de Waal suggested (2009; cf. Hoffman, 2000), love or “empathy builds on proximity, similarity, and familiarity, which is entirely logical given that it evolved to promote in-group cooperation” (p. 211). Activities promoting in-group “bonding and merging” may include communal “meals, synchronized movement, chanting or praying in unison, shared emotional experiences, common bodily ornamentation or mutilation, and the mingling of bodily fluids in nursing, sex, and blood rituals” (Pinker, 2011, p. 627).

Whereas Hoffman (Chapter 5) is optimistic, Haidt doubts that humans can appreciably reduce what Hoffman called the familiarity-similarity empathic bias: “Parochial love—love within groups—amplified by similarity, a sense of shared fate [cf. in-group solidarity], and the suppression of free riders [selfish group members], may be the most we can accomplish” (Haidt, 2012, p. 245). We are reassured that, in general, parochial love or “groupishness is focused on improving the welfare of the in-group, not on harming an out-group” (p. 218). Nonetheless, especially in the absence of joint goal-oriented activity, each in-group does tend to see itself as “at the center of the cosmos” (Graham & Haidt, 2012, p. 13; cf. empathic bias, Chapter 5); hence, in-group solidarity and favor (“groupishness”) constitutes a risk factor for “in-group favoritism” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 818, emphasis added). “When several people burst out laughing at the same moment, they broadcast solidarity and togetherness. But since such bonding is sometimes
directed against outsiders, there is also a hostile element to laughter” (de Waal, 2009, p. 47). African-Americans were not exactly seen in a positive light from the White youth’s in-group vantage point. “I didn’t hold back,” the White youth recalled in the above passage, “no more than anyone else. I said, ‘go, nigger, go,’ with all the others. And I meant it.”

Out-group hostility often also links to the “purity” intuition: the downside of purity is “disgust” at perceived impurity or violation of sanctity. We noted in Chapter 1 the involvement of disgust in the hostile rejection of “untouchables” in India’s caste system. One (experimentally created) in-group of children used “disgust to express shared revulsion for the other side (e.g., holding their noses in the vicinity of out-group members)” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 24; M. Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & C. Sherif, 1961).

It should be noted that, like the other thematic features in Haidt’s new synthesis, in-group solidarity, favoritism, and success are meant to be descriptive or value-neutral. Frans de Waal (2009) cautioned with a similar note: “If biologists never stop talking of competition, this doesn’t mean they advocate it” (p. 39). Haidt (personal communication, July 30, 2012) certainly does not prescribe, for example, in-group favoritism and social Darwinism. Instead, Haidt’s main aim is to describe the history, function, and various expressions of morality across cultures, or “what people happen to think is moral” (2012, p. 270). The particular values held by the researcher should not restrict or bias what counts as “moral.” Again, the focus is on describing what morality “really is.” Scientists in the new synthesis are merely “telling it like it is,” not how one might like things to be, normatively or prescriptively.

Perhaps for this reason, Haidt and Bjorklund (2008a, p. 191) chose the more minimal word “altering” to describe the social practice in some cultures of mutilating female genitalia (see Chapter 1). The focus on description may also figure into Haidt’s tendency not to address “prescriptive questions about how moral judgment or behavior could be improved” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 798).

To move from description to explanation, Haidt’s new synthesis adopts a functionalist perspective. Derived from evolutionary psychology and applied to morality, its functionalist approach is social and pragmatic (cf. Krebs & Denton, 2005; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2011). As Haidt (2012) asserted, his functionalist perspective defines “morality by what it does” (p. 270). The pragmatic version of the functionalist approach asks: Is the described practice, norm, or institution useful with respect to its function? Does it work? Is it effective in achieving a given goal?

In-group solidarity defines the functional success goal of morality for the group, as individuals “work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative societies possible” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 800). The result is “shared norms, institutions, and gods that, even in the twenty-first century,” societal members “fight, kill, and die to defend” (Haidt, 2012, p. 207). By Darwinian criteria, a successful group is one that “supplants” or incorporates other groups (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 815) and thereby gains in reproductive dominance. Globally, the human species gained dominance as emergent early humans developed the ability to share intentions and cooperate toward common goals in groups. Inter-group competition intensified as each group’s abilities “to hunt, gather, raise children and raid their neighbors increased exponentially” (p. 206; cf. Tomasello, Carpenter,
Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Especially when challenged by another group, group members “feel that they are part of something larger”; they may “come together to sing, dance around a fire and dissolve the [egoistic] boundaries that separate them from each other” (Haidt, May 11, 2011).

In-group loyalty and conformity, then, facilitate progress toward group success by helping to build in-group solidarity; i.e., social cohesion and trust (cf. Durkheim, 1973/1925). Morality, in this descriptive functionalist view, “directs people’s strongest moral passions toward the heroes and martyrs who die for the group [hence the establishment of commemorative monuments and holidays] and toward the traitors and apostates who must be put to death in the name of the group” (pp. 817, 820). “Norm-violators, cheaters, and free-riders” (p. 820; cf. Fehr & Gachter, 2002) may not count as traitor and apostates, but they, too, must be punished for the sake of the group, perhaps by being shamed or ostracized.

What about the White youth in the Coles account? The last time we saw him, his loyalty and conformity to his peer group were strong; he “meant” his expression of segregationist ideology and out-group hostility as much as they did. That was about to change.

Intuitive Primacy and the Rescue: Just an Affective Shift?

In our narrative journey, we now arrive at the rescue—as well as further consideration of the second theme (and introduction of the third) in Haidt’s new synthesis. The White youth who had fully “meant” his hostility in the prior weeks suddenly did an about-face. He himself was surprised by what he was later to call “the strangest moment of my life”:

Then it happened. I saw a few people cuss at him [one of the two African-American students]. “The dirty nigger,” they kept on calling him, and soon they were pushing him in a corner, and it looked like trouble, bad trouble. I went over and broke it up. I said, “Hey, cut it out.” They all looked at me as if I was crazy. . . . But my buddies stopped. . . . Before he [the African-American youth] left, I spoke to him. I didn’t mean to, actually! It just came out of my mouth. I was surprised to hear the words myself: “I’m sorry.” As soon as he was gone, my friends gave it to me: ”What do you mean, ’I’m sorry’!” I didn’t know what to say. (Coles, 1986, p. 28)

The suddenness of the White youth’s act relates to the second theme of Haidt’s new synthesis; namely, intuitive primacy. As noted in Chapter 1 and the last section, Haidt has argued that the concerns of justice, care, loyalty, authority, and purity are all best characterized as moral intuitions or emotions. The goal in the new synthesis “is to describe and understand how people think and behave in light of morally salient emotions like anger, disgust, empathy, love, guilt, humiliation, etc.” (Harris, 2010, p. 49). These primary moral emotions in turn derive from still more primary affects (cf. Zajonc, 1984):

Affect refers to small flashes of positive or negative feeling that prepare us to approach or avoid something. Every emotion (such as happiness or disgust) includes an affective reaction, but most of our affective reactions are too fleeting to be called emotions (for
example, the subtle feelings you get just from reading the words *happiness* and *disgust*). (Haidt, 2012, p. 55)

These affects, emotions, or felt intuitions—not moral reasoning—are posited to be the main generative source of our moral evaluations, perceptions, and actions. Haidt and Bjorklund (2008a) defined *moral intuition* as

the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about the character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a relationship. (p. 188)

The reference in this definition to mentally going through “steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a relationship” pertains to moral reasoning. Haidt (2001) earlier defined *moral reasoning* as “conscious mental activity that consists of transforming given information about people (and situations) in order to reach a moral judgment” or evaluation (p. 802). The intuitions are primary insofar as they are “triggered more quickly” than is conscious, rational moral reasoning “in real-time judgments” (p. 819).

Such primary affect would seem to characterize the dynamics of the rescue. It would certainly seem that a powerful preconscious affective intuition of one sort or another—rather than any conscious reasoning—impelled the White youth to suddenly rescue and apologize to the African-American youth. Yet this powerful intuition, whatever it was, evidently did not impel the White youth’s buddies. *Their* moral perception and behavior continued to reflect loyalty and in-group solidarity. Whatever prompted the White youth’s sudden action had to override those feelings, perhaps along with an anticipatory fear of becoming a target of shaming or ostracism, or worse. So what was that powerful intuition?

Before we address that question, let us elaborate on the theme of intuitive primacy in Haidt’s new synthesis. Moral intuitions are among the automatic, implicit reactions or feelings that largely drive and structure mental life as well as situational social behavior (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Intuitive primacy in morality means, in this view, that affective flashes or moral intuitions come first. They are primary not only in the real time of everyday social perception and action, but as well on the larger temporal scales of human ontogeny and animal phylogeny. In terms of human development, we noted earlier that a preference for voices with familiar accents—arguably part of a module leading to the in-group loyalty intuition—is evident in infancy. We will suggest in Chapter 5 that basic arousal modes of the “intuition” or predisposition of caring are certainly evident in human infancy and, to some extent, in the behavior of other species. Such a biologically based “fellow-creature feeling” is at the heart of Hoffman’s theory of empathy and moral development.

What about fairness? Do moral judgments of fairness or justice derive from a modular affective intuition as well? Broadly, is justice a biologically prepared predisposition, sentiment, or module (essentially a preformationist or nativist view)? Or is it a product of cognitive and social development (essentially an emergentist or constructivist view, distinguishable from environmental learning; see Moshman, 2011a)?
The issue is not new. Decades ago, William Damon (1977) pondered the developmental significance of certain rudimentary or “precursory” (p. 291) appeals to equality or reciprocity by some of the younger (three- to five-year-old) children in his study of “positive” or distributive justice. Damon noted that in some of the preschoolers’ responses, a rudimentary usage of equality appears in the form of one-to-one correspondences: “Give them all some” (though not necessarily all the same). Also, rudimentary notions of reciprocity appear in the form of action-reaction sequences: “If I don’t share with her, she’ll get mad at me.” (p. 79)

Damon offered a nuanced assessment, one that entailed both developmental and nativist sides of the issue: “In none of these rudimentary forms is true reciprocity or equality employed accurately or consistently, but we do see the germinal roots of these later organizing principles” (p. 79). As did Haidt and colleagues, then, Damon partly saw in such “rudimentary” responses “the germinal roots” of later moral judgment. Yet Damon also characterized these early responses as simple appeals to “one-to-one correspondences” and “action-reaction sequences” distinguishable from “true” reciprocity or equality. In the main, Damon interpreted these rudimentary responses less as foundations and more as superficial precursors. The young child’s responses were characterized as generally “egocentric and subjective,” in which “judgments like ‘I should [in fairness] get more candy than Jimmy’ are not distinguished from statements like ‘I want more than Jimmy.’” If the four-year-old does justify his responses, he may do so by appeal to certain external, observable characteristics of persons: “The biggest should get the most” or “she should have it because she’s pretty.” These “objective” considerations…are invoked in a fluctuating, a posteriori manner and are consistent more with the principle of self-gratification than with any constant, objective standard of fairness. (p. 79)

The verbal interview responses of a four-year-old child named Mary are illustrative. Asked “Who should Miss Townshend [a teacher with a class of boys and girls] give the ice cream to?” Mary replied:

Clara. Why Clara? Because she [Clara] likes ice cream….Suppose there is not enough, and all the kids like ice cream. Who should she [the teacher] give it to? Rebecca. Why Rebecca? She [the teacher] likes Rebecca. Is it fair to the boys just to give the girls ice cream? Yes. Why is that fair? Because they [the girls] don’t like the boys. So is it OK not to be fair to the boys? If they [the boys] don’t like the ice cream, then they won’t want to eat the ice cream. (Damon, 1977, p. 78)

We consider further this issue in the next chapter. It is important even at this point, however, to describe a relevant study by Vanessa LoBue, Haidt, and colleagues (LoBue, Nishida, Chiong, DeLoache, & Haidt, 2011). LoBue and colleagues replicated Damon’s (and others’, e.g., Dunn & Munn, 1987; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008) main verbal results: Confronted with a “blatantly unequal distribution of a desired reward” (fewer stickers than those given a peer; p. 159), the younger children in their sample of three- to five-year-olds generally appealed to their wishes or desires (e.g., “I want more,” or “I don’t have enough”). But LoBue
and colleagues also studied nonverbal expressions. By nonverbal criteria, even the youngest children (the three-year-olds) seemed to evidence an intuitive concern with their unfair treatment; e.g., by looking over at the other child’s greater goods and/or by appearing to be unhappy at their situation. A few of the children spontaneously attempted to make the amounts equal. Other studies find a preference even in infants for animated figures who equally distribute goods and who help rather than hinder others (e.g., Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007, 2012; Geraci & Surian, 2010; Kenwood & Dahl, 2011; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012; but cf. Scarf, Imuta, Colombo, & Hayne, 2012).

On the basis of such studies, Haidt and colleagues asserted the nativist side of the issue: equality, fairness, or reciprocity is a module or a built-in emotional reaction, organized prior to environmental experience, unlearned, and evident even in infancy. David Moshman (2011a) pointed out that Haidt’s view might be called neo-nativist given Haidt’s interpretation of modules as culturally revisable prototypes (see Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007; but see Bell & Buchner, 2012, regarding modular specificity). As had Damon decades earlier, LoBue and colleagues (including Haidt) noted that such early responses reflect at the least a “simple perceptual preference for one-to-one matching” in young children (LoBue et al., 2011, p. 157). Their main position, however, differed from Damon’s in that they attributed much greater significance to the early fairness-oriented responses (identified through nonverbal behavior in their study). The young children’s egocentric bias and desires were viewed almost as an artifact obscuring recognition of their grasp of justice. Fairness judgments were characterized as linguistic expressions stemming from built-in subjective feelings such as aversion: “Children show an aversion to disadvantageous inequality . . . well before they can talk about fairness” (LoBue et al., 2010, p. 157). Broadly, the wellsprings of morality in Haidt’s neo-nativist synthesis are claimed to lie in the fast, nonverbal emotions or affects—not in conscious talk or “rational” reasoning. Developmental evidence (Chapter 3) notwithstanding, in Haidt’s view there is no “true” equality and reciprocity that emerges through constructive processes of cognitive and social development.

Besides in speed and human ontogeny, intuitions are posited to be primary in the order of evolutionary emergence. Regarding inequality aversion, LoBue and colleagues even cited “ambiguous” (p. 157) evidence for it among chimpanzees and other primates (e.g., Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Wynne, 2004), perhaps even among wolves or dogs (see review by Brosnan, 2006). Perhaps inequality aversion and other intuitive reactions of other species represent the foundational “building blocks” of human morality (de Waal, 1996, 2009, 2012, 2013; the issue is considered further in Chapter 3). The comparative-species or phylogenetic reference pertains to this sense of “primacy”: As in ontogeny, the intuitions are posited to have emerged relatively early in phylogenetic history. Haidt and Kesebir (2010) noted the distinction made in dual-process models (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999) between “the ancient, fast emotions and intuitions” and “the evolutionarily newer and motivationally weaker language-based reasoning” (p. 801). The phylogenetic distinction is also made in applications of the “triune brain” (pertaining to brain regions with differential histories and functional roles; MacLean, 1990) to moral psychology (Narvaez, 2008). The particular importance of the regions associated
with the “ancient, fast emotions” (especially the limbic region) is suggested by the dramatic shifts toward irresponsible and antisocial behavior among individuals with brain damage or atrophy in those regions rather than the “newer” regions of the frontal cortex (e.g., Damasio, 1999).

In sum, Haidt’s second theme—intuitive primacy—posits that affective intuitions are temporally primary and causally preeminent in moral life. They are first in phylogeny, ontogeny, and everyday functioning. They are fast, automatic, involuntary, and effortless. They drive and find verbal articulation in conscious reasoning, which in turn might modulate—but not in its own right cause—social behavior. Compared to the intuitions, reasoning is slow, deliberate, voluntary, and effortful (cf. Zajonc, 1984). Although reasoning may regulate or suppress the intuitions, it does not (or so the new synthesis implies) readily penetrate them (see, e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999, and Chapter 6). Relatively impermeable, in this view, is the border between intuitions and reasoning—two systems divided, as it were, by a common brain.

Now that we have elaborated on the intuitive primacy theme, we can return to the event in Atlanta in a better position to frame our question. If these early, fast intuitions drove the sudden rescue, which did the driving? Certainly not those intuitions serving the morality of in-group solidarity. A more likely candidate is empathy, or “harm/care: concerns for the sufferings of others” (p. 822) in Haidt and Kesebir’s (2010) typology. Note the White youth’s recollection that the scene “looked like trouble, bad trouble.” He saw that his buddies had cornered an African-American student and knew that he was about to witness a physical assault. Might not an anticipatory empathic distress (Chapter 5) have been triggered by the sight of the cornered victim? Hoffman’s (2000, Chapter 5) analysis of this incident notes the sudden expression as well of empathy-based guilt: the White youth blurted out, “I’m sorry.”

It all happened so fast. In a switch too quick for consciousness, the moment was at least initially “strange” for the rescuer—and shocking for his buddies, who (true to intuitions serving in-group solidarity) promptly “gave it to” him. Just as surprised as his peers, the rescuer himself “didn’t know what to say” after his intervention and apology. The dynamics of that moment would seem to suggest that we are, after all, “strangers to ourselves” (the title of a fascinating book by Timothy Wilson, 2002; cf. Eagleman, 2011). Empathic primacy had evidently replaced his (but not his peers’) in-group primacies so quickly that the White youth’s conscious mindset—even his identity as a segregationist—found itself flustered, floundering, and dumbfounded at the starting gate.

Broadly, this incident would seem to support Haidt and Kesebir’s (2010) claim that “prosocial behavior”—when it does happen—“points to intuitions, not reasoning” (p. 806). Also conducive to prosocial behavior are positive emotions or mood states, however induced. Studies have demonstrated that various external or internal circumstances—good weather, soothing music, a pleasant aroma, the scrumptious taste of a cookie, etc.—can induce certain subjective feelings or mood states and thereby promote prosocial behavior (Baron, 1997; Cunningham, 1979; Fried & Berkowitz, 1979; Isen & Levin, 1972; North, Tarrant, & Hargreaves, 2004; Rosenhan, Underwood, & Moore, 1974).
As noted, “intuitive primacy” means that quick feelings are posited to be “where the action is” in morality. In everyday life, people continually and rapidly appraise others as good or bad, likable or unlikable, given even the briefest, thinnest slice of others’ demeanor and behavior (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Lazarus, 1984, Zajonc, 1984). Moral reasoning, or for that matter rationality in general, is relegated to a secondary role in social perception and behavior.

The thesis that intuitions are preeminent over “secondary” moral reasoning or rationality is argued forcefully in Haidt’s new synthesis. Perhaps the common impression that moral perception and action derive from rational moral reasoning owes more to our desire to see ourselves as rational beings than it does to reality. When taboo-violation vignettes (e.g., sex with a chicken or between siblings, or eating one's family’s dead pet dog) are crafted as harmless so as to preclude rational appeals to harmful consequences, people are dumbfounded; i.e., left with their emotional disgust but rendered unable to rationally explain their moral objections to the violations of the taboo (e.g., Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Given post-hypnotic suggestions to experience disgust (the downside of the purity intuition) in response to arbitrarily designated stimuli, participants readily confabulate; i.e., concoct “explanations” for their moral evaluations (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005)—totally unaware that their plausible-sounding reasons are in fact irrelevant to the real determinants of their moral evaluations. Confirmation biases and self-servingly “motivated” reasoning are well-documented (Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998; cf. egocentric bias and self-serving cognitive distortions, Chapters 3 and 7, respectively).

Such studies would suggest that moral reasoning is not only “secondary” but *servile* to moral intuitions. Steven Pinker (2011; cf. Lynch, 2012) noted the irony that Haidt and colleagues “have been mustering their powers of reason to argue that reason is overrated” (p. 642). Indeed, Haidt and Kesebir (2010) declared that David Hume was “mostly right” (p. 802) in his famous dictum that “reason is the slave of the passions.” Shweder and Haidt (1993) even praised Hume for his “intellectual courage not to shrink [from] emotivist conclusions” regarding the role of reason (p. 361). Although Haidt (2012) saw reason more as “servant” than “slave,” he derided as “the rationalist delusion” views of reason as the noble master of the passions (p. 88). Approvingly cited was Freud’s thesis that morality is “driven by unconscious motives and feelings, which are then rationalized with publicly acceptable reasons” (p. 817). Indeed, morality a la Freud is “a thin veneer over a cauldron of nasty tendencies” (de Waal, 2013, p. 34). In this affective-primacy view of moral motivation, people are seen to “employ their puny powers of reason only to rationalize their gut feelings after the fact” (Pinker, 2011, p. 642). Perhaps the emotivist A. J. Ayer (1952) was right that morality really boils down to affects, feelings, or primitive preferences, that one might as well save time by dispensing with one’s so-called rational talk and just say “ugh” or “hurrah!”

Analogy helps capture the qualities of this affective primacy view of morality. We might accordingly refine Haidt’s (2001) now-famous analogy relating the dynamics of morality to the “emotional dog and its rational tail” (p. 814). Haidt
Beyond Haidt’s New Synthesis

wrote that “moral emotions and intuitions drive moral reasoning, just as surely as a dog wags its tail” (p. 830). Given the literature reviewed, we might say more emphatically that an arbitrarily (depending on mood, passion, desires, feelings, or circumstantial influences at the time) emotional dog wags its pseudo-rational or rationalizing tail. The power resides primarily with the emotional intuitions, not with reason or rationality. The force of intuition is an elephant, and its rider is reason (“the rider is an attentive servant . . . [without] the power to make things happen, . . . [and] always trying to anticipate the elephant’s next move”) (Haidt, 2012, p. 56). Haidt (2007) further suggested that “moral reasoning is not like [the reasoning] of an idealized scientist or judge seeking the truth. Moral reasoning is like [the argumentation] of a lawyer or politician seeking whatever is useful, whether or not it is true” (p. 999). One thinks of the besieged ego in Freudian theory, distorting reality this way and that to satisfy the contradictory motives and desires of unconscious agencies.

Of course, Haidt does acknowledge that reason can function like a truth-seeking judge rather than a case-building lawyer, and indeed does occasionally. One trusts, for example, that Haidt’s own work on his “new synthesis” results from an authentic, rational search for the truth and is an honest conclusion offered to the field in good faith (Turiel, 2006b, 2010). An honest discussion, after all, presupposes a common commitment “to whatever conclusions follow from the careful application of reason” (Pinker, 2011, p. 181). Even among lawyers, only the most servile will fail to “resist when the client goes too far” with “absurd” demands (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 807). “Elephants rule, but they are neither dumb nor despotic” (Haidt, 2012, p. 71) and will sometimes “listen to reason” (p. 68). Three of the six “links” in his social intuitionist model pertain to a causal role for moral reasoning (Haidt, 2004). Haidt even suggested (2012) that intuition and reason are both “kinds of cognition” (p. 45); specifically, automatic versus deliberate information processing—with “intuitive primacy,” accordingly, not reducible to affective primacy (Haidt, July 30, 2012, personal communication).

Yet cognitive or moral reasoning primacy, rationality, or truth-seeking is not the thrust of Haidt’s new synthesis. The reasoning links are considered to be infrequent and hence relatively unimportant. “It is useful to study judgments of extreme [rational reasoning, truth-seeking] cases,” wrote Haidt and Kesebir (2010), “but much more work is needed on everyday moral judgment” (p. 807; emphasis added; cf. Krebs & Denton, 2005). The name of the game in everyday life is doing what is useful, effective, or successful—not necessarily what is rational or true. We ordinarily first experience our gut feelings; in the wake follow rational-sounding fabrications.

Social Persuasion

The image of a politician or lawyer (cf. moral reasoning) seeking “success” leads us to the third theme of the new synthesis: social persuasion (as Haidt and Kesebir [2010, p. 808] put it, “moral thinking is for social doing”; i.e., “moral thinking is done in order to help the social agent succeed in the social order”). In these functionalist terms, moral reasoning is in the main a social and pragmatic enterprise:
“People rarely override their initial intuitive judgments [second theme] just by reasoning privately to themselves” (p. 819). If group “success” (flourishing, gaining dominance over other groups) is the point of in-group solidarity (first theme), individual “success” (in terms of strategic defense, social status, heroic reputation, or alliances within the group) is the point of moral reasoning qua social persuasion (third theme)—accomplished through use of whatever works, whether rational or rhetorical. In this basically pragmatic and instrumental view, one’s moral “arguments don’t succeed because they’re right. They seem right because they succeed” (Appiah, 2008, p. 150).

Haidt (2012) drove home “whatever succeeds” with a personal epiphany: his “discovery” that he is no exception to the pragmatics of social persuasion; indeed, that he is “a chronic liar:

I was at home [working] … when my wife, Jayne, walked by my desk. In passing, she asked me not to leave dirty dishes on the counter where she prepared our baby’s food. Her request was polite but its tone added a postscript: “As I have asked you a hundred times before.”

My mouth started moving before hers had stopped. Words came out. Those words linked themselves up to say something about the baby having woken up at the same time that our elderly dog barked to ask for a walk and I’m sorry but I just put my breakfast dishes down wherever I could. In my family, caring for a hungry baby and an incontinent dog is a surefire excuse, so I was acquitted.…

So there I was at my desk, writing about how people automatically fabricate justifications of their gut feelings, when suddenly I realized that I had just done the same thing with my wife. … I had felt a flash of negativity by the time Jayne had gotten to her third word (“Can you not…”). … My inner lawyer went to work. … It’s true that I had eaten breakfast, given Max his first bottle, and let Andy out for his first walk, but these events had all happened at separate times. Only when my wife criticized me did I merge them into a composite image of a harried father with too few hands, and I created the fabrication by the time she had completed her one-sentence criticism (“ … counter where I make baby food?”). I then lied so quickly and convincingly that my wife and I both believed me. (pp. 52, 54)

This claim that reason is dedicated to persuasion rather than truth (cf. Nietzschean perspectivism) follows from a pragmatic understanding of evolution (we will question Haidt’s exclusively pragmatic rendering of evolutionary processes in Chapter 10). “From an evolutionary perspective, it would be strange if our moral judgment machinery was designed principally for accuracy, with no concern for the disastrous effects” of “periodically siding with our [perhaps morally or rationally right] enemies and against our [perhaps morally or rationally wrong] friends” (Haidt, 2001, p. 821, bracketed material added). Useful skills at manipulating appearance rather than ideals of authenticity, integrity, or truth even pervade the new-synthesis view of “reputation” and “conscience”:

Reputations matter for survival, and natural selection favors those who are good at tracking the reputations of others while simultaneously restraining or concealing their own selfish behavior…. As the humorist H. L. Mencken once quipped: “Conscience is
the inner voice that warns us somebody may be looking.” (p. 810; cf. Krebs & Denton, 2005)

We now return to our dumbfounded, floundering rescuer. In this mainly intuitionist view of morality, a quick switch in his (but not his buddies’) affective flashes—say, from loyalty to empathy—accounts for his sudden prosocial behavior. Moral reasoning had essentially nothing to do with the rescue. Or so it has seemed so far.

Moral Reasoning, Moral Development, and the Meaning of the Rescue

There is more to the rescue: more to its meaning for the rescuer, more to prior events, more to changes in the rescuer from that moment onward. Granted, the White youth’s first few school weeks had been marked by an intensely felt hostility against an out-group member. “But” then,

after a few weeks, I began to see a kid, not a nigger—a guy who knew how to smile when it was rough going, and who walked straight and tall, and was polite. I told my parents, “It’s a real shame that someone like him has to pay for the trouble caused by all those federal judges.”…

I’d be as I was, I guess, but for being there in school that year and seeing that kid—seeing him behave himself, no matter what we called him, and seeing him being insulted so bad, so real bad. Something in me just drew the line, and something in me began to change, I think. (Coles, 1986, p. 28)

To anticipate our critique, we note that Haidt’s new synthesis does not encourage us to pay much attention to the moral reasoning (the violation of ideal reciprocity or fairness, the bad treatment inflicted upon a good person) depicted in the meaning the White youth made of the episode. A dedicated Haidtian might take the youth’s account with more than a grain of salt (except perhaps for its intuitive empathic aspects, such as “seeing him [the victim] being insulted so bad, so real bad”). Perhaps, without even realizing it, the White youth was lying or “con-fabulating” a spurious explanation of his action, concocting a story that he knew would succeed by sounding good or acceptable, strategically delivering what he anticipated the interviewer, Coles, would want to hear. Perhaps the actual dynamics of the moment pertained merely to a quick switch of intuitions and the pragmatics of persuasion.

Yet only the most cynical of us would not hear a ring of authenticity, of profound truth rather than a concern with pragmatic “success” or socially acceptable talk, in the White youth’s account. It is true that the rescuer had been at the time dumbfounded by his act and apology. After all, as far as he consciously knew at the time, he still believed in the ideology of segregation. (Interestingly, in an essay titled “The Cognitive Unconscious,” Piaget [1972/1973] suggested that one may be unaware of “structures” directing what “one ‘must’ do” if those structures at that time are “incompatible” with one’s beliefs; i.e., “cannot…be integrated into [one’s] system of conscious concepts,” pp. 33, 39; emphases added). Although it is true
that the youth was at that time dumbfounded, it is not necessarily true that conscious moral reasoning had therefore been irrelevant. To the contrary, the White youth’s moral reasoning was crucially relevant to the dynamics of the rescue. His prior mental coordination of features of the situation (“Seeing him behave himself, no matter what we called him”; “It’s a real shame that someone like him has to pay . . .”) yielded a “lack of reciprocity between character and outcome” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 108).

We might say that the rescuer’s moral reasoning–based perception of unfairness, shared with his parents (certainly not just to look good or gain some pragmatic advantage) went underground. In effect, his (formerly conscious) moral reasoning penetrated his intuitions for the better—and accordingly primed them with a more mature understanding, a more profound perception. If a border does divide reasoning and intuitions, it is evidently after all a permeable one that allows our reasoning sometimes to transform and deepen our intuitions or gut feelings. David Pizarro and Paul Bloom (2003) cited evidence (e.g., Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999) that once an individual has sufficiently reasoned and reached a conclusion pertaining to, say, social inequality or a situation of harm and injustice, “all [subsequent] responses” to that situation “might be fast and automatic” (p. 193); hence, “many moral intuitions are shaped and informed by moral reasoning” (p. 193; cf. Hoffman, 2000; Lynch, 2012). “That a concept is used rapidly does not necessarily mean that it” did not involve, in its formation, “complex processes of reasoning” (Turiel, 2006b, p. 19). Indeed, “it often happens” that complex cognitions “eventually migrate” into automaticity (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 51) and indeed operate in our ongoing unconscious mental life (Hassin, 2013). Steven Pinker (2011) aptly noted that “even if a decision is guided by intuition, the intuition itself may be a legacy of moral reasoning that had taken place beforehand” (p. 644). Such prior moral reasoning can enable one to “infer that people who are different from us in many superficial ways—their gender, their race, their culture—are like us in fundamental ways” (p. 181).

Did not the White youth, pondering the unfair treatment of the African-American youth, develop precisely such a deeper inference and perception? Even before the scene of “trouble, bad trouble,” the White youth had begun to change, affectively and cognitively (we will argue for co-primacy in moral motivation in subsequent chapters). He cared or empathized, and he appreciated a fine person, an authentic and dignified character morally above the petty level of trading insults. He did not just switch intuitions; he grew beyond a superficial and distorted perception.

As we will elaborate in our conclusion and critique, development must be taken seriously. Although his peers remained benighted by their out-group hostility, the rescuer began “to see a kid, not a nigger”—not a despised outsider, not an object, but a person, a subject like himself. The rescuer grew in “self and social reflection over time” (Selman & Feigenberg, 2010, p. 242). His reflection, growth, and perception pertain to what philosopher Kwame Appiah (2010) called “the great modern discovery: the fundamental equality, in the eyes of morality, of all human beings” (p. 127).

Then came the scene and the sudden, pivotal moment. Both empathic intuitions and violated ideals of moral reciprocity had primed the youth to react as he did, even though he did not know it at the time. At the scene, the line drawn
in the White youth’s mind was activated as he witnessed, now not just insults, but their escalation to aggressive pushing and cornering the African-American youth, obviously heading toward physical assault. The moral line was crossed; it was just too much. Despite the implicit pressures of loyalty, conformity and group solidarity, he could take it no longer. In that sudden but perhaps not-so-strange-after-all moment, he intervened and apologized.

That the dynamics of the incident entailed not just a simple intuitive switch to empathic primacy but also a more complex and rational, moral reasoning-based “intuitive” primacy is suggested by the lasting, powerful impact of the incident in the life of the rescuer. Coles (1986) observed that “we never quite know . . . how an event will connect with ourselves” (p. 29; see Chapter 6). After the event, the 14-year-old “had to endure lots of scorn . . . from the many others who were not as swift as he to show a change in racial attitudes” (p. 28). Nonetheless, his life had . . . changed. In no time, it seemed, he was beginning to talk more consciously (more self-consciously, actually) to the black youth. Soon, he was championing him personally, while still decrying “integration.” Finally, he would become a friend of the black youth’s and advocate “an end to the whole lousy business of segregation.” (p. 28)

**CONCLUSION AND CRITIQUE**

We have related the rescue incident to Haidt’s proposed new synthesis for moral psychology. Analysis of the rescue has yielded for us a sense of both the valuable aspects and the limitations of Haidt’s approach. Using the rescue as our heuristic vehicle, we surveyed key themes of Haidt’s new synthesis. In the weeks prior to the rescue, the White youth’s hostility against the outsiders led to our consideration of Haidt’s first theme; namely, *in-group solidarity* or *morality binds, builds, and blinds*: a loyalty intuition can be cultivated as the group’s custom complex is internalized; the resulting in-group solidarity may shade into in-group favoritism. Loyalty was a biologically prepared intuition that was cultivated by his culture and internalized by the youth; yet at the subsequent scene of “bad trouble” for the African-American youth, the White youth’s intuitive empathy (in part, we would add) abruptly took over, prompting the rescue and apology. That this switch happened so fast that the youth was left dumbfounded spoke to Haidt’s second theme; namely, that pre-rational and basic *affective intuitions are primary* in everyday moral functioning. Haidt’s third theme assigns to moral reasoning the function not of private reflection and truth but rather of *persuasion* and social success. In addition to elucidating valuable aspects of Haidt’s approach, the etiology of the rescue also served to hint at some limitations.

We conclude, then, by reflecting upon and critiquing Haidt’s new synthesis. At first blush, Haidt’s vision for moral psychology is bracing and even appealing. Its argument is that the field has been in need of a good dose of reality, a down-to-earth reminder of our often less-than-exemplary or -rational functioning in everyday moral life. Trends in the social, behavioral, and biological sciences do seem to converge to offer a dose of humility: We are after all not so unique, noble, or special. Although we humans do cooperate and achieve successful groups on a far vaster
scale than has any other animal species, we nonetheless evidence considerable phylogenetic continuity. Our evolutionary biological heritage has yielded modules, instinctual emotions, or “intuitions” discernible even in infancy and shared in good measure with other primates or mammals. Intuitions emanating from phylogenetically older regions in the neural circuitry of the brain are much more influential than we might wish to admit. Moral psychology in this view should focus upon evolutionarily prepared, neurologically based, and culturally shaped “quick” emotions rather than upon developmentally constructed reason; i.e., upon “the way in which feeling drives judgment” (Harris, 2010, p. 89). In so much of everyday life, as in Haidt’s personal example, we use our conscious “reason” or fine words to dress up or excuse our egoistic and self-serving behavior.

Haidt’s emphasis is on cultural diversity. His (and his colleagues’, especially Shweder’s) work has expanded our appreciation of the wide variety of feelings that can influence and even generate morality. In this connection, Haidt has analogized morality—beyond tail-wagging dogs, lumbering elephants, strategic lawyers, or harried dads—to the taste buds and spontaneous babbling of infants. Cultures refine their infants’ “moral taste buds” into one or another “moral cuisine” (Haidt, 2012). That is, each culture socializes and shapes its own morality from the child’s starting array of foundational intuitions (modules of loyalty, purity, authority, justice, care). Haidt has also analogized morality to each culture’s shaping of its own genre of language from infants’ broad array of babbling sounds (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). The implication is that we should accept the diverse moralities of cultures of the world, much as we should accept their diverse acquired tastes and languages.

Haidt’s theory of morality is of course not unprecedented. How new are the themes of Haidt’s new synthesis? As Elliott Turiel (2008) noted, “we are seeing [in the current moral development literature] some reversions to old ways in the guise of the new” (p. 285; cf. Blasi, 2009; Turiel, 2010). Haidt and Kesebir (2010; cf. Haidt, 2012) did not hide their links to “old ways.” They readily acknowledged and indeed appealed to earlier work, such as E. O. Wilson’s call (1975; cf. 2012) decades ago for a sociobiological “new synthesis” in moral psychology. McDougall’s (1906/1926) “instinct” view of morality as the socialization of (initially largely selfish albeit potentially moral) individuals into cooperative groups was approvingly cited. As noted, Haidt has also acknowledged precedents in Durkheim’s and Darwin’s view of morality qua cooperative group solidarity and success; and in Freud’s and Hume’s views of moral reasoning as subservient to egoistic desires.

The descriptive stance in Haidt’s moral psychology, noted earlier, harks back to that of mid–twentieth-century eras in American psychology. At least Haidt does refer to morality. American psychologists in the 1950s and early 1960s did not even claim to have a view of “morality” per se—they used instead terms such as “attitude,” “custom,” “norm,” and “value.” Such terms “seemed more objective…and behavioral scientists were very anxious not to let their own values influence their research” (Brown & Herrnstein, 1975, p. 308). Much like Haidt’s descriptive stance, the “prevalent position” of American psychology was “that norms, customs, values, and attitudes varied from culture to culture and were what they were, providing no real basis for preferring one way of life over another.” Hence, as does Haidt’s new synthesis, American psychology of the 1950s and early 1960s encouraged a
“tolerant relativism” or appreciation of cultural diversity (Brown & Herrnstein, 1975, p. 308).

Does it matter that Haidt’s new synthesis is essentially not new? Whether new or old, what is wrong with a neutral or descriptive moral psychology, rich in tolerance and even appreciation of cultural diversity? Again, at first blush, there is a certain appeal. Who can plausibly deny our phylogenetic heritage? Who can demur from Haidt’s (2012) encouragement to diverse groups (liberals and conservatives, members of Western and Eastern cultures, etc.) to recognize one another’s differential intuitive emphases, share communal meals and narratives, and “get along”? Yet as we further reflect, our appreciation of these valuable aspects (phylogenetic humility, neutral descriptivism, cultural diversity) in Haidt’s new synthesis leads to recognition of at least three serious limitations: descriptive inadequacy or negative skew; unwarranted exclusion or studied avoidance of prescriptive implications; and moral relativism.

**Descriptive Inadequacy or Negative Skew**

The first limitation might be characterized as an *inadequacy* or *negative skew* to Haidt’s descriptions. Haidt’s new synthesis does not objectively “tell it like it is”; its representations and characterizations are often seriously deficient (Blasi, 2009; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). To describe the practice of female genital mutilation as an “alteration,” for example, is not genuinely objective or value-neutral; rather, it is so minimal as to be an instance of minimizing or mislabeling (see Chapter 7). As noted in Chapter 1, most variations of the practice entail not just a tissue modification but serious, permanent damage. This morally wrong and harmful practice should not be tolerated anywhere, but any “tolerance may”—and should—“run out [when some] immigrants to Western countries” seek to perpetrate this practice upon their daughters (Pinker, 2011, p. 632). Moral psychology at least owes the victims of this moral wrong an adequate description of the practice.

Also inadequate—even negatively skewed—are Haidt’s characterizations of human development, reason, and care. Claims that “morality comes from what we feel rather than what we know…. don’t have much room for changes in moral thinking or for the moral discovery and growth that is so characteristically human” (Gopnik, 2009, p. 203). Perhaps because of this overemphasis on our inborn feelings and early intuitions from evolution, Haidt (2012) neglects, for example, the emergent striving for authenticity of self (a “major contributor to our well-being”; Harter, 2012, p. 7) often seen by mid-adolescence. Regarding reason or rationality, is its function merely to serve the passions; e.g., to succeed (gain advantage, public status, social dominance)? Does our vaunted “rationality” reduce to arationality or irrationality, to the happenstance of circumstantial emotional influences? Granted, some measure of humility and recognition of circumstantial influence is well advised. The overall thrust of such reductionism, however, demeans, in the case at hand, the Atlanta rescuer’s pondering of the African-American youth’s admirable conduct and its moral implications (the higher reaches of human reason and existential self-awareness are discussed in subsequent chapters). Nor is it accurate to relegate moral reasoning exclusively to conscious, linear cognitive processes. We
will see in the next chapter that moral reasoning entails not only conscious “deliberation” but also constructive processes of implicit mental coordination that yield qualitatively new, deeper moral understandings (cf. Blasi, 2009; Hassin, 2013). As Michael Lynch (2012) noted, “sometimes the process of explanation and justification happens beneath the level of immediate attention” (p. 29).

The negative skew in Haidt’s descriptive work discourages study in moral psychology of higher reaches of morality such as rational moral reflection (Chapters 3, 4), empathy for the plight of entire out-groups (Chapter 5), moral courage (Chapter 6), and the cultivation of responsible, mature moral agency (Chapter 8)—broadly, study of “the scope of human possibilities, of what people can do morally, if they are prepared, through development and education, to approach life’s important issues in a thoughtful way” (Blasi, 2009, p. 419). Haidt (e.g., Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) asserted that these phenomena: (a) have already been studied extensively; and (b) are less common and hence less ecologically valid than the ordinary functioning of everyday morality. Even if these assertions are totally accurate (their accuracy is questionable), the higher reaches still merit adequate coverage.

Again, demonstrations of self-serving and even spurious moral reasoning or rationality abound in Haidt’s writings, but genuine rationality and moral reflection (such as the White youth’s)—more broadly, responsible moral agency and development—receive short shrift (Blasi, 2009; Bloom, 2010; Moshman, 2011a; Narvaez, 2008; vs. Haidt, 2008a; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Moral justifications for our moral or immoral behavior cannot be entirely reduced to causal mechanisms or psychological accounts. Kwame Appiah (2008) pointed out that “we invoke psychological explanations only when we’re seeking exemptions from moral agency (‘I’m sorry I said that—I haven’t been sleeping well lately’),” (Appiah, 2008, p. 117; cf. Carpendale, Sokol, & Muller, 2010) or character (cf. Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012).

Is there not something defeatist and deleterious about this negative skew? “The implication” in Haidt’s work “is that since irrationality is inevitable, we may as well lie back and enjoy it” (Pinker, 2011, p. 642). Similarly, an implication (in traditional economic models; see Henrich et al., 2005) that selfishly narrow “rational” behavior is inevitable renders us at risk for self-fulfilling prophecy: “the danger of thinking that we are nothing but calculating opportunists is that it pushes us precisely toward such behavior. It undermines trust in others, thus making us cautious rather than generous” (de Waal, 2009, p. 162). Accordingly, the traditional economic model of human motivation “is a seriously deficient caricature and can mislead.” Failure to appreciate empathic concern as a “pervasive and powerful force in human affairs” can handicap “efforts to build…a more caring, humane society” (Batson, 2011, p. 161).

A more balanced description of human moral development encourages us to be and do better. We agree with David Moshman, Paul Bloom, Gus Blasi, and Sam Harris (among others) on this point. Granted, “adolescents and adults may be far from perfect, but they are far from infants” (Moshman, 2011b, p. 45). “Unlike babies, children and adults have the capacity for rational deliberation [and] moral progress” (Bloom, 2012, p. 84; cf. Blasi, 2009). People can “learn to reason more effectively, pay greater attention to evidence, and grow more mindful of the
ever-present possibility of error” (Harris, 2010, p. 89). Despite indications of ger-
minal roots in infancy, justice or fairness does not entirely reduce to a refined
verbal expression of an intuition. Broadly, moral development must be distin-
guished from moral socialization or learning; and morality does grow beyond the
superficial. The White youth did not just experience a switch in his intuitions;
he grew, evidencing a deeper and more accurate perception of the “out-group
member” as a person, a fellow human being.

As noted, we must take development seriously. Haidt (2004) was “mys-
tified” by charges (e.g., Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 2004) that his approach is
non-developmental, given his attention to processes such as “how culture shapes
morality” (p. 286). Haidt’s mystification notwithstanding, the charges are accurate.
Again, “enculturation,” “socialization,” or “internalization” is not moral develop-
ment (see next chapter). A comprehensive and valid moral psychology is one that
represents the developmentally mature and admirable at least as well as the com-
monplace and immature or even venal aspects of human reason, development,
and social behavior.

**Excessive Descriptivism or Exclusion of Prescriptivity**

This negative skew or inadequate developmental description, then, should be cor-
rected—and the implications of a more adequate and balanced account accepted.
Yes, the higher reaches of morality tend to have prescriptive implications. Why not
embrace them? Granted, the descriptive-prescriptive, fact-value, or “is-ought” issue
is a thorny one in moral philosophy (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971). Although it is generally
true that “nature” can only offer “information and inspiration, not prescription”
de Waal, 2009, p. 30), development is progressive (Moshman, 2011a), its eventual
products more adequate than those that paved their way. Beyond feeling inspired,
we should strive for and prescribe more adequate human moral competence.

We arrive, then, at a second limitation of Haidt’s theory: its excessive descrip-
tivism: i.e., its misguided effort to exclude prescriptive (or proscriptive) implica-
tions from any and all descriptive accounts. Earlier, we cited Haidt’s (2012) candid
description of his use of a self-serving fabrication to falsely acquit himself of
his wife’s legitimate complaint (regarding his leaving dirty dishes in their baby’s
food-preparation area), hence his ostensible discovery that he is a “chronic liar.”
My personal impression of my colleague Jonathan Haidt is that he is no such thing
(his self-effacing exaggeration did succeed as an opening literary device)—but
what if he were a chronic liar? Are not self-serving fabrications morally wrong
self-centered, non-reversible, etc.; see Chapter 1)? What would Haidt think if he
were to put himself in his wife’s place, taking and coordinating with her perspec-
tive (see next chapter)? Should he not have appreciated her perspective? Did she
not have a legitimate concern (that his misplaced dirty dishes could contaminate
their baby’s food with harmful bacteria)? Should not our instances of irresponsible
428)—leading, one hopes, to moral improvement? In the cognitive developmental
approach to morality, consolidated self-serving worldviews and habits linked to
antisocial behavior require treatment (see Chapters 7 and 8).
Haidt’s writings are in fact not consistently descriptivist, not totally devoid of prescriptive appeals and higher expectations. He does, for example, advise (Haidt, 2006) that you “find a fault in yourself”—partly because it may “save a relationship,” but mainly because of its emotional rewards: “you are likely to be rewarded with a flash of [the] pleasure of taking responsibility for your own behavior” as well as “a hint of pride”; namely, “the feeling of honor” (p. 79). One reviewer (Brownrigg, 2012) of Haidt’s (2012) *Righteous Mind* discerned a disconnect between Haidt’s emotion-based, descriptive account of human nature and his greater expectations (in *Righteous Mind*, that his insights might help us, despite our divided groups, to “all get along”):

He [Haidt] takes a passive, empirical view of human nature. He describes us as we have been, expecting no more…. But… Haidt [also] speaks to us rationally and universally, as though we’re capable of something greater…. If intuitions are unreflective, and if reason is self-serving, then what part of us does he expect to regulate and orchestrate these faculties? (p. 13)

Again, in moral psychology we should include and even champion the “part of us” that is “something greater”: the higher reaches of human development and morality, the ideals of maturity and rationality. Why not endorse those better angels as preferable to the alternatives? Haidt’s functionalist explanation of morality in terms of the suppression of self-interest and creation of community can have a legitimate place in moral psychology. Yet, as Moshman (2011a) concluded, identification with one’s community can be a “mixed blessing” (p. 142). Hoffman (2000; cf. de Waal, 2013) noted that in-group solidarity can promote prosocial behavior within the group, and that “bias in favor of one’s in-group when one is deciding whom to help is not [necessarily] such a bad thing.” Surely, however—as Haidt (personal communication, July 30, 2012), in normative terms, concurs—we can identify Durkheimian in-group solidarity as “a bad thing when people [accordingly] feel compelled to attack others [outside their] group” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 270; cf. Jacobson, 2008). As Piaget (1965/1932) established, mature morality has a meaning beyond adherence to Durkheimian in-group solidarity, beyond the Darwinian success of one’s group (in terms of faster group population growth and the empire-building “supplanting” or slaughter of other humans). Relatedly, Freud’s and Hume’s view of moral reasoning as serving the passions or sentiments has a place in a comprehensive view of morality and society—but not so great a place as to crowd out the genuine ideals of rationality, objectivity, and impartiality in human development. The higher reaches of morality (Chapters 3 and 4) provide an anchor point for specifying mature compassion (Chapter 5), accounting for prosocial behavior (Chapter 6), and understanding and treating antisocial behavior (Chapters 7 and 8, respectively). A moral psychology that emphasizes human foibles or worse, and punts on remedial treatment or moral education, falls seriously short of adequate paradigm status.

**Moral Relativism**

A third (and related) serious limitation is that of moral relativism. Haidt’s and other relativistic views in moral psychology were noted in Chapter 1. In fairness,
we should acknowledge that Haidt (2012) has explicitly objected to such a characterization of his position: “I am not saying that all moral visions are equally good, or equally effective at creating humane and morally ordered societies. I am not a moral relativist” (p. 338). Indeed, Haidt endorsed “a Durkheimian version of utilitarianism” (p. 272). Yet in the same work, Haidt (2012) repeatedly asserted the culturally relative contexts for the shaping of a group member’s intuitively based moral visions or principles (presumably, even that of Durkheimian utilitarianism). Haidt’s (2012) sentiment that liberals and conservatives should share meals and narratives and “get along” is helpful, but missing is any call for rational dialogue or moral progress. Nor did Haidt appeal to “the right” (consistency, reversibility, etc.), objective accuracy, or cognitive development except to note that, historically, Kant championed “non-contradiction” (p. 119). As noted, Haidt even likened moral judgments to diversely shaped babblings or tastes. Haidt quoted Hume: “Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived” (cited in Haidt, 2012, p. 339). Yet if ethical judgments “are nothing but the outflow” of subjective affects, of esthetic feelings or sensory tastes, then “it would be as inappropriate to criticize ethical judgment as it would be to criticize gastronomic preferences” (Singer, 1981, p. 85).

Given such analogies, what happens to moral objectivity? In his appreciation of the beauty of diverse cultural contexts, Haidt (as noted) minimized female genital mutilation as a mere alteration. He (Haidt, 2012) did feel that practices subordinating (and even attacking) women are “ugly” (p. 102); that is, unpalatable, distasteful, or disgusting. It is possible that, as Plato posited, esthetic appraisals can sometimes reflect some ultimately objective basis. In the main, however, “beautiful” or “ugly” would seem to be in the eye of the beholder. The esthetic analogy misses the objective basis of morality (see Chapter 1). Female genital mutilation is not to be minimized, subjectivized, emotionalized, or relativized. It is not just ugly. It is morally wrong.

Roger Brown and Richard Herrnstein (1975) referred to the cultural relativism of 1950s American psychology as the “tide” against which Lawrence Kohlberg (and in 1930s Europe, facing Durkheimian cultural relativism, Jean Piaget) “swam” (p. 307). Again, a valuable aspect of Haidt’s work has been its encouragement of us to remain open-minded and tolerant, and even to appreciate diverse cultural norms or practices, political ideologies, and individual lifestyles. Indeed, we grow (as did the rescuer) through taking into account the perspectives of other individuals, groups, and cultures. Still fresh in the 1950s, however, were the horrors of Nazi aggression. “Since the holocaust,” wrote Martin Hoffman (2000), “cultural relativism is dead. We no longer have the luxury of assuming every culture’s values or guiding principles will pass the moral test and that each is as [morally] good as any other” (p. 273). In the twenty-first century, the relativist tide has returned; we must swim against it as did Kohlberg and Piaget in their eras. Now, as then, we cannot afford the moral paralysis of a moral psychology that reduces development to enculturation or socialization. Fundamentally, we cannot afford a relativistic moral psychology whose functionalist evolutionary perspective encompasses pragmatic success, advantage, or utility, but not progress, consistency, or truth (this limitation will be discussed in Chapter 10).
Concluding Comment

We will have occasion to refer further to Haidt’s new synthesis in remaining chapters of this book. Again, there is much of stimulating value in the bold, down-to-earth sweep of his work and that of others in allied disciplines. Haidt does successfully administer a dose, if not of reality (his descriptive work is too skewed for that), at least of phylogenetic humility: We are reminded of our pretensions and the impact of fast, preconscious emotions in morality, as well as the phylogenetic history and neurology of those emotions. We are also reminded of the values of scientific description and of respecting the important contribution of diverse cultures and communities to human flourishing. We can value in-group solidarity (mixed blessing though it is) and affective primacy (balanced though it need be with cognitive primacy). With respect to the emotion of empathy or caring, a developmental or multilevel version is evident in the work of Martin Hoffman as well as Frans de Waal and Jean Decety (Chapter 5). In the final analysis, however, the serious limitations (negative skew, exclusion of prescriptivity, moral relativism) of Haidt’s theory overshadow its contributions. We must now move beyond Haidt’s new synthesis as we continue our exploration of moral development, social behavior, and reality.
“The Right” and Moral Development

Fundamental Themes of Kohlberg’s Cognitive Developmental Approach

In the first chapter, we noted that young children might be so taken with an intellectually disabled man’s (Edward’s) colorful reaction to a prank that they might not perceive his suffering and the pranksters’ self-centered unfairness. Generally, young children often over-attend to, or “center upon,” one or another salient feature of a situation and accordingly fail to infer underlying realities. What does it mean in a cognitive sense to say that children grow beyond the superficial in morality? Does the construction (through taking and coordinating social perspectives) of a deeper understanding of fairness or moral reciprocity contribute to one’s moral motivation? Would an older person’s grasp of an injustice, a violation of how people should treat one another, generate a desire to right the wrong?

Lawrence Kohlberg called his theoretical approach to morality and moral motivation “cognitive developmental” to describe his contextualization of moral development within social and non-social (or physical) cognitive development. One of Kohlberg’s chief sources of inspiration, Jean Piaget, considered mature morality to be a logic or rationality inherent in social relations. Morality in the cognitive-developmental approach refers mainly to the moral judgment (or reasoned evaluation) of the prescriptive values of right and wrong.¹ To a much greater extent than in Haidt’s new synthesis (last chapter), this approach emphasizes moral development (Gibbs, Moshman, Berkowitz, Basinger, & Grime, 2009).

In this chapter, we articulate the fundamental themes of the cognitive-developmental approach to morality. We have already hinted at them in the use of certain words in our opening paragraph, among them superficial, center upon or self-centered, social perspective-taking, construction, and moral reciprocity. To be explicit, we will discuss the following themes.

Superficiality, Self-Centration • The young child’s over-attention in moral judgment to this or that eye- or ear-catching feature of a situation reflects an overall superficiality; that is, a general cognitive tendency to center upon salient stimuli. Although one’s own immediate perspective is salient throughout life, the young child tends to be especially egocentrically biased or centered on the self.

Growing Beyond Superficiality/Self-Centration Through Social Perspective-Taking • To “decenter” or grow beyond these centrations upon the self or upon some salient, here-and-now feature of a situation, the child needs not only to gain in working memory but also to take, coordinate with, and reflect upon the perspectives of others through social interaction (see also the next theme).
Decentration, Mental Coordination, Social Construction • To decenter from biasing centrations is to keep in mind and mentally coordinate multiple features (some salient, some not so salient) of a situation. This process can foster change that is both qualitative and progressive. Such change accomplishes a deeper understanding (cf. stage; see below). As we will see, the “construction” of knowledge in Piagetian usage is irreducibly distinct from the learning or internalization of a norm. Social construction (construction through social interaction, social perspective-taking and coordination, and reflection) is especially important in moral judgment development.

Moral Reciprocity • The constructed structures most relevant to growth beyond the superficial in a cognitive and social sense are those of reciprocity. Advanced stages of moral reciprocity and equality (or equity) in human development surpass those attained by any other species.

Moral Necessity, Cognitive Primacy • A constructed structure of moral reciprocity is “right” or necessary (e.g., moral equality must not be violated), much as logical reciprocity is right or necessary (e.g., mathematical equality cannot be violated). Real or apparent violations of reciprocity generate a cognitively based desire to right the wrong (cognitive primacy).

Stages • A network of structures such as those that pertain to moral reciprocity can be conceptualized as a basic framework, complex schema network, or stage by which a child or older person perceives (meaningfully experiences), interacts with, and reflects upon events or situations. Because they are so mixed in one’s overall functioning at any given time, stages in moral judgment development define only the qualitative levels of a rough age trend. As we will see, this age trend has been evidenced in over forty countries or regions around the world.

The pervasiveness of these fundamental themes across social and non-social cognitive development reflects the broad sense of cognitive in Kohlberg’s and Piaget’s theoretical approach. Indeed, Kohlberg (1964) began his work in part by identifying stable moral judgment trends that may “reflect cognitive development” (p. 398). After all, it is the same child who meaningfully interacts with social and non-social (or physical) objects. We stress, however, the uniqueness of social interaction and perspective-taking. Consider that social cognitive “objects” such as people are also conscious, intentional subjects. There is something quite unique about taking the perspective of an “object” that can also take your perspective! Pervasive cognitive-developmental themes notwithstanding, the story of sociomoral development (to use Hugh Rosen’s [1980] term) does not reduce entirely to the story of non-social cognitive development (Damon, 1977, 1981; Hoffman, 1981b).

Although Kohlberg’s and Piaget’s cognitive-developmental approach is clearly crucial to our exploration of the cognitive strand of moral development (a number of Piagetian constructs are quite helpful), we do not feel bound to the orthodoxy of either theorist’s work. Indeed, although we do not systematically critique Piaget’s version of the cognitive-developmental approach (see Beilin, 1992; Flavell, 1996; Lourenco & Machado, 1996; Newcombe, 2011; Siegler & Alibali, 2005), we will spend the entire next chapter critiquing (and offering a new view that builds partly
from) Kohlberg’s stage theory. This chapter goes “beneath” Kohlberg’s theory. In other words, we explicate basic cognitive-developmental themes as a context for exploring the right and wrong of morality; in particular, the justice or reciprocity strand of moral development.

## EARLY CHILDHOOD SUPERFICIALITY

Because preschoolers generally have difficulty keeping in mind multiple sources of information, their moral judgment—more generally, their social and non-social cognition, understanding of self, even social play—tends to be superficial. Impressive appearances oft en capture their attention or imagination. In other words, young children evidence a “vulnerability to salient features of the here-and-now” (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002, p. 181). This pronounced tendency to center upon the salient includes their own immediate viewpoint, especially their egoistic motives or desires at the moment. We will consider the superficial judgments of early childhood in terms of both social and non-social cognition.

### Superficiality in Social Cognition

Young children over-attend in their social (including moral) cognition to one or another salient appearance or consequence; accordingly, their moral understanding tends to be superficial. Despite their evaluations of acts such as hitting as wrong even if adults were to approve (Turiel, 2006a), young children may legitimize the commands of authority figures such as parents or teachers by appeal to an imposing feature of size or power (e.g., “Dad’s the boss because he’s bigger”; Kohlberg, 1984, p. 624). Keeping a promise may be evaluated as important because “otherwise the other person will be mad or beat you up”—that is, may be justified by appeal to concrete or salient consequences. (A personal note: When my grandson Micah was five years old, he explained that telling the truth is “very” important because “if you don’t tell the truth, it’s a lie [and] if you lie, you get in trouble.” We will return to five-year-old Micah later in this chapter.) Among children asked “What happens when lies are told?” 80% of five-year-olds, but only 28% of 11-year-olds, mentioned punishment by an adult authority figure (Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983). Preschoolers, in contrast to older children, evaluate lies that lead to punishment more negatively than lies that do not (Bussey, 1992). Charles Helwig and Angela Prencipe (1999) found that six-year-olds were more likely than eight- or ten-year-olds to suggest severe consequences (“a lot of trouble”) for flag-burning. The preschoolers also appealed to the material damage of the act and preferred the decisions of authorities among various approaches to changing a flag’s design. Young children’s orientation to salient authority and to visible or punitive consequences partly inspired Piaget’s term heteronomy (meaning “rules from others”) for their morality. It also inspired Kohlberg to characterize his moral judgment Stage 1 as “punishment and obedience” (see Chapter 4). The essential theme, however, is superficiality.

Perhaps the most famous example of superficiality in young children’s moral judgments is found in one of Piaget’s (1932/1965) early studies. Presenting pairs of
stories of transgression, Piaget asked children which story entailed a “naughtier” act, and why. One of the story pairs contrasted one child who accidentally breaks 15 cups as he comes to dinner with another child who breaks one cup as he tries to sneak a treat out of the cupboard. The younger (in his study, six-year-old) children, impressed by the “tangible” (p. 166) consequence of so many broken cups, often judged the coming-to-dinner child to be naughtier, even though that child was not the one with the mischievous intention. Piaget's research design was criticized in subsequent literature (e.g., S. A. Miller, 2007) for confounding intention with consequence. The “confounding,” however, was strategic: Piaget's aim was not to investigate whether young children can understand intentions (his own research established that they do) but rather to study whether young children tend to focus on the salient and neglect the subtle (e.g., an underlying intention) when the two are juxtaposed in a morally relevant task or situation.

Young children's tendency not to keep in mind intangible or subtle considerations means that their moral evaluations tend to be absolute and inflexible (although their “inflexibility” may also reflect a recognition of the distinctly invariant character of the moral domain; Turiel, 2006a). For example, in the Peterson et al. (1983) study, 92% of the five-year-olds (but only 28% of the 11-year-olds) stated that lying is “always wrong” (because, for example, the lie will always be found out and punished). Similarly, in the Helwig and Prencipe (1999) study, 96% of the six-year-olds but only 46% of the ten-year-olds thought that flag burning could never be acceptable as a ritual showing respect for the country. Despite such “all or none” or inflexible declarations (Harter, 2012, p. 32; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991), young children's sociomoral judgments can also be quite capricious, as we will see.

Besides moral judgment, other areas of social cognition (understanding of self, others, social relations and situations, friendship, emotions, gender, death, and so on) also provide evidence of young children’s vulnerability to the impressive or salient. Preschoolers' spontaneous descriptions of themselves or others tend to emphasize physical or directly observable attributes, abilities, and possessions (“I live in a big house,” “I can run faster than anyone,” “I have brown hair,” etc.; Flavell & Miller, 1998; cf. Damon & Hart, 1988; Harter, 2006, 2012). Similarly, their social explanations, person-description, and narrative comprehension tend to emphasize overt actions or expressive features (e.g., Livesley & Bromley, 1973; J. G. Miller, 1986; Paris & Upton, 1976). Preschoolers' accounts of having been hurt or having hurt another person “lack depth” and tend to be “utterly behavioral,” featuring simple one-way acts of physical harm (e.g., “Um, Jack hit me. And he also, he also kicked me”; Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005, p. 54). Similarly, preschoolers’ conceptions of friendship tend to focus on surface aspects such as playing together and sharing toys or other material goods (Selman, 1980). Gender is stereotyped by outer or situational features such as clothing, hairstyle, and occupational activity (Signorella, Bigler, & Liben, 1993). In the development of children's understanding of death, cessation of overt biological functions generally precedes cessation of related psychological conditions (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004).

Young children’s vulnerability to the pull of this or that particular overt feature does not preclude recognition of their own or others' wishes, preferences, or intentions. Indeed, broad characterizations of cognition in early childhood as “external”
rather than psychological are untenable (Miller & Aloise, 1989). Various avenues of social cognitive research have found that early childhood judgment can be “internal”; that is, it can take into account psychological factors. As noted, despite young children’s tendency to focus on external damage in naughtiness judgments, they are able—especially in the absence of highly salient surface features—to make judgments based on intentions or preferences (Flavell & Miller, 1998; cf. Piaget, 1932/1965). Self-descriptions, although generally concrete, often include psychological assertions (“I like pizza,” “I love my dog Skipper,” etc.). Indeed, young children even prefer to describe an emotional reaction in terms of psychological states (e.g., “he’s scared of the dog”) over behaviors (e.g., “he’s holding his mommy’s hand”) when psychological and behavioral descriptions are both made salient as options (Lillard & Flavell, 1990).

**Paucity of Ongoing Mental Coordination**

Yet something is curiously amiss in the “internal” or psychological judgments of young children. Recall, in the last chapter, Damon’s (1977) description of the “fluctuating” or inconsistent and egocentric way in which young children often reason on distributive justice (how to share) tasks. Similarly, consider a six-year-old’s replies to Robert Selman’s (1976) famous social cognitive task called “Holly’s Dilemma,” pertaining to whether a girl named Holly would rescue a kitten stuck in a tree despite having promised her father that she wouldn’t climb trees. Asked “What do you think Holly will do: save the kitten, or keep her promise?” the six-year-old replied,

She will save the kitten because she doesn’t want the kitten to die. *(How will her father feel when he finds out?)* Happy, he likes kittens. *(What would you do if you were Holly?)*

Save the kitten so it won’t get hurt. *(What if her father punishes her if she gets the kitten down?)* Then she will leave it up there. *(Why?)* She doesn’t want to get in trouble. *(How will she feel?)* Good, she listened to her father. (p. 303)

Although this six-year-old’s judgment is “internal” insofar as it appeals to psychological states such as wishes or preferences (“she doesn’t want the kitten to die,” “she doesn’t want to get in trouble,” etc.), the responses evidence an egocentric and capricious quality. Attending to the kitten, she predicts Holly will climb the tree and suggests the father will be “happy” because “he likes kittens” (a convenient attribution that neglects the father’s likely distress over the broken promise). But then, prompted to consider the prospective salient consequence of punishment, the child abruptly switches focus from the kitten to the father: Holly would “leave it [the kitten] up there” and thereby avoid trouble with her father; she would even feel “good” about having listened to and obeyed him (an attribution that neglects her feelings for the endangered kitten). This six-year-old seems blithely oblivious to the contradictions of her successive judgments. Is this not the whimsical charm of a young child?

Young children typically attend to one or another feature, then, captured by what is salient for them at that moment. They tend to “react to events only as they occur” and neglect relevant events that have just occurred (Chatham, Frank, &
Although they do refer to psychological states, their self-descriptions list “piecemeal and seemingly random and unrelated features of the self” (Harter, 2012, p. 31). Robbie Case (1998), Robert Siegler (1996b), and other developmental psychologists called this momentary consideration of one or another feature at a time “unidimensional thinking.” What preschoolers tend not to do in their judgments, then, is to keep in mind multiple sources of information (e.g., both the “kitten” and “father” facets of Holly’s dilemma)—what Paul Bloom (2004) called “double bookkeeping” (p. 21)—and coordinate them to make a more adequate judgment (cf. Feffer, 1970). Ongoing mental coordination of the here-and-now with other facets of a continuing situation—*multidimensional thinking*—is precisely what is missing in young children’s “internal” yet still superficial judgments.

It is worth emphasizing that this paucity of ongoing mental coordination in social perspective-taking is evident whether the social cognitive task is descriptive or prescriptive. In other words, one can discern the same unidimensional tendency whether the task questions ask what *will* or *would* happen and why (as in Selman’s [1976] social cognitive dilemma) or what *should* happen and why (as in a moral dilemma). Consider young children’s moral judgment responses to moral dilemmas such as William Damon’s (1977) obedience-to-authority task. The protagonist of the dilemma story, Peter (“Michelle” for girl respondents), has been told that he can’t go anywhere until he cleans up his messy room, but now he has an opportunity to go with his friends to a picnic. What should Peter do? A four-year-old replied,

*Go to the picnic. (Why should he do that?) Because he wants to and all his friends are going. (But what if his mother says, “No, Peter, you can’t go until you clean up your room first”?) He would do what his mama says. (Why should he do that?) Because he likes to. (What if Peter really wants to go on the picnic and he doesn’t want to clean up his room at all because if he does he’ll miss the picnic?) His mama will let him go out with his friends. (But what if she won’t let him?) He will stay home and play with his sister and clean up all his toys in his toy box. (Why will he do that?) Because he wants to.* (p. 182)

Once again, we find a capricious sequence of momentary preferences and wishful attributions, with no discernible regard for consistency. Young children just do not seem to engage in much mental coordination in forming their judgments.

Paucity of mental coordination also seems to characterize young children’s responses in studies that address development in the understanding of emotions. Young children tend not to take into account the influence of prior emotions upon current mood (e.g., that a person’s being upset by an earlier negative experience, or prior harm to another, could dampen or complicate his or her elation in a current pleasant situation) (Berk, 2012; cf. Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006). Furthermore, young children have difficulty understanding mixed emotions; that is, that two emotions from a single stimulus can occur at once (Harter, 2012). In studies regarding post-transgression emotions (e.g., one child is shown pushing another off a playground swing and then swinging on it), young children characterize the swinging victimizer simply as “happy.” They apparently “view victimization as involving two relatively separated sets of emotional reactions—victimizer who...
are happy because of their gains and victims who feel quite negatively because of their losses” (Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006, p. 584).

This unidimensional or uncoordinated cognitive tendency is surprisingly stable in early childhood. The young children retained their “separated,” simple, or one-sided view of post-transgression emotion even in the face of efforts to make more salient to them the negative feelings of the victim. Only when “young children are repeatedly reminded of the immoral nature of victimizing others” do the “happy” attributions become less prevalent (Arsenio et al., 2006, p. 604).

Uncoordinated or one-sided social judgment is also broadly evident in early childhood. In several studies (Fabes, Eisenberg, Nyman, & Michealieu, 1991; Gnepp, 1983; Hoffner & Badzinski, 1989; Hoffner, Cantor, & Thorson, 1989), questions regarding pictures depicting incongruous scenes such as a happy-faced boy with a broken bicycle elicited among the preschoolers’ descriptions of emotion that centered on salient features such as facial expression (e.g., “He’s happy because he likes to ride his bike”). Complex inferential judgments—for example, responses that coordinate or integrate the “happy face” and “broken bicycle” features of the scene (e.g., “He’s happy because his father promised to help fix his broken bike”)—did not become prevalent until somewhat older ages (seven years of age or so).

**Egocentric Bias**

This here-and-now immediacy or vulnerability to one or another salient feature of a present situation inclines the young child toward egocentric or self-centered cognitions, perceptions, and behavior. After all, what is more immediate and salient than one’s own mental chatter or “self-talk”? And the mental stream of young children’s thought (despite genuinely empathic concerns, Chapter 5) is especially self-oriented. Preschoolers are likely to describe the (less salient) perspectives of others in egocentric terms (e.g., “She gives me things”; Livesley & Bromley, 1973). Three-year-olds are also prone to attribute their own privileged-information perspective to others, not realizing that others, being uninformed, cannot share their perspective (see Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; Chandler & Carpendale, 1998; Doherty, 2009; Flavell et al., 2002).

Other social cognitive research also points to a pronounced salience of self—that is, a paucity of taking and keeping in mind the perspectives of others—especially in early childhood. Although young children may infer that others are engaged in thought if others are depicted with a thoughtful expression or challenging task, they tend not to attribute spontaneous thoughts to others (Flavell & Miller, 1998). In other words, they have not yet developed “an active conception of mental life” (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006, p. 202). Nor do they attribute spontaneous thought to themselves: the “minds” encompassed within their superficial “theory of mind” include their own.

Yet in many respects, young children are especially prone to attend to their own immediate thoughts, feelings, or knowledge, more than to the perspectives of others. “When they play hide and seek, very small children will notoriously put their heads under a table with their behinds sticking very visibly into view” (Gopnik, 2009, p. 58; cf. Doherty, 2009). Young children’s typically inflated self-esteem and overestimation of their skills and abilities have been seen as following
in part from the fact that children generally do not compare their competency with that of others until the elementary school years (Harter, 2012). The youngest children on distributive justice tasks tend to reduce questions regarding “fairness” to personal desire (see Chapter 2). As noted, young children typically judge that a child who gets to swing by pushing off the swing’s current user would feel “happy” or “good” because he got what he wanted (Arsenio et al., 2006). In a study of children’s understanding of the effects of lying (Peterson et al., 1983), none of the five-year-olds (versus nearly a fourth of the 11-year-olds) made reference to a guilty conscience. Egocentric impulses of physical aggression are three- to six-year-olds’ prevalent approach to resolving social conflict (Selman & Shultz, 1990).

The sense in which young children tend to be egocentric must be specified. Ample research has demonstrated the untenability of Piaget’s classic definition of egocentrism as an inability or lack of capacity to differentiate others’ perspectives from one’s own (e.g., Flavell & Miller, 1998). Rather, egocentrism should be construed as a pronounced bias favoring one’s own perspective over others’ or a distortive tendency to assimilate others’ perspectives to one’s own (or, occasionally, his own to another’s; see Damon, 1977). Decety (2007) even suggested that the “self-perspective” may be “the default mode of the human mind” (p. 258). This bias, cognitive distortion, or centration upon self may decline with gains in working memory, executive (prefrontal cortical) functioning, and social perspective-taking experiences (discussed later); nonetheless, this default mode or processing bias does not disappear:

Our own points of view are usually more cognitively “available” to us than another person’s views (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Furthermore, we are usually unable to turn our own [immediate] viewpoints off completely when trying to infer another’s. Our own perspectives produce clear signals that are much louder to us than the other’s, and they usually continue to ring in our ears while we try to decode the other’s. For example, the fact that you thoroughly understand calculus constitutes an obstacle to your continuously keeping in mind a friend’s ignorance of it while trying to explain it to him; you may momentarily realize how hard it is for him, but that realization may quietly slip away once you get immersed in your explanation. (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 182; cf. Birch & Bloom, 2004)

Interestingly, and in fairness, Piaget (1962) in later writings was amenable to this view of egocentrism as a tendency or bias rather than an inability or incapacity. He interpreted non-differentiation of viewpoints as merely “an unconscious preferential focus” (p. 5, emphasis added), and illustrated how persistently that focus can interfere with efforts to take another’s perspective. Antedating not only Flavell and colleagues’ construal (above) but also Susan Birch and Paul Bloom’s (2004) finding of a “tendency to be biased by one’s own knowledge when attempting to appreciate a more naïve or uninformed perspective” (p. 1364), Piaget (1962) wrote:

Every beginning instructor discovers sooner or later that his first lectures were incomprehensible because he was talking to himself, so to say, mindful only of his own point of view. He realizes only gradually and with difficulty that it is not easy to place oneself in the shoes of students who do not yet know what he knows about the subject matter of his
As a second example we can take the art of discussion, which consists principally in knowing how to place oneself at the point of view of one’s partner in order to try to convince him on his own ground. (p. 5)

This interference from one’s personal knowledge can undermine not only effective communication but also impartiality or objectivity. For example, egocentric bias can lead to hypocrisy and its maintenance by self-serving cognitive distortions (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008; see Chapter 7; cf. Haidt, 2012). Although present throughout life, egocentric bias is especially evident during childhood (Damon, 1977). It is integral to the superficiality of early childhood moral judgment.

**Superficiality in Non-social Cognition: The Conservation Task**

Superficiality characterizes young children’s judgments not only in social but also in general or non-social cognition. Unidimensional thinking may contribute to four-year-olds’ perceptual (rather than conceptually relational) interpretation of analogies and metaphors (Gentner & Christie, 2010) as well as their difficulty in understanding multiple meanings in language (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). Consider young children’s perceptual responses to Piaget’s famous “conservation tasks” (so called because an amount is conserved despite changes in its appearance). Immediate appearance-oriented (preconservation) judgments on a classic Piagetian task concerning conservation of quantity are described by Flavell et al. (2002) as follows:

1. The child first agrees that two identical glasses contain identical amounts of water;
2. the experimenter pours the water from one glass into a third, taller and thinner glass, with the child watching; (3) she then asks the child whether the two amounts of water are still identical, or whether one glass now contains more water than the other.

The typical preschool nonconserver is apt to conclude, after the liquid has been poured, that the taller and thinner glass now has more water in it than the other glass. Why? One reason is that it looks like it has more to her, and she is more given than the older child to make judgments about reality on the basis of the immediate, perceived appearances of things. (p. 140)

As on social cognition tasks, young children’s judgments on non-social cognition tasks such as conservation center on whatever is immediately salient and accordingly may meander from moment to moment. In the conservation task (the example pertains to fluid or continuous quantity, one of many referents for conservation), most young children are more impressed with the height of a tall, thin glass and hence say there is now more water. Some children, however, are more impressed with the narrowness of the glass and say there is now less water. Either way, of course, the young child is thinking unidimensionally (whether the dimension is height or width). A given child’s preconservation judgments can be made to shift from one (inaccurate) appearance-based judgment to another, from “more” to “less,” as a function of which dimension is made salient in the task procedure. If water is poured from a tall glass to a washtub, such that the water scarcely even covers the bottom of the tub, the young child who had judged that there is now more
water may blithely and abruptly switch to a judgment of less water (Brown, 1965)!
The contradiction does not seem even to be noticed. And why would we expect young children to notice contradiction, given their paucity of ongoing mental coordination? We again encounter the curious caprice of the young child, this time in a non-social cognitive context. But again, as we will see, children do grow.

Superficiality and Centrations

Whether in terms of social or non-social cognition, then, the young child's judgments tend to be superficial. Common to their performance on social and non-social cognition tasks is their unidimensional focus on one or another (usually, highly salient) momentary feature to the exclusion of important other features; that is, their tendency not to keep in mind and coordinate aspects of a situation. We have repeatedly seen this paucity of mental coordination on social cognition tasks, but it is particularly clear on the conservation tasks.

A Piagetian construct helps us analyze the young child's unidimensional thinking. With respect to conservation tasks, Flavell et al. (2002) invoked the Piagetian term centration in their analysis of young children's here-and-now immediacy in conservation task performance:

The preschooler is more prone to concentrate or center (hence, centration) their attention exclusively on some single feature or limited portion of the stimulus array that is particularly salient and interesting to him, thereby neglecting other task-relevant features. The difference in the heights of the two liquid columns is what captures most of the child's attention (and "capture" often does seem the apposite word), with little note given to the compensatory difference in column widths. (p. 141)

The capricious social and non-social judgments of the young child center not only on the "here" (a particular interesting feature or limited portion) but also the "now" (the present state of the problem): "When solving problems of all sorts they [young children] are less likely to call to mind or keep in mind relevant previous states of the problem, or to anticipate pertinent future or potential ones" (p. 142; cf. Chatham et al., 2009). Pertinent to what has been called temporal centration may be their (earlier noted) tendency to neglect the impact of an earlier emotion upon a subsequent one.

Incidentally, Flavell et al. (2002; cf. Birch & Bloom, 2004) speculated that—as with egocentric bias (self-centration)—temporal centration may never disappear altogether. Indeed, temporal centration may be thought of as an egocentric bias favoring one's present perspective:

Interestingly, the "other" can be oneself in another time and condition, rather than a different person..... For example, it can be hard to imagine yourself feeling well and happy next week if you feel terribly ill or unhappy today. Taking the perspective of yourself when that perspective is different from your current one can sometimes be as hard as taking the perspective of another person. (p. 182)

Again, egocentric bias or inadequate perspective-taking (whether the perspective is that of another person or one's own in another time or condition) is a variant
of the fluctuating centrations or unidimensional thinking of the young child. As with thought, so with emotional and other social behavior: the young child tends “to display fluctuating emotional states, to focus on one attribute at a time, with either-or, love-hate feelings” (Cowan, 1982, p. 67).

Social play, for example, is “subject to the whims of the moment” (Piaget, 1965/1932, p. 30). A personal example: After my then-five-year-old grandson Micah explained the importance of telling the truth (otherwise “it’s a lie [and] you get in trouble,” see above), he entreated me to join him in a dueling game with “lightsabers.” (“Lightsabers” are plastic sword-like toy weapons that emit spectacular color and sound as their tips shoot forward.) We had great fun dueling with the impressive sabers in the darkened finished basement. Micah’s imagination was rich and enchanting. His notions came and went so quickly, though, that I found it hard to retain much sense of the game. Which of us was Luke Skywalker, and which Darth Vader? Identities kept switching. Which of us was ahead by “lots of points”? That kept switching, too. How did one of us abruptly become “invisible,” and then reappear? How did the sabers suddenly gain, then lose, then regain poison tips? Micah’s imagination enchanted, but the “rules” seemed erratic or egocentrically convenient—as when Micah would suddenly declare himself to be invisible or in a “safety zone,” immune to saber attack as I closed in. Of course, many of these shifts and switches could be attributable to Micah’s insufficient knowledge of Star Wars as well as the way games with rules are played (cf. Gentner & Christie, 2010). But were such empirical information deficits all there was to it? Given the fluctuations pervasive in the life of the young child, a question remained: Were we playing a game, or playing at a game? I was at once a delighted granddad and a reflective developmental psychologist.

After our lightsabers were put away, I thought of another “game” for us to play. Bringing appropriate materials from the kitchen, I took Micah through the conservation task and then, after the pouring, asked him again about the relative amounts. “That one [the tall glass] has more [water],” he declared. I reflected: His moral appeal to trouble or punishment, the pseudo-game we had played, his pre-conservational answer just now... do they not suggest a characteristic tendency evident across thought, language, and behavior—namely, that of the superficial social and non-social understanding, the blithe inconsistencies, the charming whimsy of the young child?

A Tendency, Not an Incapacity

We again emphasize that this early childhood superficiality, although robust and pervasive across social and non-social contexts, is a tendency characteristic of the young child—not a fixed incapacity of all preschoolers in all circumstances. As Siegler (1996b) put the point: “Although five-year-olds’ processing capacity does not preclude them from representing multiple dimensions, it may make them less likely than older children to do so” (p. 79, emphasis added). With age, young children’s superficial and blithe caprice attenuates as increasing mental coordination produces more inferential judgments—and, indeed, qualitatively new structures of logical thought with an accompanying appreciation of logical necessity.
As we will see in the next section, child cognitive development involves overlapping shifts from less to more mature modes of functioning and responding. Cognitive development does not imply that mature individuals “are always rational or are unswayed by passion and illusion” (Pinker, 2011, p. 181). Nor does cognitive development mean “that young children never make [integrative] inferences about unperceived states of affairs or that older children never base conclusions on superficial appearances” (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 141). Indeed, young children “feel the need to comment on everything, and ask about everything” (de Waal, 2009, p. 157). They are famous for asking “why” or “how” questions; e.g., “How come angels never fall down to earth when there is no floor to heaven?”—in other words, how can such-and-such an unusual notion deviate from “the way that things normally work”? (Harris & Koenig, 2006, p. 518; cf. Gopnik, 2009); their fascination with “deviations from the norm” is evident even in infancy (Thompson & Newton, 2010, p. 18). Optimal circumstances (interesting deviations, familiar stimuli, simplified task or questions, absence of misleading salient features, warm or friendly questioner, etc.) reduce stress upon young children's working memory or executive attention and hence facilitate their nascent tendency to coordinate features and make complex inferences (Siegler, 1996b). Their observations or comments can sometimes be astonishingly insightful. By the same token, less than optimal circumstances, as we all know too well, tend to induce even among adults less than mature cognitive performance (even though basic knowledge competence generally is not lost). Indeed, Judy DeLoache, Kevin Miller, and Sophia Pierroutsakos (1998) concluded from a literature review that children are more—and adults less—“logical and rational than was previously believed” (p. 802). Nonetheless, one can discern a rough age trend characterizable as growth beyond the superficial, a development that involves certain crucial qualitative changes.

**BEYOND EARLY CHILDHOOD SUPERFICIALITY**

Growth beyond the superficial in moral and other judgments means that those judgments are no longer so tied to this or that perceptual appearance or impressive feature. More subtle, complex, balanced judgments gain in prevalence as the child’s ongoing mental life becomes more multidimensional (Case, 1998; Siegler, 1996b). Displacing the merely “reactive” responses mentioned earlier, older children’s responses in a cognitive task increasingly evidence more integrative responses, ones made possible by increased “proactive control” or “advance preparation” (Chatham et al., 2009, p. 5529). Accordingly, children’s moral judgments and emotional attributions become more mature. With perspectival coordination, the simple happiness attributed to playground victimizers increasingly gives way to attributions of mixed emotions and empathy-based guilt. Although (in Piaget’s earlier noted study of transgression judgments) the imagined consequence of 15 broken cups still looms large in the judgment of the older child, the older child keeps in mind more, considers more, coordinates more: Yes, to do so much damage is bad, but keep in mind the story protagonist’s underlying good intentions, and keep in mind the naughty intentions of the other protagonist, the one who happened
to break fewer cups. Underlying intentions—a deeper consideration—ascent against the superficial in the older child’s moral judgment. Deeper still will be the appreciation of “good intentions” guided by ideals of do-as-you-would-be-done-by morality, an understanding that, as we will see, typically ascends in late childhood or early adolescence. These qualitative shifts toward deeper understanding result from increasing mental coordination, social interaction, social perspective-taking, and reflection. As David Moshman (2011a) summarized, “reflection and coordination in the context of peer interaction can generate progress” (p. 54).

This growth beyond the superficial is evident not only in moral judgment but broadly in the growing child’s social and non-social cognitive development. In the conservation task, for example, the child grows from judgments captured by misleading superficial appearances to a judgment of conservation, “an inference about underlying reality” (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 141, emphasis added). Growing beyond the superficial naturally follows early childhood superficiality in the broad cognitive-developmental approach.

If superficiality relates to centrations, then, by the same token, growth beyond the superficial has much to do with decentration. As we will see, growth beyond the superficial and decentration in morality involve a constructive process fundamentally distinct from the internalization processes of moral socialization. Construction is as much a social as it is a non-social process, and social construction through perspective-taking (in interaction with individual reflection) is particularly important for the emergence of “necessary” moral ideals that can motivate moral behavior (we will call the cognitive motivation of behavior “cognitive primacy”).

Generally, the construction of more profound moral judgment constitutes an age trend involving a sequence of qualitative developmental advances or stages. Those stages may be universal in human development, entailing a level of potential maturity that would seem to surpass that of any other species. Just as our coverage of early childhood superficiality spanned the social and non-social, our depiction of growth beyond the superficial will be similarly broad. We will depict key growth-beyond-the-superficial themes—“decentration,” “social construction,” “reciprocity,” “logical necessity,” “cognitive primacy”—in the context first of non-social cognition, especially conservation judgments. We then revisit the themes in the context of social cognition, especially, moral judgment.

**Beyond Superficiality in Non-social Cognition**

*Decentration and Construction*

Decentration can be discerned most clearly in judgments of conservation. In contrast to the centrations of young children, older children are “apt to be distributing [their] attention in a more… balanced way”; that is, “to achieve a broader or ‘decentered’ (hence, decentration)” judgment (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 141).

Decentration, then, means a more balanced perspective-taking over time: a broader and more comprehensive attention to multiple features of the situation, an ongoing and responsive mental coordination of those changing features, and hence a more consistent, adequate, and profound judgment.
In the cognitive developmental approach, *decentration* and *construction* both refer to the developmentally relevant qualities of ongoing mental coordination. *Decentration* highlights the liberation effected by mental coordination from narrow, imbalanced, and biased attentions (centrations), whereas *construction* in the Piagetian sense highlights mental coordination as a process that builds qualitatively new knowledge of a special sort (such as logical or moral reciprocity).

**Social Construction of Conservation Knowledge**

The construction even of non-social cognition such as conservation knowledge involves social interaction. Even with reference to objects, “social interaction is a context where one is particularly likely to face challenges to one’s perspective and to encounter alternative perspectives” (Moshman, 2011a, p. 60). We shorten “construction through social interaction” to “social construction,” although it has also been called co-construction, collaborative learning, dialogue, or collaborative argumentation. Basically, in social construction, participants who respect each other engage in “a balanced exploration of differences of perspective” (Rogoff, 1998, p. 711). Each participant in the dialogue is aware that his or her partner (a) may have a different perspective and (b) can actively take one’s own perspective (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1996). Social construction may be especially important if the learner is to achieve not just a quantitative increase in a skill or other proficiency, but instead a qualitatively new, basic understanding (Damon, 1984).

Social construction in the Piagetian sense can build knowledge that is epistemologically distinct, even unique (a theme we will return to in our concluding chapter). Actively constructed knowledge (again, in the Piagetian sense) is not “internalized” (used loosely here to mean transmitted, acquired, picked up, copied, imitated, or learned) from some model in the environment; nor is it simply innate. In what Moshman (2011a) called *rational constructivism*, “the child is seen as an active agent with a role that cannot be reduced to genes, environmental history, or even an interaction of both” (p. xxi).

The fundamentally distinct character of constructed knowledge à la Piaget was demonstrated in a series of brilliant studies of collaborative argumentation in connection with conservation tasks or social issues (reviewed by M. Miller, 1987; Rogoff, 1998; for a related example, see Moshman, 2011a). The most fascinating (and epistemologically critical) condition in these experiments involved pairing preconservational children whose pretest judgments involved opposing centrations. For example, a preconservational child who judged that the taller, narrower glass holds more water would be paired with a preconservational child who (centering instead upon the narrowness) judged the glass to hold less water. The dyads would be instructed to resolve their differences. The experimenter gave neither child the right answer. Nonetheless, even though there was no external source or “model” of conservation knowledge, many of the initially preconservational children made conservation judgments on the post-test. How could that be?

A typical study using such dyads, that of Gail Ames and Frank Murray (1982; cf. Doise & Mugny, 1984; Glachan & Light, 1982), was aptly titled “When Two Wrongs Make a Right.” In each dyad, both children’s judgments were wrong—but
wrong in a mutually heuristic way. Each child, in attempting to resolve the difference, enhanced the salience of the feature of the task that the other child was neglecting. The children were typically six to seven years old, old enough to have the working memory or “executive attention” (e.g., Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Case, 1998; Chapman & Lindenburger, 1989; McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010) needed to react with at least some perplexity to the other’s challenges: “Look here, this glass is skinnier . . . there’s less water”; “No, look there, the glass is taller . . . there’s more water.” Again, the “right” or more profound judgment (in this example, conservation of quantity; Ames and Murray actually used conservation of length) could not have resulted from any direct imitation or internalization from the environment; after all, neither experimenter nor partner provided conservation information. It seems most plausible that the conservation judgments reflected each child’s decentration and mental coordination, or construction stimulated by the opposing child’s challenge. Such studies have been cited to suggest that the child at least in part achieves knowledge such as that of conservation through a constructive process not reducible to internalization. Although children do not usually argue with each other over questions such as that of conservation, social construction may in general play a role even in non-social cognitive advances. These advances beyond the superficial entail important cognitive developmental properties—“reciprocity,” “necessity,” and “cognitive primacy”—noted at the beginning of this chapter.

**Depth, Decentration, and Reciprocity**

Constructed knowledge, such as that of conservation, represents a deeper understanding. Such judgments involve “an inference about underlying reality”; for example, that two amounts of water, despite misleading appearances from a transformation, “are really still the same” (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 141). This inference about underlying reality represents a qualitatively new, more adequate understanding and a kind of knowledge that, as we will see, has much to do with the right and wrong of morality. Although conservation “research has not so far yielded really clear answers” as to the significance of the phenomenon (Halford & Andrews, 2006, p. 577), decades ago Roger Brown (1965) made an insightful observation. Brown described a “crucial difference” between an older and a younger boy’s (or girl’s) responses to a conservation task:

> After pouring, the experimenter asks [the older boy] the familiar question: “Is there the same amount or more or less?” The boy promptly says, “The same,” and there is an implicit “naturally” in his intonation. If we continue with other containers of varying size he will become impatient and say, “It’s the same, it’s always the same.”

> It is important to watch the older boy’s performance carefully. There is a crucial difference between his reaction to each problem and the reaction of the younger boy. The younger boy when he is asked the critical question intently examines the materials before him. The older boy scarcely looks at them. For him it does not seem to be a problem in perceptual judgment. The correct answer appears to have a necessity in it that removes it from the sphere of matters requiring empirical verification.” (p. 201)
As noted, the older child's inference of this underlying “necessity” is effected through mental coordination or decenteration. Remedying the temporal and spatial centrations described earlier are temporal and spatial decenterations:

Conservers are likely to [temporally decenter, that is, to] say that the two quantities had, after all, been identical at the outset…, or that the experimenter had merely poured the water from one container to the other, and without spilling any or adding any…. They might even say that the continuing equality of amounts could be proved by pouring the liquid back into its original container. (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 142)

The older child's analysis may also coordinate and balance the lesser width with the greater height of the liquid in the thinner but taller container.

That the temporally and spatially decentered response called conservation knowledge is balanced means that such knowledge derives from reciprocity. Reciprocal refers to a “simultaneous exchange,” “return in kind,” or action “given by each party to the other” (Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2012), implying a counterbalancing. Temporal decenteration and reciprocity (“you can pour it back and see it’s the same”) involve a counterbalancing through an “equal reaction to an initial action” (Damon, 1977, p. 284); that is, a second action that completely undoes or inverts the first. Spatial decenteration and reciprocity (“it’s taller but also thinner”; “nothing is added or spilled”) also involve a compensatory counterbalancing or equating of actual or potential changes (taller with thinner; additions of water could compensate for spills). Damon (1977) pointed out that “precise” (p. 284) reciprocities or compensations imply stable equalities.

Logical Necessity and Cognitive Primacy in the Motivation to Right a Wrong

As in mathematics, the precise reciprocity and equality entailed in conservation judgments have a logical quality; they refer to what Piaget called logico-mathematical knowledge. For example, the precise reciprocity, “nothing added or taken away,” means that $x + 0 - 0 = x$. It is logic that makes the “crucial difference” Brown (1965) referred to, the qualitative change that removes conservation knowledge “from the sphere of matters requiring empirical verification.” The older child’s conservation answer “appears to have a [logical] necessity to it,” as Brown put the point. Granted, conservation judgments are not purely a matter of logic. As Thomas Shultz and colleagues noted, “Conservation judgments are neither wholly logical nor wholly empirical” but rather “derive from a combination of logical and empirical knowledge” (Shultz, Dover, & Amsel, 1979, p. 117). Conservation judgments do involve logic. For this reason—and not as a result of a sensitive-period acquisition—the judgments “feel self-evidently valid” (Haidt, 2001, p. 828). In Brown’s and Piaget’s terms, judgments such as those of conservation, transitive relations, and class inclusion are experienced as necessary rather than contingent, as that which “must be true” and not simply as “facts about the world that are true but might have been different” (Miller, Custer, & Nassau, 2000, p. 384; cf. Piaget, 1967/1971). Generally, conservation and other Piagetian tasks that require “the
comprehension of logical necessities . . . are rarely passed before age seven but [are] relatively easy for nine-year-olds” (Moshman, 2011a, p. 208).

The sense of logical necessity means that this constructed, qualitatively new understanding of underlying reality (in the present case, of conservation) generates a compelling feeling that can motivate behavior. Consider the typical responses of children in so-called counter-suggestion or contrary feedback research initiated in the 1960s by Jan Smedslund (1961) using a conservation-of-weight task. Those who make judgments of conservation (or other logic-related judgments) and give reciprocity explanations are surprised and upset upon being confronted (through the trick of surreptitiously removing some of the material) with an apparent violation of inferred or “necessary” reality. They seek some explanation, some logical way to account for or correct the imbalance. Mature conservers confronted with violations of weight conservation may make comments such as, “We must have lost some clay on the floor,” or “There must be something wrong with the scale.” Interestingly, initially nonconserving children who had been empirically taught or trained in Smedslund’s experiments to give conserving responses reacted to the violations with no such surprise or distress—another indicator that early-childhood cognitive superficiality is robust (and hence that genuine growth beyond the superficial typically requires more than simple instruction). The crucial broader point is that learning, training, acquisition, internalization, socialization, or enculturation is not necessarily tantamount to development (see Moshman, 2011a).

In general, although the mastery of necessity is “gradual and multifaceted” (Miller et al., 2000, p. 400), mature judges do tend to act as if illogical imbalances or violations of precise reciprocity and equality are wrong or “should not be.” The nonconservation that confronts them doesn’t make sense logically, and that illogic prompts a feeling of distress as well as an action tendency. The conservers are motivated to try to restore (through some logical explanation or action to find missing material) the “necessary” reciprocity or equality. The parallel with moral judgment and motivation is striking, as we will see.

Beyond Superficiality in Social Cognition

The fundamental themes of the cognitive-developmental approach to moral-ity emerge as we revisit the concepts of growth beyond the superficial (chiefly, reciprocity or equality, social decentration, mental coordination, construction, necessity, and cognitive primacy), this time in the context of social cognition. As Steven Pinker (2011) observed, “It’s no coincidence that the word proportionality has a moral as well as a mathematical sense” (p. 648). The same is true for equality and reciprocity. We start by examining a traditional treatment of reciprocity in the social sense; namely, as a norm that is internalized through moral socialization.

Reciprocity: Internalized Norm or Constructed Ideal?

Decades ago, Alvin Gouldner (1960) interpreted reciprocity as a societal norm. Essentially, the reciprocity norm prescribes that one should reciprocate if one receives help, or that one should receive help in return if one has given help. Gouldner posited
that the reciprocity norm somehow gains motivational power as it is internalized by members of society (particularly through parental socialization). He noted that the norm is cross-culturally pervasive and attributed such universality to reciprocity’s functional value for promoting and stabilizing social relationships. He saw the norm as particularly helpful in preventing “system-disrupting exploitation” (p. 174) from interpersonal power inequalities in which the more powerful individual would—were it not for internalized inhibition from the reciprocity norm—simply take from the less powerful and (according to Gouldner) feel no compunction to return any benefit. Also helpful in preventing exploitation and reducing the tension of unequal exchanges or “reciprocity imbalances” are certain other norms, such as those prescribing one-sided generosity (e.g., Christian charity or noblesse oblige) and magnanimity (“It’s not the gift but the thought behind it that counts”).

Given its functional importance for any society, the reciprocity norm (at least in its positive form) is widely taught and should be part of moral socialization. Although less prescriptive and more biologically based, Haidt’s theory (see Chapter 2) also recognizes the functional importance and status of reciprocity or fairness as a common cultural norm. In general, this socialization view of reciprocity as a norm is valid.

Also valid, however, is the cognitive-developmental view of moral reciprocity as a product of construction and decentration. The emergence in human development of non-social and sociomoral forms of reciprocity may relate to the development of a “natural” human preference for balance or harmony (Heider, 1958), as well as consistency or logical non-contradiction, cognitive dissonance reduction, congruity, and symmetry (Abelson et al., 1968). Could the motive power of the reciprocity norm represent the power of not only an internalized norm but also a constructed ideal? Reciprocity may not be either a “norm” or “ideal,” but both! And is only one level of reciprocity constructed? As we will see, the cognitive-developmental approach explicates the “moral reciprocity” coexistent with the reciprocity norm.

**Social Construction (vs. Internalization) Revisited**

It is time to revisit social construction in the context of social cognitive development. In this context, we find not only logical reciprocity and necessity, but moral reciprocity and necessity; correspondingly, we now find “cognitive primacy” generating moral feelings that in turn can motivate moral behavior. Piaget (1932/1965) regarded social construction (again, construction through social interaction) as “the main mover of [moral] judgmental change during the childhood years” (Youniss & Damon, 1992, p. 280). For Piaget, constructive social interaction chiefly meant peer exchanges that involve “comparison,… opposition… [and] discussion” (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 393). The experimental condition described earlier, in which peer dyads exchanged viewpoints and thereby helped each other decen- ter and construct conservation knowledge, parallels the social construction of the “necessary equilibrium” of moral reciprocity:

For true equality and a genuine desire for reciprocity there must be [an ideal] that is the *sui generis* product of life lived in common. There must be born of the actions and
For example,

In the course of discussion [about how to distribute candy] the children may realize that... an equal division of the candy, although not giving any child as much as she or he might like, avoids giving any child a valid basis for complaint. In the course of multiple such interactions, all the children may come to recognize the inherent fairness of no one getting more or less than anyone else—at least not without reason. (Moshman, 2011a, p. 69)

Such a socially constructed moral understanding cannot, according to Piaget, be simply learned or internalized from parents or other socialization agents:

But would it not be more efficient for an adult simply to tell the children to divide the candy equally? In the short run, an externally imposed rule to this effect might indeed avoid hostility and/or violence. Piaget believed, however, that such a rule would be perceived by a child as simply one of many rules that must be followed because they come from those with power or authority....Genuine...morality, then, is not a matter of culturally specific rules learned [or externally imposed] from parents or other agents of society. (Moshman, 2011a, pp. 69–70)

Moshman’s question and point are well taken: Why not simply teach the children the rule? Moral socialization and internalization can play a valuable role; again, it is important for society to support moral development by, in this case, teaching the positive reciprocity norm. But beware. Recall from the Smedslund experiments the indifference to violations of logical necessity among the young children simply taught or trained to give the conservation answer. Similarly disappointing have been efforts to teach formal operational problem-solving to children (see Moshman, 2011a). More successful have been certain efforts to foster genuine conservation-related understanding among five-year-olds—mainly, by providing them with logical rather than empirical explanations of correct answers (Siegler & Svetina, 2006). If reciprocity, equality, or fairness is related to the logic of social relations, then facilitating genuine sociomoral understanding of reciprocity or fairness may require processes of social construction. Once again, society or culture must support moral development and behavior. And training in prosocial skills contributes to effective programs to reduce antisocial behavior (Chapter 8). Socialization, learning, or training, however, is not the primary story. A morality simply learned from powerful authorities may be no more genuine, stable, or mature than was the “conservation” learned in the Smedslund experiments.

A crucial vehicle for the construction of genuinely mature basic morality, then, is egalitarian peer interaction. Consistent with Piaget’s claims, Ann Kruger and Michael Tomasello (1986) found that, relative to children paired with a parent, children in peer discussions generally evidenced more active reasoning followed by
gains in moral judgment; parents, too, can contribute to children’s moral judgment development if their interactive style is nonthreatening or Socratic and “inductive” (cf. Kruger, 1992; Taylor & Walker, 1997; see Chapter 5). Marvin Berkowitz and I (Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983, 1985) found that college peers who reasoned from the hypothetical premises of one another’s moral arguments (e.g., identifying a logical inconsistency or implication of the other’s reasoning, questioning the other’s premises, or suggesting a premise underlying both positions) were those who evidenced greater pre-post gains in mature moral judgment.

Piaget (1972) considered such “just for the sake of argument” considerations of another’s perspective in a discussion to exemplify the social expression of “formal operations.” Socially applied formal operations (or hypothetically based deductive reasoning) change the nature of discussion: “A fruitful and constructive discussion means that by using hypotheses we can adopt the point of view of the adversary (although not necessarily believing it) and draw the logical consequences it implies” (pp. 3–4). Similarly (but with the goal of successful persuasion more than fruitful or constructive discussion; see Chapter 2), Haidt (2012) suggested: “If you really want to change someone’s mind on a moral or political matter, you’ll need to see things from that person’s angle as well as your own” (p. 49).

As in non-social cognition, social construction and decentration in social cognition mean the decline of egocentric bias, or an increasing tendency to consider and keep in mind multiple perspectives, not just one’s own immediate preferences. Later levels of sociomoral judgment are less egocentric: “The self’s welfare is still important, but . . . self-interest is increasingly seen in the context of the welfare of everyone in the relation” (Damon, 1977, p. 221). Older children no longer need salient cues to infer that the minds of others are spontaneously active, and are more cognizant of what other persons would or would not know in a situation. The self-esteem level becomes less inflated or more realistic as children during the elementary school years begin to base their self-evaluations on social comparisons (Harter, 2012).

Generally, as perspectives interpenetrate, emotions gain nuance. Children more readily grasp mixed emotions or the impact of one emotion upon another (Harter, 2012). In their accounts of post-transgression emotion, children’s attributions become more complex—indeed, more mature, more adequate, more genuinely interpersonal—with age. No longer is the victimizer seen as being simply “happy;” instead, “older children [understand] that the pain and loss experienced by the victim would affect the victimizer emotionally” (Orobio de Castro, 2010, p. 78). Attributions of conscience appear as children increasingly coordinate and “integrate” victim with victimizer perspectives “so that the pain and negative emotions of their victims” complicate “any happiness that victimizers might feel” (Arsenio et al., 2006, p. 584; cf. Arsenio, 2010); but emotion attributions also reflect dispositional differences and relate to “aggression, peer acceptance, and overall social competence” (Orobio de Castro, 2010, p. 78; see Krettenauer, Malti, & Sokol, 2008, and Malti & Krettenauer, in press; cf. Dunn & Hughes, 2001). In their accounts of having been hurt or having hurt someone else, they are increasingly likely to coordinate social perspectives, refer to subtle mental states or emotions such as intentions, and describe violations of trust (Wainryb et al., 2005). Friendships become more stable. Indeed, in all of the areas of social cognition and behavior surveyed
earlier, one can discern in later childhood and beyond an increasing prevalence of decentered and deeper understanding.

Conditions for Social Construction

That social construction differs irreducibly from internalization is a key theme of the cognitive-developmental approach, whether that which is constructed is social or non-social. Constructive benefits from peer interaction cannot be taken for granted, however. With reference to the earlier example of candy-sharing among children, Moshman (2011a) noted that “one child may grab all the candy and run off” (p. 69). Generally, Piaget’s presumption that peer interaction will always be egalitarian and constructive seems a bit optimistic. Hoffman (2000) argued that Piaget and Kohlberg underplayed the role of egoistic motives. As Kenneth Rubin and colleagues (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006) commented, “If the exchange of conflicting ideas is marked by hostility, dysregulated or disabling emotions are not likely to promote cognitive growth and development” (p. 583). Indeed, Damon and Killen (1982) found that children who simply contradicted or ridiculed their partners’ ideas were less likely to show post-test moral judgment gain. The downward spiral of gratuitously violent peer interaction depicted in William Golding’s classic novel Lord of the Flies (1954/1962) seems to be validated by numerous media reports of bullying and other violence perpetrated by children upon children.

Hoffman and others have collectively suggested four conditions that are probably important if peer interaction is to work as a constructive process. Hoffman (1988, 2000) suggested three conditions. First, to preempt egoistic tendencies to dominate or bully, the children involved should be comparable not only in age but also in social status or “pecking order” within the peer group context (but cf. Taylor & Walker, 1997). Indeed, Rogoff (1998) argued that perceived status equality was more important than equality in chronological age among factors conducive to cognitive-developmental change. Second, to further counteract tendencies to dominate, the interacting children’s disciplinary background should be characterized primarily by inductions (inducing consideration for others) rather than power assertions (see Chapter 5). (In this connection, we might note as well the value of socioemotional backgrounds characterized primarily by secure attachment; see Thompson & Newton, 2010.) Third, conflicting children should be “coached” or encouraged by a supervising adult to consider one another’s perspectives. Finally, Rubin and colleagues (Rubin et al., 2006) suggested that peer interaction is most likely to lead to moral judgment development if the peers are friends and hence can interact in a positive and nondefensive fashion. These four conditions enhance the likelihood that peer interaction will stimulate sociomoral development.

Morality and Logic: Necessity and Cognitive Primacy Revisited

As noted, in the cognitive-developmental approach, morality is a close kin to logic and rationality. The intertwining of morality with logic is expressed in Piaget’s famous assertion of a “kinship” between morality and logic: “Morality is the logic of action,” just as “logic is the morality of thought” (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 398). In
other words, the two intimately interrelate: Moral or socially prescriptive reciproc-
ity is logical, just as logic (or logical necessity) is prescriptive. Corresponding to the
motive power of the logical necessity discussed earlier is the motive power of moral
necessity. Violations of reciprocity or justice, like violations of logic, “shouldn’t
be.” The inference of unfairness generates a motivation to restore the “necessary”
reciprocity or equality (cf. Hammock, Rosen, Richardson, & Bernstein, 1989).
As Kohlberg (1984) put the point, “Violation of logic and violation of justice may
arouse strong affects” (p. 63).

In this connection, Laura Berk (personal communication, April 1, 2002)
recounted an incident in which both logic and justice were violated (although
logic was not actually violated—fairness or respect was). Several years ago, during
her course on methodology, a student

replicated Smedslund’s [1961] research by surreptitiously removing a piece of the Play-Doh
while making the transformation in a conservation-of-weight task. In one instance, an eight-
year-old girl was so secure in her grasp of the logic of conservation that she knew she had
been tricked. Her emotional reaction was strong: Why, she asked the college student, would
an adult be so dishonest as to [try to] deceive [and upset] a child in that way? In this case,
simultaneous violation of conservation and [justice] did, indeed, “arouse strong affect.”

The motivation to account for or correct a “reciprocity imbalance” in the social
context, then, may be no less cognitively based than is the corresponding motiva-
tion in the non-social or physical context. And note that, in either context, the
affect follows the cognition. Indeed, the affect of logical or moral necessity owes
its very existence to the cognitive construction of logic or justice. Violations of
logic or justice not only arouse but in the first place generate a desire to rectify the
imbalance, to right the wrong. 8 Again we encounter cognitive primacy, this time
in the context of moral motivation.

STAGES OF MORAL JUDGMENT DEVELOPMENT

Growth beyond the superficial in moral judgment entails an overlapping
sequence of basic frameworks, or stages. Beyond the centrations on salient fea-
tures (size, power, damage, punishment, etc.) of Stage 1 are two stages of moral
judgment that have at their core structures of moral reciprocity (see Table 4.1
in Chapter 4). The second moral judgment stage—and the more primitive stage
of moral reciprocity or justice—is that of a concrete and simple “you scratch
my back so I should scratch yours,” or “eye for an eye” morality. It is a moral-
ity of exact payback, of strict equality, of “getting even” in favors or blows. As
C. S. Lewis (1962) recollected,

Once when my brother and I, as very small boys, were drawing pictures at the same
table, I [unintentionally] jerked his elbow and caused him to make an irrelevant line
across the middle of his work; the matter was amicably settled by my allowing him to
draw a line of equal length across mine. (p. 93)

Piaget (1932/1965) labeled such tit-for-tat morality or short-term exchanges
of action “reciprocity as a fact,” involving “crude equality” (p. 323) and sometimes
even “vengeance…in all its brutality” (p. 217). Kohlberg’s label for this form of reciprocity was “Stage 2” or “pragmatic” and defined by “instrumental exchange”: “For example, it is seen as important to keep promises to insure that others will keep their promises to you and do nice things for you, or it is important in order to keep them from getting mad at you” (Kohlberg, 1984, pp. 626–628).

A morality defined by concrete exchanges or literal equalities prompts some questions. What is its developmental status, its theoretical significance? In the passage quoted above, Lewis recollected that he and his brother were “very small boys” when they righted an ostensible wrong—not by the acceptance of an apology for an accidental bump (as they might have had then been older and more mature) but instead by the acceptance of a literally equal payback. How “small” or young were they? Did their “settlement,” although crude and concrete, nonetheless represent progress beyond earlier one-sided impulses and action-reaction sequences (see Chapter 2)? Did their reciprocity emerge thanks to construction (i.e., mental coordination of perspectives through social interaction)? More broadly, as we put the issue in Chapter 2: Is justice a biologically prepared predisposition, a module ready to activate? Or is it a constructed and emergent developmental product?

We argue mainly for the latter position. Although, like William Damon, we recognize germinal roots (see Chapter 2), we share Damon’s emphasis on the development or construction (mental coordination and reflection) of morality. In growth beyond the superficial, justice is not merely a verbal expression of an emotional sentiment or “intuition.” Rather, Stage 2 reciprocity represents an advance beyond the centrations and action-reaction sequences of Stage 1. Whereas the child with unidimensional cognitive tendencies may understand social influence in one direction at a time (self to others or others to self; Selman, 1980; cf. Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006; Wainryb et al., 2005), the child whose thinking is designated “Stage 2” is beginning to realize that each of two friends evaluates the other’s actions, needs, and attitudes. In this sense, the social perspective-taking coordinations of Stage 2 pragmatic reciprocity produce a concrete, logic-related morality that, although still superficial, is less so than that produced by the centrations of Stage 1.

**Pragmatic (Stage 2) Moral Reciprocity in Primate Societies**

The germinal roots of justice or moral reciprocity pertain to a primate heritage, raising the question of what is and is not uniquely human in the development of moral maturity. Frans de Waal (1996) argued that judgments and norms of moral reciprocity evolved from practices of social exchange and cooperation evident throughout the primate world. Even Old World (e.g., macaque) monkey societies “may be veritable marketplaces in which sex, support, grooming, food tolerance [passive food sharing], warnings of danger, and all sorts of other services are being traded” (de Waal, 1996, p. 156). Primates may be biologically prepared to engage in reciprocal social activity (Levitt, Weber, Clark, & McDonnell, 1985; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). One is reminded of the attitudinal action–reaction sequences of capuchin monkeys: “If others are hostile, they’ll be hostile back. If others are nice, they’ll be nice back. Consequently, if another monkey helps them pull a heavy
Moral Development and Reality

tray, they’ll share in return” (de Waal, 2009, p. 177). Furthermore, the emotional and behavioral precursors of reciprocity in ontogeny can be discerned in infants’ interactions with caretakers, and young children can learn to take turns with toys during play activities (e.g., Damon, 1977; Mueller & Brenner, 1977). One can discern in human society rituals of exchange ranging from a tacit nod after a “pardon me” to formal treaties. Consistent with both Gouldner’s functionalist and Piaget’s constructivist analyses is de Waal’s (1996) suggestion that exchanges can serve to restore social balance.

Sociomoral advances in exchange and reciprocity may have been linked to cognitive advances in the evolution of primates. The social and non-social cognitive abilities of macaque monkeys are less advanced than those of their relatives, the chimpanzees. In contrast to monkeys, mature chimps can recognize themselves in a mirror and (relatedly) engage in social perspective-taking activities such as social pointing or intentional deception (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002; Boysen, 1993; Boysen, Berntson, Shreyer, & Quigley, 1993; de Waal, 1996, 2009; Premack & Premack, 1983; but cf. Tomasello et al., 1996; see Chapter 5). Correspondingly, social reciprocity in chimp societies takes on more systemic or normative and prescriptive properties conducive to the restoration of balance or equilibrium. Chimpanzees, according to de Waal (2009), “regularly break up fights over food without taking any of it” (p. 190).

Furthermore, not until one studies chimpanzee societies in the primate world does one find instances of punishment for non-reciprocation of favors. In the following incident, the chimpanzee Puist became furious at her erstwhile ally Luit and even attacked him, apparently because he declined to support her after she had supported him against a rival:

A high-ranking female, Puist, took the trouble and risk to help her male friend, Luit, chase off a rival, Nikkie. Nikkie, however, had a habit after major confrontations of singling out and cornering allies of his rivals, to punish them. This time Nikkie displayed at [threatened] Puist shortly after he had been [chased off]. Puist turned to Luit, stretching out her hand in search of support. But Luit did not lift a finger to protect her. Immediately after Nikkie . . . left the scene, Puist turned to Luit, barking furiously. She chased him across the enclosure and even pummeled him. (p. 97)

In another incident, the group shared food with the group members who had shared—but not with a selfish chimp named Gwinnie:

If [the female chimp] Gwinnie obtained one of the large bundles of browse [in the enclosure], she would take it to the top of a climbing frame, where it could easily be monopolized. Except for her offspring, few others managed to get anything. [Another female chimp] Mai, in contrast, shared readily and was typically surrounded by a cluster of beggars. Guess who met with more resistance if she herself was in need and tried to get food? . . . It is as if the other apes are telling Gwinnie, “You never share with us, why should we share with you!” (p. 160)

Despite these impressive anecdotes, the extent to which chimps grasp the logic of exchanges and equalities remains at issue. Although he emphasized phylogenetic continuity, Haidt (2012) considered the evidence for reciprocity among chimps to
be “ambiguous” (p. 178): Although they may “recruit a collaborator to help them get food,” chimps “don’t seem to be sharing intentions or truly coordinating with that collaborator” (p. 357; cf. Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006). And although their reciprocity seems normative, chimps do not “build up increasingly elaborate networks of norms over time” (Haidt, 2012, p. 357). It should be noted that de Waal’s (1996) claim was merely that chimps evidence the “building blocks” of morality, not morality per se. Using another metaphor, de Waal (1996) was cautious: “Are animals moral? Let us simply conclude that they occupy a number of floors of the tower of morality” (p. 212).

**From Stage 2 to Stage 3: Construction of Reciprocity as an Ideal**

Although normative reciprocity may characterize much of chimps’ fighting, feeding, sex, grooming, and so on, its form is (literally!) no more than that of you-scratch-my-back-I’ll-scratch-yours. Pragmatic moral reciprocity—Stage 2 in the Kohlberg stage typology (Chapter 4)—is also prominent in human societies. Indeed, as Thomas Lickona (1983) declared, “Stage 2 is alive and well in most of us adults” (p. 134). Haidt (2012) “felt a mixture of amusement and revulsion” at an overheard conversation, which he could not legitimately criticize “from within the ethic of autonomy” (an ethic attributed to individualistic Western culture [Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997], which Haidt implicitly and mistakenly equated with the cognitive developmental perspective on morality):

> I was recently eating lunch at a UVA [University of Virginia] dining hall. At the table next to me two young women were talking. One of them was very grateful for something the other had agreed to do for her. To express her gratitude she exclaimed, “Oh my God! If you were a guy, I’d be so on your dick right now!” (p. 106)

Such Stage 2 exchanges are not considered to be the optimal end state of moral development. As Piaget (1932/1965) suggested, “the best adult consciences ask for something more than” pragmatic morality (p. 323). Children’s—if not chimps’—quid pro quo social cognition typically develops into “a third perspective, that of . . . mutuality of expectations” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 34; cf. Selman, 1980, 2003). In Stage 3, the relationship itself takes on a longer-term and deeper value beyond that of the concrete exchange of favors, sexual or otherwise. One need not shift, as Haidt (2012) suggests, from an “ethic of autonomy” to an “ethic of divinity” (Shweder et al., 1997)—or, for that matter, shift in “relational models” (Rai & Fiske, 2011) or “moral orders” (Krebs & Denton, 2006)—in order to judge an instance of “trivialized sexuality” (p. 106) as, well, an instance of trivialized sexuality. One can legitimately do so within the cognitive developmental context of greater and less adequacy in morality. Asked to choose the “best” advice to give to hypothetical individuals in a dilemma situation, adolescents evidencing third-stage or higher moral judgment generally reject developmentally less adequate options (typi- cal was one adolescent’s rejection of Stage 2 advice: “I don’t like the idea that ‘if you do this, then I’ll do that.’ You should not make a decision because you’ll be paid off”) (Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969, p. 238; cf. Boom, Brugman, & van der Heijden, 2001).
Typically from childhood to adolescence (Gibbs et al., 2007), then, a qualitative advance takes place in the understanding of human interpersonal relationships. “My friend is thinking about what I am thinking” evolves into “true friends should understand each other” (Damon, 1977). This third-person, mutual perspective affords a more contextual and ideal justice in which “the circumstances of the individual are taken into account” (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 272; cf. Damon, 1977). In one of Piaget’s distributive justice stories, concerning whether a family’s youngest child who had accidentally dropped his allotment of bread should be given another piece, 95% of 13- to 14-year-olds but only 17% of six- to nine-year-olds made allowance for the young child’s ineptness. Older children and adolescents, then, are much more likely to “attempt to understand the psychological context” in their moral judgments (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 267; cf. Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991).

This third-person perspective affords a truly ideal normative reciprocity, recognizable as Golden Rule, do-as-you-would-be-done-by morality. Such ideal morality represents the quintessential expression of what philosophers have called the moral point of view (see Chapter 1). In Brian Barry’s (1995) terms, it is the transition from “justice as mutual advantage” to “justice as impartiality” (p. 51). The hypothetical ideal of “would be done by” transcends the temporal sequences of exchanges entailed in concrete moral reciprocity.

The concrete origins of such hypothetical reflection in moral perspective-taking are evident in its nascent expressions. Kohlberg (1971), following Selman, cited the “intellectual effort” made by a ten-year-old boy to justify the Golden Rule:

> Well, the Golden Rule is the best rule, because like if you were rich, you might dream like that you were poor and how it felt, and then the dream would go back in your own head and you would remember and you would help make the laws that way. (p. 197)

The intellectual ability to reflect on the basis of a contrary-to-fact hypothesis (such as a rich person imagining and reasoning on the basis of how it would feel to be poor) represents a qualitative advance that Piaget called formal operations: “To be formal, [logical inference or] deduction must detach itself from reality and take up its stand on the plane of the purely possible” or hypothetical (Piaget, 1928/1969, p. 71). Of course, even a young child’s flight of imaginative fancy is in a sense a “hypothetical” departure from concrete reality (Gopnik, 2009). What is developmentally new is the deduction and interrelation of propositions just for the sake of argument. “The formal thinker, in other words, is able to… formulate [and appreciate the logic of] arguments independent of the truth or falsity of their premises” (Moshman, 2011a, p. 10).

Although the shift from the concrete to the hypothetical represents only a rough age trend discernible during late childhood and early adolescence, it is nonetheless a distinct, qualitative change. David Moshman (1998) found “surprisingly strong support” for Piaget’s thesis “that formal or hypothetico-deductive reasoning—deliberate deduction from propositions consciously recognized as hypothetical—plays an important role in the thinking of adolescents and adults but is rarely seen before the ages of 11 or 12” (p. 973). In contrast, “few nine-year-olds grasp this distinction even after… explanation and feedback” (Moshman, 2011a, p. 209). Such
thinking is a high-level example of metacognition or “thinking about thinking”: The child reflects upon the processes and propositions of cognition.

Piaget suggested that the third-person perspective in social cognition emerges as children use their newfound hypothetical and deductive reasoning abilities to infer the limitations and “deeper trend” of tit-for-tat morality. Piaget’s description of the child’s reflection upon pragmatic reciprocity is suggestive of the process that he would later term reflective abstraction (Piaget, 1967/1971):

[The child’s] concern with reciprocity leads [him or her] beyond… short-sighted justice…. The child begins by simply practicing reciprocity, in itself not so easy a thing as one might think. Then, once one has grown accustomed to this form of equilibrium in his action, his behavior is altered from within, its form reacting, as it were, upon its content. What is regarded as just is no longer merely reciprocal action, but primarily behavior that admits of indefinitely sustained reciprocity. The motto “Do as you would be done by,” thus comes to replace the conception of crude equality. The child sets forgiveness above revenge, not out of weakness, but because “there is no end” to revenge (a boy of 10). Just as in logic, we can see a sort of reaction of the form of the proposition upon its content when the principle of contradiction leads to a simplification and purification of its initial definitions, so in ethics, reciprocity implies a purification of the deeper trend of conduct, guiding it…. to…. the more refined forms of justice. (pp. 323–324)

Ironically, reflective abstraction from temporal justice (based on short-term, unstable sequences of “merely reciprocal action”) yields a timeless justice (“do as you would be done by”) and the potential for “indefinitely sustained” relationships. As Singer (1981) put it, the resulting higher and wider standard of conduct…is not a recommendation that we do to others as they have done to us, but that we do to them what we would wish them to do to us. Nor is anything said about doing this only if they are likely to respond in kind. (p. 137; emphasis added)

**Reflective Abstraction and Social Construction**

Although reflective abstraction and other metacognitive processes play an important role in sociomoral and non-social cognitive development, that role is embedded in social construction. So, do individual reflection and reasoning derive from social construction, or is it individual reasoning that makes possible constructive social interaction? Going beyond the traditional Vygotskian emphasis on the sociocultural origins of individual thought, Haidt and Frederick Bjorklund (2008) depicted reasoning as a process that remains mainly social: “reasoning happens between people quite often,… and within individuals occasionally”; p. 200). In contrast, Piaget is often depicted as emphasizing the primacy of individual reasoning. Deanna Kuhn (1997) suggested a “dual focus… on the social process of development from the outside in (as forms originating in social interaction become interiorized) as well as from the inside out (as newly constructed forms are consolidated and applied in social interactions” (p. 257). Similarly, Moshman (1998)
suggested a “reciprocal influence” between the social and the individual reasoning processes:

Reasoning is traditionally viewed as [simply] taking place within an individual. An alternative is to view reasoning as a fundamentally social process of group interchange, with individual reasoning a derivative phenomenon involving internalized aspects of the group process [cf. Vygotsky, 1930–1935/1978, 1934/1986]). A middle-ground possibility is that individual and collaborative reasoning are partially distinct and equally fundamental, developing via a complex process of reciprocal influence. (p. 962)

**Stage 3 Reciprocity and Cognitive Primacy**

Unlike that of Stage 2, Stage 3 reciprocity is a reliable cognitive source of mature moral motivation. Granted, in the context of positive interpersonal relations, both forms or “structures” of reciprocity motivate moral behavior: Reciprocating someone’s help may be prompted by the aim of gaining future favors from a valued other (Stage 2), as readily as it can be prompted by the aim of cultivating a mutually caring relationship (Stage 3). The importance of the distinction between the structures of reciprocity becomes clear, however, once tensions or frictions jeopardize those positive relations. The payback logic of Stage 2 motivates action to restore a balance of equality or “get even,” whereas Stage 3 thinking prompts efforts to resolve any misunderstanding for the sake of the relationship. In this connection, we know of no data to suggest that chimpanzees can appreciate forgiveness or nonreciprocation the way humans can.

Robert Kegan (1982) discovered the importance of the distinction between Stage 2 and Stage 3 in the cognitive primacy of moral motivation during his work as a secondary school teacher. One day, he asked his seventh-grade English class of 12-year-old boys to explain the moral of a story called “The New Kid” (Heyert, 1976). Heyert’s short story depicts the feelings and behavior of an unathletic boy named Marty. In the choosing of sides for baseball, Marty experiences the humiliation of always being chosen last. He must also endure verbal abuse as he plays poorly. When a new kid arrives who is found to be even more unathletic, the new arrival receives even worse treatment, especially from—guess who—Marty. Kegan noted the Stage 2 level at which many of the 12-year-olds understood the point of the story:

The story is saying that people may be mean to you and push you down and make you feel crummy and stuff, but it’s saying things aren’t really all that bad because eventually you’ll get your chance to push someone else down and then you’ll be on top…. Fair is fair! (p. 47)

Dramatically different from these students’ Stage 2 understanding of the story was the emergent Stage 3 understanding of some other 12-year-olds in the class who argued that “Marty should be able to think about how he felt when he was picked on and therefore not pick on the new kid” (p. 55). Marty, in other words, should treat another as he (or almost anyone) would want to be treated. The ensuing discussion, Kegan (1982) surmised, gave the less advanced thinkers in the class
some stimulus for development. The discussion was stimulating in part because the prescribed behavior differed so greatly: Whereas the “fairness” of pragmatic moral reciprocity prescribed abusive behavior (one was abused, so it’s fair to abuse others), that of ideal moral reciprocity (one was abused and should take into account how that would feel) prescribed restraint.

This important developmental distinction between pragmatic (Stage 2) and ideal (Stage 3) moral reciprocity is not found in the work of most evolutionary psychologists, social intuitionists (see Haidt, 2006 and Chapter 2), and other non-developmental theorists (e.g., Alexander, 1987; Burgess & Huston, 1979; Hauser, 2006; Jensen, 2008; Krebs & Denton, 2005; Trivers, 1971; Wright, 1994). One possible exception is the identification of a “strong” reciprocity by evolutionary psychologist Herbert Gintis and colleagues (Gintis, Henrich, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2008); i.e., “a universal structure of human morality” that extends beyond mere “enlightened self-interest” or “tit-for-tat…forms of reciprocity” (p. 253; but cf. Verplaetse, Braeckman, & De Schrijver, 2009).

Hoffman (2000), too, failed to make this crucial distinction. Hoffman’s general view of reciprocity is similar to ours; namely, as a “perception of balance…which in the moral domain translates into fairness or justice” (p. 241). Furthermore, he concurred that the perception of violations of reciprocity presupposes “the ability to focus on multiple aspects of a situation” (p. 243; cf. Gibbs, 1991a). Note, however, that he does not separate ideal reciprocity (“treat others as one would wish to be treated by them”) as motivationally distinct among his examples of reciprocity in the moral domain: “earning what one deserves, being rewarded for good deeds and punished for bad; punishments fitting the crime ([an] eye for [an] eye); treating others as one would [wish to] be treated by them” (p. 241).

Interestingly, Hoffman (2000) did acknowledge that “a cognitive preference for reciprocity” may exist (p. 243). Indeed, his most recent position supports the distinct status of the justice motive (Chapter 5). Perhaps a purely cognitive motivation to “rectify nonreciprocity,” de-confounded from empathic motives, can in some contexts be activated, for example, if “one encounters someone who gets more than he or she deserves” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 243). In a similar vein, de Waal (1996) acknowledged that a motive to correct an unfairness or to see balance restored may account for the satisfaction one feels if a bad or undeservingly fortunate individual “gets his comeuppance, as when a pompous or dishonest man loses his fortune” (p. 85). The motive or satisfaction pertains to the primarily cognitive realm of unfairness or just consequences (although one might still feel a twinge of empathic distress for the erstwhile pompous victim, however richly deserved his loss).

Despite his acknowledgment of a cognitive primacy in moral motivation, Hoffman (2000) argued that there is no inherently moral cognitive motivation. Reciprocity per se is morally “neutral” or “can serve many masters,” including “non-prosocial ‘eye-for-an-eye’ thinking” (p. 243), Stage 2 in Kohlberg’s typology. Insofar as reciprocity does play a role in prosocial behavior, its contribution (according to Hoffman) is not to motivate in its own right so much as to shape or transform motivating empathic affect. For example, “if one encounters a victim, one feels empathic distress, and if he or she is a victim of injustice, reciprocity may also be activated and transform the empathic affect into a feeling of injustice”
In short, Hoffman championed affective primacy to the near-exclusion of cognitive primacy in moral motivation. (We will return to this limitation in Hoffman’s theory in Chapters 5 and 6.)

The distinction between Stage 2 and Stage 3 reciprocities is crucial for an adequate analysis of cognitive primacy and mature morality. We suspect that Hoffman did not distinguish “treating others as one would be treated by them” because doing so is inconsistent with his thesis that reciprocity is morally neutral. It is difficult to argue that ideal (third-person, mutual, Golden Rule, Stage 3) reciprocity is morally neutral or can intrinsically motivate non-prosocial behavior. Again, however, even pragmatic reciprocity may in some contexts motivate (or co-motivate along with empathy) moral behavior: For example, not only empathy but also the Stage 2 logic that hard work should be rewarded may prompt one to reward a hard worker.

**Mature Morality, Socialization, and Culture**

It is crucial that mature morality (especially, ideal reciprocity) be supported in the moral socialization practices, religious teaching, and social ecology of a society. The positive reciprocity norm that should be taught should be, more precisely, the ideal reciprocity norm (commonly referred to as the “Golden Rule”). For Kohlberg (1984), the essence of “socialization” was the provision of social role- or perspective-taking opportunities (a disciplinary practice that encourages perspective-taking is discussed in Chapter 5). The child was seen as actively seeking these opportunities, which could derive not just from home experiences or peer interactions (as Piaget emphasized) but from various aspects of the child’s social world:

If moral development is fundamentally a process of the restructuring of modes of role-taking, then the fundamental social inputs stimulating moral development may be termed “role-taking opportunities.” … Participation in various groups … [stimulates] development. … The child lives in a total social world in which perceptions of the law, of the peer group, and of parental teaching all influence one another. … Various people and groups … [stimulate] *general* moral development. … The more the social stimulation, the faster the rate of moral development. (pp. 74, 78)

Kohlberg’s emphasis on the contribution to moral development of “various people and groups” in the child’s social world is congruent with contemporary emphases in socialization research on “the interrelated effects of parenting, non-familial influences, and the role of the broader context in which families live” (Collins, Maccoby, Steinberg, Hetherington, & Bornstein, 2000, p. 228). A communitarian social context “where relationships between members are direct and multifaceted and where individuals can know and be known” may be crucial if perspective-taking experiences are to lead to interpersonally mature moral judgment and, in general, “a capacity for relatedness characterized by mutuality, reciprocity, and deepening intimacy” (Guisinger & Blatt, 1994, p. 109).

Cultures that fail to support and cultivate mature morality may place even their survival in jeopardy. Insofar as one can extrapolate from human development to cultural evolution, one can justify Napoleon Chagnon’s (1988) characterization as “primitive” (p. 985) tribal or village cultures whose normative system prescribes revenge in blood.
(the culprit’s or a relative’s) for certain offenses (cf. Pinker, 2011). In any event, as de Waal (1996) suggested, despite the balance-restoring tendency of exchanges, their negative expression can get out of hand: “Revenge can be incredibly destructive if left untamed” (p. 161). Children and early adolescents living in an Arab village culture that prescribed practices of blood vengeance evidenced elevated levels of distress on scales measuring symptomatic behavior such as hostility, anxiety, phobias, paranoid ideation, depression, and somatic complaints (Al-Krenawi, Slonim-Nevo, Maymon, & Al-Krenawi, 2001). Chagnon (1988; cf. Anderson, 1999; Edgerton, 1992) found that practices of blood vengeance accounted for nearly one-third of adult male deaths among the Yanomamo Indians of the Amazons. And apparently the Yanomamo are not atypical; homicide rates among hunter-gather tribes are generally so severe that modern per capita homicide rates—even factoring in massive wartime casualties—seem favorable by comparison (Diamond, April 21, 2008; Pinker, 2011). An adult Yanomamo man (who, we suspect, had constructed ideal reciprocity) visited the territorial capital [of the Amazons]. . . . There he discovered police and laws. He excitedly told [Chagnon] that he had visited the . . . territorial governor and urged him to make law and police available to his people so that they would not have to engage any longer in their wars of revenge and have to live in constant fear. Many of his close kinsmen had died violently and had, in turn, exacted lethal revenge; he worried about being a potential target of retaliations and made it known to all that he would have nothing to do with raiding.11 (Chagnon, 1988, p. 990)

In addition to their need for such judicial institutions, the Yanomamo were in desperate need of a mature culture whose moral climate, social institutions, and socialization practices facilitate the construction, internalization, and consolidation of ideal reciprocity, such that revenge can indeed be “tamed” (e.g., Damon, 1995; Fromm, 1955; Guisinger & Blatt, 1994). Social institutions that promote inter-ethnic trust and connection, for example, are crucial in preventing or controlling cycles of violence and vengeance. Beyond simple social contact, interdependence in the context of integrated institutions such as business or professional organizations, trade unions, or political parties has been identified as particularly crucial (Varshney, 2002). Musafer Sherif and colleagues’ (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) classic social psychological experiments established the effectiveness of joint activity toward shared superordinate goals in mitigating out-group stereotypes and preventing cycles of violence.

As trust and the sense of a common cause grow, such joint activity reduces in-group bias and expands the scope of altruism or the moral point of view (see Chapters 1 and 6): one’s group is after all but “one group among others, and from an impartial point of view no more important than others” (Singer, 1981, p. 134). Such an expansion may also entail development beyond the third stage of moral judgment.

**Stage 3 to Stage 4: Beyond Peer Interaction in Moral Judgment Development**

Although Kohlberg in effect reserved moral judgment “maturity” for his Stages 5 and 6 (see Chapter 4), our view is that moral judgment maturity (at least in the
face-to-face interpersonal context) is already evident at Stage 3, the stage of third-person or ideal reciprocity. Stage 3 moral judgment, however, does not fully represent moral-cognitive adequacy for individuals living in a society more complex than that of a small community. For such individuals, moral judgment maturity must expand in scope from the dyadic or peer to the social system context.

As such adolescents or adults move beyond familiar peer interaction in small, local communities to societal institutions such as universities or complex work settings, they increasingly deal with anonymous individuals and relate to individuals with diverse or heterogeneous values. As a result of this broader role-taking and the reflection it stimulates, their appreciation of the need for mutual trust and caring (Stage 3) expands into an appreciation of the need for commonly accepted, consistent standards and requirements (Stage 4; see Edwards, 1975, 1978, 1982, 1985, 1986; Harkness, Edwards, & Super, 1981; Mason & Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b). James Rest and colleagues (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999) noted that “typically in adolescence there is the dawning awareness” of the need to establish “a system of cooperation at a society-wide level (among strangers and competitors, not just among kin and friends) [that] calls for impartiality, generalizable norms, and ‘a level playing field’ among diverse ethnic, religious, and racial groups” (p. 15). In the words of one 18-year-old, the purpose of laws is “to set up a standard of behavior for people, for society living together so that they can live peacefully and in harmony with each other” (Adelson, Green, & O’Neil, 1969, p. 328). Commonly accepted standards, institutions, and requirements, then, “promote cooperation or social contribution and act as regulations designed to avoid disagreement and disorder” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 632). As one of Kohlberg’s longitudinal participants said, “You’ve got to have certain understandings in things that everyone is going to abide by or else you could never get anywhere in society, never do anything” (Colby et al., 1987, p. 375). In other words, individuals in a complex society must generally understand their interdependence and accept a balance between their rights or freedoms and their responsibility to respect the rights of others as well as to contribute to society. In the absence of such commonly accepted “understandings,” not only will society “never get anywhere” but (in the words of another Kohlberg longitudinal participant) “chaos will ensue, since each person will be following his or her own set of laws” (p. 375).

Especially in relation to such advanced moral judgment, Kohlberg (1984), we note again, argued that peer interaction should be conceptualized as merely one mode of social perspective-taking (or role-taking) opportunity. He acknowledged that peer interaction “appears to stimulate development” (p. 77) and may be especially important during the childhood years. Nonetheless, Kohlberg argued that peer interaction “seems better conceptualized in terms of providing general role-taking opportunities than as having very specific and unique forms of influence” (p. 77).

Research Evaluation

Studies of social experiences in relation to moral judgment have generally been consistent with Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s claims that social perspective-taking through peer interaction and group participation play an important role in moral judgment development. Kruger’s (1992) findings concerning peer (as opposed to child–adult)
discussions were noted earlier. Charles Keasy (1971; cf. Schonert-Reichl, 1999) found that moral judgment stage in childhood is positively related to social participation, as evidenced by more social club memberships and leadership roles. Similarly, Anastasia Sedikides (1989), using a measure of childhood role-taking opportunities constructed by Steven Schnell and myself (Gibbs & Schnell, 1986; Schnell, 1986), found that, for a sample of preadolescents, social role-taking opportunities were in fact related to movement through the first three stages of moral judgment. Consistent more with Piaget’s than with Kohlberg’s position, a peer interaction factor (relative to home and school factors also found in a factor analysis) accounted for the greatest percentage of moral judgment stage variance. Included in the peer interaction factor were items such as “I have many friends and talk with them very often,” and “My friend and I talk about our opinions when they differ.”

In the context of moral judgment development beyond Stage 3, Kohlberg (1984) conceptualized the growing individual’s new social interaction experiences in college or complex work settings as opportunities for “enlarged” (p. 428) or expanded role-taking. Indeed, he claimed that such experiences were crucial for development beyond Stage 3. To investigate this claim, Marion Mason and I (Gibbs & Whiteford [Mason], 1989) devised a measure of post-childhood or expanded role-taking opportunities in which participants respond (on a three-point scale from not true or rarely true to somewhat true or sometimes true to very true or often true) to items such as “I have encountered and become friends with other students or co-workers of different ethnic or cultural backgrounds (for example, a student from another country)”; “I have been involved in a group or organization where it was necessary for me to deal with various points of view”; and “I have learned just how culturally varied the world is since coming to college.” We administered both the Gibbs and Schnell childhood role-taking opportunities measure and the Gibbs and Mason post-childhood measure focusing on work and college role-taking experiences to a college sample evidencing mixtures of Stage 3 and Stage 4 moral judgment (Mason & Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b). The post-childhood measure, but not the childhood measure, was highly correlated with moral judgment level in this advanced sample. Using the post-childhood measure, Comunian and Gielen (1995, 2000) found significant gains (relative to a comparison group) in expanded social perspective-taking and toward Stage 4 moral judgment among young adults who engaged in communitarian activities. Hence, Kohlberg was right to stress the distinct importance of socially expanded perspective-taking experiences for moral judgment development beyond childhood.

Assessing Stages of Immature and Mature Moral Judgment

Although we have not emphasized the “stage” construct in our depiction of cognitive-developmental themes, it should be clear by now that many of our conclusions regarding the products of moral judgment development can be summarized in terms of immature and mature stages. Immature moral judgment stages are superficial insofar as they confuse morality either with salient appearances, consequences, or other objects of centration (Stage 1) or with “you scratch my back I’ll scratch yours” deals; that is, pragmatic reciprocity (Stage 2). The concrete decentralization of Stage 2 moral judgment provides a certain rationality, especially in contrast
to the capricious and blithe inconsistencies of Stage 1 thinking. Accordingly, Stage 2 is somewhat less superficial. Nonetheless, the light of subsequent stages exposes the superficiality even of Stage 2 judgment: Its rationality is interpersonally shallow, narrow, and unabashedly self-serving.

Perhaps through reflection upon pragmatic reciprocity, and especially with socialization support, a more ideal and profound morality typically emerges in child development. Mature moral judgment penetrates through superficial considerations to infer the bases of interpersonal relationships (Stage 3) or society (Stage 4). The Stage 3 ideal-reciprocity maturity constructed in the face-to-face interpersonal sphere extends across complex or diverse social settings (Stage 4).

To assess an individual’s moral judgment maturity in terms of these stages and thereby to study moral judgment development across cultures, we start by defining a moral judgment stage as a structure of moral justifications; that is, of reasons supporting a decision or evaluation in the context of the right and the good (see Chapter 1). Accordingly, the decision or evaluation pertains to values such as keeping a promise, telling the truth, helping a friend, saving a life, and not stealing.

Our assessment measures (even multiple-choice measures; see Gibbs, Arnold, Morgan, et al., 1984; Basinger & Gibbs, 1987; cf. Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999) of moral judgment development are based on such a definition. In particular, the Sociomoral Reflection Measure–Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992; Gibbs, Basinger, & Grime, 2003; Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey 2007; for reliability and validity, see Basinger, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1995) asks individuals to evaluate and justify the importance of specified moral values. The values are specified through certain lead-in statements (e.g., “Think about when you’ve made a promise to a friend…”). Respondents’ justifications are then matched to inductively and deductively derived “criterion” justifications found in the scoring manual (Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992). At each stage, the justifications are depicted in terms of five to seven aspects that cohere into a gestalt or “montage” that serves to guide the matching. The immature stages (1 and 2) can be illustrated in terms of their montages for the collective value of keeping a promise and telling the truth:

**Stage 1: Centrations** • “You should always keep a promise, and never be a tattletale. It’s telling a lie, and it’s not nice to lie. If you made a promise to a friend, it wouldn’t be nice to break it because then he won’t play with you and won’t be your friend any more. Or he’d cry and beat you up. Not only that, but you will get in trouble. Your parents will punish you if you lie or break a promise.”

**Stage 2: Exchanges** • “Your friend has probably done things for you and may return the favor if you help him by keeping your promise. Besides, you may like your friend, and this could be your only friend. Lies catch up with you sooner or later, and once they do and the other person finds out, they may get even. If it’s parents and children, then parents should keep their promises to the children if the children have kept their promises to the parents. But if the promise is to someone you hardly know, then why bother? They’ll probably never know whether you kept it or not.”

Illustrating mature-stage (Stages 3 and 4) moral judgment are these montages:

**Stage 3: Mutualities** • “Your friend has faith in you, and you shouldn’t betray that trust or hurt his feelings. After all, you’d expect him to keep his promises to
you, and having a friend to share feelings with means a lot. Even if it’s not a friend, honesty is still the best policy and it’s just common courtesy. It’s selfish to break promises, and once you make a bad impression, people won’t think much of you. If it’s a child and the parents don’t keep promises, the children will stop believing in their parents and will start thinking that lying is all right. Even if it’s someone you hardly know, you may start a good relationship by showing that you care and can be trusted.”

Stage 4: Systems • “Society is based on trust and reliability, and keeping promises is necessary for the sake of social order. Honesty is a standard everyone can accept, and you wouldn’t want to live in a society where you couldn’t trust anyone. After all, promises have intrinsic value, and a relationship is meaningless if there is no trust. In the case of a child, parents have an obligation to keep their word and to provide an example of character so that the child develops a sense of responsibility. Keeping a promise is a commitment—failing to keep it, even if it’s to someone you hardly know, reflects on your integrity. People must be consistent and not break promises whenever they feel like it, so that they can earn others’ respect, to say nothing of their own” (adapted from Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992).

These montages convey our sense of “stages” as reasonably coherent, qualitatively distinct frameworks, complex schemas, or cognitive structures. Each stage paves the way for the next, resulting in a sequence of progressively more mature understanding—not merely more sophisticated verbiage designed to dress up one’s intuitions in order to impress others (as suggested by Haidt; see Chapter 2). Do growing children in fact evidence such immature and mature stages in their moral judgment? Can an age trend in these terms be observed around the world, consistent with Kohlberg’s claim of universality in moral judgment development?

**Moral Judgment Stage Development Across Cultures**

These questions can in fact be addressed on the basis of findings from the measure just described. The SRM-SF as well as Kohlberg’s original interview instrument have been used to measure moral judgment development in over 100 research studies spanning over 40 countries (see Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007; and Snarey, 1985). The countries included in the SRM-SF review (Gibbs et al., 2007) collectively represented cultural diversity: Although many of the samples were urban and Westernized, some were non-urban (rural communities in Armenia, Kenya, Nigeria), and others were outside Western Europe and North America (namely, Armenia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Russia in Eastern Europe; Sweden in Northwest Europe; China, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan in Asia; Kenya and Nigeria in Africa; and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East). In this connection, the SRM-SF was translated into sixteen non-English languages. SRM-SF protocol attrition (from unscorable justifications, etc.) was generally low (less than 10%), suggesting that the questionnaire’s questions and moral values “made sense” to the respondents, and that a common core captures their reasons in support of those values, despite the diversity of the respondents’ cultural contexts.

Table 3.1 presents an overall picture of moral judgment development across cultures aggregated across the studies (not included are juvenile delinquents’
### Table 3.1 Cross-cultural samples in rank order by mean Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score (SRMS), grouped by age period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, sample/age range (mean) in years</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Global stage range</th>
<th>M</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Late childhood (approx. 9–11 years old)</strong></td>
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<td>2–2/3</td>
<td>209</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2/3–3</td>
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<td>2/3–3</td>
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<td>Japan, university students/NR (19.8)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2/3–3/4</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium, university and vocational students/21–24 (NR)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria, adults in romantic relationships/19–73 (29.8)</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>3–3/4</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England, university students/18–25 (19.5)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3–3/4</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia, upper-division university students/20–26 (22.5)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>333</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States, university students/17–39 (20.8)</td>
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<td>3–3/4</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>94</td>
<td>3–3/4</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy, adult community volunteers/33.9</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
moral judgment levels; see Chapter 7). The moral judgment levels are presented in terms of both Global Stage range and Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score (SRMS), a continuous variable ranging from 100 (pure Stage 1) to 400 (pure Stage 4). The Global Stage designations in the table are derived from SRMS values as follows: 100–125 = Stage 1; 126–174 = Transition 1/2; 175–225 = Stage 2; 226–274 = Transition 2/3; etc. The mean SRMSs for the samples reviewed are then ordered and grouped by Childhood (Late), Adolescence (Early, Middle/Late), and Adulthood (Young, Middle).

A full analysis of moral judgment development across these cultures is provided in our review, published elsewhere (see Gibbs et al., 2007). From even a brief inspection of the adapted and updated table presented here, however, support can be seen for Kohlberg’s universality claim: Growth beyond the superficial in moral judgment does indeed take place across diverse cultural contexts. Apparently, moral development is not entirely relative to particular cultures and socialization practices.

Of particular relevance to this chapter is the crucial qualitative advance that takes place in the years from late childhood into early adolescence. In our terms, the advance is from Stage 2 pragmatic exchanges to Stage 3 mutualities. As the table indicates, Stage 3 already makes an appearance in the stage ranges of some late childhood samples, but generally gains prominence (sometimes even full-stage prominence) during early adolescence. By late adolescence, Stage 3 normally (at least for non-delinquents among the cultures studied) becomes the mean global moral judgment stage. Older adolescents (at least in national states) may also begin to extend their Stage 3 mutualistic understanding to grasp the importance of agreed-upon standards and institutions for the common good (Stage 4).

**Stage Mixture**

The traditional cognitive-developmental approach claims that: (a) a stage is a structure not only conceptually but also empirically—that is, at any given time an individual is “in” mainly one stage or another (evidencing only minimal mixture with an adjacent stage); and (b) stage development occurs step-by-step in
an invariant sequence—that is, with no reversals or skipping (see Chapter 4).
Kohlberg's longitudinal research team (of which I was a member) reported results
largely consistent with these claims (Kohlberg, Colby, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983;
cf. L. J. Walker, 1988). The longitudinal results are arguably open to criticism, how-
ever, in that the low levels of stage mixture were to some extent an artifact of the
scoring methods (see Krebs, Vermuelen, Carpendale, & Denton, 1991). Scoring
methods less vulnerable to these criticisms, such as those used with the SRM-SF
(see Basinger et al., 1995), do yield higher levels of stage mixture. We agree with
Flavell and colleagues' (2002) suggestion, then, that the qualitative changes in
social and non-social cognitive development should be regarded “as rough age
trends” (p. 140). Indeed, Kohlberg's longitudinal team (Colby et al., 1983) noted
the overlapping “curves” of stage development, “with earlier stages dropping out
as later stages enter, such that the subject seems to be always in transition from one
stage to the next” (p. 49, emphasis added).
Piaget (1932/1965) himself noted the presence of considerable overlap in the
age trend from superficial to more mature moral judgment. Even within a single
child's interview, variability in the level of moral judgment can be discerned:

[Const., age 7] (Let's pretend that you are the mummy. You have two little girls. One of
them breaks fifteen cups as she is coming into the dining room, the other breaks one cup
as she is trying to get some jam while you are not there. Which of them would you punish
more severely?) The one who broke the fifteen cups. . . . (Have you ever broken anything?)
A cup. (How?) I wanted to wipe it, and I let it drop. (What else have you broken?) Another
time, a plate. (How?) I took it to play with. (Which was the naughtiest thing to do?) The
plate, because I oughtn't to have taken it. (And how about the cup?) That was less naughty
because I wanted to wipe it. (Which were you punished most for, the cup or the plate?) For
the plate. (Listen, I am going to tell you two more stories. A little girl was wiping the cups.
She was putting them away, wiping them with the cloth, and she broke five cups. Another
little girl is playing with some plates. She breaks a plate. Which of them is the naughtiest?)
The girl who broke the five cups. (pp. 125–126)

The seven-year-old’s responses vary in maturity according to whether the
questions address her direct personal experience (a condition of “high support”
conducive to optimal or more mature functioning) (Fischer & Bidell, 2006) or
hypothetical situations (“low support”). Because of such variability, Piaget refrained
from referring to his modes of moral judgment as “stages,” recommending instead
the concept of overlapping “phases” (p. 317). Damon (1980) found in a two-year
longitudinal study that distributive-justice stage development was “gradual, mixed,
and uneven” (p. 1017). Siegler (1996a; cf. Colby et al., 1983; Flavell et al., 2002;
Rest, 1979) suggested that the stage construct can be salvaged if each new stage
were conceptualized not as a new step but rather as a beginning new “wave” that
overlaps previous waves in the waxings and wanings of developmental advance.

We might describe a child as mainly “in” a certain social or non-social cogni-
tive stage, as long as we specify the context or content domain and emphasize
that stage mixture would characterize the child's cross-situational performance.
Although disequilibration may not be necessary for developmental advance
(Siegler, 1996b), high stage mixture in moral judgment development may generate
disequilibration that in turn tends to facilitate longitudinal gain (Walker, Gustafson, & Hennig, 2001).

**Stages as Schemas**

James Rest and colleagues (Rest et al., 1999) were sufficiently impressed with stage mixture and other problems to suggest replacing *stage* with the more generic and less theory-laden term *schema* in developmental theory. Schemas (or schemata) are frameworks for meaningful experience that can be activated in imagination, self-talk, or encounters with reality. Most schemas are dynamic, growing through cycles of interplay with the environment that take place over time (cf. Neisser, 1976). Through schemas, the self perceives or experiences (anticipates, attends to, interacts with) an environmental event. Surprises from that event elicit refinements or even reorganizations of the schemas. The newly refined schemas then contribute to more competent or adaptive interaction in the next environmental encounter. It is through such progressive cyclical interplay that growth beyond the superficial in morality takes place.

Various uses of the schema construct are evident in the literature of developmental psychology. The various operationalizations are of course not precisely equivalent; “boundary conditions” of each usage should be specified (Meichenbaum, 1990, p. 99). Roughly speaking, however, we can state that schemas motivate, guide, and structure. The implicit or automatic quality of established (and sometimes skeletal) schemas is emphasized in the related terms *gists* and *heuristics*. Fairly typical is Keenan and Ward's (2003) description of schemas as “structure[s] containing beliefs or attitudes that follow a similar theme or pattern” or as “organizing frameworks for processing new information” (p. 145). That schemas can provide a “picture of the way the world works” is suggested by one description of them as “causal maps” (Gopnik, 2009, p. 39; cf. “orienting schemas,” Neisser, 1976, p. 111). That schemas are dynamic is reflected in phrases such as “action-oriented representations” (Trzebinski, 1985) and “interlocking cognitive-affective representations” (Cason, Resick, & Weaver, 2002, emphasis added). Piaget claimed that schemas have “an intrinsic need . . . to exercise themselves” (Feffer, 1970, p. 198). Seymour Epstein and colleagues (e.g., Epstein, 1991; Epstein & Morling, 1995; cf. Narvaez, 2008) suggested that schemas actively serve basic needs for pleasure or avoidance of pain, self-enhancement, consistency or predictability, and social relatedness. In social cognition, we build “relational schemas” (e.g., Baldwin, 1992) that guide and shape our expectations concerning others vis-à-vis the self. Whereas relational schemas pertain to particular contexts of social interaction, *internal working models* (Bowlby, 1980; Shaver, Collins, & Clark, 1996) and “theories of mind” are thought to influence our basic approach to and understanding of social relationships. “Implicit theories” structure our perception and explanation of the empirical world (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Gopnik, 2009). In subsequent chapters, we will pay particular attention to moral identity or *self* schemas (e.g., Harter, 2012) for which morality is highly relevant (Chapter 6), schemas of cognitive distortion and constructive social interaction (Chapters 7 and 8), schemas by which people attempt to describe the near-death experience (Chapter 9), and the
Moral Development and Reality

epistemological distinction between *scripts* for event sequences in the environment (Hoffman, 2000; Nelson, 1981) and *logico-mathematical structures* of knowledge (Chapter 10).

In both Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories, *stage* can refer to a relatively broad and complex schema that is qualitatively distinct from—yet related to—other such schemas in a developmental sequence. Anne Colby (2000) defined moral judgment stages as “cognitive-moral frameworks” representing “different sets of assumptions that help to inform and shape people’s reactions to the micro-decisions they face” in everyday life (p. 162). As fundamental frameworks or sets of assumptions, moral judgment stages make only indirect contributions to everyday reactions, decisions, and perceptions. Nonetheless, a crucial point is that, once a stage has been constructed, its activation can be quick (as we saw in Chapter 2).

We continue to use the term *stage*, then, but with the caveat that its conceptual coherence typically does not mean concurrence in the emergence of its facets during childhood. In the broadest terms, *stages* in cognitive development refer to an individual’s ways of knowing and interacting with the social and non-social world. Each stage paves the way for construction of the next, qualitatively new and more adequate or mature stage. During any ongoing interaction with reality, however, a given individual is likely to activate multiple stages and other schemas (cf. Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Siegler, 1996a).

If development is to take place, schemas must be open to consolidation, refinement, transformation, and even radical reorganization as novelties and contradictions are encountered. In Piagetian terms, experience is assimilated to a preexisting cognitive structure, which itself undergoes (or should undergo) accommodation. For example, a child who encounters a camel for the first time may distortingly assimilate it to a horse schema but notice the hump and reflect, “That surely is a funny-looking horse!” Correspondingly, the preconservational children in the Ames and Murray (1982) study were perplexed (the Piagetian term is *disequilibrated*) by anomalous facts pressed upon them by peers who saw in terms of the opposing centration (e.g., a child judging “more” liquid after it is poured into the tall glass is pressed to attend to how thin the tall glass is).

Eventually, accommodation to the novel features (such as the camel’s hump or the glass’s other dimension) will induce a differentiation and the construction of a new structure or schema (“camel”; or conservation knowledge). Once the accommodation and new equilibration are accomplished, these more differentiated and integrated schemas are available to inform future encounters. Accordingly, the next camel encountered is accurately construed, or—more relevant to the cognitive developmental point—the next conservation question is understood to be a matter of logical inference rather than empirical perception (the “crucial” qualitative and developmental difference described earlier in this chapter).

It is important to note that this general account of processes in cognitive development obscures a fundamentally important epistemological distinction: horses, camels, and such represent empirical knowledge, whereas conservation, reciprocity, and such pertain in part to *logico-mathematical* knowledge (see Chapter 10). Growth beyond the superficial in this latter domain entails a coordination of inherent relations and the appreciation of logical and moral necessities, not merely the
accommodation of schemas to the empirical world. In Robert Siegler’s and Matija Svetina’s (2006) intervention (noted earlier), “there was something appealing” about the logical (vs. empirical) explanations that led to greater eventual effectiveness: “The five-year-olds who were exposed to both logical and empirical explanations for the correct answer rated the logical explanations as smarter [or more adequate] even before they themselves began to solve the problems correctly” (p. 1010; for the corresponding effect in moral judgment, see Boom, Brugman, & van der Heijden, 2001).

EVALUATING HAIDT’S CHALLENGE

In the last chapter (Chapter 2), we described Jonathan Haidt’s “dose of reality” challenges to the cognitive developmental approach. You may recall Haidt’s (and others’) claim that moral judgment such as that of equality or reciprocity entails an inborn intuition, perhaps an innate module, in place from the outset of life even if initially unelaborated and unexpressed given early-childhood language limitations. In the Haidtian view, “growth beyond the superficial” has little meaning; morality reduces to some mixture of moral nativism and enculturation. Moral development becomes not really so developmental after all.

The findings presented in this chapter afford an opportunity to extend our (Chapter 2) evaluation of Haidt’s challenge. It is true that superficiality in early childhood is more tendency than incapacity; i.e., that nascent inferential abilities are discernible earlier, under optimal circumstances. Yet as we have seen, this superficial tendency is remarkably pervasive across social and non-social, verbal and behavioral contexts. Social and nonsocial cognitive development entails growth beyond this superficial tendency.

We counter, then, Haidt’s (Chapter 2) “not really” challenge to the cognitive developmental approach with an evidentially based “Yes, really”: Yes, the mental life of the young child really is, by and large, uncoordinated and fluctuating. Young children really do tend to view, for example, victimizers and victims as simply “happy” and “sad,” respectively, with little or no interpenetration of perspectives. Young children’s paucity of ongoing mental coordination really does account for a crucial qualitative difference between their understanding and that of older children. The flip side of young children’s charming whimsy is that they generally don’t yet quite “get” logical necessity, consistency, or moral reciprocity. The development of a qualitatively new, deeper, more mature understanding in this respect is, as Smedslund demonstrated decades ago, a matter of construction more than enculturation, learning, or training. The verbal reasoning of the older child is not mere “linguistic effluvium masking far more zoological concerns,” as Sam Harris (2010, p. 51) vividly characterized Haidt’s claim. Instead, language development intimately relates to and facilitates cognitive development. Decentration or mental coordination through social interaction really is required if a genuinely adequate morality or mature moral competence is to emerge. And, as we argued in Chapter 1, caring or “the good” of welfare (vs. harm) really is the main complementary pillar to “the right” of justice in genuinely mature morality.
In the final analysis, development must be taken seriously. Presented in this chapter have been the fundamental themes of the cognitive developmental approach to morality. In this approach, growth beyond the superficial in morality entails a qualitative sequence of immature and mature stages (see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). At the core of the mature stages are hypothetical reflection and the construction of ideal moral reciprocity. Mature morality penetrates through superficial considerations of immature morality (Stages 1 and 2) to infer the intangible bases of interpersonal relationships or society (Stages 3 and 4). An age trend from immature to mature stages was evident in reviews of studies conducted in over 40 countries. Because the stages overlap so greatly, the stage sequence constitutes only a rough age trend in the use of increasingly mature ways of understanding and interacting with the social world. Bolder claims for extended stages of moral judgment development were made by Kohlberg, to whose theory we next turn.
Lawrence Kohlberg’s contribution to the field of moral development was enormous. He almost single-handedly innovated the field of cognitive moral development in American psychology. Such work scarcely existed in the early 1960s when Kohlberg began to publish his research: “His choice of topics [namely, ‘morality’] made him something of an ‘odd duck’ within American psychology…. No up-to-date social scientist, acquainted with [the relativism of] psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and cultural anthropology, used such words [as morality or moral judgment development] at all” (Brown & Herrnstein, 1975, pp. 307–308). Yet these social scientists could not ignore Kohlberg’s claim—and supporting evidence—that morality is not basically relative to culture; that is, that across diverse cultures one can discern a qualitative sequence of progressively more adequate modes of moral judgment. Kohlberg became one of the most frequently cited psychologists in the social and behavioral sciences (Haggbloom et al., 2000). His work is still noted in virtually every major developmental psychology textbook on the current market. Even so, it is not clear that Kohlberg’s developmental claim was ever fully understood. Despite Kohlberg’s (more precisely, Piaget’s) efforts, many contemporary psychologists still confuse socialization with development (as evidenced, for example, in Haidt’s theoretical work; see Chapter 2).

This chapter revisits, clarifies, and critiques Kohlberg’s theory. We conclude with a new view of “the right” in moral development. The basics of this view were introduced in our Chapter 3 depiction of the fundamental themes of the cognitive-developmental approach: themes such as growth beyond the superficial, construction, social perspective-taking, and stage sequence. Whereas Chapter 3 went “beneath” Kohlberg’s theory, this chapter addresses Kohlberg’s theory per se. Kohlberg’s driving insight was that moral development is not complete by the end of childhood, but instead continues throughout the human lifespan. For background, we narrate how Kohlberg used Piaget’s work and the stage-developmental writings of philosopher John Dewey to fashion a six-stage sequence that would be (Kohlberg hoped) clearly invariant and lifespan in scope. As we will see, that attempt was costly: It resulted in a misrepresentation of “development” in the Piagetian sense and the nature of moral judgment maturity. Kohlberg did succeed, however, in establishing the increasing importance of contemplative (or hypothetical-deductive) reflection in moral judgment development. Such reflection plays a key role in our proposed new view (outlined later in Table 4.1).

**BACKGROUND**

In 1985 (just two years before he died), Kohlberg referred both to Dewey and Piaget as he recollected how his moral judgment stages started and evolved in the course of his “search for universal morality”: 

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81
My views . . . were based on John Dewey's philosophy of development and his writings concerning the impulsive, group-conforming, and reflective stages of moral development. The first empirical work to pursue this direction was taken by the great Swiss child psychologist Jean Piaget, in 1932. . . . Using [in my dissertation; Kohlberg, 1958] dilemmas created by philosophers or novelists, I was struck by the fact that adolescents had distinctive patterns of thinking which were coherent and were their own, just as Piaget had seen distinctive patterns of thinking in younger children. In my dissertation I tentatively characterized these patterns as qualitative stages and added three stages to those formulated by Piaget.

When I completed my dissertation I was well aware that by describing ninety-eight American boys, aged ten to sixteen, I had not created a universal theory. The stages I had postulated had to meet criteria. . . .

Kohlberg's empirical starting point as he began his 1955 dissertation work, then, was the work of Jean Piaget. Kohlberg saw in Piaget's (1932/1965) classic *Moral Judgment of the Child* the potential for establishing a stable cognitive developmental underpinning for morality, and, in particular, a universal sequence of moral judgment. Piaget had identified certain basic age trends, comprising successive schemas of moral thought that might be "invariant" across factors of social class, culture, sex, race, and cohort. The more advanced schemas were "constructed" through peer interaction (as well as, in Kohlberg's revision, other experiences of social perspective-taking; see Chapter 3). Although social class, culture, and other factors might affect social perspective-taking and hence the rate of a child's moral development, they would not alter the developmental *sequence*. Cognitive moral development involved a cross-culturally invariant sequence with a "definite direction," an age trend of naturally upward, sustained change from "the more primitive" to "the more evolved" organizations or structures. Furthermore, the "more evolved" or mature schemas of judgment were expected to be fairly common or "universal" across diverse cultures (p. 335). Indeed, each structure is thought to transform into a qualitatively new and more adequate organization of thought. No schema could be skipped, because each schema was needed to pave the way for the next. *Invariant sequence* meant for Piaget, then, a standard, cross-culturally evident age trend of sustained progressive, qualitative change entailing a consecutive sequence of qualitatively distinct and basic schemas of action and reflection. Once constructed, the more advanced competencies could not ordinarily be lost. Any regression in cognitive competence (beyond ordinary variations in performance) or skipping of one of the schemas would violate the expectations of invariant sequence.

Interestingly, Piaget (1932/1965) generally refrained from labeling these basic moral judgment schemas *stages* and from making strong invariant sequence claims for them. Instead, because of variability and mixture in usage (see Chapter 3), "invariant sequence" in this context referred merely to "phases" (p. 317) of moral judgment that "partially synchronize" (p. 124); development merely meant that the later phases gradually gain ascendancy. This ascending- phases view of moral
Kohlberg’s Theory

judgment development resembles contemporary models of cognitive development (Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Rest, 1979; Siegler, 1996).

Piaget (1970, 1971, 1972) reserved for non-social cognitive development the bolder claim that invariant sequence refers not just to overlapping phases but to stages. A basic schema or stage was a structure d’ensemble, an overall organization that would “hang together” in development and hence give rise to a distinct period or era of cognitive development. He saw his famous pre-operational, concrete operational, and to some extent formal operational stages, then—but not his moral judgment phases—as characterizing such a clear sequence in cognitive development. Although he did allow for considerable variability or stage mixture (see Chapter 3), especially during transition, Piaget characterized the developing child as generally “in” one or another stage or period of development.

In moral judgment, Kohlberg had the courage of Piaget’s bolder convictions. Kohlberg hypothesized, in effect, that Piaget was unduly conservative in his relegation of moral judgment development to overlapping phases in a rough age trend. To put the point positively, Kohlberg anticipated that moral judgment development data (if investigated from a more adequate conceptual, empirical, and methodological framework) could support a claim of clearly invariant stage sequence.

Kohlberg (1964) scrutinized in light of subsequent research the various aspects of moral judgment studied by Piaget. Kohlberg found that: (a) certain aspects “reflect cognitive development” (p. 398), whereas others seemed more “socioemotional”; and (b) the age trends in the former (cognitive) but not latter (socioemotional) aspects held up across variations in children’s nationality (at least in Western cultures), social class, or religion. Hence, the constituents of these cognitive age trends held promise for satisfying Piaget’s bolder sense of invariant stage sequence (requiring low stage mixture; see Chapter 3). Indeed, beyond merely reflecting cognitive development, moral development would become “its own sequential process,” a distinct domain in its own right (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 187).

The promise of these age trends could be actualized, Kohlberg surmised, if the structure of participants’ moral judgments were more effectively probed for patterns of reasoning. Rather than Piaget’s story pairs (see Chapter 3), Kohlberg in his dissertation used moral dilemmas (“created by philosophers or novelists”). The most famous dilemma is that of the husband Heinz, who must decide whether to steal a prohibitively overpriced drug to save his dying wife. Kohlberg also included adolescents in his dissertation (Piaget’s sample was restricted to ages 6–13), which led to the identification of stages beyond Piaget’s. As noted in his recollection, Kohlberg was “struck by the fact” that the adolescents in his sample “had distinctive patterns of thinking which were coherent and were their own.”

As Kohlberg recollected, he based his work not only on Piaget’s empirical work but also on Dewey’s philosophy and writings concerning moral stages. Indeed, Kohlberg saw Piaget’s empirical work on moral judgment as pursuing the direction of Dewey’s (Dewey & Tufts, 1908) philosophy of moral developmental stages as progressing through impulsive, group conforming, and, finally, reflective levels. It is possible that Piaget was pursuing such a direction in his moral judgment research. Yet Piaget (1932/1965), in his *Moral Judgment of the Child*, made no
reference to Dewey’s stage conceptions; nor do Piaget’s phases bear much resemblance to those conceptions. Kohlberg’s (1971) thesis that psychology and philosophy can respectively inform and guide each other is well taken. Nonetheless, as we will see, Kohlberg’s Dewey-inspired three-level conception misguided the formulation, extension, and refinement of the stages.

Kohlberg’s Overhaul of Piaget’s Phases

In effect, Kohlberg overhauled and added to Piaget’s phases using an adaptation of Deweyan views. Dewey’s “impulsive” (hedonic desires, needs), “group-conforming” (customs, rules), and “reflective” (conscience, principles) stages were at first labeled premoral, conventional, and “self-accepted moral principles” levels (Kohlberg, 1963, 1964, p. 400) and later as preconventional, conventional, and postconventional levels (Kohlberg, 1976; cf. Rest et al., 1999). To this trichotomy of levels were assimilated a total of six stages: two per level. Our critique asks, essentially: How well did this overhaul work? Did it result in a more valid model of universal moral judgment stages? Did it clarify our understanding of developmental processes or of moral judgment maturity? Did the six-stage scheme evidence an invariant sequence in Kohlberg’s longitudinal research?

Dewey’s trichotomy works adequately for the first two stages; that is, the term preconventional is not inaccurate. Generally lacking in these stages, after all, is an understanding of the intangible and ideal bases for interpersonal and societal norms or conventions. Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s descriptions of these stages roughly agree. Piaget’s first phase, “heteronomous” morality—purged of what Kohlberg called its “socioemotional” aspects—constitutes a superficial childhood morality that relates fairly well to Kohlberg’s “punishment and obedience” Stage 1 (even though “punishment and obedience” is a misnomer; see Chapter 3). Nor is there great harm in relating Piaget’s Stage 2 “reciprocity as a fact” version of moral autonomy to Kohlberg’s “individualism, instrumental purpose, and exchange” Stage 2 (Kohlberg, 1976). The term “pragmatic exchanges” does depict this morality of concrete decentration.

After Stage 2, however, the Deweyan trichotomy seriously distorts the nature of moral judgment development. Although Kohlberg was right to point out the need to extend Piagetian stages of moral judgment beyond childhood, his use of the Deweyan trichotomy meant that those later stages were misrepresented. As noted in Chapter 3, Piaget (1932/1965) hypothesized that “reciprocity as an ideal” (our referent for Stage 3) is achieved as the socially interacting child reflectively grasps the mutuality—the deeper, ideal social logic, as it were—underlying the concretely applied logic of reciprocal exchanges. Hence, Piaget’s Stage 3 marks the construction of mature or profound moral understanding (albeit only within the sphere of the dyad or the homogeneous community). Unfortunately, Kohlberg lost Piaget’s recognition of this stage’s maturity. Ideal reciprocity was largely obscured and even distorted in Kohlberg’s Deweyan characterization of interpersonal morality as essentially group-conforming or conventional. Ideal reciprocity, or Stage 3, became the stage of “interpersonal conformity” or even “‘good boy–nice girl’” (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 164). Even later in Kohlberg’s theoretical work, Stage 3 became
Kohlberg’s Theory

part of the “member of society” sociomoral perspective in which “the self is identified with or has internalized the rules and expectations of others, especially those of authorities” (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 10).

The growing person’s grasp of the intangible bases for social cooperation may expand from the Stage 3 interpersonal to broader social spheres such as that of social systems, as indicated in Stage 4 (see Chapter 3). In other words, profound or mature moral judgment blossoms, and Kohlberg was right to explore its blossom beyond the childhood years. The expansion to a fourth stage through Kohlberg’s Deweyan lens, however, was misrepresented as entailing an identification with the authorities and internalization of the legal and other norms of one’s society, resulting in a “law and order orientation” (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 164), scarcely what one could characterize as basic moral judgment maturity.

Kohlberg hypothesized the existence not only of a fourth stage but also of a fifth and sixth stage, beyond the childhood moral judgment studied by Piaget. These stages were intended to capture the development of moral reasoning beyond the confines of the childhood moral perspective. However, the critical question is whether these later stages are indeed stages of moral development or simply reflect an increased ability to conform to or internalize societal norms.” (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 164).
final two stages composed his Dewey-inspired postconventional level, representing a “prior-to-society” social perspective that “differentiates the self from the rules and expectations of others and defines moral values in terms of self-chosen principles” (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 16). The principles pertained to “social contract or utility and individual rights” (Stage 5) or “universal ethical principles” (Stage 6). In his original cross-sectional dissertation sample, Kohlberg (1963) interpreted 20% of the 16-year-olds’ moral judgment protocols as evidencing Stage 5 thinking and a much smaller percentage (5%) as using Stage 6. Neither stage was used with more than negligible frequency among the other participants in the sample (the 10- and 13-year-olds).

The irony is evident. In Kohlberg’s search for a universal morality, the highest stages—even among the oldest participants in his dissertation sample, the adolescents—were far less than prevalent. As Kohlberg subsequently discovered and dealt with violations of the invariant sequence claim in his longitudinal research, the non-universality problem worsened. Indeed, as we will see, the highest stages were to become (to use Kohlberg’s word) rare.

Discoveries of Longitudinal Research

As Kohlberg noted in his recollection, his dissertation stages and levels did not necessarily constitute a “universal theory” of moral judgment development. Evaluation of the stage typology would require empirical research, especially longitudinal and cross-cultural studies. Kohlberg embarked on an ambitious longitudinal research project, following up his dissertation sample by conducting moral judgment interviews every three years, from the late 1950s until the early 1980s. The longitudinal results yielded problems that, as per Kohlberg’s recollection, quoted earlier, “led to refinement and revision in the description and scoring of the stages.”

Violations and Restoration of Invariant Sequence

The most substantial revisions were prompted by the discovery of major violations of invariant sequence in longitudinal interview data collected during the 1960s. The regressions were evidenced by participants whose high school moral judgment had been “principled-sounding,” for example, who had conceptualized “the moral value of life as taking precedence over obedience to laws or authority” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 447). During their college-years interviews, however, their moral judgments were scored as largely at Stage 2. The regressions to Stage 2 during the college years were major not only in magnitude (much of it from the highest to the lowest stages) but also in frequency, involving approximately 20% of his sample. What a challenge to invariant sequence!

Kohlberg’s strategy for dealing with this challenge evolved. His initial response (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969) was to accept the apparently downward movement at face value as an ego development–related regression: the respondents had apparently “kicked…their Stage 5 morality and replaced it with good old Stage 2 hedonistic relativism” (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969, p. 109). Elliot Turiel (1974, 1977) argued, however, that the Stage 2 label for the college relativism belied its
actual sophistication. Kohlberg came to agree; he (1973b, 1984) then reinterpreted the stage significance of selected longitudinal data, eliminating the “regression” through certain refinements in stage description and scoring. As Anne Colby (1978) and Kohlbergian colleagues explained (myself among them: see Colby et al., 1983; cf. Colby et al., 1987), seven longitudinal cases were selected for the refinement work. The refined scoring system, constructed through scrutiny of these cases, was “used to score the remaining interviews in the longitudinal study” (Colby, 1978, p. 9), thereby providing a test of whether the refined stage constructs evidenced invariant stage sequence.

The refined system rested on Kohlberg’s reinterpretation of the apparent regression from the highest stages to Stage 2 as in fact a transition (“4½”). Kohlberg (following Turiel) argued that, although the moral judgment of the “regressed” college students resembled in content the naïve hedonism and instrumental pragmatism of the young Stage 2 participants, the college-level thinking was actually far more abstract and philosophical. For example, although a 20-year-old college student’s initial moral judgment response to Heinz’s dilemma (“If he values her life over the consequences of theft, he should do it”) resembled “good old Stage 2 relativism,” further questioning revealed greater sophistication. Instead of offering instrumental reasoning, the student explained that people “have varying values and interest frameworks [that] produce subjective decisions which are neither permanent nor absolute” (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969, p. 110). Kohlberg identified two distinct “levels of discourse” or “social perspectives”: Whereas naïve Stage 2 moral judgment aimed at “justifying moral judgment to an individual selfish actor,” the discourse evident in the college students’ moral judgment protocols was beyond Stage 4, aimed at “defining a moral theory and justifying basic moral terms or principles from a standpoint outside [or prior to] that of a member of a constituted society” (Kohlberg, 1973b, p. 192). The “theory,” emphatically “defined” by the “4½” thinkers, was a meta-ethical skeptical relativism (Turiel, 1977) that Michael Boyes and Michael Chandler (1992) called extreme or “unbridled.” Boyes and Chandler attributed this epistemological and moral relativism to the impact of “newfound” formal operations:

The achievement of formal operational models of reasoning, while a decided advantage to those living in a culture as riddled with abstractions as our own, is not accomplished without certain short-run costs. One of these is that the newfound capacity for reflection characteristic of formal operational thinkers serves to transform the isolated or case-specific uncertainties of childhood into an altogether more ominous set of generic doubts…[leading for a time to] unbridled relativism. (pp. 284–285, emphasis added)

To establish the “4½” transition as part of an invariant sequence, the refined analysis scrutinized not only the college but also the high school data; specifically, the “principled-sounding” moral judgments. Truly principled moral judgment must be more sophisticated than that. After all, if the new 4½ thinking was at a meta-ethical, theoretical, even a philosophical level of discourse, then should not the moral judgment beyond 4½ also evidence at least this level? Furthermore, should not 4½ skepticism naturally lead to more adequate levels of moral judgment? Unbridled relativism seemed to Kohlberg to be inherently unstable from
internal contradictions: if all morality is subjective, arbitrary, and relative, then why wouldn't those characteristics apply to the attendant claim that one should not impose one's morality on others? Accordingly, relativism undermines itself. Hence, sooner or later (at least for reflective adults, postmodernists notwithstanding), 4½ should destabilize. The internal contradictions of meta-ethical relativism should eventually “disequilibrate” or perplex the thinker and prompt a “reequilibration” leading to movement beyond unbridled relativism to the achievement of post-skeptical rationalism:

What comes to be understood by this class of especially mature young persons is that, despite the inescapably subjective character of the knowing process, it is still possible to settle upon methods and standards for deciding that certain beliefs and courses of action have better legs to stand on than do others. (Boyes & Chandler, 1992, p. 285)

Postskeptical rationalism in turn provides the nonrelative epistemological “legs” for principled, philosophical moral judgment stages (cf. Moshman, 2011). “From reflection upon the limits of customary morality in very varied cultural and educational circumstances”—and upon the internal contradictions of unbridled relativism—emerges the “natural” (as opposed to professional) philosophical (Stage 5) structure comprising “notions of natural rights, social contract, and utility” (Kohlberg, 1973a, p. 634). Whereas the level of discourse of the philosophical post-college adult data was seen as genuinely principled and scored accordingly, the discourse of the ostensibly principled high school adolescent moral judgment was judged in the refined analysis to be merely social conformist or member-of-society.

Dealing with Two New Problems

Although they restored invariant sequence, these refinements of the stages created two major new problems: (a) a strain upon the logical coherence of the so-called conventional level and (b) a worsening of non-universality at the so-called postconventional level.

Straining “Conventional”

The first problem was that the “conventional level” (now also called the “member-of-society” perspective) was internally contradictory. The two supposedly “conventional” stages, 3 and 4, now included profound expressions of “principled-sounding” moral ideality. How could a participant whose moral judgment represents an internalization of “the rules and expectations of others, especially those of authorities,” produce moral judgment conceptualizing “the moral value of life as taking precedence over obedience to laws or authority”?

Innovation of Moral Types A/B

Perhaps in an effort to deal with this problem and save the “conventional level” designation for Stages 3 and 4, Kohlberg (1984) introduced Moral Type A or B (see Chapter 6). Roughly speaking, in Kohlberg’s 1960s revision, the dissertation-
version Stage 3 (good boy–nice girl) and Stage 4 (law and order) moral judgment became designated respectively as Stage 3 Type A and Stage 4 Type A, whereas the previously postconventional, “principled-sounding” moral judgment became designated as either Stage 3 Type B (basic and universalized interpersonal ideals) or Stage 4 Type B (basic and universalized societal ideals). Alongside caring for friends and living up to interpersonal expectations (Stage 3A) were placed concerns for mutual good faith or understanding and for universalized caring (Stage 3B). Alongside concerns with fixed responsibilities or authority and the givens of the law (Stage 4A) were placed concerns with ideal responsibility to contribute to a better society and with moral law (Stage 4B).

Although Stages 3B and 4B embody moral ideality, Kohlberg argued that they are still at the conventional level because, like Stages 3A and 4A, their expression is only “intuitive,” not theoretical in any clear or precisely articulated way (although such expression still reflects constructive emergence rather than modular activation à la Haidt). Intuitive appeals to the priority of life in the Heinz dilemma, for example, might be (see Colby et al., 1987) that “a person’s life is more important than money” (Stage 3B) or that “the value of human life is more important than society’s need for law in this case” (Stage 4B). For a postconventional score, the expression would have to make the point in a more explicitly principled way, such as “a human life was at stake… that transcends any right the druggist had to the drug” (Stage 5); or, best of all, a Stage 6 formulation from a philosopher:

Since all property [such as the drug] has only relative value and only persons can have unconditional value, it would be irrational to act in such a manner as to make human life—or the loss of it—a means to the preservation of property rights. (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 209)

This insistence upon explicit theoretical or philosophical formulation struck an odd note in the cognitive development endeavor to identify implicitly evident patterns in social and nonsocial cognitive development.

The Rarification of Postconventional Moral Judgment

The elevation of theoretically over intuitively expressed justifications led to a second problem: rarification or elitism of the highest stages (Gibbs, 1979). Although this refinement did restore invariant sequence, it also generated “a fairly radical change in age norms” (Colby et al., 1983, p. 67). In addition to straining the meaning of “conventional,” the relocating of “principled-sounding” but roughly expressed justifications to the conventional level and the criteria of sophistication for the postconventional stages left for those stages precious little material. This problem was evident despite an effort, in the final scoring system, “to put the focus of the scoring back on operative moral judgments rather than in ultimate justification and metaethical assumptions” (Colby, 1978, p. 93). Given this problem, it is no wonder that, as Kohlberg recollected, the “final stages” were “found”—or, more accurately, refined—to be “rare.” As we noted, Kohlberg’s Stages 5 and 6 were already uncommon in his original 1950s formulation, but now the problem became severe. By the new scoring stringency, none of
Kohlberg’s longitudinal participants reached postconventional moral judgment before adulthood. Even in the adult years, only 13% fully or partially reached Stage 5, and all of those “had some graduate education” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 458, emphasis added). Stage 6 became so rare that Kohlberg was led to “suspend” (p. 273) his empirical claims for it and eliminate it from the scoring manual. He acknowledged that his revised description and scoring of Stage 6 “came from the writings of a small elite sample, elite in the sense of its formal philosophical training and in the sense of its ability for and commitment to moral leadership” (p. 270, emphasis added).

The rarity problem with the philosophically trained “discourse” of the final stages was also evident in cross-cultural research. As Kohlberg (1984) noted in his recollection, he was especially concerned with “whether the stages were really universal in non-Western cultures.” In a cross-cultural review, John Snarey (1985) noted that Stage 5’s “frequency within any particular sample is seldom high” and that none of Kohlberg’s longitudinal participants unambiguously reached Stage 6. Snarey concluded that even Stage 5 is based on the individualistic philosophies of “Kant, Rawls, and other Western philosophers” and hence is “incomplete” (p. 228). Snarey suggested that the characterization of Stage 5 be supplemented with more “collective” (p. 226) postconventional principles from non-Western societies (cf. Vasudev & Hummel, 1987). Yet even Stage 5 is inappropriate as a description of moral judgment maturity, not because it is cross-culturally incomplete, but more basically because any theory-defining level, even in broadened form, misrepresents moral judgment maturity as the exclusive province of the philosophically or theoretically articulate. Although many mature individuals spontaneously express the intangible bases for their moral values and decisions, few “people can articulate a principled justification, such as that human life is a cardinal value that trumps social norms, social stability, or obedience to the law” (Pinker, 2011, p. 624; emphasis added).

**Why Not Discard Dewey’s Trichotomy?**

The two problems created by Kohlberg’s stage revisions—contradiction within the conventional-level construct and rarification at the postconventional level—both derive from a generic problem: Kohlberg’s persistence through his three decades of work in assimilating his longitudinal moral judgment data into a Procrustean bed; namely, his Deweyan conceptual trichotomy (preconventional, conventional, postconventional). Kohlberg was correct that there is more to moral development than the basics of childhood and adolescence. Aspects of Kohlberg’s stage refinement were quite valid; for example, his innovations of the Moral Types A and B. Indeed, the moral clarity or ideality of Type B judgment represented a newer and more appropriate sense of “postconventional thinking”—not as an elite level but rather as an insightful mode of moral perception (see Chapter 6). Precisely because of these valid contributions, however, it is time finally to discard Dewey’s preconventional-conventional-postconventional trichotomy so that a more accurate depiction of basic moral judgment development and maturity can emerge.
Dewey's influence on Kohlberg's theory was not entirely adverse. Although the imposition of Dewey's tri-level sequence (impulsive, group conforming, reflective) led to serious problems of misrepresentation and elitism in Kohlberg's work, the Deweyan association of metacognitive reflection upon morality with the achievement of moral maturity is in principle valid. As Michael Tomasello and colleagues (Tomasello et al., 1996) observed, "Human beings have the seemingly unique capacity to treat their own behavior and cognition [and, we would add, existence] as 'objects of contemplation' in their own right" (p. 509). To treat as objects of contemplation one's thought and behavior—and, indeed, the phenomena and contexts of one's life—is to "disembed" oneself from those contexts (Fromm, 1947; cf. Kegan, 1982; Mustakova-Possardt, 2000). Accordingly, "the mature thinker may think about all manner of abstract ideas and ideals in such areas as morality, religion, and politics" (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 182). Although Kohlberg's conceptualization of reflective moral principles in terms of adult moral judgment stages (“4½,” “5,” “6”) can be questioned, his association of hypothetical reflection or cognitive disembedding with growth in moral judgment maturity is valid.

Beyond Invariant Sequence

Besides relating metacognitive reflection to the achievement of higher moral judgment stages, Kohlberg also discussed two ways in which such reflection contributes to adult moral development beyond an invariant sequence of stages. First, a contemplative adult may propose a systematic or formal philosophy of ethics. Second, a contemplative adult in existential crisis may develop a deeper and broader perspective on the moral life.

Formal Philosophy

Adults who become professional philosophers may reflect on basic "natural" ethics and go on to develop and publish formal theories. A formal theory may systematize or build from a "natural" moral-stage structure such as the Stage 5 judgment of laws “by the light of a social contract, by rule-utilitarianism, and by some notion of universal or natural rights” (Kohlberg, 1973a) or the Stage 6 ethics of universalizable claims. Indeed, Kohlberg saw "natural" Stages 5 and 6 as the generative sources, respectively, for these "two major families of formal moral theory"; namely, contractarian and Kantian ethics (p. 634). But after attaining the maturity of the natural and even the professional moral philosopher, then what?

Metaphorical "Stage 7"

Metacognitive, contemplative reflection can lead not only to formulations of professional philosophy but also to existential concerns:

Even after attainment of Stage 6’s clear awareness of universal principles, a fundamental ethical question still remains, namely, "Why be moral? Why be just in a universe that..."
appears unjust?” This question asks whether there is any support in reality or nature for acting according to universal moral principles. This question entails the further question, “Why live?”; thus, ultimate moral maturity requires a mature solution to the question of the meaning of life. This in turn, is hardly a moral question per se. (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990, p. 192, emphasis added; cf. Kohlberg & Power, 1981)

Mature metacognitive thinkers encountering ultimate questions—meta-ethical, existential, even spiritual and ontological—often first experience “despair,” which “can arise when we first begin to see … the finitude of our individual self” (p. 192). There is hope, however, for movement beyond despair. After all, individual finitude cannot be seen except from some (at least dimly intuited) perspective of holistic infinity. Emerging from the despair of finitude, then, is a cosmic perspective [in which] what is ordinarily ground [i.e., nature or the universe] becomes foreground, and the self is no longer figure to the ground. We sense the unity of the whole and ourselves as part of that unity. In the state of mind I metaphorically term Stage 7, we identify ourselves with the cosmic or infinite perspective and value life from its standpoint…. If we are aware of the relationship of all people and things to the whole of Nature, then we continue to love the whole in spite of the disappointments or losses [of life]. (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990, pp. 192, 196)

This initially dim but increasingly clear transcendent intuition, characterizable as a gestalt-like shift in figure–ground perception, parallels the earlier movement through the adolescent crisis of relativism, [transition] 4½, [which] can occur only because there is a dim apprehension of some more universal ethical standard in terms of which the cultural code is relative and arbitrary. To explore the crisis of relativism thoroughly and consistently is to decenter from the self, reverse figure and ground, and see as figure the vague standpoint of principle that is the background of the sense of relativity. (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990, p. 195)

Unlike the rational, theory-defining resolution of 4½, however, the resolution of existential despair cannot be resolved “solely on the basis of formal operational thought.” Rather, the existential resolution seems also to require a “mystical experience” (p. 206) or “experience of a nonegoistic or nondualistic variety…. Even persons who are not religious may temporarily achieve this state of mind in certain situations, as when on a mountaintop or before the ocean” (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990, p. 192; cf. Haidt, 2006, pp. 193–206).

Despair is overcome and the moral life is again valued as existential thinkers and meditators shift to this cosmic perspective. Such a perspective brings some resolution of ultimate questions: “Well-developed moral intuitions [are seen to] parallel intuitions about nature or ultimate reality” (p. 197). For example, we see that “our consciousness of justice…is parallel to, or in harmony with, our consciousness of… the larger cosmic order” (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990, p. 196). Concurrently, an eternal love displaces temporal desires:

If pleasure and power are not intrinsic ends, only the love of something eternal and infinite…can be an intrinsic end…. The knowledge and love of Nature is a form of union.
Our mind is part of a whole, Spinoza claims, and if we know and love the eternal, we ourselves are in some sense eternal. (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990, pp. 200–201)

The resonance between mind or morality (justice, love) and a holistic, supportive reality will be explored further in Chapters 9 and 10. Pertinent to our present concerns is Kohlberg's speculation regarding his metaphorical Stage 7 as “essential for understanding the potential for human development in adulthood” (Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990, p. 207). Adult moral development goes beyond invariant stage sequence: grasping a sense of a deeper reality “relies in part upon the self’s particular and somewhat unique life experiences” and hence is not a universal “developmental stage in the Piagetian sense” (p. 207).

A CRITIQUE AND NEW VIEW

In our view, moral development beyond “natural” moral stages need not await the formal enterprises or meta-ethical struggles of the adult years. For that matter, the so-called postconventional stages (5, 6) of “natural” moral philosophy already represent a kind of human development beyond basic moral judgment stages of maturity, ones in which even the bright, well-read, contemplative adolescent can and sometimes does participate.

It is not that professional philosophical theorists draw inspiration from the discourse of postconventional-stage theorists (as Kohlberg would have it), but rather that moral theorists (whether professional ethical philosophers or “postconventional” thinkers) draw inspiration from the basic stages of human moral understanding or social perspective-taking found in childhood and adolescence. Analogously, the implicit starting points for mathematical philosophers’ theories of number can be found in children’s constructions of the number concept. Philosophers and developmental psychologists interested in the scientific enterprise ponder analogs to scientific problem-solving in the hypothetical and deductive reasoning of adolescents (e.g., Kuhn & Franklin, 2006).

Particularly interesting are the contributions to moral philosophy made by the basic moral judgment stages. The more promising philosophies tend to be those that start from more mature basic assumptions. The emphasis on authoritarian, unilateral power in Hobbesian (Leviathan) and might-makes-right philosophies would seem to reflect the centration- and appearance-oriented perspective-taking of Stage 1. Social contract or libertarian theories that emphasize “maximum liberty consistent with the like liberty of others” (Locke, Mill) require and expect no more than Stage 2–level “pragmatic reciprocity” perspective-taking. Finally, Kantian ethics, with its emphasis on respect, reversibility, and consistency, would seem to draw upon and gain richness from the moral point of view; that is, Stage 3–level “ideal reciprocity” perspective-taking. In this sense, Rawls’s (1971) version of the social contract, in which initially egoistic participants do not know which position in the society will be theirs (the “veil of ignorance”), induces participants to adopt something tantamount to the moral point of view and agree to principles for a just society (Hoffman, 2000).

It must be stressed that these philosophies, whether of number, science, or ethics, are just that: philosophies. They may derive their starting assumptions and
draw inspiration from one or another basic stage, but they are not *themselves* basic stages (see below).

Adult moral development in Kohlberg’s theory includes not only the development of philosophies of ethics but also existential reflection. Again, whereas Kohlberg attributed prior-to-society, existential, and ontological reflection to the sophisticated adult, such reflection can also be found among contemplative Stage 3 and 4 (perhaps especially Type B) adolescents. That even adolescents can think from a prior-to-society vantage point about social contractarian and communitarian issues is suggested by their hypothetically reflective responses to Joseph Adelson and colleagues’ classic “desert island” problem (How might the marooned individuals go about building a society?). One 18-year-old suggested that people would agree to laws “to set up a standard of behavior for people, for society living together so that they can live peacefully and in harmony with each other” (Adelson et al., 1969, p. 328). The adolescent was appealing, in effect, to the need for a social contract.

There is no reason that the objects of hypothetical contemplation must be restricted to the phenomena of dyadic exchanges, conventions, or even normative ethics. Sooner or later, the mature metacognitive thinker (whether chronologically adolescent or adult) may come to reflect on ultimate questions. Not only the theory-discoursing adult but even the Stage 3 but theory-discoursing adolescent can ponder meta-ethical, existential, spiritual, and ontological questions such as: Isn’t all morality relative? Why be moral? Does our being alive matter? What is the meaning of life? What is reality? In one study, adolescents were asked an existential question: “If you were to look back on your life now, how would you like to be remembered?” (Damon, 2008, p. 135). As did Carl Jung and Erich Fromm, Harold Kushner (1986) asserted: “these are not abstract questions suitable for cocktail party conversations. They [can become] desperately urgent questions. We will find ourselves sick, lonely, and afraid if we cannot answer them” (p. 19).  

A New View of Lifespan Moral Judgment Development

Hypothetical reflection and contemplation, then, play a pivotal role in our broad reconceptualization of moral development. We see the lifespan development of “the right” (i.e., moral judgment and reflection concerned mainly with right and wrong) as entailing two major phases: standard and existential (see Table 4.1). Terming these modes of development *phases* is appropriate in that they overlap in time. Like other animal species, humans undergo certain standard sequences of cognitive and social-cognitive development, although we (through reflective contemplation) *surpass* other species in the method and flower of our intellectual achievement. The aim of Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s work was mainly to describe this standard intellectual development, which, as John Flavell and colleagues (Flavell et al., 2002) argued, can continue in sophistication, scope, and consistency even in the adult years.

Intriguingly, the hypothetical metacognitive ability that emerges in the course of standard development—the formal operational ability to disembed from the context of a thought or phenomenon and hold it as an object of contemplation—makes
TABLE 4.1 Outline of the lifespan development of moral judgment and reflection

Moral judgment involves ways of understanding the basis for moral decisions or values or right and wrong (but also of caring) in morality. The lifespan development of moral judgment and reflection consists of two overlapping phases (standard and existential).

I. **Standard Development** (invariant albeit high-mixture stage sequence; U.S. age norms provided in Gibbs et al., 1992; and Basinger et al., 1995; cross-cultural age norms reviewed in Gibbs et al., 2007).

A. **The Immature or Superficial Stages.** Constructed in early childhood; typically, by adolescence. Stage 1 usage is negligible, and Stage 2 usage has appreciably declined. The level is superficial in that morality is understood in terms of the physical or momentary (Stage 1) or the pragmatic (Stage 2). Morality is also reduced to egocentric biases and motives (blatantly at Stage 1, more subtly at Stage 2).

   1. **Stage 1: Centrations.** Morality tends to be confused with physical size or power (“Daddy’s the boss because he’s big and strong”) or with the momentary egocentric desires of one’s mental life (“It’s fair because I want it”). The over-attention to a particular salient here-and-now feature of others or of one’s egoistic perspective is called *centration* in Piagetian theory. The young child’s vulnerability to the immediately salient is evident not only in moral but more broadly in social and non-social cognitive domains. Adult might-makes-right philosophies draw inspiration from this stage.

   2. **Stage 2: Exchanges.** Gains in mental coordination, perspective-taking, and logic-related inference bring about a more psychological, if pragmatic and still self-centered, morality (e.g., the Golden Rule is misinterpreted as “do for others if they did or will do for you”). This concrete moral reciprocity underlies norms of “blood vengeance” found in some cultures and seems to be evident in the social behavior of chimpanzees. The emphasis on pragmatic deals provides foundational inspiration for social contractarian philosophies such as that of John Locke.

B. **The Mature or Profound Stages.** (Typically constructed and socialized during late childhood and adolescence, with elaboration in later years; but developmental delay is sometimes seen among adolescents and even adults.) Moral judgment is mature insofar as it appeals to the intangible, ideal bases (mutual trust, caring, respect) and moral point of view (ideal reciprocity, “How would you or anyone wish to be treated?”) of social life. Mature morality applies mainly to interpersonal relationships (Stage 3) but may expand in scope to social systems (Stage 4). Care-related aspects of these stages are more prevalent among highly empathic individuals (Eisenberg et al., 2006). These stages presuppose attainment of the hypothetical and deductive abilities Piaget referred to as *formal operations* (these abilities also make possible existential development; see below). Although “Type A” versions of these stages tend to confuse this ideal morality with the maintenance of given interpersonal (Stage 3) or societal (Stage 4) expectations, “Type B” versions entail particularly clear perceptions of ideal reciprocity and render problematic Kohlberg’s designation of these stages as necessarily “conventional level” and “member of society.”

   1. **Stage 3: Mutualities.** Do-as-one-would-be-done-by or Golden Rule morality, based on third-person perspective. The core appeal is to ideal reciprocity, mutual trust, or intimate sharing as the basis for interpersonal relationships. Kohlberg’s early “good boy–nice girl” label applies to the Type A version; Type B may inspire moral-point-of-view (Baier, 1965) and other Kantian philosophies. A relativized version of Stage 3 (a truly sincere person’s morals are right for him or her) is termed “Transition 3/4 R” (Gibbs et al., 1992) or “3½” (Colby, 1978).

   2. **Stage 4: Systems.** The social contexts for mutualities expand beyond the dyadic to address the need for commonly accepted values and standards in a complex social system. Kohlberg’s “law and order” label applies to a version termed Type A; Type B appeals to the values of an ideal society.

II. **Existential Development** (qualitative changes no longer characterizable as an invariant stage sequence. Although associated with adulthood, this phase of life can begin as early as adolescence for some individuals; throughout the lives of others, however, this phase may remain absent). Existential development transcends the standard moral judgment stages. The existential phase involves hypothetical contemplation, meta-ethical reflection, the formulation of moral or philosophical, and spiritual awakening or ontological inspiration. In epistemological terms, meta-ethical reflection tends to evolve from relativism [cf. Kohlberg’s “4½”] to post-skeptical rational perspectives. The theoretical products of contemplation can include those of “natural” (cf. Kohlberg’s “Stage 5” and “Stage 6”) or professional philosophies. The most profound expressions of existential development involve transcendent ethical insights (such as an ethic of interconnectedness; Lorimer, 1990) emergent from meditation, existential crises (cf. Kohlberg’s metaphorical “Stage 7”), or near-death crisis events. Such deep inspiration can diminish cognitive distortions and revitalize dedication to the moral life.

Source: Adapted from J. C. Gibbs (2010), *Moral development and reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman* (2nd ed.). Boston: Pearson Higher Education. Used with permission.
possible not only basic cognitive maturity but also existential awareness and the
impetus for development in a post-standard sense. Accordingly, the adolescent or
adult may progress in the contexts of both standard and existential development.

Although no longer necessarily entailing an invariant sequence, the intellectual
products in this latter, “existential” phase are still developmental by Moshman’s
(2011) criteria: the endeavors are temporally extended and self-regulated, and
the products are qualitatively distinct, tending to progress in adequacy. Without
invariant sequence, however, “qualitative” difference and “progressive” adequacy
refer mainly to the comparative status of more or less adequate intellectual endeav-
ors and formulations. Suppose that, after pondering morality and society, an
abstract thinker formulates an ethical or political philosophy. His or her philoso-
phy may draw its inspiration from a basic developmental morality. As noted, the
maturity of that inspirational morality makes a difference. Does not, say, a Kantian
ethical philosophy of reversible and universalizable perspective-taking strike us
as more adequate in some sense than, say, a Hobbesian contractarian philosophy
(all relinquishing power to a “Leviathan” or strong ruler)—or for that matter, a
philosophy of “might makes right” (famously argued by Thrasymachus in Plato’s
The Republic)? Is it not more than coincidental that the corresponding bases of
Kantian philosophy in standard development, specifically, of mutuality and sys-
tems (Stages 3 and 4) are more mature than are moralities of pragmatic deals and
physical power (Stages 2 and 1)? Again, our point is that more adequate moral phi-
losophies draw inspiration from higher reaches of morality. Particularly relevant
to moral judgment and behavior is the emergence in existential development of
an ethic of interconnectedness (Lorimer, 1990). The potential contribution of a
“near-death experience” to existential or spiritual awareness and a moral life of
connection will be discussed in Chapter 9.

Our two-phase view of lifespan moral judgment development, then, involves
the following points, articulated in this and the preceding chapter:

♦ Lifespan moral judgment development consists of two overlapping phases:
standard (involving an invariant sequence of stages comprised in a rough
age trend) and existential (involving meta-ethical, philosophical moral judg-
ment as well as ontological and spiritual concerns and intuitions).

♦ Standard development consists of two overlapping levels, each of which
nests two stages: immature (Stage 1, Centrations; and Stage 2, Exchanges)
and mature (Stage 3, Mutualities; and Stage 4, Systems). The crucial event is
the emergence of ideal moral reciprocity (Stage 3).

♦ The standard stages are at least in part “constructed,” particularly through
certain facilitative conditions of peer interaction and, beyond childhood,
broader contexts of social perspective-taking and coordination. The con-
structive process also entails reflection and presupposes gains in working
memory. An advanced metacognitive ability—namely, hypothetical and
deductive reflection (in particular, reflective abstraction)—may play a key
role in the emergence of ideal moral reciprocity.

♦ Although at least Stage 3 of the mature level is reached in most human soci-
eties, such maturity must be supported by societal norms, institutions of
social interdependence toward common goals, and moral internalization if it is to displace immature morality in the social life of the culture.

- Hypothetical reflection or disembedded contemplation (e.g., upon the meaning of life or the universe) also plays a key role in the emergence (during adolescence or adulthood) of the existential phase of human development. Persons may develop existentially from sustained contemplation but also from sudden insights or inspirations (as may occur during meditation, “soul-searching” crises, life-threatening circumstances, or other existentially profound events).

**CONCLUSION**

The late Lawrence Kohlberg deserved considerable credit for championing and elaborating the themes of the cognitive-developmental approach, putting cognitive moral development on the map of American psychology, relating moral psychology to philosophy and vice versa, encouraging attention to moral judgment development beyond the childhood years, and recognizing the role of reflection or contemplation in the achievement of moral judgment maturity. Nonetheless, as his stage theory evolved, it increasingly distorted basic moral judgment development and maturity. In Kohlberg’s theory of stages and Deweyan levels, construction is confused with internalization, and basic understanding with reasoning that reflects philosophical training. Contractarian and Kantian philosophies should be seen, not as postconventional, final stages in an invariant sequence, but rather as products of hypothetical reflection on normative ethics, stemming from the morality of one or another of the basic moral judgment stages. Adults who contemplate their morality and formulate ethical principles have not thereby constructed a new Piagetian stage. They have, however, engaged in a developmental process of existential inquiry with personal relevance for ethical living:

Merely the explicit formulation of principles about obligations should make us more sensitive to those obligations. It should make us less liable to be deceived by selfish ethical reasoning in ourselves or others. It should make us more perceptive in our moral assessment of ourselves and our motivation. (Brandt, 1959, p. 14)

In other words, formulating principles of ethics should render us less vulnerable to self-serving cognitive distortions (see Chapter 7). Generally, disembedding from and reflecting on moral right and wrong should promote moral development and the cognitively based motivation of behavior. Also figuring into any comprehensive discussion of moral development and the motivation of moral behavior, however, is “the good.” At the core of the good is empathy—the primarily affective motive—to which we now turn.
Our exploration of moral development shifts in this chapter from the right to the good. In particular, we shift from a concern with how we grow beyond superficial moral judgment to a concern with how we grow beyond superficial moral feeling, and from cognitive sources of moral motivation such as justice or reciprocity to affective sources such as benevolence or empathy. Accordingly, our conception of moral motivation will expand to include not only cognitive but also affective primacy. Moral motivation derives not just from cognitively constructed ideals of reciprocity but also from what Nel Noddings (1984) called an “attitude…for goodness” (p. 2) and what Carol Gilligan (1982) claimed1 was a distinctly feminine “voice” that urges responsible caring. Nancy Eisenberg (1996) called empathy “the good heart” and made impressive contributions to its measurement. Frans de Waal (2012) saw empathy’s underpinning in a socially and emotionally sensitive “perception–action mechanism” common among mammals. Haidt included empathy among his posited biological and affective foundations of morality. Particularly impressive has been the systematic, integrative work of Martin Hoffman (2000, 2008). As is Kohlberg’s, Hoffman’s work is noted in virtually every developmental psychology textbook currently on the market. (Hoffman [2011] has also written on empathy’s contributions—both positive and negative—to legal justice and the law.)

Decades before Haidt’s challenge to cognitive emphases in moral psychology, Hoffman (1982) asserted a need to redress an erstwhile imbalance favoring moral judgment or “the right.” Accordingly, Hoffman sought to “stimulate research on the role of affect on moral action and moral thought” (p. 84, emphasis added). As did Haidt, Hoffman found inspiration in the writings of Hume, who was “at times explicit about giving primacy to affect over cognition…. He used the terms ‘sympathy’ and ‘fellow feeling,’ but he clearly meant what we call empathic affect—feeling what the other feels” (p. 86, emphasis added).

Hoffman’s affective-primacy theory of empathy-based moral development and prosocial behavior (as well as the inhibition of aggression) starts with biologically based predispositions. In contrast to Haidt’s treatment of empathy as a unitary construct, empathy in Hoffman’s theory entails multiple modes and developmental processes. Jean Decety and Margarita Svetlova (2012) construed such modes as “additions” successively innovated in evolutionary history (p. 3; cf. de Waal, 2012). We will have occasion to draw upon Decety’s and others’—especially, Frans de Waal’s, Daniel Batson’s, and Carolyn Zahn-Waxler’s—contributions as we discuss Hoffman’s work. Hoffman’s theory is especially impressive in its discussion not only of empathy’s relation to moral development but also of empathy’s
cognitive complications and limitations as well as its key role in moral socialization. Hoffman's research-based typology of parental discipline techniques remains in prominent use today.

THE EMPATHIC PREDISPOSITION

What is empathy? Metaphorically, empathy is the “spark of human concern for others, the glue that makes social life possible” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 3) and “the bedrock of prosocial morality” (Hoffman, 2008, p. 449). Literally, it is “feeling in,” or with, another’s emotion; that is, “feeling what another is feeling” (Hauser, 2006, p. 347). “Feeling” may refer to a joy or a sorrow (Light & Zahn-Waxler, 2012; Dunfield, Kuhmeier, O'Connell, & Kelley, 2011), but the emphasis in Hoffman's theory (and the field generally) has been on empathic distress. Empathic distress can mean enduring another’s suffering by imaginatively “enter[ing], as it were, into [the sufferer’s] body,” becoming “in some measure the same person with him” (Smith, 1759/1965, p. 261)—but only in some measure. Empathy is generally taken to mean that one retains some awareness that one is feeling and responding to the suffering of the other person. Accordingly, empathy is “a vicarious response to others: that is, an affective response appropriate to someone else’s situation rather than one’s own” (Hoffman, 1981a, p. 128). Full empathy is complex; i.e., involves not only affective but also cognitive facets, components, or levels (Hoffman, 2000; Decety & Svetlova, 2012). In full (affective and cognitive) empathy, we “connect to and understand others and make their situation our own” (de Waal, 2009, p. 225, emphasis added). Batson (2011) concluded from extensive research that “empathic concern—other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need—produces altruistic motivation” (p. 228; cf. Batson, 2012). In this chapter, we will discuss empathy as a biologically and affectively based, cognitively mediated, and socialized predisposition that contributes to prosocial behavior.

Background: Prosocial Behavior and Empathy

Ethologists and sociobiologists have posited genetic programming as well as more complex bases (such as the empathic predisposition) for the cooperative, prosocial, and even sacrificial behaviors that have been observed in many animal species. An intrusion into the hives of ants, bees, or termites will trigger genetically programmed suicidal attacks against the intruder by certain members of that insect group. Such behaviors are adaptive for the insect group because only some are programmed for sacrificial defense; others are programmed to carry out the group’s reproductive activity (Campbell, 1972). Genetically programmed separation of survival and reproduction functions is not seen within groups of phylogenetically higher animal species.

More relevant to human empathy is the cooperative or prosocial behavior observed among social groups of mammalian and especially primate species. After all, “to recognize the need of others, and react appropriately, is…not the same as
a preprogrammed tendency to sacrifice oneself for the genetic good” (de Waal, 2013, p. 33). Chimpanzee groups practice adoption of a motherless infant; they also engage in cooperative hunting and in sharing meat after a kill (Goodall, 1990). Baboons “may suddenly increase their vigilance if one among them is injured or incapacitated. When a juvenile in a captive baboon colony had an epileptic seizure, other baboons immediately turned highly protective” (de Waal, 1996, p. 52). Humans of all ages are likely to help others in distress, especially when other potential helpers are not around (e.g., Latane & Darley, 1970; Staub, 1974).

Groups whose members engage in such cooperative and prosocial behavior have obvious adaptive advantages. Such behavior can also be adaptive for the helper insofar as the individual helped is genetically related (even if the helper does not survive, some percentage of the helper’s genes are passed on through the surviving recipient) (Hamilton, 1971). Prosocial behavior is also adaptive where the recipient may eventually reciprocate the help (Trivers, 1971). Robert Trivers described this reciprocal altruism in terms of “the folk expression...you scratch my back—I scratch yours” (de Waal, 1996, p. 25). Cooperation between individuals in extended human groups may have crucially contributed to the global success of our species (see Chapter 2).

A certain minimum of cooperative and prosocial or altruistic behavior is essential for the survival of human societies. But given individual egoistic motives, how is that prosocial minimum attained? It is unfeasible for any society to have “a cop on every corner” to deter egoistic motives, or to have a moral exemplar on every corner to encourage prosocial ones. Requisite to the essential minimum of cooperative and prosocial behavior, then, is in turn some minimum degree of moral self-regulation. More than a century ago, the sociologist George Simmel (1902) depicted the indispensable role of moral self-reward in the regulatory functioning of society:

The tendency of a society to satisfy itself as cheaply as possible results in appeals to “good conscience,” through which the individual pays to himself the wages for his righteousness, which would otherwise have to be assured to him through law or custom. (p. 19; quoted by Hoffman, 2000, p. 123).

Such moral self-reward derives partly from moral socialization and the internalization of a society’s moral norms. A society needs help to accomplish moral socialization, however—help from a source with greater stability than “the whims of politics, culture, or religion” (de Waal, 2009, p. 45). In particular, given the cross-cultural diversity of societal norms and of approaches to moral socialization, it is unlikely that requisite levels of prosocial behavior could be commonly achieved without some universal starting place in the child, as it were, for such socialization. Put positively, moral socialization and internalization must have help from a biological readiness or receptivity to altruistic appeals in socialization; that is, a predisposition to accept prosocial norms.

Hoffman’s word for such a biologically based predisposition is empathy. Empathic responsiveness emerges at “an early age in virtually every member of our species” and hence may be “as natural an achievement as the first step” (de Waal, 1996, p. 45; cf. Vaish & Warneken, 2012). From infancy on, we “affectively resonate with
basic affective—positive and negative—states of others” (Decety & Svetlova, 2012, p. 8). One biological substratum for empathy inheres in neurophysiological pathways between the limbic system (specifically, the amygdala) and the prefrontal cortex (Blair, 2006; Brothers, 1989; Decety & Howard, 2013; Decety & Svetlova, 2012; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Maclean, 1990). Heritable individual differences in neural sensitivity may account for the higher correlation between identical compared to fraternal twins in degree of empathic responding (Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, Emde, & Plomin, 1992).

MODES AND STAGES OF EMPATHY

Although biology imparts to empathy its earliest modes of affective arousal, more advanced modes—especially as they “coalesce” with cognitive developmental milestones to form stages or levels—subsequently enrich the empathic predisposition. Multiple modes, components, or stages promote the reliability and subtlety of the empathic response. That the complex human tendency to connect with the sufferings or joys of others is multi-determined suggests its functional importance for the life of the group—even though, as we will see, certain limitations and complications can compromise the contribution of empathy to prosocial behavior.

Modes of Empathic Arousal

The full empathic predisposition is complex at least partially because its modes of arousal in the human adult are both immature and mature. Hoffman argues that empathy has biological roots and can be activated by multiple modes or mechanisms. These modes are classifiable as basic (involuntary mechanisms of mimicry, conditioning, direct association) or mature (mediated association, perspective-taking). Although the basic modes are broadly shared across mammalian species (de Waal, 2009, 2013), the higher-order cognitive or mature modes flower most fully in humans. Whereas basic empathic concern may have originally pertained to infant care or group synchrony, empathic understanding may have emerged with “maturation of the prefrontal cortex and its reciprocal connection to the limbic system and development of a sense of self” (Decety & Svetlova, 2012, p. 3; cf. Hoffman, 1984). The higher-order modes are layered upon the basic ones. As de Waal (2009) put it:

The full capacity seems put together like a Russian doll. At its core is an automated process shared with a multitude of species, surrounded by outer layers that fine-tune its aim and reach. Not all species possess all layers: Only a few take another’s perspective, something we are masters at. But even the most sophisticated layers of the doll normally remain firmly tied to its primal core…. Seeing another’s emotions arouses our own emotions, and from there we go on constructing a more advanced understanding of the other’s situation…. Only the most advanced forms of knowing what others know may be limited to our species. (pp. 72, 100, 209, 241)

Depending on whether one’s referent for empathy is “primal” or fully layered, then, empathy is or is not common among mammals. Humans are uniquely
capable of reaching “the most advanced forms of knowing what others know” and understanding their situation (see Hoffman’s Stages 5 and especially 6, below). Yet the “primal core” or affective foundation is crucial: to neglect the basic modes and focus only on the most advanced modes “is like staring at a splendid cathedral while forgetting that it’s made of bricks and mortar” (de Waal, 2009, p. 205).

We now review the basic and mature modes, followed by the developmental stages of empathic distress (see Table 5.1).

**The Basic Modes**

At its most basic level, empathy is an emotional connection between self and other. Such “affective responsiveness is present at an early age, is involuntary, and relies on somato-sensorimotor resonance” (Decety & Michalska, 2012, p. 171). The basic modes can be seen in “the affective synchrony in mother–infant play”; that is, the mother–infant “dance” of bonding and attachment broadly observable in mammalian species (Decety & Jackson, 2004, p. 78; cf. Batson, 2011). Once these modes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.1 Modes, stages, and attributions of empathic distress</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>I. Modes of empathic affect arousal (activated singly or in combination):</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Basic or non-voluntary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Motor mimicry (automatic facial/postural imitation plus feedback)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Conditioning (self’s distress infuses experience of other’s distress cues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Direct association (self’s past distress infuses experience of other’s distress)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Higher-level cognitive</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Verbally mediated association (other’s distress experienced via language)</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Social perspective-taking (self-focused [imagining self in other’s place] and/or other-focused)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Developmental stages of empathic distress (sympathy formed as arousal modes coalesce with cognitive development)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immature (superficial) stages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Global (newborn reactive cry)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Egocentric (confuses other’s distress with empathic distress, may seek to comfort self yet stares at, drawn to distressed other; cf. preconcern)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Quasi-egocentric (differentiates other’s distress but may seek to comfort other with what comforts self)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mature (subtle or discerning, expanded; true sympathetic concern) stages (highest may be unique to humans)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Veridical (feels what other feels or what one would normally feel in the situation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Beyond the situation (feels for other’s distressing life condition, future prospects)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Distressed groups (feels for distressed group’s life condition, future prospects)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>III. Causal attributions or inferences (situational interpretations, cognitive appraisals that can complicate relations of empathy to prosocial behavior)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Neutralization of empathy (cause of distress attributed to victim; cf. just-world hypothesis)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Sympathetic distress (cause of distress clearly not attributable to victim)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Empathy-based or transgression guilt (cause of victim’s distress attributed to self; cf. bystander guilt)</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Empathic anger (cause of victim’s distress attributed to another individual or group)</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Empathic injustice (inference that victim did not deserve distress)</td>
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</table>
emerged in phylogeny, “they could be applied outside the rearing context and play a role in the wider fabric of social relationships” (de Waal, 2012, p. 89)—especially as the bodily affective mechanisms “coalesce” or compound with the advanced cognitive modes.

The three basic or primitive modes—mimicry, conditioning, direct association—constitute empathy in the earliest months of life. These modes continue throughout life and give face-to-face empathic distress or joy an automatic, involuntary, or compelling quality.

1. Mimicry

Mimicry in moral development refers to a synchrony of changes in body and feeling between self and other. “We all know how joy spreads, or sadness, and how much we are affected by the moods of those around us” (de Waal, 2013, p. 142). As Decety and Jackson (2004) noted, “humans mimic unintentionally and unconsciously a wide range of behaviors, such as accents, tone of voice, rate of speech, posture and mannerisms, as well as moods” (p. 76)—even pictures of angry or happy faces, flashed on a computer screen “too briefly for conscious perception” (de Waal, 2012, p. 88). An anticipatory motor mimicry is evident as we unconsciously “open our mouths when trying to feed applesauce to a baby” (Pinker, 2011, p. 576). Generally, the observer “synchronizes changes in his facial expression, voice, and posture with the slight changes in another person’s facial, vocal, or postural expressions of feeling.” These changes “trigger afferent feedback which produce feelings in the observer that match the feelings of the victim” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 37).

In phylogenetic history, bodily synchrony and mimicry may have been adaptive in the context of not only the mother–infant dance but also intra-group cooperation: “running when others run, laughing when others laugh, crying when others cry, or yawning when others yawn.” Such emotional convergence or “mood contagion serves to coordinate activities, which is crucial for any traveling species (as most primates are)” (de Waal, 2009, pp. 48–49).

Hoffman (2000) suggested that mimicry “may not only be a prosocial motive but also a prosocial act” (p. 45) insofar as instant, ongoing nonverbal imitation can communicate emotional connection: “By immediately displaying a reaction appropriate to the other’s situation (e.g., a wince for the other’s pain), the observer conveys precisely and eloquently both awareness of and involvement with the other’s situation” (Bavelas, Black, Chovil, Lemery, & Mullett, 1988, p. 278). In this sense, Eric Nelson’s (2013) point that “motor mimicry lacks an emotional link between individuals” (p. 183) must be qualified in some instances.

2. Conditioning

Like mimicry, conditioning can induce quick and involuntary empathic responses. In terms of classical conditioning, basic empathy is an acquired or learned response to a stimulus that is temporally associated with one’s previous affect (distress, joy, etc.). Hoffman (2000) suggested that empathic learning in this sense may be inevitable as mothers hold their infants and communicate through bodily contact: “The mother’s accompanying facial and verbal expressions [of, for example, anxiety or
tension] then become conditioned stimuli, which can subsequently evoke distress in the child even in the absence of physical contact” (pp. 45–46).

By the same token, the mother can condition positive empathic affect:

When a mother holds the baby closely, securely, affectionately, and has a smile on her face, the baby feels good and the mother’s smile is associated with that feeling. Later, the mother’s smile alone may function as a conditioned stimulus that makes the baby feel good. (p. 46)

3. Direct Association

Empathy by association can take place even in the absence of conditioning. A child may, for example, become distressed upon seeing another child fall down on ice and cry simply because the scene evokes one’s painful memory of a similar accident one experienced.

**The Basic Modes and Superficiality**

As Hoffman (2000) noted, empathy aroused by the basic modes (mimicry, conditioning, direct association) is relatively superficial. Early empathy is here-and-now, “based on the pull of surface cues and requiring the shallowest level of cognitive processing” (p. 48). A young child, for example, may simply laugh along with a momentarily laughing but terminally ill peer. Although there are precocious exceptions, children’s attention tends to be fixed or “centered” on the more salient personal and situational cues of another’s distress in the situation. Owing to the powerful impact of conditioning, association, and mimicry, the “pull” of these cues may be powerful enough to capture a child’s attention, with the result that his empathic response is based [exclusively] on these cues. (Hoffman, 2000, pp. 84–85)

**The Mature Modes**

Full-fledged empathy requires not only the superficial affective modes but also cognitive modes of arousal. With cognitive and language development in the second year and beyond, two more advanced modes of empathy arousal take root and foster more subtle and expanded empathic responding. These two higher-order cognitive modes are verbally mediated association and social perspective- or role-taking. The mature empathy developed through these advanced modes is a deeper emotional connection with others.

4. Verbally Mediated Association

Empathy by association can also take place through the cognitive medium of language. For example, one may read a letter describing another’s situation and affective state. Empathic responding through language-mediated association entails the mental effort of semantic processing and decoding. In the process, some “psychological distance” is introduced between observer and victim (Hoffman, 2000,
Accordingly, mediated association tends to be a relatively low-intensity mode of empathic arousal. Despite this psychological distance, verbally mediated association can be affectively intense insofar as it is grounded in direct association, that is, activates projections from our schemas of personal experience: “Even if we just read about another’s situation in a novel, our reaction still draws on well-established neural representations [or schemas] of similar situations that we have encountered, allowing us to have empathy for a fictional character based on our imagination” (de Waal, 2012, p. 101; see self-focused perspective-taking, below).

5. Social Perspective-Taking

Empathy is also aroused when one takes the role or situational perspective of the other person; that is, imagines oneself (or anyone) in the other person’s place. Although de Waal (2009) noted that other-oriented perspective-taking is evident in other species (for example, apes, dolphins, elephants, and even dogs), he also noted its restriction in those species largely to here-and-now perception. Even humans “care more about what we see firsthand than about what remains out of sight” (p. 221; see here-and-now empathic bias, below). Nonetheless, beyond that of any other species, “humans have great imagination. We can visualize a poor family wearing the clothes we sent them or children sitting in the school that we helped build at the other end of the globe. Just thinking of these things makes us feel good” (p. 194).

The imagination entailed in perspective-taking can be either self-focused (imagining how one would feel in the other’s situation) or other-focused (imagining how the other person feels or how most people would feel in that situation). Although other-focused perspective-taking is more readily sustained, self-focused perspective-taking tends to be more intense, probably because it “activates one’s own personal need system” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 56).

This activation, however, renders self-focused perspective-taking vulnerable to what Hoffman calls “egoistic drift,” in which the observer “becomes lost in egoistic concerns and the image of the victim that initiated the role-taking process skips out of focus and fades away” (p. 56; cf. Decety & Jackson, 2004). One of Hoffman’s students, after hearing that a pregnant friend’s unborn child had Down’s syndrome, “became so engrossed in [her] own thoughts” and fears that she “forgot all about” her friend’s specific circumstances (Hoffman, 2000, pp. 57–58).

“Fully mature” (p. 58) social perspective-taking achieves the best of both worlds—that is, sustained intensity—by “co-occurring, parallel processing” of both self and other (Hoffman, 2008, p. 442). Furthermore, it specifies the optimal sense of the social perspective-taking entailed in ideal moral reciprocity or full implementation of the condition of reversibility (Chapter 1).

The Complex Empathic Predisposition

As the infant grows into childhood and adolescence, then, the empathic predisposition becomes less superficial and increasingly multi-modal. The interrelated functioning of the basic and mature modes of development renders the full-fledged empathic predisposition flexibly responsive to a diverse array of distress
cues. Accordingly, the complex empathic predisposition is rich with contrasting qualities: shallow but also penetrating; fleeting or immediate but also stable and sustained; narrow but also broad in scope (encompassing victims who are absent); automatic or involuntary but also voluntary; passive and unconscious but also effortful and conscious.

Since Hoffman’s (2000) work, others have noted as well the multifaceted or complex nature of the full-fledged empathic predisposition. For example, Decety and Svetlova (2012; cf. de Waal, 2012) concluded that empathic “responses are organized across multiple levels, from lower-level systems that are rapid, efficient, but rigid, to higher-level systems that are integrative and flexible” (p. 43). Nonetheless, the full-fledged empathic predisposition is typically experienced as a unitary response tendency.

Hoffman (2000) pointed out that, although the mature modes are more “subject to voluntary control” and effort, “they too can be fast-acting, involuntary, and triggered immediately on witnessing the victim’s situation” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 61). A dramatic case of sudden prosocial behavior generated partly from mature but “fast-acting” empathy and moral judgment was introduced in Chapter 2—and will be further examined in the next chapter.

Empathy and Cognitive Development:
Stages of Empathic Distress

Given our thesis that moral development entails growth beyond the superficial, we find most intriguing the developmental progression in the arousal modes from shallow processing (attention to surface or physically salient cues) to more subtle discernment and expanded caring. This superficial-to-profound theme becomes particularly evident as the modes “coalesce” with cognitive development to form stages of empathy development (see Table 5.1). “Growing beyond the superficial,” then, applies not only to moral judgment (Chapter 3) but also to the development of empathy. As the modes of the empathic predisposition interact with cognitive advances, we again see a cognitive developmental age trend toward more mature stages of moral perception, motivation, and behavior. When the trend beyond the superficial in morality refers not to moral judgment but to empathy or caring, however, cognition—although still crucial—loses the limelight. As we will see, it is depth of feeling in morality that is highlighted in Hoffman’s theory.

Hoffman’s later rendition of his model (Hoffman, 2008) posits six stages (see Table 5.1), from immature (Stages 1–3) to mature (Stages 4–6). Hoffman does not emphasize the stage construct. Although he would presumably expect his sequence to be fairly standard across cultures, he does not explicitly claim that the stage sequence is invariant. Much as Piaget might have said for moral judgment phases, Hoffman points out that “the age levels assigned to the stages and transitions between stages are approximate and individual differences can be enormous” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 64). The developing arousal modes interact with the child’s growing understanding of the self and other to produce overlapping stages of increasingly discerning and subtle empathic emotion. One can say generally that the empathy stages emerge for most part in infancy and early childhood (in
contrast to the stages of moral judgment). However, the emergence of Hoffman's most mature stage may await adolescence (in any event, Hoffman's examples of this stage are drawn exclusively from adolescents and adults). Like Kohlberg's later moral judgment stages, Hoffman's later stages of empathy entail expansions in subtle or accurate discernment and social scope; e.g., “an awareness” that others (and oneself) have “personal histories, identities, and lives beyond the immediate situation” (p. 64). Extending from the modes, we now describe Hoffman's immature and mature stages of empathy development. In the course of the description, we will consider a challenge to the major role accorded to cognitive development in Hoffman's empathy-based theory of moral growth beyond the superficial.

The Immature Stages

The immature stages of (reactive, egocentric, quasi-egocentric) empathic distress are seen most exclusively during the first year or so of life, as a rudimentary sense of the physically present “other” influences the impact of the basic arousal modes (motor mimicry, conditioning, direct association) upon social behavior. Hoffman discusses three immature stages of empathy.

Stage 1. Global Empathic Distress: Newborn Reactive Cry

When the newborn cries in reaction to hearing another's cry, that reactive cry is more than a weak imitation or simple reaction to a noxious stimulus. Rather, the newborn reactive cry is just as intense and vigorous as if the newborn itself were in distress. Interestingly, the newborn's reactive cry is more likely to be triggered by the cry of another human newborn than by control stimuli that have included a computer-simulated cry, the cry of a chimpanzee, and even the newborn's own previous cry (Dondi, Simion, & Caltran, 1999; Martin & Clark, 1982; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Simner, 1971). Marco Dondi and colleagues (Dondi, Simion, & Caltran, 1999) noted that a newborn's familiar–unfamiliar distinction among the auditory stimuli is further evidence that even infants process new experience in relation to established prototypes or rudimentary schemas (Walton & Bower, 1993). Hoffman (2000, 2008) argued that the newborn's innate reactive cry response is triggered by mimicry, conditioning, or both. This cry is “global” insofar as the infant may not clearly recognize “whose feelings belong to whom” (Decety & Jackson, 2004, p. 71). Nonetheless, newborns' relative non-reaction to their own cry suggests at least “a primitive physiological awareness of the self as separate from others” (Light & Zahn-Waxler, 2012, p. 111); i.e., “some self–other distinction already functioning right from birth” (Decety & Jackson, 2004, p. 78), perhaps indicating “an implicit sense of self as an agentic entity in the environment.” Such a sense of self would not necessarily “imply,” however, “any self-consciousness or self-awareness” (Decety & Svetlova, 2012, p. 8; see below).

Stage 2. Egocentric Empathic Distress

After several months, the reactive cry typically attenuates (less automatic, instant, or intense crying). The infants may first look sad and pucker up their lips before crying in the presence of another's distress. This behavior, “which they also do
when actually distressed themselves, very likely reflects the early beginning of their ability to control their emotions” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 67; cf. Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2004). By six months or so, infants “require more prolonged signs of another’s distress before feeling distressed themselves” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 67). Hoffman (2000) cited a landmark study by Dale Hay and colleagues (Hay, Nash, & Pedersen, 1981; cf. Roth-Hanania, Davido, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011), which found that, among six-month-olds, “when one infant was distressed, the other generally watched but rarely cried himself” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 66). The relatively few instances when resonant crying did occur resulted from “a cumulative effect: After several instances of an infant’s showing distress, the other infant did become distressed and started to cry” (p. 66). Hoffman suggested that reactive crying is less common by six months or so because “other” is increasingly differentiated. Indeed, “the other is now becoming a true ‘other’ who is perceived, at least dimly, as physically separate from oneself” (p. 67).

By the end of the first year, infants may engage in rather curious behavior upon witnessing a peer’s distress: whimpering and watching the peer, sometimes accompanied by behavior that relieves their own distress (thumb-sucking, head in mother’s lap, etc.). One nine-month-old “would stare intently, her eyes welling up with tears if another child fell, hurt themselves or cried” (Hoffman. 2000, p. 68). Consistent with a high threshold for responding, subsequent self-comforting (or crawling to mother) reactions were only infrequently observed in young infants in a recent longitudinal study (Roth-Hanania et al., 2011).

Although one-year-olds can differentiate the other child as physically separate and respond empathically to another’s distress, they may still be “unclear about the difference between something happening to the other and something happening to the self” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 68)—hence their occasional egocentric seeking of self-comfort as if that would remediate the observed distress. Empathically driven behavior in the egocentric or cognitively immature sense—and its uselessness (at least directly) for the distressed other—has been observed among infant rhesus monkeys:

Once, when an infant had been bitten because it had accidentally landed on a dominant female, it screamed so incessantly that it was soon surrounded by many other infants. I counted eight climbing on top of the poor victim—pushing, pulling, and shoving each other as well as the infant. That obviously did little to alleviate its fright. The infant monkeys’ response seemed automatic, as if they were as distraught as the victim and sought to comfort themselves as much as the other. (de Waal, 2012, p. 91, emphasis added)

Decety (2007) attributed such responses to a basic arousal mode, namely, mimicry or emotional contagion, perhaps “the first step on the road toward full-blown empathy” (de Waal, 2009, p. 74). Yet de Waal (2009) suspected that the self-comforting and simple emotional contagion of this first step “can’t be the whole story” (p. 95). After all, in the above episode, the monkeys were drawn to the distressed peer:

If these monkeys were just trying to calm themselves, why did they approach the victim? … In fact, animals as well as young children often [stare at or] seek out distressed
parties without any indication that they know what's going on. They seem blindly attracted, like a moth to a flame. Even though we would like to read real concern about the other into their behavior, the required understanding may not be there. I will call this blind attraction preconcern. (p. 95)

Similarly, Hoffman (2000) suggested that egocentric empathic distress “could be called a precursor of prosocial motivation” (p. 70). Hoffman (personal communication, August 29, 2012) pointed out that, like his egocentric empathic distress, de Waal’s preconcern is “a primitive form of empathy” lacking the advanced modes (such as social perspective-taking). Empathy in the early stages is posited to be, as de Waal put it, a “blind attraction” rather than “real [or mature] concern” for the other person.

Stage 3. Quasi-Egocentric Empathic Distress

Starting in the second year, children do try to help a distressed peer. Nonetheless, their “help” may still be more appropriate to relieving their own discomfort (e.g., bringing a distressed peer to one’s own mother even though the friend’s mother is present, or offering one’s own rather than the peer’s favorite toys)—suggesting a somewhat egocentric projection of one’s own onto others’ inner states and needs. This egocentric projection is a bias that, as we have learned from cognitive-developmental work (Chapter 3), dissipates but does not disappear entirely even among adults entirely capable of perspective-taking. De Waal (2009) mentioned well-intentioned but thoughtless friends whose gifts reflected “what they like.” For example, they “never noticed that we don’t have a single blue item in the house, but since they love blue, they bestow an expensive blue vase on us” (p. 109, emphases added). Egocentrically inclined adults notwithstanding, Hoffman (2000) concluded that egocentric projections are especially prevalent in the empathic responses of very young children.

The Mature Stages

In the social behavior of toddlers, one can discern not only the superficial stages but also empathic discernment and appropriate prosocial behavior. “Fourteen-month-olds,” for example, “are willing and able to help instrumentally.” Their prosocial behavior orients to the here-and-now; that is, it occurs “almost exclusively in situations in which helping consisted in handing over an out-of-reach object and not in more complex situations involving less salient goals and complex forms of intervention” (Vaish & Warneken, 2012, p. 138; cf. Warneken & Tomasello, 2010).

As empathic morality deepens, the individual increasingly discerns the authentic inner experience, subtler goals, and complex life situations of another individual or group. This deeper level of empathic experience, characterizable in terms of mature stages, can be intense and even life-changing (see examples in Hoffman, 2008).

Key to this growth beyond the superficial, according to Hoffman as well as de Waal and others, are the cognitive advances in self-awareness that permit more
accurate attributions: “The emotional state induced in oneself by the other now needs to be attributed to the other instead of the self. A heightened self-identity allows a subject to relate to the object’s emotional state without losing sight of the actual source of this state” (de Waal, 2012, p. 94; cf. Hoffman, 2000). In phylogeny, the concurrent emergence of advanced helping behavior (e.g., consolation) with self-recognition is consistently evident in apes but not Old World monkeys, suggesting that these advances may be functionally linked, co-emerging relatively late in phylogenetic history (de Waal, 2009, 2012).

Is heightened self-identity or self-awareness crucial, then, for advances in prosocial behavior or concern for others? Extending from Hoffman, de Waal (2009) argued in the affirmative, declaring that “advanced empathy is unthinkable without a [distinct] sense of self” (p. 122; cf. Decety, 2007). After all,

the child needs to disentangle herself from the other so as to pinpoint the actual source of her feelings. . . . Without a concept of self, we’d lack mooring. . . . In order to show genuine interest in someone else, offering help when required, one needs to be able [in a wave of emotion] to keep one’s own boat steady. (p. 124; cf. Decety & Svetlova, 2012)

Hoffman (2000) suggested that this emotionally “steady” concept of self entails an appreciation of one’s own—and the other’s—“inner experience.” Self-aware agents

sense their body as containing, and being guided by, an inner mental self, an “I,” which thinks, feels, plans, remembers . . . [and understand] that one is somebody separated from others not just physically but also in terms of inner experience; and that one’s external image is an aspect of one’s inner experience. This makes it possible for one to realize that the same holds true for others: Their external image is the other side of their inner experience. (pp. 72–73)

According to Hoffman (2000; cf. de Waal, 2009, 2012), children’s self-awareness and understanding of others’ distinct subjective experience enable them to decenter from self, experience veridical empathic distress, and more appropriately perspective-take (e.g., to recognize and appreciate that one’s upset, crying friend would be better comforted by his or her own teddy bear, parent, etc.).

Carolyn Zahn-Waxler and colleagues have questioned this linkage of cognitive development (especially, self-awareness or “heightened self-identity”) with advanced prosocial behavior. After all, they point out, we already “enter this world equipped to experience a rudimentary sense of ourselves in relation to others” (Light & Zahn-Waxler, 2012, p. 122). It would appear that the human self can recognize and respond to the non-self at birth—perhaps even in utero (Castiello et al., 2010; Lepage & Theoret, 2007; Martin & Clark, 1982). Other-oriented prosocial behavior in the first year would perhaps be more prevalent if young infants were more capable of controlling their emotional distress (regulatory skills, keeping one’s own “boat steady”) and had the motor skills to reach and help or comfort the distressed other (Roth-Hanania et al., 2011).

This question revisits the fundamental issue of neo-nativism: Have we been under-appreciating the newborn’s innate moral capacity and evolutionary heritage? Zahn-Waxler and colleagues (e.g., Davidov, Zahn-Waxler, Roth-Hanania, & Knafo, 2013) urged moral psychologists to take “a closer look at the early roots of
concern for others” (p. 4). Might a basic “self-knowledge” be all that is needed for a “real concern about the other,” entailing a clear awareness “that the other person is hurting rather than the self” (Davidov et al., 2013, p. 2)? Recall Haidt’s (Chapter 2) broad neo-nativist claim: namely, that moral psychology should focus on how diverse cultures refine the human infant’s biologically prepared affective intuitions (cf. Thompson & Newton, 2010). In this neo-nativist view, “development”—including moral development—means merely an increasing sophistication built upon modular activation, skill (including self-regulatory skill) acquisition, verbal articulation, and socialization in a particular culture.

The issue pertains at least partly to what is meant by “self-awareness” or “self-knowledge.” Of course, “no animal can do without . . . some self-awareness”; that is, even in infancy, “every animal needs to set its body apart from the surrounding environment” (de Waal, 2009, p. 147, emphasis added). Zahn-Waxler’s and colleagues’ claim is that an implicit sense of self vis a vis others in the environment may be all that is needed “for the purely emotional experience of feeling for or caring about another” (Davidov et al., 2013, p. 4). Hoffman and de Waal would not dispute this point; indeed, Zahn-Waxler’s “implicit” or “rudimentary” self is very similar to the proprioceptive (and other-differentiating) self discussed by Hoffman (2000, p. 69) (Hoffman, personal communication, April 4, 2013). Hoffman’s and de Waal’s claim pertains more precisely to the importance for advanced prosocial behavior of a psychological self-awareness, that is, awareness of self (or other) as a distinct intentional agent with distinct inner experiences. Their claim is that cognitive development brings about a psychological self-awareness in the second year that enables veridical empathic distress and hence appropriate, discerning prosocial behavior. Mirror-test results (do participants try to remove, say, a mirrored facial smudge?), along with concurrent indications of psychological self-awareness (such as the emergence of shame, guilt, and other self-conscious emotions, personal pronoun usage, and make-believe play; see Berk, 2013; Kartner, Keller, Chaudhary, & Yovski, 2012), do suggest that infants’ awareness of themselves (and others) as autonomous intentional agents (whose “subjective experience . . . is located within, or bound to, their own bodies”; Kartner et al., 2012, p. 7) does generally emerge in the second year and does relate to advanced prosociality—but not consistently across cultures (Kartner, Keller, & Chaudhary, 2010). Accordingly, Joscha Kartner and colleagues in their 2010 study suggested an alternative “pathway” (through certain sociocultural emphases) to advanced prosociality.

In general, children typically do grow in self-awareness, social perspective-taking, and appropriate concern for diverse others in various situations of distress. Although early roots and sociocultural factors should be studied, cognitive development plays a major role in the “substantial” increase in “acts of comforting and helping . . . during the second year of life” (Davidson et al., 2013, p. 3). Although they dispute that its role is crucial, Davidson, Zahn-Waxler and colleagues do acknowledge that the emergence of psychological self-awareness does appear to “facilitate toddlers’ prosocial behavior” (Davidov et al., 2013, p. 2; emphasis added).

As in “the right” of moral judgment, growth beyond the superficial in “the good” of benevolence or empathy must be recognized as entailing important
developmental advances. As Steven Pinker (2011) noted, a superficial “distress at another’s suffering is not the same as a sympathetic concern with their well-being” (p. 575). The latter sense of empathy relates to the mature stages. Although toddlers upon seeing others in distress continue to experience ego-oriented discomfort, they also come to experience compassion or sympathetic distress. This partial “transformation” of egocentric empathy into sympathetic empathy means that, from early childhood on, people “want to help because they feel sorry for the victim, not just to relieve their own empathic distress” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 88; cf. Batson, 2011). Again, however, egocentric bias and “a purely [egocentric] empathy may remain . . . even in adulthood” (p. 89; as discussed in Chapter 3).

Mature (accurate or veridical, subtly discerning) empathic concern can be elicited not only in the context of the immediate situation but also beyond that situation—a full empathic capacity that may be unique to the human species. Thanks to the contributions of advanced modes in coalescence with “abstract and domain-general high-level cognitive abilities,” mature humans are special in the sense that they can feel empathic concern for a wide range of others in need, even dissimilar others or members of different species….Executive function, language, and perspective-taking enhance and expand the range of behaviors that can be driven by empathy. When people send money to distant earthquake victims in Haiti, or petition to support a bill that would contribute to curb the violence in Darfur, empathy reaches beyond its context of evolutionary origins. (Decety & Svetlova, 2012, pp. 3–4)

Hoffman (2008) delineates three stages (4–6) of mature or profound empathic understanding and concern. These stages specify a cognitive developmental growth beyond the superficial in empathic morality.

Stage 4. Veridical Empathy

As he or she becomes less egocentric or more aware of the other’s psychological experience as distinct from that of the self, the young child begins to experience socially accurate or veridical empathy. “Veridical empathy has the basic features of mature empathy, but becomes more complex” or profoundly discerning and flexible with cognitive development (Hoffman, 2008, p. 445). Beyond 14 months of age, children increasingly accommodate in their giving to the distinct preferences of others, even when those preferences differ markedly from their own (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997; cf. Gopnik, 2009). Preschoolers begin to understand that an event can evoke different emotions in different people and that people can control the expression of their feelings. As noted in Chapter 3, older children begin to grasp mixed or subtle emotions and to take into account social context in judging another’s feelings. A child may be judged to be sadder if distress over a broken toy occurs despite friends’ entreaties not to be a “crybaby” (Rotenberg & Eisenberg, 1997).

Stage 5. Empathic Distress Beyond the Situation

As temporal decentration (or extension of time perspective; see Chapter 3) develops, self and others are increasingly understood to have, not only present inner states and situations, but also experiential histories and prospective futures; that
is, to have coherent, continuous, and stable identities. The preadolescent responds, then, not only to immediate expressive or behavioral cues but also to information concerning the other’s life condition, knowing that momentary expressions can belie deeper emotions or mood states. In contrast to the child’s simple empathic connection with the laughter of a terminally ill peer, for example, mature individuals may experience a more complex emotion that encompasses joy and sadness (but see Note 4).

Stage 6. Empathy for Distressed Groups

Beyond-the-situation veridical empathic distress can be distinguished as a sixth stage, as empathy for an entire group’s life condition emerges:

It seems likely that with further cognitive development, especially the ability to form social concepts and classify people into groups, children will eventually be able to comprehend the plight not only of an individual but also of an entire group or class of people such as those who are economically impoverished, politically oppressed, social outcasts, victims of wars, or mentally retarded. This combination of empathic distress and the mental representation of the plight of an unfortunate group would seem to be the most advanced form of empathic distress. (Hoffman, 2000, p. 85)

Even for those evidencing mature stages of empathy, prosocial behavior may not ensue. In Chapter 6, we will study moral exemplars—those who evidence Hoffman’s mature stages of empathy in sustained action as well as feeling. The moral lifestyle and contributions of these individuals are truly remarkable. Yet we know that, in general, egocentric and empathic biases (see below) do not entirely disappear. Sociocultural and temperamental factors can also undermine empathy (see Hoffman, 2000, pp. 282–283). And even highly empathic individuals must still interpret appropriately another’s distress. As in Kohlberg’s and Piaget’s theories, stages for Hoffman may identify developing competences or potentials more than actual performance. Let us look, then, at factors that can complicate or limit the contribution of empathy to situational prosocial behavior.

EMPATHY AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: COGNITIVE COMPLICATIONS AND EMPATHY’S LIMITATIONS

Although empathy may be the “bedrock of prosocial morality” (Hoffman, 2008, p. 449), empathy even at the mature stages does not necessarily eventuate in prosocial behavior. Empathy’s relationship to prosocial behavior is complicated by the intervening role of certain cognitive processes, as well as by certain biases or limitations that may be natural or intrinsic to the empathic predisposition.

How Is the Situation Interpreted? Attributions, Appraisals, and Inferences

Although individuals with mature empathy tend to help distressed others, the actualization of that tendency is influenced to a great extent by how the situation is perceived
Moral Development and Reality

(Hoffman, 2000; see Table 5.1). “Depending on how beholders…interpret the straits of another person, their response to another person’s pain may be empathic, neutral, or even counterempathic” (Pinker, 2011, p. 578; cf. Hoffman, 2000). In other words, cognitive processes can complicate and even undermine the relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior. Cognition has thus far played a constructive role in the morality of the good: understanding or awareness of self and other facilitates a progressive maturity of caring for others. It is a matter of common observation, however, that mature empathy does not necessarily eventuate in prosocial behavior. As Hoffman pointed out, self-concerns (egoistic motives and biases) as well as causal attributions and other interpretive cognitive processes, can critically shape empathic emotion and hence the character of its contribution to social behavior.

People are mentally active, especially as mental coordination increases during childhood (Chapter 3). As persons perceive another’s distress, they bring to that perception not only their empathic predisposition but their tendencies to make causal attributions and inferential judgments as well (Hickling & Wellman, 2001; Weiner, 1985). These cognitive appraisal processes (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007) can play a crucial mediating role. For an observer who is aware that it is another person who is in distress, empathy for the distressed other generally takes the form of, in Hoffman’s terminology, sympathy (Hoffman, 2000, 2008). The formation of this empathy-based sentiment (we will use empathy loosely to mean sympathy) requires a certain causal appraisal; namely, that the distressing circumstances were beyond the sufferer’s control (perhaps a natural disaster, unavoidable accident or illness, or the death of a loved one). Empathy may not form sympathy, however, if the observer attributes responsibility to the victim for his or her plight. Especially in ambiguous circumstances, observers may be motivated to make precisely that causal appraisal to reduce empathic over-arousal (discussed later). A victim-blaming attribution also supports the belief in moral reciprocity (studied in social psychology as the motivated “just world hypothesis” or need to believe that the world is just; Lerner, 1980; see Hafer & Begue, 2005). Accordingly, it is often tempting to blame the victim even when such a causal attribution is unwarranted (cf. Chapter 7). When that happens, instead of being shaped into sympathy and thereby prompting prosocial behavior, empathy is neutralized as the victim is derogated.7

Blaming the victim illustrates one transformation of empathic distress into a specific empathy-based sentiment. There are others. Attributing the cause of another’s distress to an aggressor (whether an individual or group or even corrupt society) can shape one’s empathic distress into empathic anger, even if the distressed victim is not angry at the time. Empathy-based or transgression guilt derives from attributing the victim’s plight to one’s own actions. Bystander guilt derives from attributing that plight to one’s inactions (for example, more than 40 years after having witnessed a continuing victimization, the author has still experienced bystander guilt over his passivity; see Chapter 1).

Hoffman (2000) discussed not only causal attributions but also “inferences about whether victims deserve their plight” (p. 107) as cognitions that can fundamentally shape the nature of empathy’s impact on behavior. “If the victim is viewed as bad, immoral, or lazy, observers may conclude that his or her fate was deserved and their empathic/sympathetic distress may decrease.” As noted, there
is a temptation to view the victim in precisely this way. If, however, the victim can only be “viewed as basically good, observers may conclude that his or her fate was undeserved or unfair and their empathic/sympathetic distress, empathic anger, or guilt may increase” (p. 107, emphasis added).

Such a perceived unfairness entails the violation of one’s sense of justice or reciprocity and belief in a just world: Bad things should happen to bad—not good—people. As noted in Chapter 3, Hoffman (2000) acknowledges a common “preference for reciprocity” (p. 242) or fairness and even a motive to correct reciprocity imbalances or violations, to right a wrong. An inference of injustice (or activated moral principles, discussed later) can even increase the intensity of empathic emotions. Generally speaking, however, Hoffman has emphasized reciprocity’s mediating or shaping role: Beyond empathic anger, the reciprocity-based perception of an undeserved or unfair fate “may transform [the viewer’s] empathic feeling of injustice” (p. 107).

Empathy’s Limitations: Over-arousal and Bias

In addition to certain cognitive complications or appraisals, certain limitations of empathy itself can compromise its contribution to prosocial behavior. Hoffman identifies two such limitations: over-arousal and empathic bias. As we will see, regulatory cognitive strategies, beliefs, principles, and other processes can remedy these limitations and even promote prosocial moral development.

Empathic Over-arousal

As first pointed out by Hoffman (1978), overly intense and salient or massive signs of distress can create an experience in the observer that is so aversive that the observer’s empathic distress transforms into a feeling of personal distress. The personally distressed observer’s feelings may then shift into egoistic drift (described earlier) or a sense of futility. The intensity level of empathic distress, in other words, can be post-optimal: “if emotions run too high, the perspective-taking may be lost in the process” (de Waal, 2009, p. 100). A neurosurgeon, for example, avoids operating on loved ones because empathic concern “may be so strong as to cause a normally steady hand to shake,” with potentially disastrous consequences (Batson, 2011, p. 189).

Intervention programs designed to promote empathy and prosocial behavior can do more harm than good. A high school “Literature and Justice” program on world hunger and poverty actually reduced support for humanitarian aid—apparently, the students felt overwhelmed and immobilized by the size and scope of the problems (Seider, 2009). Beyond the daunting statistics, the massive presentation of individual profiles and “graphics” may have accounted for this counter-productive over-arousal (Seider, 2009, p. 69).

Empathic over-arousal is the downside of empathy’s multiple arousal modes: combined arousals (especially if they include self-focused perspective-taking, generating vivid mental images) often account for the post-optimal level of distress, a level that, ironically, can exceed the victim’s actual level of distress. Chronic empathic
over-arousal, or “compassion fatigue” (Figley, 2012), is a problem well known to critical care nurses and other helping professionals. “Doctors and nurses in emergency rooms…just cannot afford to be constantly in an empathic mode” (de Waal, 2009, p. 80). Indeed, “the medical profession has a longstanding struggle to achieve an appropriate balance between empathy and clinical distance” (Decety & Svetlova, 2012, pp. 17–18; cf. Gleichgerrcht & Decety, 2012). In general, then (despite the dedication of helping professionals; see below) states of empathic over-arousal tend to induce egoistic drift and hence undermine the contribution of empathy to prosocial behavior.

**Empathic Bias**

Empathic bias is the second limitation of empathy. This bias pertains to the difficulty of “identifying with people whom we see as different or belonging to another group.” By the same token, “we find it easier to identify with those like us—with the same cultural background, ethnic features, age, gender, job, and so on—and even more so with those close to us, such as spouses, children, and friends” (de Waal, 2009, p. 80; cf. Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011). Even as babies, we prefer our “own kind” (Bloom, 2012, p. 82).

Within empathic bias, Hoffman distinguishes between “familiarity–similarity” and “here-and-now.” A prototype of the familiarity bias is the preference that can develop for a stimulus to which one is repeatedly exposed (e.g., Zajonc, 1968). Roger Brown (1965) once wondered whether the Mona Lisa owes its popularity at least partly to its recognition value among museum tourists. A familiarity bias is adaptive in an evolutionary context where survival and security of the group against external threat is of paramount importance (cf. Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011). In this context, the functional value of prosocial behavior pertains to the survival of the prosocial actor’s familiar “in-group” of family, friends, and others similar to oneself. Accordingly, arousal modes such as self-focused perspective-taking are more readily activated by the distress cues of someone perceived as similar to oneself. By the same token, others perceived as dissimilar (such as Edward in the camp incident; see Chapters 1, 2) are less likely to elicit empathy—although some empathy may remain. Batson (2011) concluded from experimental research “that as long as perceived dissimilarity does not evoke antipathy, we can feel empathic concern for a wide range of targets” (p. 194, emphasis added; cf. Hoffman, 1984, 1987).

The “here-and-now” version of empathic bias favors distressed persons who are immediately present. Again, these are likely to be the members of one’s in-group; such persons are especially likely to stimulate the primitive empathic arousal modes (physical salience–driven modes such as mimicry or conditioning). Although children with their pronounced centrations (see Chapter 3) are especially vulnerable, even mature observers capable of representing others’ life conditions beyond the immediate situation are vulnerable to here-and-now bias. In experiments (e.g., Batson et al., 1995) and in real life, individuals often act to relieve the distress of an immediately present other, even when that prosocial act is unfair to comparably distressed but absent others. Indeed, distressed (or deceased) victims who are no longer salient may lose out in sympathy even to “culprits who
Empathic bias for the here-and-now distressed individual may reflect broader biases of human information processing. “Human beings can’t even keep track of more than about 150 people, let alone love them all,” observed Alison Gopnik (2009, p. 216). Nor is the satisfaction of saving 150 lives 150 times more intense than that of saving one life. Slovic (2007) suggested that “a single individual, unlike a group, is viewed as a psychologically coherent unit. This leads to more extensive processing of information and clearer impressions about individuals” (p. 89). The greater salience of individuals (faces, names, personal narratives, etc.) in particular situations is consistent with the greater sensitivity in “our cognitive and perceptual systems . . . to small changes [often signaling present, visible, and immediate danger] in our environment.” Although adaptive at critical moments, this sensitivity comes “at the expense of making us less able to detect and respond to large changes. As the psychophysical research indicates, constant increases in the magnitude of a stimulus typically evoke smaller and smaller changes in responses” (Slovic, 2007, pp. 84–85).

Remedying Empathy’s Limitations

The limitations of empathy might not be all bad. As noted, some empathic and information processing bias might have some adaptive value. After all, “if people empathized with everyone in distress and tried to help them all equally, society might quickly come to a halt” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 14). Pinker (2011) warned of the unfeasibility and adverse psychological consequences of chronic empathic over-arousal: “a universal consideration of people’s interests . . . does not mean that we must feel the pain of everyone else on earth. No one has the time or energy, and trying to spread our empathy that thinly would be an invitation to emotional burnout and compassion fatigue” (p. 591). Beauchamp and Childress (2009), too, warned of over-extension: “The more widely we generalize obligations of beneficence, the less likely we will be to meet our primary responsibilities . . . to those to whom we are close or indebted, and to whom our responsibilities are clear rather than clouded” (p. 200). Haidt even mused: “Might the world be a better place if we could greatly increase the care people get within their existing groups and nations while slightly decreasing the care they get from other groups and nations?” (p. 242).

This issue relates to what Hoffman (2000) called the “multiple claimants dilemma” as well as to the scope of application of impartiality and equality ideals (Chapter 1): How can one legitimately help some needy claimants but not others equally in need? Yet, as noted, total equality of all claimants near and far, with no bias or gradient of care whatever, would place an impossible strain on the prospective helper. Of course, this practical point and Haidt’s in-group emphasis should not be stretched to excuse doing nothing to help alleviate distant suffering. Although their total elimination might be counter-productive, empathy’s biases should nonetheless be reduced. We review below processes, strategies, beliefs, or principles that can help reduce such biases and otherwise remedy the limitations of empathy.
Reducing Empathic Over-arousal

Generally speaking, empathic over-arousal undermines the contribution of empathy to prosocial behavior and hence should be reduced. Fortunately, empathic arousal levels can be moderated: “self-regulatory processes play an important role in empathy-related responding. Individuals who are well-regulated are unlikely to be overwhelmed by their negative emotion when witnessing another person in distress or need” (Decety & Svetlova, 2012, p. 14). Helpful in reducing empathic intensity to a more manageable level are the development of prefrontal cortical maturity and self-regulatory processes. These processes include cognitive strategies, beliefs, and perceptions, especially: (a) temporary “defensive” strategies such as selective attention (“if you don’t want to be aroused by an image, don’t look at it”; de Waal, 2009, p. 80), thinking or looking at something distracting, self-soothing, or looking ahead to a planned interlude (e.g., the “rest and relaxation” breaks of emergency care workers; cf. “exposure control,” Gleicherrcht & Decety, 2012); (b) a self-efficacy belief (Bandura, 1977) that one has the requisite skills and other competencies to substantially alleviate the victim’s suffering; (c) moral or “helping professional” identity; and (d) the activation of moral principles. Habituation or “psychic numbing” can also reduce empathic over-arousal (see below).

Several points in this connection are noteworthy. Interestingly, empathic over-arousal may actually for a time intensify prosocial behavior insofar as it empowers the role identity or moral principles of helping professionals and other individuals. Consider dedicated clinicians, nurses, rescue workers, and other helping professionals, especially those with self-efficacy beliefs and capabilities (Hoffman, 2002, 2008). Although compassion fatigue can become a problem, empathic over-arousal for these individuals may temporarily “intensify rather than destroy one’s focus on helping the victim” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 201). Professional commitment or moral identity (“the kind of person one is or wishes to be”; see Chapter 6) as well as the activation of caring as a principle may make a crucial motivational contribution:

An observer may feel empathically motivated to help someone in distress, but he may in addition feel obligated to help because he is a caring person who upholds the principle of caring. This activation of a caring principle and the addition of one’s “self” (the kind of person one is or wishes to be) should add power to one’s situationally induced empathic distress and strengthen one’s obligation to act on principle. (Hoffman, 2000, p. 225, emphasis added)

The broad scope or abstract quality of moral principles can help the empathizing helper “to ‘decenter’ from the salient features of the victim’s plight, and thus respond with more appropriate…empathic distress” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 238). As we will see, moral principles are particularly helpful in the regulation of empathic distress. Less conscious and voluntary than strategies, beliefs, or principles is habituation through repeated and excessive exposure to distress cues. If unchecked, however, habituation can reduce empathic arousal to suboptimal levels and even eliminate it. Also potentially deleterious is the radical protective defense of “psychic numbing…against overwhelming and unacceptable stimuli.” If prolonged,
psychic numbing can lead to “despair and depression, or various forms of withdrawal and a generally constricted life pattern” (Lifton, 1967, pp. 31–32).

Reducing Empathic Bias

As have Haidt and evolutionary psychologists, Hoffman (2000) suggested that empathic bias reflects our evolutionary tendency to help those with whom we share the most genes; i.e., our primary group. Hoffman also suggested, however, that we can “transcend” our empathic bias if we make a “conscious deliberate effort to use our knowledge to reduce empathic bias through moral education” (p. 267). Similarly, Singer (1981) suggested that we “can master our genes” (p. 131) to expand our “moral circle” through the use of reason (cf. “moral insight,” Bloom, 2004, p. 146). Bloom (2013) even suggested that “narrow, parochial, innumerate…. empathy will have to yield to [fair and impartial] reason if humanity is to have a future” (119–121).

What might effective moral education consist of, and how might we use reason to achieve moral insight? Moral educational or cognitive behavioral interventions are discussed in Chapter 8. For now, the point is worth making that our here-and-now and similarity-familiarity biases can be used against themselves! Hoffman suggested that moral educational or cognitive behavioral programs (see Chapter 8) make prominent use of a technique that, ironically, recruits our empathic bias to the service of its own reduction. The technique is called reframing or relabeling, as when we reframe an otherwise abstract out-group with a suffering individual. Empathic distress for a vividly presented victim can generalize, as when a well-publicized, highly salient victim of a widespread disaster or severely crippling illness (say, a poster child for muscular dystrophy) elicits empathic distress and help that extends to the entire group of victims. Those who might not help a distressed group of anonymous individuals may at least help a needy child who becomes in effect a “foster child” in a long-distance relationship (photos received, letters exchanged, etc.; Singer, 1981).

Similarly, a stranger in need can be assimilated into one’s sphere of familiarity if the stranger is imagined as a friend or family member. Parents and moral or religious educators often attempt to broaden the scope of social perspective-taking by encouraging contact and interdependence with other groups and appealing to “the universal qualities that make strangers similar to the self—for example, ‘all men are brothers’” (Maccoby, 1980, p. 349). Morally mature or exemplary individuals may be especially prone to discern such universal qualities and act accordingly (cf. Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). If members of disparate groups find themselves working together to achieve a superordinate goal, the respective group members may begin to redefine themselves as common members of a single superordinate group (e.g., Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy, & Johnson, 2010; Echols & Correll, 2012). Accordingly, any of these techniques may expand the moral circle or reduce familiarity-similarity biases; i.e., prejudice against out-group members.

Reframing, Aggression Inhibition, and Moral Development

Empathy for the “human face” of a group can not only broaden the referent for prosocial behavior but also inhibit aggression and promote moral development. And reframing may refer not to a “technique” but to a feature of social experience. Mark
Mathabane (2002), a Black South African, remembered “learning to hate” white people as he grew up during the years of apartheid and oppression of Black people.

Learning to hate was…simple…. All it took was a gradual twisting of my humanity while I was growing up in the impoverished ghetto of Alexandria…. White policemen…would invade our neighborhood in the middle of the night, break down our door and march my parents half naked out of bed, interrogate and humiliate my father and then arrest him for the crimes of being unemployed and harboring his family as illegal aliens in “white” South Africa…. White people could not be human. If they were, why didn’t they feel my pain? (p. A21)

Yet Mathabane also remembered that, when he was seven years old, a White person, a nun, did feel the pain of his family’s oppression and predicament. When he saw the nun cry while listening to his mother’s plight, he was “stunned by her tears, for they were the first I’d seen streak a white face. I remember saying to myself: ‘She feels my mother’s pain. She’s human after all, not a monster’” (p. A21).

Perhaps, then, “not all white people were unfeeling like the police.” He wondered whether

by killing whites I would also kill people like the nun whose empathy had given my mother hope and whose help had saved me, by making it possible for me to get an education, from the dead-end life of the street and gangs. As long as there was that chance, I couldn’t bring myself to kill in the name of hate. (p. A21)

He reflected that

guns, bombs, and tanks cannot defeat hatred. It can be vanquished only by humanity…. One is not fully human until one acknowledges and affirms the humanity of others—including one’s enemies. Ultimately, the enemy is within the human family and not without. And once we acknowledge that, we will all have the courage…[to] move beyond the darkness of mutually destructive hatred and revenge into the light of reconciliation and forgiveness. (p. A21)

It is worth noting that Mathabane’s growth beyond the superficial in morality is captured in Kohlbergian as well as Hoffmanian theories. Mathabane’s moral development was in part an empathy-based story of how empathy, reflection, and reframing humanized an enemy and thereby inhibited aggression. Mathabane’s moral development was also in part a cognitive-developmental story, one of an appreciation and reflection that grew his moral judgment from Stage 2 retaliation to Stage 3 reconciliation and forgiveness in an expanded moral sphere (Kane, 1994; cf. Singer, 1981). Although distinguishable, the Hoffmanian and Kohlbergian aspects of the story are intimately interrelated and complementary.

Finally, Mathabane’s growth into a deeper perception of common humanity was perhaps ultimately a spiritual story with ontological implications. We will save for later consideration (in Chapter 10) the question of moral development and reality.

**Role of Moral Principles**

Besides reframing and other cognitive strategies, the activation of moral principles or “philosophical ideals” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 223) can also serve to remedy the
limitations of empathy—not only empathic over-arousal but also empathic bias. Although moral principles per se are seen to “lack motive force” (p. 239) and are originally “learned in ‘cool’ didactic contexts [such as those of lectures, sermons]” (p. 239), they do have an affective motive power through bonding with empathy (we would add that moral principles can also gain cognitive motive power from moral reciprocity). Hoffman argues (and we would agree) that there are basically two families of moral principle: caring and justice.

Hoffman’s additional claim that empathy bonds with and motivates moral principles is more straightforward with respect to the principle of caring: “The link between empathic distress and [principles of] caring is direct and obvious. Indeed, caring seems like a natural extension of empathic distress in specific situations to the general idea that one should always help people in need” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 225). Empathy transforms caring ideals into prosocial hot cognitions—cognitive representations charged with empathic affect, thus giving them motive force. How is this accomplished? I suggest that people in a moral conflict may weigh the impact of alternative courses of action on others. This evokes images of others’ being harmed by one’s actions; these images and empathic affects activate one’s moral principles. The concurrence of empathy and principle creates a bond between them, which gives the principle an affective charge. (p. 239)

Hoffman posits the same bonding process for principles of justice; that is, ideals of equality and reciprocity. “Distributive justice” emphasizes equality, but includes consideration (and images) of particular individuals’ special neediness or effort in the determination of how much of a given set of goods should be distributed and to whom.

Affectively charged moral principles can reduce empathic over-arousal and biases insofar as they give “structure and stability to empathic affects” (p. 216). They embed empathic affects in cognitive representations, thereby imparting longevity: the empathic affects should survive in long-term memory. Structure, stability, and longevity mean that the mature individual is less vulnerable not only to over-arousal but to under-arousal as well. In other words, moral principles can serve to regulate and optimize the level of empathic distress. Moral principles “charged with empathic affect” can help “stabilize” empathic responses or render them “less dependent on variations in intensity and salience of distress cues from victims, and over-arousal (or under-arousal) is less likely” (Hoffman, 2000, pp. 238–239). Moral principles and other cognitive regulators of empathy level, along with low impulsivity, permit effective and sustained prosocial behavior (Eisenberg et al., 2006).

**Empathy, Its Cognitive Regulation, and Affective Primacy**

The optimal regulation of affect is seen not only in terms of the stabilizing role of moral principles but also broadly in moral or rational decision-making. Although empathic feelings affectively charge an airplane pilot’s knowledge of safe landing procedures, for example, those feelings must not be allowed to become disruptive. An optimal level is called for:
The airplane pilot in charge of landing his aircraft in bad weather at a busy airport must not allow feelings to perturb attention to the details on which his decisions depend. And yet he must have feelings to hold in place the larger goals of his behavior in that particular situation, feelings connected with the sense of responsibility for the life of his passengers and crew, and for his own life and that of his family. Too much feeling at the smaller frames and too little at the larger frame can have disastrous consequences. (Damasio, 1994, p. 195)

Although cognition can be quite active as it stabilizes, optimizes, or otherwise regulates affect, it is nonetheless biologically based affect that in the final analysis plays a primary role in the motivation of much situational behavior. Cognition then mediates or moderates (regulates, transforms, directs, etc.) the impact of that initial affect on behavior. De Waal (1996) suggested that social perspective-taking and other cognitive processes permit humans to direct more appropriately and effectively (“fine-tune”) the empathic and helping tendencies shared with other cooperative animals:

The cognitive dimension [has] to do with the precise channeling of [empathy]. . . . Thus, in aiding a friend, I combine the helping tendency of cooperative animals with a typically human appreciation of my friend’s feelings and needs. The forces that propel me into action are the same, but I carry out the mission like a smart missile instead of a blind rocket. Cognitive empathy [the ability to put oneself in the “shoes” of this other entity without losing the distinction between self and other; cf. empathic understanding, described earlier] is goal directed; it allows me to fine-tune my help to my friend’s specific requirements. (pp. 69, 80)

Like de Waal, Hoffman (1986, 2000) argues that affective forces (arousal modes of the empathic predisposition; cf. “action tendencies,” e.g., Saarni, Campos, & Witherington, 2006) propel action (affective primacy) but gain more or less “smart” direction from cognition. Hoffman’s (1986) emphasis, however, is on the interaction between affective and cognitive processes, rather than on affect as a prior force that can operate independently of cognition (e.g., Zajonc, 1984). Furthermore, since his major statement in 2000, Hoffman has modified his view that empathy “may provide the motive to rectify violations of justice to others” (p. 229, emphasis added). His modified position converges with my position (see Chapters 1 and 6) that empathy provides a motive along with that of injustice: the justice motive has an “independent origin” from the empathy motive, although the two primary motives are “parallel, continually interact, and are difficult to disentangle. In any adequate theory of mature morality, you have to deal with them both” (Hoffman, personal communication, August 14, 2012). Hoffman also pointed out that the emphasis should remain on the ongoing interaction between affective and cognitive primacies.

Empathy plays a key role in socialization, including parental discipline. Empathy empowers the mental representations and causal schemas entailed in moral internalization. A mental representation of an event has been termed a “generic event memory,” or “script” (cf. schema, Chapter 3):

Scripts are derived from experience and sketch the general outline of a familiar event….three- and four-year-olds are quite good at telling what happens in general in
a familiar event such as having lunch at the preschool or going to the beach, the zoo, or McDonald’s (Hudson & Nelson, 1983; Nelson, 1981). . . .

Discipline-encounter scripts . . . can be charged with the aff ects [e.g., empathy, empathy-based guilt] that accompany the event. (Hoffman, 2000, pp. 156–157)

Like moral principles, then, mental representations such as scripts owe their moral motive power to empathic aff ects. The development of scripts (or, more broadly, schemas) into morally “hot” cognitions is discussed further in the context of moral internalization.

THE EMPATHIC PREDISPOSITION, SOCIALIZATION, AND MORAL INTERNALIZATION

Under optimal circumstances, one who sees another in distress is likely to help. More specifically: Biologically normal, cognitively and verbally competent humans are likely to experience in bystander situations where no one else is around to help (or other situations where egoistic biases and motives are not strong) a multi-determined empathic distress that can generate sufficient motive power to elicit prosocial behavior.

In addition to biological bases and cognitive development, socialization is crucial for an empathic predisposition to eventuate into mature and effective prosocial behavior. Most situations in life, after all, are less than optimal. In the broadest terms, the development of functionally adequate levels of cooperative and prosocial behavior in a human society requires not only appropriate biological and cognitive/linguistic development, but also appropriate socialization and moral internalization. Socialization is needed especially because many situations are more confl ictual than is the simple bystander situation and, accordingly, elicit basic egoistic motives or desires (hunger, thirst, sex, safety, dominance, etc.), egocentrically biased self-chatter, and associated emotions (impulses or immediate desires or pleasure, pain, fears, anger, etc.). These motives and biases—especially pronounced during the childhood years—can override empathy (cf. Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). Consider a situation in which a child in the first place caused another’s distress:

Child A says it is his turn and grabs a toy from child B, who grabs it back. They argue until A pushes B away, grabs the toy and runs. B starts to cry. A ignores B’s crying and plays with the toy. (Hoffman, 2000, p. 138)

Such ambiguous confl ict situations beg for adult intervention because they allow “each child to blame the other”; the neutralizing eff ect of other-blaming causal attributions on empathy was noted earlier. Furthermore, although cognitively developing children are increasingly able to decenter (“that is, to transcend the egoistic pull, free themselves from the grip of their own perspective, and take another’s perspective as well”; Hoffman, 2000, p. 160), the ability to coordinate one’s own with other viewpoints “is not enough to keep children’s own viewpoint from capturing most of their attention in a confl ict situation” (p. 160) that has elicited powerful egoistic and angry emotions. Such emotions can “blind” (p. 135)
children to the harm they have done. Socialization support for decentration is necessary if each child is to understand the other’s perspective and realize it is like his own (“He expects to be given a reason, not a flat refusal, just as I do”). It is also necessary if each child is to empathize with the other and anticipate his disappointment at not getting what he wants and for each child to accept his share of blame and be ready to make amends or compromise (p. 138). Socialization and, more broadly, culture must support sociomoral development.

Adult intervention, then, is often needed in child conflict situations. After all, “even highly empathic children can get emotionally involved when pursuing their goals or when their desires conflict with [those of] others” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 169). Adults may also react after a child has already done harm or damage, especially if the harm was serious and intentional (reflecting awareness and deliberation) or negligent (the child could have been aware and more considerate) and did not evidence spontaneous guilt or reparative behavior. Such interventions in the midst of or following transgression are discipline encounters. Although parent–child interactions during discipline encounters constitute but one dynamic in the family system (Parke & Buriel, 2006) and parent–child influences are to some extent bidirectional, Hoffman (1983, 1984, 1994, 2000) argues cogently that discipline encounters are at the heart of moral socialization and internalization.

Socialization Through Discipline Encounters

Not surprisingly, Hoffman (2000) advocates interventions in the discipline situation that encourage decentration or perspective-taking through the elicitation and cultivation of empathy and transgression guilt—natural “allies” (p. 151; cf. Damon, 1988) of the parent’s prosocial cause. Specifically, Hoffman advocates the use of “inductions” or parental messages that “highlight the other’s perspective, point up the other’s distress, and make it clear that the child’s action caused it” (p. 143).

To be effective, inductions must be delivered appropriately and with optimal power or influence. Parents who make effective inductions cast the message in a form appropriate to the maturity level of the child’s available empathic arousal modes and cognitive development. Inductions with a preverbal toddler can point out an act’s physical harm and thereby activate classically conditioned and direct associations. An intervening induction may point to the still-present crying victim:

For inductive information to be understood well enough to arouse empathic distress and guilt at that age, it must simply and clearly point up the victim’s distress and make the child’s role in it salient (“You pushed him and he fell down and started to cry”).

In processing their very earliest inductions, children probably integrate the cause–effect relation between their act and the victim’s distress into the simple, nonmoral physical cause–effect scripts. [These] scripts are [thereby] enriched and given a moral dimension (my actions can harm others). Furthermore, the scripts can be infused with empathic distress and a (rudimentary) guilt feeling, which gives them the properties, including the motivational properties, of affectively charged representations, or hot cognitions. (Hoffman, 2000, pp. 159–160)
With cognitive and linguistic advances, the child develops role or perspective-taking and mediated association modes of empathic arousal. Accordingly, parents can now communicate more complex and subtle information concerning emotional harm.

Through this process [of progressively integrating the information in literally thousands of inductions over the childhood years], children's early, physical, nonmoral causal scripts are gradually transformed into complex, generalized, affectively charged scripts pertaining to the effects of one's actions on others. (Hoffman, 2000, p. 161).

Of particular theoretical interest is Hoffman's construal of this moral internalization as a “constructive” process: Children “build up” or “construct an internalized norm of considering others” (p. 144, emphases added). At first blush, the juxtaposition of “constructing” with “internalizing” is odd; we saw in Chapter 3 (cf. Chapter 10) that construction has a special referent in Piagetian usage to logic and, in that sense, is not reducible to internalization. In a broader context, however, construction in Piagetian theory refers to an interplay in which the person actively assimilates, transforms, and adapts to environmental information. Insofar as Hoffman conceptualizes internalization in terms not of simple transmission but instead constructive transformation, his usage is not inconsistent with a broad Piagetian (or, for that matter, Vygotskian) conceptualization (cf. Lawrence & Valsiner, 1993). Some knowledge, however adapted or transformed, does originate in the environment or culture (Piaget called it empirical knowledge; see Chapter 10). In this sense, social construction can be expanded beyond peer interaction and the logic of action to encompass inductive influences and moral internalization. The constructive value of inductive discipline suggests that Piaget (1932/1965) underplayed the role that parents can play in the moral development of the child (see also Walker et al., 2000).

Effective inductions are not only developmentally appropriate but also reflect an optimal level of parental power or influence. Children experience a certain degree of pressure to comply in a discipline encounter once they become aware of the relative power of parents. Furthermore, they care about parental approval and are vulnerable to anxiety in response to indications of parental disapproval. Induction and power (which generate in the child anxiety about the parent’s approval) are the dimensions of any discipline initiative. Parental power is expressed either in physical terms (demands, threats, actual punitive or restraining force, or deprivation of a privilege or possession; i.e., “power assertion”; Hoffman, 1960) or psychological terms (love withdrawal). Even the most nurturing, inductively disciplining parents bring an implicit power dimension to the discipline encounter. Hoffman argued that parents' judicious use of power can promote moral socialization. Parents should bring to bear an optimal level of “pressure”:

Too little pressure obviously gives children no reason to stop, attend, and process inductive messages. . . . Too much power assertion or love withdrawal directs children's attention to the consequences of their action for themselves. . . . Induction's explanatory feature reduces the arbitrary quality of the parent's demand, and by focusing on the parent's disapproval of the act and its harmful effects rather than on the child, . . . makes a high-anxiety, cognitively disruptive response less likely. (Hoffman, 2000, p. 153; cf. Hoffman, 1960, 1963, 1975a; Hoffman & Salzstein, 1967)
The optimal level of pressure to attend elicited in inductive discipline is congruent with the broader balance between parent-centered (authoritarian) and child-centered (permissive) orientations achieved in authoritative parenting (Baumrind, 1989; Damon, 1995). Considerations relevant to the question of what constitutes “optimal” pressure for an induction include the type of situation (an intense conflict requires more pressure than, say, a negligent act to reach the “optimal” attention level), a particular child’s temperament (a higher level of pressure defines “optimal” for a willful than for a shy or inhibited child; cf. Kochanska, 1995), and cultural context (physical discipline is less likely to be viewed as rejecting where such discipline is more normative; see Dodge, McLoyd, & Lansford, 2005).

**Inductive Discipline and Moral Internalization**

Children’s transition from compliance with parental discipline to acceptance of parental induction constitutes, then, moral socialization or the internalization of a society’s prosocial norms. It should be emphasized that an internalized moral norm is one that has been appropriated or adopted as one’s own. In other words, the child: (a) experiences the normative information “as deriving autonomously from within oneself” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 135), (b) feels compelled by an inner obligation to live up to it even in the absence of witnesses or external reward and punishment, and (c) feels empathy-based transgression guilt and/or engages in reparative or other prosocial behavior toward the victim in the event of a failure to live up to the norm.

Hence, given moral socialization and internalization—along with the biological and cognitive-developmental factors already discussed—an older child will at least experience an inner moral conflict in a moral encounter. When a moral requirement and motive (for example, one promised to visit and feels sympathy for a sick friend) conflict with an egoistic desire (one is tempted instead to accept an invitation to join a party), the morally internalized person seeks a responsible balance or priority (even if it means forgoing the party). Moral socialization or internalization can be construed as the transition from a child’s compliance to a constraining adult in a discipline encounter to an inner conflict and resources for autonomous self-regulation (Bugental & Grusec, 2006; Hoffman, 2000) in a subsequent moral encounter. The common features of conflict (outer, inner) and influence (compliance, self-regulation) in the discipline encounter form the basis of Hoffman’s (1983) argument for the importance of discipline practices to the outcome of moral socialization. Although nurturance and warmth or prosocial role modeling foster a more receptive child, neither does what inductions in the discipline encounter can do: teach the impact of the child’s selfish act on another and empower that teaching with empathy—the crucial connection for moral internalization.

**Evidence for Hoffman’s Theory of Moral Socialization**

The socialization component of Hoffman’s moral developmental theory, then, features empathy. Specifically, the empathic predisposition is seen as playing a key role in the contribution made by inductive discipline to children’s subsequent prosocial behavior. Discipline that emphasizes power does not cultivate empathy;
indeed, unqualified power assertion fosters in the child self-focused concerns with external consequences, which can in turn reduce prosocial behavior. After all, such discipline “contains no message about alternative, appropriate behavior, focuses children's attention away from the consequence of their behavior for others, and may teach children to avoid getting caught rather than to curtail the unacceptable behavior”; it may even encourage “children to view their appropriate behavior as externally imposed, rather than motivated by internal factors” (Kerr, Lopez, Olson, & Sameroff, 2004, p. 370; cf. Hoffman, 2000).

Severe levels of power assertion, or physical child abuse, can inculcate in the child a schema or internal working model of the world as dangerous and threatening, of others as having hostile intentions; such biased or distorted social information processing has been linked to subsequent antisocial behavior (Dodge, Coie, & Lynam, 2006). In contrast, inductive discipline elicits empathic distress and empathy-based transgression guilt by directing the child to consider how his or her behavior has affected others. The elicited empathic affect charges or renders “hot” the other-oriented induction, empowering it to prevail over egoistic motives in subsequent moral situations.

The key claim of Hoffman's moral socialization theory is that empathy mediates the relation between parents' use of inductive discipline and children's prosocial behavior. Two contemporaneous studies that have examined this claim both found results consistent with it. Using modeling analyses, Jan Janssens and Jan Gerris (1992) found that postulating children's empathy as a mediator between authoritative parenting (including inductive discipline; Baumrind, 1971) and prosocial development (including prosocial behavior) yielded a more adequate causal model than did alternative models of empathy. Julia Krevans and I (Krevans & Gibbs, 1996) found that inductive discipline no longer predicted children's prosocial behavior when variance attributable to children's empathy was removed from regression analyses. Put positively, empathy provided the crucial variance in the link between inductive discipline and prosocial behavior. In other results, both studies found that parental use of harsh power assertions related negatively both to children's empathy and children's prosocial behavior (cf. Hastings, Utendale, & Sullivan, 2007).

The findings of these studies established a precondition for further research using Hoffman's theory. If the researchers had found, for example, that the relationship between inductive discipline and children's prosocial behavior remained significant after the variance attributable to empathy was removed, then the validity of Hoffman's inductive discipline theory would have been seriously undermined. Such a finding would have meant that, whatever the reasons for the induction–prosocial behavior relationship, it could not be attributed to parents' promotion of children's empathy.

Krevans and I (Krevans & Gibbs, 1996) also evaluated the mediating role of empathy-based guilt, for which the results were less consistent. The mediational status of empathy-based guilt could not be adequately tested, because the component correlations using guilt were significant only for some of the measures of the variables. Notably, however, guilt did strongly relate to empathy and to prosocial behavior for high-empathy children, the portion of the sample for which the guilt
variance was most likely to be attributable to empathy-based guilt as opposed to other kinds of guilt. This result pointed to the importance of Hoffman's empathy-based guilt construct and to the need to develop more valid measures that target specifically this type of guilt.

Because the design of these studies was cross-sectional and correlational, the results are amenable to alternative causal interpretations. For example, it can be argued that high empathy in children leads not only to prosocial behavior but also to inductive discipline in the first place: After all, the responsiveness of such children to inductions (they might already be noticing their act's consequences for their victim) would presumably encourage parents to use this discipline technique. Hoffman and we argued, however, that the relations between parent and child variables were most likely bidirectional—in particular, that induction and empathy “feed each other . . . in complex, interlocking ways” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 169). Much the same can be said of the interaction between socialization contexts in general and other child variables such as temperament (Collins et al., 2000). Hoffman suggested that, although influence almost certainly flows in the main from parent to child, a longitudinal research design and structured equation modeling would yield more definitive data and conclusions regarding the causality question.

Expressing Disappointed Expectations

An unexpected finding in the Krevans and Gibbs (1996) study pointed to the importance of a construct not currently included in Hoffman's theory: parental expression of disappointed expectations. "Disappointment" is an elusive construct. Insofar as the message highlights harm to another (namely, the parent, who may comment, “What you said made me unhappy”), it is classifiable as an induction. Other versions clearly communicate love withdrawal (e.g., “I can't trust you any more”) or even ego attacks (Gershoff et al., 2010). A number of the items in the original Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) measure of inductive discipline were statements of disappointed expectations, for example, “I never would have expected you to do that”; such expressions may connote induction or love withdrawal but may also go beyond both in their meanings. They seem to say in effect to the child, “You know better, you can do better, and I think much more highly of you than I do of what you did” (Berk, personal communication, April 1, 2002; cf. Damon, 1995; Hoffman, 1970). Given such a message, children may be induced to reflect on the kind of persons they wish to be, appropriate the parental values for themselves, feel a disappointment in themselves, and determine to be more honest or considerate toward others in the future.

An adaptation of the Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) measure was used in our (Krevans & Gibbs, 1996) replication of the relationship between inductive discipline and children's prosocial behavior. According to Hoffman's theory, other-oriented inductions specifically account for this relationship. To evaluate this claim empirically and improve the construct validity of the Hoffman and Saltzstein measure, we retained some disappointed-expectations items but added items (e.g., “point out how his friend must feel”) that were clearly other-oriented induction appeals. We then created disappointment and other-oriented induction subscales and
correlated each with prosocial behavior. We expected to find that other-oriented induction mainly accounted for the inductive-discipline–prosocial behavior relationship. Instead, the results indicated the opposite: The disappointment subscale was the stronger component factor. Hence, parental expression of disappointed expectations may be even more important than other-oriented induction for the socialization of cooperative and prosocial behavior, at least for older children (our participants were early adolescents).

Disappointed expectations are related to other-oriented induction in positive discipline. In our study, disappointment statistically “behaved” like other-oriented induction (cf. Patrick & Gibbs, 2007): Both correlated positively with maternal nurturance, negatively with parental power assertion, and positively with child empathy. A similar pattern of correlations was found in the Janssens and Gerris (1992) study for a disappointment-like variable, “demandingness” (in which parents “appeal to their child’s responsibility, make demands about mature behavior, and control whether their child behaves according to their expectations,” p. 72). These findings that disappointed expectations generally “behave” like other-oriented induction led Hoffman (2000) to conclude that disappointment messages are often interpreted by the child as other-oriented inductions specifying the parent as the hurt “other” (but that rejecting or ego-attacking expressions of disappointment might be interpreted as love withdrawal). Accordingly, Hoffman suggested that disappointment items be assimilated either to induction or love withdrawal, “depending on how the parent usually responds in similar situations” (p. 155).

Yet parental expression of disappointed expectations might also foster in the child a sense of the relevance of morality to his or her self-concept (Patrick & Gibbs, 2007, 2012). Hoffman (1963) suggested that parental expressions of disappointed expectations (as distinct from parental “ego attacks”) could promote positive behavior by communicating that the child was “capable of living up to an ideal” (p. 311). In other words, such expressions “may connect [the] parent’s expectations and hopes for the child with the child’s own self-image and developing expectations and hopes for himself” (Hoffman, personal communication, February 24, 2007). Indeed, parent’s more frequent expression of disappointed expectations in discipline encounters is related to higher levels of moral identity among adolescents or preadolescents (Patrick & Gibbs, 2012). Consider the following childhood recollection from a young woman (she did not recollect her age at the time of the incident):

I once stole some candy from a food store and was caught by the manager. He demanded to know my name, and, terrified, I told him. He phoned my parents, told them what I had done, and sent me home.

As I rode my bicycle home in the dark, I thought about the reception and probable spanking I would receive. Looking scared, I entered the house and was met by a rather calm father and mother. They stressed that they were very disappointed in me that I hadn’t lived up to their expectations. They said they hoped I would never do it again, because it was wrong to take what didn’t belong to me.

My initial feeling when I was back in my room was that I had escaped with my life. But as I thought about it, I, too, was disappointed in myself. I resolved never to do it again, and didn’t. (Lickona, 1983, p. 155)
Although the child initially reacted to the parents’ calm eschewing of power assertion with relief at having avoided external consequences, she then contemplated her parents’ disappointment in her. From this reflection emerged a sense of self-disappointment (“I, too, was disappointed in myself”). She (the “she” emergent through her reflection) then found immoral acts such as theft to violate who “she” is, her identity. To protect her newfound (or newly constructed and appropriated) moral identity against subsequent violations, she summoned her ego strength (“I resolved never to do it again, and didn’t”). The contributions of moral identity and ego strength to moral motivation are discussed further in Chapter 6.

Role of Nurturance

The studies also examined the relationship of maternal nurturance or warmth to parental discipline styles as well as to children’s empathy and prosocial behavior. Generally, an emotionally close or warm relationship between parent and child is thought to foster the formation of a secure attachment and, accordingly (perhaps through an internal working model, prosocial prototype, or positive social expectations), subsequent other-concern and prosocial behavior (Hastings et al., 2007). In Hoffman’s theory, maternal warmth is a “background or contextual variable” (Hoffman, 1970, p. 303) or an example of parenting style (Darling & Steinberg, 1993). Children of generally warm or affectionate parents should care more about the child–parent relationship and hence more readily experience attentional arousal during a disciplinary encounter. Eleanor Maccoby (1983) suggested that parental nurturance promotes cooperativeness in the child and hence reduces the necessity for parents “to resort to heavy-handed, power-assertive modes of control” (p. 363). Accordingly, parental nurturance should be negatively correlated with power assertion, a finding obtained in both studies (see also Hastings et al., 2007). Both studies also found that maternal nurturance related positively to parental induction, parental disappointment, and child empathy—variables that in turn correlate with prosocial behavior (cf. Hoffman, 1975a; Zhou et al., 2002). Little or no support was found, however, for a direct correlation between warmth per se and child prosocial behavior, suggesting that Hoffman is correct to view nurturance as a mediated or interactional more than main-effect variable in moral socialization. Nurturance combined with low levels of induction or demandingness (often called “permissive” or “indulgent” parenting), for example, does not predict child prosocial behavior.

Conclusion and Critique

Thanks to Hoffman’s theory, we gain in our exploration of moral development a greater appreciation of the fact that morality must contend with the egoistic motives of the individual—and that morality entails more than judgments of right and wrong. We find relief in Hoffman’s theory from a decades-old (even pre-Haidtian) complaint against Kohlberg’s theory as “cold” in that its cognitive-developmental approach “gives relatively little attention to the strong emotions” of the ego (Maccoby, 1980, p. 325). In contrast, Hoffman consistently respects “the hot” in
morality: the naturally hot desires of the ego (or the id in Freudian theory); the countervailing, naturally hot basic arousal modes of the empathic predisposition; and the role of empathy and evoked images in rendering “hot” various aspects of cognition (we have encountered, for example, self-recognition, cognitive development, scripts or heuristics, attributions, inferences, moral principles, internalized moral norms, and inductions).

Hoffman’s attention to egoistic motives and empathic processes in moral socialization accounts for the major caveats he invokes as he uses cognitive-developmental themes. Doesn’t the child actively construct moral schemas? Well, yes—but mainly if “constructing moral schemas” can be taken beyond its classic Piagetian context of necessary knowledge (see Chapters 3 and 10) to mean “building up moral scripts” of social sequences and gaining motivation from empathic affect in the course of moral internalization. Doesn’t peer interaction promote social decentration and moral development? Well, yes—but only if those interacting peers do not vie for dominance, and only if they have been socialized in inductive homes or are supervised in their conflict by inductive “coaches.” Doesn’t perspective-taking promote moral behavior? Well, yes—but thanks mainly to the primacy of empathy; otherwise, “why should perspective-taking serve prosocial rather than egoistic [e.g., manipulative] ends?” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 131).

Hoffman’s caveats lead to a broader understanding of human nature, morality, and moral development. Extending from Hoffman’s work, de Waal (2009) concluded: “I rate humans among the most aggressive of primates but also believe that we’re masters at connecting and that social ties constrain competition…. It’s all a matter of balance” (p. 45). A fully balanced and comprehensive view of human nature and moral development requires recognition of the right as well as the good. Our main counter-caveat to Hoffman and de Waal is that “the right” is in a sense just as primary as “the good” in morality (as noted, Hoffman has come to agree with this point). The construction of ideal and “necessary” moral reciprocity, for example, has a place in moral motivation that affective primacy fails to capture. If reciprocity is akin to logic—“the morality of thought” in Piaget’s famous dictum—then reciprocity (or its violation), equality, and impartiality generate a motive power in their own right, one that can join the motive power of empathy. Indeed, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith (1759/1976) even regarded empathy or benevolence as “feeble” relative to the corrective power of reason, justice, or the third-person point of view:

It is not… that feeble spark of benevolence… that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power…. It is reason,… the great judge and arbiter of our conduct…. The natural misrepresentation of self-love can be corrected only by the eye of this impartial spectator. It is he who shows us…the deformity of injustice…of doing the smallest injury to another, in order to obtain the greatest benefit to ourselves. (p. 136; cited in Pinker, 2011, pp. 670–671)

Although Kohlberg’s theory may underplay egoistic motives and empathy, then, it does remind us of the role and potential power of cognitive primacy, especially the moral motivation engendered by coordinations of social perspectives
and violations of justice. An adequate moral psychology must represent not just “the good,” but also “the right” in morality.

We will need the resources of both Hoffman’s and Kohlberg’s theories (and to some extent Haidt’s theory) as we now turn our attention more fully to social behavior and its motivation. Do Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories of moral development enable an adequate understanding of prosocial and antisocial behavior? This question will be explored in the next two chapters.
To know the right or feel the good is not necessarily to do the right or good. One who has grasped ideal moral reciprocity, or who on multiple levels empathizes with others, may—or may not—actively seek to correct an injustice or come to the aid of someone in distress. Consistency across ideals of understanding, empathic feeling, and prosocial action in morality does occur in many instances. Those dedicated to humanitarian causes, who persevere through adverse circumstances, stand out as particularly admirable. One thinks of those who courageously campaign for equal human rights, engage in nonviolent protest against social injustice, feed and nurture needy children of the world, care for the abandoned or neglected, heal the desperately ill, or comfort the dying (Ackerman & Duvall, 2000; Colby & Damon, 1992). Smaller-scale prosocial or altruistic behavior—a parent’s encouraging hug for a child, a teacher’s tutoring for a struggling student—is also important and, fortunately, common.

In this chapter and the next two, we will apply what we have learned from Kohlberg’s, Hoff man’s, and Haidt’s theories to social behavior. The present chapter will focus on prosocial behavior and individual differences in its occurrence; the next two (Chapters 7 and 8) on antisocial behavior and its treatment. In our attempt to account for the complexity of sociomoral behavior, we will revisit in this chapter the question of moral motivation. We will also highlight the need to elaborate certain underdeveloped concepts in Kohlberg’s and Hoff man’s theories: chiefly, moral identity in this chapter, and cognitive distortion as well as social skills in the next two. A case study to be introduced at the end of this chapter will serve to sharpen our understanding of key points pertaining to full-fledged prosocial behavior. To introduce our considerations we will revisit a case study, from Robert Coles’s (1986) *The Moral Life of Children* (see Chapter 2).

**PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: THE RESCUE**

In its fullest sense, *prosocial behavior* is social action intended to benefit others (remedying injustice, promoting others’ welfare) without anticipation of personal reward; indeed, perhaps at some cost or risk to oneself. Our case study of prosocial behavior in effect fits this definition: At some personal cost and risk, one youth rescued another from an imminent attack. As you may recall from Chapter 2, the rescuer was White, the rescued was African-American; both youths were students at a previously segregated high school in Atlanta, Georgia, in the 1970s. The incident is described at length in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we revisit this dramatic rescue in order to consider the affective and cognitive dynamics of prosocial behavior.
Moral Motivation: Affective, Cognitive, and Co-primacy

Hoffman (2000) offered an empathy-based analysis of this incident that is brilliant, yet limited inasmuch as it reserved the role of moral motivation for empathy exclusively. Let us go with Hoffman’s affective-primacy analysis as far as it will take us. Consider the sudden, at-first-inexplicable quality of the rescue and apology. We think first of Hoffman’s involuntary mechanisms of the empathic predisposition (see Chapter 5).¹ The youth himself referred in effect to empathy and its cognitive alloys: sympathetic distress (“seeing him being insulted so bad, so real bad….soon they were pushing him in a corner”), the anticipation of worse sympathetic distress (“it looked like trouble, bad trouble”), and empathy-based guilt (“I’m sorry”). Also note the affective precedent in the youth’s dramatic moral turnabouts. Specifically, the emotional shift from anger to empathy and friendship preceded the cognitive shift from his segregationist ideology to the emergence of his philosophy of integration.

In Hoffman’s traditional view, then, even the White youth’s unfairness concern was primarily an empathic feeling, albeit one shaped by cognition. The White youth recalled seeing the African-American youth smile, be polite, and remain above trading insults “no matter what we called him.” This “contrast between the Black youth’s admirable conduct and the way he was treated” generated the inference that he was “a fine person who deserved better.” Discerned during those weeks, then, was an “obvious lack of reciprocity between character and outcome” (p. 108). The inference of non-reciprocity, in Hoffman’s analysis, “transformed… the boy’s empathic/sympathetic distress… into an empathic feeling of injustice” (p. 108). As noted in Chapter 3, Hoffman’s most recent position has been that justice can motivate in its own right. Insofar as Hoffman’s modified position attributes a cognitive character to the justice motive, it diverges from that of other affective primacy theorists such as Haidt (see Chapter 2)—for whom all moral motives, justice included, are primarily affective. Hoffman’s traditional position, much like Haidt’s, treated justice as primarily an affect—hence, the injustice cognition would have no motive power were it not for empathy. Furthermore, moral principles represent an empathy alloy once removed: In Hoffman’s (2000) analysis, the empathic feeling of injustice itself then activated and primed (or charged with empathic affect) the youth’s moral principle of “equal rights” (p. 244) or philosophy of integration.

For a moral theory that still emphasizes affective primacy, Hoffman’s is remarkably cognitive and developmental. His depiction of the cognitive development of empathy and the crucial role of cognition in structuring the empathic predisposition renders his theory less extreme than are Haidt’s claims (see Chapter 2) that “the action in morality is in the intuitions, not in reasoning” and that reasoning’s role in morality is mainly that of self-serving, post-affective-flash rationalization or “confabulation” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008a, pp. 190, 196, emphasis added). Moreover, “affective primacy” in Hoffman’s theory does not proliferate beyond empathy. For example, feelings such as loyalty or purity—although they may entail empathy—are not identified in their own right as additional legitimate foundations of morality.
Again, although Hoffman’s theory is more cognitive and developmental than Haidt’s, Hoffman has emphasized affective primacy. Transformed and directed though it may have been by an inference of unfairness (and empathy-based guilt), empathy alone in Hoffman’s traditional theory exclusively provided the motive power that prevailed over the youth’s egocentric biases and ethnocentric prejudices and impelled him to action, apology, and the advocacy of integration.

In our view, an exclusive affective primacy claim exceeds the proper bounds of primary affect in moral motivation. The evocative moral power of the African-American youth’s moral dignity in the face of those bad-and-getting-worse insults and pushes, or, more generally, of the nonviolent protester against oppression or injustice (Ackerman & Duvall, 2000), is affective and cognitive. Automatic unconscious and preconscious processes entail feelings or emotions but also judgments or cognitions—in the case at hand, the empathic predisposition as well as the logically and morally necessary ideals of justice or reciprocity. As we argue in Chapter 2 and throughout this book, justice is a moral motive in its own right, just as primary as empathy.

The motivational primacy issue has long been pondered in psychology. Regarding the two “flatly opposed doctrines” of cognitive and affective primacy (respectively, that “judgment in every case produces the emotion” and that “emotion always determines the judgment”), William McDougall (1926) simply declared: “We must recognize that both are partially true” (p. 220). Similarly, Orobie de Castro (2010) supported both standpoints, “namely, ‘that a stimulus is first represented cognitively . . . [which] then evokes a specific emotion’ and ‘that a relevant stimulus directly evokes an emotion, which then evokes a specific cognition’” (p. 57). Philip Cowan (1982) characterized co-primacy as a joint “approach” or “emphasis”:

Three approaches have dominated attempts to understand the affective/cognitive connection. Some theorists have adopted an affective emphasis in which emotion precedes and dominates thought [affective primacy]. Others have taken a cognitive emphasis in which meaning precedes and determines feeling [cognitive primacy]. A very few theorists appear to have accorded equal status to both [co-primacy]. (p. 53)

Although Hoffman has moved toward a joint approach that recognizes the cognitive contribution of justice or reciprocity, he has not distinguished ideal from pragmatic reciprocity. Such a distinction is particularly important in the case at hand. The non-reciprocity discerned by the White youth represented the violation of an ideal; he seemed to have been impressed with the African-American youth’s dignity “no matter what we called him.” Less mature youths (such as the rescuer’s peers?) might not have been moved, indeed, might have thought the Black youth a fool not to pay back, not to reciprocate tit-for-tat every insult with a counter-insult (Kohlberg’s moral judgment Stage 2). But the White youth may have constructed a more mature or ideal understanding of reciprocity: Again, he was moved as he appreciated a fine person, an authentic and dignified character morally above the level of trading insults. The sense of justice or construction of reciprocity generates its own motivating affect, known as the feeling of logical or moral necessity. In this case, the White youth’s inference of non-reciprocity, his perception of
injustice generated a distress akin to that of “conservational” children confronted with (spurious) non-reciprocity outcomes in the conservation task (Smedslund, 1961; see Chapter 3). Unfortunately, in the sociomoral realm, non-reciprocity is not spurious but all too real and in need of correction.

If exclusive affective primacy is untenable, so is exclusive cognitive primacy as a sufficient account of moral motivation. Certainly, any attempt to argue for cognitive (justice) primacy instead of affective (empathy) primacy is an intellectual nonstarter. If it is true that true (logic-based) reciprocity generally does not “kick in” until age 7 or so, then cognitive primacy is an ontogenetic latecomer relative to the basic empathic arousal modes of the infant. And empathy, insofar as it contributes to love, may be linked to the “ultimate” moral motive (see Chapter 10). We argue, not for cognitive primacy as the motive, just for cognitive primacy as a motive. Again, in our co-primacy view, justice contributes moral motive power along with that of empathy. Primary in the rescuer’s social perception and impetus to act were both sympathetic distress (“seeing him insulted so bad, so real bad”) and the violation of ideal reciprocity (“seeing him behave himself, no matter what we called him”).

The rescuer’s case suggested a strong sense of co-primacy, insofar as he may have been initially struck by both wrong and harm. In less concurrent versions of co-primacy, the coalescence may take time. Eventually, however, as Paul Bloom (2004) pointed out, “empathy and rationality [or injustice inference] can be mutually reinforcing” and facilitating. For example, a rational conclusion that slavery is unjust can lead one to empathize with the plight of a slave; just as “someone who, for whatever reason, . . . feels empathy [for a slave] might be driven to explore the notion that slavery in general is immoral” (p. 144; cf. Decety & Batson, 2009). Either way, the wrong and harm of slavery eventually coalesce (co-primacy) to motivate moral action.

As can the affective, the cognitive source of morality can motivate throughout one’s life. In 1992, Anne Colby and William Damon published their landmark study of 23 moral exemplars, a term subsequently defined by Lawrence Walker, Jeremy Frimer, and William Dunlop (2012) as “people who have engaged in extraordinary moral action that has real-world significance” (p. 276)—particularly where their action reflects a sustained moral commitment. Such individuals’ expression of moral obligation evokes a quality similar to numerical necessity, as when one realizes that two plus two must equal four and therefore simply cannot be convinced to say that it equals something else. Virginia Durr expresses this certainty when she says that all people must be treated equally and that this must apply to blacks as well as whites. Cabell Brand . . . expresses it when he says that it is wrong for poor children to have less opportunity than rich children…. The great certainty that we observed in our moral exemplars was the certainty established by logical necessity once the truth is found. (pp. 75–76, emphasis added)

Consistent with our co-primacy analysis is the finding of some motivational confluence among “helper” altruists and “reformer” altruists. The aims of the helper and the reformer respectively correspond to the good and the right: Whereas the helpers empathically identify with and seek to alleviate the distress of
the people they are helping, the reformers aim to correct social injustice (Carlson, 1982). Many helpers are also reformers to some extent, and vice versa. Indeed, we interpret these aims as matters of emphasis and their motivational sources as distinguishable yet inextricable and complementary: Although the prosocial behavior of helpers concerns mainly the alleviation of suffering, helpers may also seek to alleviate a cause of that suffering pertaining to social injustice. Correspondingly, the reformer’s cognitive motive to correct injustice or inequality as a logical or moral necessity coalesces with the motivating power from empathizing with the victims of that injustice. The interrelated helper and reformer categories of prosocial behavior are both primary—as are the basic sources of moral motivation to which those categories correspond.

**INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR**

The prosocial behavior of rescue and apology in our case study is remarkable not only because of its suddenness but also because the rescuer-to-be, an ordinary youth (Coles, 1986, described him as “a tough athlete, a poor student, not a well-read boy of fourteen,” p. 27) who had yelled “Go nigger, go!” at the very African-American youth he was subsequently to rescue, was a most unlikely candidate for such action. Again, the White youth was impelled to act by a primarily cognitive motive to stop an injustice and a primarily affective motive to relieve or prevent another’s pain and suffering (co-primacy). But then why were not his White buddies also moved by injustice and empathic distress? Why were they “not as swift as he to show a change in racial attitudes” (Coles, 1986, p. 28)? How was this White youth able to resist their social influence? Had he been, perhaps, less identified with or committed to his peers’ in-group segregationist ideology (see Tarrant, Calitriti, & Weston, 2012)? Yet he recollected that he had “meant it” as he had joined in shouting the epithets. More broadly, what factors might account for individual differences in the likelihood of prosocial behavior?

In a study of this question (Gibbs et al., 1986), we explored the extent to which individual-difference and moral-judgment-stage variables could account for the variance in prosocial behavior among high school students. Teachers characterized students they knew well in terms of one or another of five “nutshell” descriptions of “how the subject tends to act in social situations.” The rating instrument was developed by Robert Havighurst and Hilda Taba (1949) and adapted by us to measure moral courage, which can be characterized as prosocial behavior in the face of major adverse circumstances. Representing the bottom of our adapted four-point scale was a description of a person who “would only consider joining a just or rightful cause if it is popular with his/her friends and supported by adult authorities. He/she would prefer to remain in the background even if a friend is being taunted or talked about unfairly.” At the highest level was a person who consistently stands by his/her principles. He/she would stand up for a just or rightful cause, even if the cause is unpopular and will mean criticizing adult authorities. He/she
will defend someone who is being taunted or talked about unfairly, even if the victim is only an acquaintance. (Gibbs et al., 1986, p. 188)

This description of moral courage is pertinent to our case study from Coles (1986), insofar as the White youth did indeed defend an acquaintance who was being taunted (and worse), and to many of the exemplars studied by Colby and Damon (1992). Of course, neither Coles’s nor Colby’s and Damon’s participants were among the high school students studied in our research. We can speculatively apply to these cases, however, our and other findings concerning individual differences in prosocial behavior.

**Moral Types A and B**

The main individual difference variable we studied was Moral Types A and B, introduced in Chapter 3. The Type A/Type B distinction pertains to the extent to which the prescriptive ideals of the mature stages are evidenced. Even the Type A versions of Stage 3 and Stage 4 judgments indicate a profound understanding of the bases for viable interpersonal relationships and societal systems. However, 3A and 4A thinking is more embedded in existing social arrangements and hence is less clearly ideal than that of 3B and 4B. High school students evidencing Stage 3 Type A judgment, for example, may “care so much about what others think of them that they can turn into moral marshmallows, willing to do something because ‘everybody’s doing it’” (Lickona, 1983, p. 161). In contrast to the asymmetrical social conformist tendencies of Type A, Moral Type B is more balanced in perspective. A 3A decides in terms of What does a good husband do? What does a wife expect? A 3B decides in terms of What does a good husband who is a partner in a good mutual relationship do? What does each spouse expect of the other? Both sides of the equation are balanced; this is fairness. At 4A, the subject decides in terms of the question, What does the system demand? At 4B the subject asks, What does the individual in the system demand as well as the system, and what is a solution that strikes a balance?

Because of this balance, B’s are more prescriptive or internal, centering more on their judgments of what ought to be. They are also more universalistic, that is, willing to carry the boundary of value categories, like the value of life, to their logical conclusion. (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 185)

Accordingly, we operationalized Moral Type B as composed of three components: balancing or reciprocal perspective-taking, fundamental or universal valuing, and conscience or prescriptive internality (cf. moral identity, discussed below). Whereas “parents should not expect to be respected if they don’t treat their children fairly” illustrates the balancing component, “parents will lose their self-respect if they treat their children unfairly” illustrates the conscience component. One component may support another in a moral justification. For example, a participant may evaluate saving even a stranger’s life as important because “all life is precious” and “people shouldn’t just care about those in given relationships but about all humanity” (fundamental valuing) and then support that universal
appeal by asking, “How would you feel, if you were the stranger and no one cared enough to save your life?” (balancing). The Type B participant may add something like: “After all, I have to live with myself as a person and respect that person” (conscience; Harter, 2012, p. 125).

A central finding of our study was that Moral Type B is related to prosocial behavior. Adolescents who make appeals in their moral judgment to balanced perspectives, fundamental values such as the basic humanity of people, and personal conscience are rated by their teachers as individuals likely to engage consistently in acts of moral courage and other exemplary prosocial behavior. Anna Laura Comunian and Uwe Gielen (1995, 2000) found that Italian adolescents and adults evidencing Moral Type B (as well as those evidencing mature moral judgment in societal [Stage 4] as well as interpersonal [Stage 3] spheres) were more likely to engage in volunteer services assisting disabled, elderly, and refugee individuals. Relevant to fundamental valuing and prosocial behavior is Sam and Pearl Oliner’s (1988) classic finding that European rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust tended to perceive superficially dissimilar others as essentially similar to themselves.

Moral Type B, Field Independence, and Veridical Moral Perception

A clue to the significance of Moral Type B lies in its correlation with a cognitive style variable called field dependence-independence, also known as psychological differentiation (Ferrari & Sternberg, 1998) and relevant to perceived locus of control (see below). Traditionally, this variable pertains to perceptual or kinesthetic ability: Individuals high in field independence are able to orient vertically despite biasing influences, such as a tilted chair or window frame, or (as in the measure we used) discern and differentiate geometric figures that are embedded or concealed in more complex designs or “fields.” The social relevance of the variable is indicated by the relative autonomy or independence from conformity influences of field-independent individuals in social judgment tasks (Witkin & Goodenough, 1977).

The relationship we found between field independence and Moral Type B suggests that Moral Type B individuals are more likely to engage in prosocial activity because they are more able to discern a core injustice in a situation despite distortive, obscuring, or distracting influences from the social context or “field” of a social group. The distorting field in which the White youth was embedded included the immediate social-conformity pressures from his peers and, more broadly, an ecological context (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006) or custom complex (Haidt; see Chapter 2) in which ideological norms of segregation and out-group rejection were prevalent. Nor were the field influences merely external pressures: In Herbert Kelman’s (1958) classic terms of social influence, the White youth had not only complied with his buddies’ expectations but had also identified with their anti-African-American norms (although he may not have fully internalized those norms).

The field-independence interpretation of Moral Type B fits with the “moral clarity” (p. 173) and “resistance to illusory interpretations of events” (p. 289) shown by moral exemplars (Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 173), including whistleblowers
Moral Development and Reality

(Anderson & Morgan, 2007; Andrews, December 3, 2006; Glazer, 2002; Lacayo & Ripley, 2002; Walsh, November 18, 2007) and other individuals who resist illegitimate conformity or authority demands. In a replication of the famous Stanley Milgram obedience-to-authority experiment, a resistor (that is, a participant who refused to continue administering ostensible shocks to a “learner”), responded to “Aren’t we supposed to do what we’re told?” with a field-independent retort: “Do you have a brain? Shouldn’t you use it, too? If someone walks up to you and says, ‘The blackboard is white,’ and they’ve got on a lab coat, do you believe him? No. You’ve got your own eyes.” (Burger et al., 2011).

Again, Moral Type B (vs. Type A) individuals clearly see moral wrong (even amid obfuscating norms, pressures from authority, rationalizations, and ideologies). Accordingly, they experience a stronger sense of the violation of moral necessity and, at least in part because of this cognitive motive, feel impelled to act. For example, in light of the prominent concern with the ideal perspective-taking balance in Type B, would not a Type B-oriented individual be more primed to discern an essential moral imbalance (non-reciprocity of treatment, unfairness) even in a complex and confusing social situation? Might not a Type B-oriented individual be especially “able to discriminate between the demands of convention and the requirements of justice”—and, accordingly, “attempt to transform societal arrangements embedding inequalities and injustices” (Turiel, 2008, p. 4)? Moreover, in light of the prominent concern with fundamental values that go beyond superficial role boundaries, would not a Type B individual be more primed to discern the essential humanness of a member of an out-group? Significantly, a “human ability to treasure the spark of humanity in everyone” (p. 279) was common among Colby’s and Damon’s (1992) exemplars.3

Given the perceptual emphasis in the field independence construct, it is interesting that the White youth in our case study repeatedly used a visual figure of speech in explaining his intervention: He kept “seeing him [the African-American youth] behave himself, no matter what we called him, and seeing him being insulted so bad, so real bad” (Coles, 1986, p. 28, emphasis added); “after a few weeks, I began to see a kid, not a nigger” (p. 27, emphasis added). It is as if the youth had a “good eye” for the ethical dimension of life. Much as a child penetrates misleading appearances despite superficial impressions to infer an underlying reality of conservation, our White youth inferred injustice and saw through stereotypes and superficial differences to see a human being. Indeed, his maturity and growing clarity, accuracy, or veridicality of moral perception may have fed his empathic distress and his distress at the violation of morally necessary ideals. These factors may have related to the “something in him” that “began to change.” Given that internal change, the remaining field pressures were restricted to the extrinsic (such as compliance) and were insufficient to suppress his mounting motivation to do something as the unjust victimization escalated.

Morality and the Self-Schema: Moral Identity

Individuals who seem primed to discern and respond to the ethical core in the complexities of human social existence tend to be those for whom morality is
relevant to their sense of self, or even, as David Moshman (2011a) put it, “central to your deepest sense of who you are” (p. 113; cf. Blasi, 1995). In other words, mature and accurate or discerning moral perception should be related to moral self-identity (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). Colby and Damon (1992) concluded that their exemplars’ “hopes for themselves and their own destinies are largely defined by their moral goals” (p. 300); that is, there is “a moral center” to their self-understanding or an exceptional degree of “unity between self and morality” (p. 300; cf. Frimer & Walker, 2009; Patrick & Gibbs, 2012). Given this moral center, moral schemas in moral exemplars are “chronically accessible for appraising the social landscape” (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006, p. 268). And the scope of their concerns is “exceptionally broad”: “They drop everything not just to see their own children across the street but to feed the poor children of the world, to comfort the dying, to heal the ailing, or to campaign for human rights” (p. 303). Daniel Hart and colleagues (Hart, Atkins, & Donnelly, 2006; cf. Aquino & Reed, 2002) found that adolescents who engaged in extensive volunteer community work were more likely to describe themselves in terms of moral personality traits and goals. By the same token, those who use fewer moral terms in their self-description are more likely to engage in antisocial behavior (Barriga, Morrison, Liu, & Gibbs, 2001; Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007).

Individual differences in the relevance of morality to one’s sense of self are greater than, say, individual differences in the relevance of gender to self-concept. As the toddler becomes aware of the distinction between self and other, the sense of self (or “self-schema”) grows through interplay with the environment. Gender is perceived from the start as relevant to self. The toddler picks up the self-label “boy” or “girl” and accordingly differentially attends to, prefers, and remembers social information in the environment. Within a few years, gender becomes consolidated into the self-schema; the child has a gender identity (Martin, 2000).

Not necessarily so for morality. Whereas a sense of self as male or female develops relatively early as a stable and central feature of one’s emergent identity, a consolidated sense of one’s essential self as moral may take place more gradually (Blasi, 1995; Damon & Hart, 1988; Frimer & Walker, 2009; Patrick & Gibbs, 2012). “Early in life, morality and self are separate conceptual systems with little integration between them” (Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 305; but see Krettenauer, in press-a, in press-b, for senses of “moral self” in childhood). By mid to late adolescence, some measure of integrity—i.e., of integration of moral ideals into the self’s explicit identity—is typically achieved (Giesbrecht & Walker, 2000; Harter, 2012; Moshman, 2011a). The rescuer had to reconcile his sense of self and even his worldview with his strange moment of intervention to reduce the cognitive inconsistency between his act of rescue and apology and his erstwhile beliefs in segregation (Abelson et al., 1968). As we noted in the last chapter, parental expression of disappointed expectations after a transgression can stimulate the child (at least the adolescent) to reflect on self and gain in moral identity. Individual differences in the degree of moral identity, however, are still considerable even among adults (Colby & Damon, 1992, pp. 305–306). In George Kelly’s (1963; cf. Markus & Wurf, 1987) terms, morality for some is a “core construct” in their identity and self-evaluation, whereas for others it is more peripheral. Along a continuum of
the prominence of moral schemas in identity, those for whom schemas of morality are central to their self-schema and interpretation of social events define one pole (highly schematic; moral character or integrity); defining the other pole are those for whom morality is entirely irrelevant (aschematic; cf. clinical sociopathy or psychopathy; Lykken, 1995). Most individuals are of course in the middle range of moral self-relevance (Baldwin, 1992; cf. Arnold, 1993).

The high moral schematicity or almost total integration of self and morality evidenced by Colby and Damon’s (1992) moral exemplars is what “makes them exceptional” (p. 301). This integration, as well as the evolution of their goals, was achieved as the exemplar connected with others in a transformative process of social construction in the broad sense of the term, called “co-construction” by Colby and Damon:

Both the exemplar and his or her colleagues are active agents in determining the shape of the transformation. All new ideas must owe their shape to some interaction between external guidance and internal belief: the transformation is, in one precise word, a “co-construction.” Over an extended period of time, the new or expanded moral goals are co-constructed in the course of many negotiations between the exemplar and other persons. (p. 184)

At one or another point during co-construction, there may occur a critical event or experience triggering an “abrupt change” (Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 185). “We never quite know…how an event will connect with ourselves” (Coles, 1986, p. 29). The White youth of our case study certainly did not know that the encountered scene of worsening “bad trouble” would personally connect with him the way it did, that it would evoke his empathy and guilt and sense of injustice and stimulate a “strange” moment of moral intervention and apology. Nor could he have anticipated his subsequent transformation and expansion of friendships and attitudes—in effect, substantial changes in his identity, perhaps the “something in him” that “began to change.” (Coles tells us nothing of the White youth’s subsequent life. It is intriguing to fancy that he subsequently co-constructed such a life of moral commitment that in the 1980s, he was among those recruited for study as moral exemplars by Colby and Damon!)

Beyond the contributions of ideal reciprocity and empathy, then, a moral identity may motivate one to live up to (act consistently with, express, fulfill in life) profoundly self-attributed moral principles, ideals, or goals (cf. Bergman, 2004; Blasi, 1995). Similarly, Hoffman (2000) suggested that a person with internalized moral principles will act morally not only because of empathy (and, we would add, ideal moral reciprocity) but also as “an affirmation of one’s self” (p. 18); to do otherwise would be a violation of consistency, a betrayal of self. Accordingly, although attention to self can become detrimental (Baumeister, 1991), moral identity plays an important role in moral behavior. A person with a moral identity may refrain from padding his expense account not only because doing so would betray his employer’s trust and because he would feel guilty, but also because “it would violate his sense of integrity” (Colby, 2002, p. 133). Kohlberg and Candee (1984) even posited that persons make “responsibility judgments” of the extent to which “that which is morally good or right is also strictly necessary for the self” (p. 57; cf. Blasi, 1995).
The central place of moral identity in our chapter title mirrors its mediating role in the dynamic relation between moral development and exemplary prosocial behavior. Within that dynamic, exemplary prosocial behavior may foster moral identity, as it may have for the Atlanta youth. For moral exemplars, moral identity even becomes, as it were, a *meta*-primacy of moral motivation, a dynamic framework of personally invested moral goals that encompasses the primacies of justice and care.\(^4\) Keep in mind, however, one intriguing fact about the Atlanta rescuer: at the “strange” moment of rescue, his conscious identity—in Moshman’s (2011a) terms, his explicit theory of self—was still that of a segregationist who would never engage in such an act, who certainly (in his conscious mind) owed no apology to a rejected out-group member. He acted not from moral identity but instead from “the nonarbitrary and nonrelativistic force of morality itself” (Nucci, 2004, p. 126). Specifically, he acted out of justice and care (cf. Nucci, 2004); those motivational primacies were joined only later by the meta-primacy of moral identity. In general, moral identity is best viewed “as an important *supplementary* source of motivation” (Moshman, 2011a, p. 178, emphasis added), contributing especially to “consistent moral behavior and enduring moral commitment” (Hardy & Carlo, 2005, p. 234; cf. Hardy & Carlo, 2011).

**Moral Judgment Stage, Empathy, and Locus of Control**

Although Moral Type B and field dependence-independence (associated with moral identity) were the main foci of our study of prosocial behavior (Gibbs et al., 1986), we also explored the possible role of certain other variables: moral judgment stage, empathy, and a variable related to field dependence-independence; namely, locus of control. Moral type correlated with moral judgment stage (cf. Comunian & Gielen, 1995, 2000, 2006; Krettenauer & Edelstein, 1999). Even controlling for moral type, moral judgment stage correlated with prosocial behavior (cf. Brabeck, 1984; Comunian & Gielen, 1995, 2000), indicating that the moral perception involved in prosocial behavior (at least in the sense of moral courage) is not only veridical but also mature.

Morally courageous prosocial behavior also related to self-reported empathy, but only marginally so (the correlation only approached statistical significance). Anecdotally, the rescuer in our case study did retrospectively appeal to empathic distress (“seeing him insulted so bad, real bad”) in accounting for his action. Other studies have found a fairly consistent relationship between empathic distress and altruistic or prosocial behavior (see Eisenberg, Huerta, & Edwards, 2012; Krevans & Gibbs, 1996; Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Empathic distress by itself may not be sufficient where doing the right thing requires willpower or ego strength (see below). In the Milgram experiment replication, highly empathic participants were nonetheless just as likely to continue to administer shocks (Burger, Girgis, & Manning, 2011). Blasi (2005) suggested that “virtues” such as empathy must be combined with “higher order” character qualities such as willpower (cf. ego strength, below) and personal responsibility “in order to have stability and motivational strength” (p. 71).

Finally, among the male participants, exemplary or courageous prosocial behavior related to internal locus of control. Internal locus of control is a belief
that one’s own actions are the main determinants of one’s outcomes in life (cf. self-efficacy theory, Bandura, 1977). Within our adolescent sample, males who were rated high in moral courage were less likely to evidence external locus of control; in particular, to attribute events in their lives to the effects of chance or actions of powerful others. Perhaps the rescuers’ overcoming of inhibitory peer expectations was attributable not only to accurate moral perception but also to an implicit belief that his actions are not necessarily controlled by external forces. Accordingly, one would tend to hold oneself rather than others accountable for the consequences of one’s actions. Colby and Damon (1992) observed that, among their moral exemplars, “blaming others, even impersonal forces” was rare, and personal accountability (“the importance of taking full responsibility for their actions”) was common (p. 290). In the Milgram experiment replication, participants who expressed a sense of personal responsibility (e.g., “If he died, I would feel a deep responsibility”) were more likely to stop administering the shocks (Burger et al., 2011). Individuals evidencing the full host of supportive attributes—not only internal locus of control but also Type B/field independence, moral judgment maturity, moral identity, empathy and ego strength (see below)—would be most likely to intervene as a bystander among others in an emergency situation (Latane & Darley, 1970).

Prosocial Behavior, Moral Perception, and Information-Processing Models

In our study of prosocial behavior thus far, we have mainly addressed the question of how such individuals see others and interpret their social world; that is, the variables entailed in their moral perception. Our and other studies suggest that the moral perception of prosocial actors is veridical, mature, and empathic and that they see or define themselves in moral terms. Perception in the broadest sense—that is, meaningful experiencing—is dissected in information-processing models of behavior. In Kohlberg and Daniel Candee’s (1984) model of moral action, perception is composed of the “functions” of interpretation (based on one’s stage, type, and other factors), choice or decision, and self-attribution (or non-attribution) of personal responsibility. Similar to these functions are the “components” of moral sensitivity (e.g., empathy), moral judgment, and prioritizing of moral values in James Rest’s model (e.g., Narvaez & Rest, 1995). The broader model of Kenneth Dodge and colleagues (e.g., Dodge & Schwartz, 1998) specifies not functions or components but steps. The “steps” include encoding and interpreting situational cues, clarifying a goal (or orientation toward a desired outcome) in the situation, and evaluating and deciding among prospective responses pertinent to that goal.

Such analyses of perception in terms of components or steps have strengths and weaknesses. On one hand, these models do identify factors and processes that are typically involved in one way or another as individuals encounter events; that is, as we anticipate, experience, and react to the environment. On the other hand, they can give the misleading impression that the meaningful experience of events typically involves extensive calculations or sequential steps of decision-making. Colby and Damon (1992) criticized such models insofar as their depiction of the
individual as “constantly in the throes of decision” was not seen in the “simplicity of moral response” evident among their moral exemplars (pp. 69–70).

Colby and Damon (1992) might agree, however, that seemingly simple or sudden responses can stem from a complexity of cognitive factors and processes—an important point that, as we saw (Chapter 2), is neglected in Haidt’s conceptualization of morality. In a reformulation of the social information-processing model, Nicki Crick and Kenneth Dodge (1994) suggested that a situational response is a function not only of the event per se but also of the schemas (proximal mental representations or attributions as well as “latent knowledge structures”) that are brought to and activated by the event. The schemas may be complex and might have been slow to develop. Their development may even have entailed conscious reflection. Once the schemas have developed and become well practiced and dominant, however, their implicit activation can be very quick indeed (cf. post-conscious automaticity as described by Bargh, 1996). “That a concept is used rapidly does not mean that it does not involve [in its history] complex processes of reasoning” (Turiel, 2006b, p. 19).

The point can be made in terms of non-social cognition (e.g., conservation knowledge) as well as moral principles. Consider the older child who promptly justifies a conservation response with a complex appeal. The child’s schemas and resultant sense of necessary reciprocity took a while to develop, but once they have become dominant, they can be readily activated—much like the schemas and sense of moral necessity of the moral exemplars. Gordon Moskowitz and colleagues (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; cf. Pizarro & Bloom, 2003) found that male undergraduates who had become highly committed to moral principles of gender equality were (in contrast to low-commitment controls) uninfluenced in a verbal task (concerning the pronunciation of female attributes) by prejudicial stimuli (negative female stereotypes). The equality principles they were highly committed to can be regarded as complex and dominant schemas. The prejudicial stimuli—and their control by the activated equality schemas—happened quickly, even preconsciously: The stimulus was quite brief (presented for less than 200 milliseconds) and immediate (presented less than 200 milliseconds prior to the task judgment). The prejudicial stimuli (e.g., “irrational”) facilitated the low-commitment participants’ but not the high-commitment participants’ response times, presumably because the stimuli were in the latter case controlled or inhibited by the activated equality schema. Again, it all happened very quickly; the control operated “so early [in preconscious processing] that there [was] no associated experience of will or agency” (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). The schema had already been activated and done its implicit inhibition of the prejudicial stimulus before the respondent could even know what happened.

Similarly, sudden moments or simple responses of prosocial behavior can have a complex cognitive background. The rescuer’s sudden intervention stemmed not just from the scene of imminent assault per se but also from the dominant, complex schemas that he had developed and brought to his perception of that scene. These were schemas of wrong (violation of ideal moral reciprocity) and harm (empathic alloys such as sympathy, guilt) that had been developed and, recently, applied to the African-American youth (perceived as “a kid, not a nigger”). The White youth
was, in a way, primed to act, even though he didn’t know it at the time. Only later did he realize that a (schema-based) line had been formed in his mind. That moral line divided levels of both wrong and harm. In both respects, the line was crossed as he saw his peers escalate from verbal abuse to imminent assault. In general, sudden and ostensibly simple responses can derive from complex processes and schemas that operate implicitly in various ways and degrees (Bargh, 1996; Bushman & Anderson, 2001; Hossin, 2013; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Wegner & Bargh, 1998; see Chapter 2). Again, the suddenness of an action does not necessarily preclude the action’s derivation from mature rationality or morality.

**Ego Strength and the Regulation of Affect**

Beyond moral perception, a final component or step included within processing models of social behavior links perception to action. This component has been characterized as “follow-through” skills enabling goal attainment (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984), implementation (Narvaez & Rest, 1995; Rest et al., 1999), and enactment (Dodge & Schwartz, 1998). Trait-like individual differences in these follow-through skills or attributes have gone by various names, such as willpower, goal-directed affect regulation, executive attention, conation, character, self-control, non-distractibility, perseverance, drive, and bravery. Blasi (2005) interpreted willpower as a “higher order” attribute related to integrity, consistency, or personal accountability (p. 72). We have referred to this attribute as “ego strength,” given its muscle-like properties: one’s ego strength can be temporarily weakened from over-exertion (“ego depletion,” see process analysis by Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012), yet can also improve through regular exercise (see Baumeister, 2002; Baumeister & Tierny, 2011). Ego strength involves *grit*, defined by Duckworth and colleagues (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007) as “perseverance and passion for long-term goals” (p. 1087). A slightly broader term is *performance control*, pertaining especially to “focusing your energy on the task at hand [and] finding the right combination of speed and accuracy” (Baumeister & Tierny, 2011, p. 37).

The moral exemplars evidenced ego strength, grit, or performance control in that they were extraordinarily persistent in pursuing their moral goals, partly because of their (earlier noted) positive attributional style in the face of failure. Similarly, the courageously prosocial male high school students we studied were less likely to attribute their actions to external influences (i.e., were higher in internal locus of control). Yet the moral exemplars did not need to struggle (and thereby deplete their ego strength) to attain and maintain their resolve. Moral necessity, deep empathy, and moral identity meant that they saw no morally acceptable alternative course of action and hence did not need to will themselves to overcome fear or doubt (Colby & Damon, 1992). The White youth regarded his rescue intervention as “the strangest moment of [his] life” partly because of its abrupt spontaneity; that is, the absence of any conscious reasoning and resolve to do the right thing despite the costs.

Nonetheless, ego strength is often needed for the attainment of behavioral goals. Ego strength links perception to action and goal attainment, irrespective of the *content* of the goal. A similar point can be made with respect to corresponding
virtues such as courage, diligence, and loyalty, which “help individuals and groups achieve their goals regardless of the morality of those goals” (Moshman, 2011a, p. 81; see Chapter 1). After all, an impressive “level of ego strength and will capacities” were recruited “to carry out the Holocaust” (Blasi, 2005, p. 78).

Ego strength and related attributes are admirable, then, insofar as they are applied toward the attainment of moral goals, ranging from prosocial behavior to completing a task honestly (which may involve resisting a temptation to cheat). Honesty has been linked to non-distractibility or the stable maintenance of attention. Paul Grim, Sheldon White, and Kohlberg (1968) found that elementary school children's degree of attentional stability (operationalized as a low standard deviation in the reaction time of their response to a visual stimulus) was related to the extent to which they avoided cheating. “Stable attention seems to promote honesty primarily by leading to a higher threshold for distracting thoughts of the opportunity to cheat” (p. 250).

Contributing to the ego strength to resist a tempting distraction are affect-regulating strategies also useful for achieving self-control or delaying gratification. The research question has been whether individuals of various ages can eschew a smaller immediate reward (such as a treat) in order to obtain a larger but later reward (perhaps two treats). Delay of gratification means regulating one's appetitive affect. Strategies or skills for regulating affect may include reducing the salience of the “hot” stimulus (e.g., covering the treat or avoiding attending to it), enhancing the salience of alternative stimuli or thoughts (e.g., singing a song or thinking of engaging in some alternative activity), and reinterpreting the meaning of the hot stimulus (e.g., minimizing a marshmallow treat’s chewy, sweet, tasty qualities by reframing the marshmallow as “just a picture” or as a non-appetizing object such as a cloud or cotton ball) (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). In general, “when people construe events in terms of their abstract, essential features rather than their concrete, incidental details, they are more likely to look beyond salient local rewards and make decisions in accordance with their global concerns” (Fujita, 2008, p. 1491; cf. Fujita & Carnevale, 2012; Fujita & Roberts, 2010). Also strategic for affect regulation are the positive attributions (e.g., “learning opportunity”) by which the moral exemplars interpreted the significance of failure.

Ego strength qua affect regulation or executive attention tends to grow during child development. As we know from earlier chapters, the young child's behavior tends to be impulsive, egocentrically biased, and uncoordinated or centered on momentary here-and-now stimuli (in Metcalfe and Mischel's [1999] terms, “responsive primarily to the urgencies of internally activated hot spots and the pushes and pulls of hot stimuli in the external world,” p. 8). The child gains ego strength through learning, socialization, language acquisition, cognitive development (primarily, decentration, mental coordination, and inferential ability), frontal lobe maturation, and increasing attentional stability. Accordingly, appetitive affect can be increasingly regulated and gratification delayed.

In later childhood, cognitive gains helpful for self-control or affect regulation come to include metacognitive awareness or understanding (e.g., understanding the value of “cool” ideation in sustaining gratification delay). A metacognitively savvy 11-year-old explained that, in the delay-of-gratification situation, he would
tell himself, “I hate marshmallows, I can't stand them. But when the grown-up gets back, I'll tell myself 'I love marshmallows' and eat it” (Mischel & Mischel, 1983, p. 609).

**Conclusion: A Spurious “Moral Exemplar”**

In addition to Coles’s (1986) adolescent rescuer and Colby and Damon’s (1992) 23 moral exemplars, a final case warrants consideration. With charity, we might characterize this man as caring and imbued with a strong sense of justice; he apparently cared intensely for relatively defenseless people perceived to be suffering injustices at the hands of cruel bullies or arrogant governments. He became totally dedicated to a campaign against those perceived cruelties and injustices; in Colby and Damon’s terms, he merged his sense of self and his personal goals into his campaign. In the process, he evidenced impressive qualities of perseverance or ego strength, as well as self-efficacy or internal locus of control. He sought to do something big or spectacular for his cause, and succeeded. The name of this exemplar? Timothy McVeigh, ideological terrorist, willful prisoner of hate (Beck, 1999) whose big, spectacular event for his cause succeeded in killing 168 innocent men, women, and children. Despite the presence in his story of factors we have seen to be associated with prosocial behavior, he is an exemplar not of love, mature and accurate perception, and compassion, but instead of distorted anger, vengeance, and hate (Damon, personal communication, October 14, 2001). His ostensibly “moral” identity is more accurately identified as, to use David Moshman’s term (2004, 2011a; cf. Skitka, 2012), a false moral identity. McVeigh was found guilty of bombing a federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; he was executed on May 19, 2001.

This spurious “moral” exemplar prompts us to refine the thrust of the present chapter and move us toward our next topic: antisocial behavior. The acts of McVeigh reflect a nature-nurture interplay and are amenable to analysis on many scales of context or level. Much as it would be fascinating to explore the gradual twisting of his humanity (to borrow a phrase from the South African Mark Mathabane, 2002; see Chapter 5), that is not our goal. Rather, we seek to use McVeigh as a counterfoil in a discriminant analysis of the meaning of prosocial behavior. Hence, we will probe as best we can the mind of this man, his worldview, his schemas for meaningful social experiencing. (Our probe owes much to the hundreds of hours of verbal data that McVeigh accorded interviewers Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck in 2001, as well as their interviews with key individuals associated with McVeigh.) As Dodge (1993) suggested, it is the level of cognitive phenomenology, one’s mind set, that is the most “proximally responsible” (p. 560) for a person’s overt behavior in a given situation. We will mainly use McVeigh to make three points regarding full-fledged prosocial behavior.

First, the moral basis for prosocial behavior must be mature. Although even preschoolers can act prosocially (see Chapter 5), prosocial behavior in the deepest sense requires mature morality. The adolescent rescuer appreciated that the prospective victim (an African-American student) was responding in a forgiving way to taunts and threats, and forgiveness was a common quality among the 23
exemplars (Colby & Damon, 1992, pp. 278–279). As Piaget emphasized, forgiveness and reconciliation (where feasible) are key indicators of ideal reciprocity or, more broadly, mature moral judgment. In contrast, forgiveness was absent in the pronouncements of McVeigh. He might have seen the African-American youth’s non-reciprocation as foolish or cowardly and perhaps deserving of contempt.

Prominent instead in his pronouncements was that of eye-for-an-eye reciprocity: vengeance, retribution, or retaliation. McVeigh embraced a “philosophy” of “dirty for dirty” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 17). Particularly chilling threats of vengeance were reserved for McVeigh’s former compatriots. Having reached a “philosophical impasse” with a former Army friend named Steve, McVeigh wrote Steve a 23-page letter that concluded with a transparent threat: “Blood will flow in the streets, Steve…. Pray it is not your blood, my friend” (pp. 153–155).

The case of Timothy McVeigh drives home just how crucial for social behavior is the difference between the initial, developmentally primitive version of “moral reciprocity” and its more advanced form—that is, between pragmatic reciprocity (moral judgment Stage 2) and reciprocity as an ideal (moral judgment Stage 3, especially Stage 3 Type B). Hoffman’s (2000) claim that reciprocity “can serve many masters” (p. 243)—including hate—is tenable specifically with reference to pragmatic reciprocity. As we will discuss in the next chapter, moral judgment developmental delay is a risk factor for antisocial behavior.

Empathic distress as an empowerment of violence through immature moral judgment is illustrated with particular clarity in the case of McVeigh. As a child, McVeigh loved animals. He “cried…for days” after seeing kittens drown; he “let out a scream of shock and terror and ran for his parents in tears” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 17) to obtain help for an attacked and fatally injured rabbit. A decade or so later in McVeigh’s life, a more complex empathic distress (specifically, self-focused perspective-taking and empathic anger) partly motivated his primitive reciprocity, activated as he watched on television the violence at Waco, Texas:

There it was…. Mount Carmel, the wooden complex where the Branch Davidians worshiped and lived under the rule of David Koresh, was engulfed in flames. Armored vehicles were ramming the walls…. The Davidians’ Star of David flag…drifted into the fire…. tears were streaming down [McVeigh’s] cheeks.

When federal agents raised their own flag over the smoldering ruins, McVeigh’s anger neared the point of exploding. People died in that house, he thought. How crude and ruthless and cold-blooded can these guys be?…The government’s use of CS gas, the tear gas McVeigh had been doused with as a soldier, enraged him. The memory of his own experience with the gas made the thought of using it on women and children unbearable to him…. In his mind, it was the ultimate bully attack…. Something…would have to be done. (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, pp. 135–136, 160)

Years later, after doing his “something,” McVeigh invoked his Stage 2 vengeance philosophy to defend the murders of those in and around the federal building: “Women and kids were killed at Waco and Ruby Ridge. You put back in [the government’s] faces exactly what they’re giving out…. Dirty for dirty, he thought. You reap what you sow. This is payback time” (pp. 2, 225). The moral immaturity of McVeigh’s social perception could scarcely be more explicit.
Second, *the social cognitive basis for prosocial behavior must be veridical*. The moral exemplars studied by Colby and Damon (1992) achieved not only mature moral understanding but also “ever greater moral clarity” (p. 173), which, again, we interpret as a kind of field independence in moral perception. As noted, they were rigorously truthful or veridical, resisting illusory interpretations of events: “Distortion…was not a mental process to which they would readily bring themselves” (p. 290). The vision or optimism that sustained them was, in Sandra Schneider’s (2001) terms, “realistic” rather than biased. In contrast, McVeigh’s visions and pronouncements, despite elements of truth, were rife with grandiose biases, cognitive distortions, and contradiction. McVeigh’s cognitive distortions are examined more systematically in Chapter 7.

The distorted character of McVeigh’s “moral” perception was especially evident as he attempted to cope with the problem that his act of ostensible morality meant the murder of innocent human beings. After all, Stage 2 “dirty-for-dirty” reciprocity still meant that the act was, well, dirty (i.e., morally reprehensible), and McVeigh was not devoid of empathy. Indeed, perhaps precisely because he was vulnerable to empathic distress, he needed to rationalize, distort, and thereby preempt any adverse feelings of self-blame or guilt for his actions (see Chapter 7). McVeigh did find a way to blame the victims. He summoned an image that had remained with him since his childhood: the destruction of the Death Star in the 1977 motion picture *Star Wars*.

McVeigh saw himself as a counterpart to Luke Skywalker, the heroic Jedi knight whose successful attack on the Death Star closes the film. As a kid, McVeigh had noticed that the *Star Wars* movies show people sitting at consoles—Space-Age clerical workers—inside the Death Star. Those people weren't storm troopers. They weren't killing anyone. But they were vital to the operations of the Evil Empire…As an adult, McVeigh found himself able to dismiss the killings of secretaries, receptionists, and other personnel in the Murrah Building with equally cold-blooded calculation. They were all part of the evil empire. (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, pp. 224–225)

To elaborate on this rationalization, McVeigh used the military phrases he had learned as a soldier in the U.S. Army. As he prepared to bomb, he was “in a combat mode” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 156). “If he seemed devoid of feelings and sensitivity,” then, “that was because he was a soldier” (p. xix) preparing for an “act of war” (p. 3), with a “duty to carry out…a mission” (p. 288). His “positive offensive action” (p. 332) against the government would need to generate a large “body count” (p. 169) if it was to make its point.

The military metaphor, then, enabled him to minimize the enormity of the crime with euphemisms. The dead among the “body count” who were peripheral to the evil empire were “collateral damage”: “In any kind of military action,” he explained, “you try to keep collateral damage to a minimum. But a certain amount of collateral damage is inevitable” (p. 331). McVeigh’s apparent need to use this minimizing distortion suggests that his assimilation of his killing innocent people to his Stage 2 dirty-for-dirty philosophy was not entirely successful. We do know from experimental research that maintaining distortions can require the expenditure of cognitive resources (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008).
In other words, McVeigh’s “field” of rationalizations and minimizing strategies could not entirely obscure the heinousness of his crime. Even the murderous “Unabomber,” Theodore Kaszynski, a fellow inmate for several months, criticized McVeigh’s allegedly moral perception as seriously flawed in its crudity; after all, “most of the people who died at Oklahoma City were . . . not even remotely responsible for objectionable government policies or for the events at Waco” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 364).

Third, and in summary, ego strength serves morality insofar as it links mature and veridical moral perception to action. As noted, ego strength or persistence toward goal attainment depends partly on the use of strategies or skills for regulating affect and thereby maintaining attentional stability or avoiding distractions. Ego strength per se is neutral with respect to morality; hence, in Lawrence Walker’s and Karl Hennig’s (2004) study of moral exemplarity, the character attribute “brave” is a moral quality only insofar as it is contextualized by “just” and/or “caring” qualities. Indeed, ego strength in the service of attaining moral goals (e.g., prosocial behavior or honest task completion) rests ultimately on processes of mature and accurate moral perception. A money-hungry and egocentrically biased man walking past a blind beggar is distracted by the sight of the beggar’s many coins in a nearby cup and thinks how easy it would be to take them. This man will have little motivation to resist acting on this thought unless he processes the situation in moral terms. For example, the man might automatically activate a Stage 3 schema pertaining to how he or anyone would wish to be treated in that situation (ideal reciprocity à la Kohlberg or Piaget), or, relatedly, he might attend to that person’s plight and imagine how he would feel or how that person must feel (empathic perspective-taking à la Hoffman).

McVeigh’s ego strength served an ideology of hatred. Against such perversely guided regulations of affect, empathic affect for the prospective victims scarcely had a chance. According to Michel and Herbeck (2001), McVeigh did have at least one moment of moral clarity. As McVeigh drove his bomb-laden truck toward the federal building and “his eyes fell upon it,” he was “hit . . . by the enormity of what he was about to do.” But “just as quickly, he pushed the thought aside” (p. 230). Our speculative translation: As he saw all the unsuspecting, innocent people in and around the building, he anticipated with some beginning moral maturity and accuracy what his bomb would do to them. He experienced incipient moral inhibition from empathic distress, empathy-based guilt, and justice violation. Before the affective and cognitive moral motives could effectively inhibit him, however, he reestablished his distorted mindset and mustered his resolve; that is, he empathized again with the Waco victims, generating empathic anger and reactivating his developmentally delayed morality (crude “payback” reciprocity) and inaccurate schemas of interpretation (e.g., “positive military action”). He thereby neutralized his moment of moral clarity. Such perverse use of ego strength—that is, such regulation of effect through cognitive distortion in the service of antisocial goals—is discussed further in the next chapter.
This chapter and the next continue the application of moral knowing and feeling—especially what we have learned of moral knowing and feeling through study of Kohlberg's and Hoffman's developmental theories—to social behavior. From the last chapter's focus on variables of prosocial behavior, we shift at this point in our exploration to the understanding and treatment of antisocial behavior. According to Kohlberg's and Hoffman's theories, the key principle of treatment for antisocial behavior is at least in part the same as that for facilitating children's social decen-
tration and moral judgment development or for socializing prosocial norms and empathic motivation. Whether the aim is to cognitively facilitate or empathically socialize, the key is to give egocentrically biased or self-centered individuals—children, adolescents, adults—opportunities and encouragement to take the per-
spectives of others. Perspective-taking treatment programs will be discussed in Chapter 8.

This chapter will focus on self-centration and other limitations characteristic of youths with antisocial behavior problems. Three caveats to the term limitation should be noted. First, pronounced egocentric bias and other “limitations” are best construed as tendencies, not incapacities evident in all circumstances. Second, such tendencies are best studied in the context of theories that take develop-
ment seriously; e.g., conceptualize antisocial behavior in relation to sociomoral immaturity, social perceptual inaccuracy, and imbalanced social interactive skills. We seek, after all, to understand in order to treat antisocial behavior (Chapter 8). Accordingly, our examination will draw on Kohlberg's and Hoffman's develop-
mental theories rather than Haidt's non-developmental and generally descriptivist approach (see Chapter 2).

Finally, these tendencies result from “a complex interplay of nature and nurture” (Rutter, 1997, p. 390). “Nature” encompasses partially neurophysiological variables such as difficult temperament and hyperactivity, and “nurture” encompasses not only relatively direct effects such as those of abuse and neglect but also the indirect effects of macrocontexts such as social class, negative youth culture, and economic disadvantage (Collins et al., 2000; Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1997; Kazdin, 1995; cf. Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006). Although they are not the focus of this chapter, the background factors of nature and nurture should be kept in mind as we discuss the limitations that tend to characterize antisocial youths.

■ LIMITATIONS OF ANTSOCIAL YOUTHS

After extensive work with antisocial and aggressive youths in Cleveland, Ohio, high school teacher Dewey Carducci (1980) reached three main conclusions regarding the limitations (problematic tendencies might be a better term) of such
adolescents. First, according to Carducci’s impressions, the antisocial juvenile is “frequently at a stage of arrested moral/ethical/social/emotional development in which he is fixated at a level of concern about getting his own throbbing needs [i.e., impulses and desires] met, regardless of effects on others.” Second, such juveniles were seen to “blame others for their misbehavior.” Third, they “do not know what specific steps [in a social conflict] . . . will result in [the conflict’s] being solved [constructively]” (pp. 157–158). The research literature concerning conduct disorder, opposition-defiance disorder, and other patterns of adolescent antisocial behavior (e.g., Kazdin, 1995; Stams, Brugman, Dekovic, van Rosmalen, van der Laan, & Gibbs, 2006) strikingly corroborates Carducci’s impressions.

We (Gibbs, Potter, Barriga, & Liau, 1996) have termed these limitations, respectively, (a) developmental delay in moral judgment, (b) self-serving cognitive distortions, and (c) social skill deficiencies—the “three Ds,” so to speak, common among antisocial youths. Although distinguishable, the limitations are interrelated (Barriga, Morrison, Liu, & Gibbs, 2001; Larden, Melin, Holst, & Langstrom, 2006; Leeman, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1993) and commonly point to a paucity of social perspective-taking/coordinating. Following our review of the literature pertinent to these three main interrelated limitations of antisocial youths, we will revisit for illustrative purposes the case of Timothy McVeigh (who was still in his 20s when he committed his atrocity), which was introduced in the last chapter.

**Moral Judgment Developmental Delay**

*Moral developmental delay* refers chiefly to the persistence of immature morality into adolescence and adulthood. Just as prosocial behavior stems in part from the mature moral perception (or meaningful experience) of events (Chapter 6), antisocial behavior stems in part from moral perception based on developmentally delayed morality (other risk factors are noted in Chapter 1). As discussed in Chapter 2, immature morality is composed of pronounced egocentric bias or, more broadly, superficial social and moral cognition. Among adolescents’ accounts of having harmed another person or persons, violent adolescents refer frequently to actions or objects—and infrequently to emotional or other psychological states (especially, their victims’). In these respects, the violent adolescents’ narratives differed from those of nonviolent adolescents and were comparable to the superficial discourse characteristic of young children (Wainryb, Komolova, & Florsheim, 2010; cf. Dunn & Hughes, 2001; Krettenauer, Malt, & Sokol, 2008; see Chapter 3).

**Superficial Moral Judgment**

Superficial moral judgment reduces morality to the salient surface features of people, things, or actions: either to impressive physical appearances, and physical consequences or action–reaction sequences (Stage 1) or to concrete, tit-for-tat exchanges of favors or blows; that is, pragmatic reciprocity (Stage 2). Relative to controls, delinquent or conduct-disordered adolescents evidence a delay in moral judgment stage level (even after controlling for socioeconomic status [SES], intelligence, and other correlates), attributable mainly to a more extensive use of moral
judgment Stage 2 (see meta-analyses by Nelson, Smith, & Dodd, 1990; and by Stams et al., 2006; for overviews, see Blasi, 1980; Palmer, 2003). Our cross-cultural review (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007) found that delinquents were delayed in moral judgment (relative to matched or group-selected comparison controls) in all seven countries where the question was studied (the delinquents’ delay in the Netherlands became non-significant when participants from “a high-risk urban area” were added to the comparison group; Brugman & Aleva, 2004, p. 325). Inspection of Table 7.1 reveals an almost total absence of overlap between delinquents’ and non-delinquents’ moral judgment means across the seven countries.

We also studied moral judgment delay by area of moral value (keeping promises, helping others, respecting life, etc.). Although we found delay in every area (Gregg, Gibbs, & Basinger, 1994; Palmer & Hollin, 1998), the area of greatest delay concerned the reasons offered for obeying the law. Non-delinquents gave relatively more Stage 3 and Transition 3/4 reasons—for example, the typical selfishness of lawbreaking such as stealing, and its ramifications in society for chaos, insecurity, or loss of trust. In contrast, the delinquents’ reasoning mainly concerned the risk of getting caught and going to jail.

It should be emphasized that the superficiality of delayed moral judgment pertains mainly to the reasons or justifications for moral decisions or values. I remember discussing moral values in the late 1980s with Joey, a 15-year-old at a specialized middle school in Columbus, Ohio, for juveniles with behavior problems. Joey seemed earnest and sincere as he emphatically affirmed the importance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, sample/age range (mean) in years</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Global stage range</th>
<th>M</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain, non-delinquents/17–18 (17.7)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3–3/4</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States, non-delinquents/13–19 (15.7)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2/3–3</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden, non-delinquents/13–18 (15.6)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2/3–3</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England, non-delinquents/14–16 (15.5)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>2–3</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, non-delinquents/14–16 (15.6)</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>2/3–3</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain, delinquents/14–19 (16.8)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2/3–3</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, non-delinquents/13–15 (NR)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands, non-delinquents (NR 15.1)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2–3</td>
<td>249</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany, delinquents/14–17 (15.6)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2–3</td>
<td>243</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States, delinquents/13–18 (15.9)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2–2/3</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands, delinquents (16.5)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2–2/3</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden, delinquents/13–18 (15.5)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2–2/3</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England, delinquents/14–17 (15.9)</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2–2/3</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia, delinquents (1 female)/14–18 (16.5)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1/2–2/3</td>
<td>211 a</td>
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<tr>
<td>China, delinquents/13–15 (NR)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: NR indicates information not reported. Global stage range is estimated on the basis of plus or minus one standard deviation of Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score. Non-delinquents are generally male high school students selected (sometimes matched) for a comparison study of delinquents. The studies are referenced in the source article.

aMean pretest score in an intervention study.

of moral values such as keeping promises, telling the truth, helping others, saving lives, not stealing, and obeying the law. “And why is it so important to obey the law or not steal?” I asked Joey. “Because [pause], like in a store, you may think no one sees you, but they could have cameras!” His other explanations were generally similar: Keeping promises to others is important because if you don’t, they might find out and get even; helping others is important in case you need a favor from them later; and so forth. The more Joey justified his moral evaluations, the less impressed I became. Could Joey be trusted to live up to his moral values in situations where his fear of observers and surveillance cameras would be less salient than his egocentric motives? Despite their evaluation of moral values as important (Gregg et al., 1994; Palmer & Hollin, 1998), many antisocial juveniles are developmentally delayed in that they do not evidence much grasp of the deeper reasons or bases for the importance of those values and associated decisions.

**Pronounced and Prolonged Egocentric Bias**

The high salience of egocentric biases and egoistic motives in superficial moral judgment means that the antisocial youth tends to be concerned with “getting his own throbbing needs [or desires] met, regardless of effects on others” (Carducci, 1980, p. 157). Accordingly, relative to non-delinquent adolescents, antisocial youths respond empathically to others less frequently and less intensely, and more frequently make self-references (Robinson, Roberts, Strayer, & Koopman, 2007). Like children, they tend to “complain of mistreatment if their wishes are not given priority over those of other[s]” (Beck, 1999, p. 236). Their energy tends to go into asserting their needs and desires and making the world accommodate to them. They have a supersensitive Unfairness Detector when it comes to finding all the ways that people are unfair to them. But they have a big blind spot when it comes to seeing all the ways they aren’t fair to others and all the ways parents and others do things for them. (Lickona, 1983, p. 149; cf. Redl & Wineman, 1957, pp. 153–154)

As we have seen, it is normal for egocentric bias to be pronounced in early childhood; young children tend not to decenter from their own very salient needs, desires, or impulses. With perspective-taking opportunities such as those afforded by peer interaction and inductive discipline, egocentric bias normally declines. In a study of the development of children’s reasons for obedience, Damon (1977) found later reasons to be less egocentric: “The self’s welfare is still important, but at…later levels self-interest is increasingly seen in the context of the welfare of everyone in the relation” (p. 221). The often highly power-assertive and harsh parenting homes of children at risk for conduct disorder (Kazdin, 1995), however, preclude opportunities to take the perspectives of others. Accordingly, bias of self over the welfare of others and superficial moral judgment generally remain pronounced into the adolescent years.

**Self-Serving Cognitive Distortions**

Moral judgment stages are not the only schemas relevant to social perception and behavior. Just as prosocial behavior can stem from schemas of mature and
veridical moral perception (Chapter 6), antisocial behavior can stem from perception structured by schemas of self-serving cognitive distortion. Cognitive distortions (cf. “thinking errors,” Yochelson & Samenow, 1976, 1977, 1986; “faulty beliefs,” Ellis, 1977) are inaccurate or non-veridical schemas for perceiving events. Reviewed below are self-serving cognitive distortions that, at elevated levels, facilitate aggression and other antisocial behavior.

**Self-Centered: The Primary Self-Serving Cognitive Distortion**

The longer that pronounced egocentric bias persists through childhood, the more it tends to consolidate into a primary self-serving cognitive distortion that we have called *Self-Centered*. In the absence of moral judgment perspective-taking opportunities, the self-centration (including “I want it now” temporal centration) characteristic of early childhood can evolve in later years into a network of self-skewed schemas that guides one’s perception and explanation of events and, indeed, one’s basic approach to life, one’s worldview. We have defined (Gibbs et al., 1996) the Self-Centered schema network as “according status to one’s own views, expectations, needs, rights, immediate feelings, and desires to such an extent that the legitimate views, etc., of others (or even one’s own long-term best interest) are scarcely considered or are disregarded altogether” (p. 108). The combination of a radically self-centered worldview with even the normal array and intensity of egoistic motives constitutes a risk factor for antisocial behavior.

Numerous clinicians working with antisocial youths have discerned a link between the youths’ antisocial behavior and a self-centered attitude or approach to social relations. Stanton Samenow (1984) quoted a 14-year-old delinquent: “I was born with the idea that I’d do what I wanted. I always felt that rules and regulations were not for me” (p. 160). Redl and Wineman (1957) gave as an example the responses of a youth who had stolen a cigarette lighter and was confronted:

> His only defense seemed to be, “Well, I wanted a lighter.” When further challenged, “Yes, you wanted a lighter but how about going to such lengths as to steal it from someone?” he grew quite irritated. “How the hell do you expect me to get one if I don’t swipe it? Do I have enough money to buy one?” … The act… was quite justifiable to him… “I want it, there is no other way, so I swipe it—just because I want it.” (pp. 154–155)

Similarly, in our group work with antisocial youth (see Chapter 8), one group member seemed to think that he had sufficiently justified having stolen a car with this explanation: “I needed to get to Cleveland.” Other group members, reflecting on their shoplifting and other offenses, have recollected that their thoughts at the time concerned whether they could do what they wanted and get away successfully. The only perspective these juveniles took was their own; spontaneous references to the victims’ perspectives (except perhaps to their vulnerabilities) were almost totally absent.

Self-centered and manipulative social perspective-taking may be especially evident among some psychopathic or violent individuals. “Some intelligent psychopaths do learn to read other people’s emotional states, the better to manipulate them, though they still fail to appreciate the rich emotional texture of those
states” (Pinker, 2011, p. 575; cf. de Waal, 2012). Indeed, they can manipulate and harm others precisely because of their “insensitivity” to the rich texture of others’ emotions (Hoffman, 2000, p. 36). Cecilia Wainryb and colleagues (Wainryb, Komolova, & Florsheim, 2010; cf. Carr & Lutjemeier, 2005) found that only 10% of violent youths (versus 89% of comparison youths) made reference to their victims’ emotions or feelings in narrating a time of having harmed someone. Whereas nonviolent adolescents focused on the consequences their actions had for others or for relationships, the violent adolescents generally focused on external consequences for themselves. “Their lack of attention to their victims’ emotions is especially troublesome” (Wainryb et al., 2010, p. 196). Possibly even more troubling are the relatively few cases in which violent offenders do attend to a victim’s emotions—that “attention” could reflect the sadism seen in some avengers, hit men, or interrogative torturers. After all, “torture requires an appreciation of what others think or feel…. Cruelty, too, rests on perspective-taking” (de Waal, 2009, p. 211). Although some aggressors (such as sadistic torturers) may (perversely) appreciate the “rich emotional texture” of their victims’ suffering, generally speaking, “perspective-taking” in the service of manipulation and harm is inadequate (see Chapter 1).

A pronounced self (or inadequate social perspective-taking) orientation has also been evident in the responses of aggressive male juveniles to the following vignette (used in connection with the anger management component of our EQUIP group program, discussed in Chapter 8):

Gary is in the kitchen of his apartment. Gary’s girlfriend, Cecilia, is angry at him for something he did to hurt her. She yells at him. She pushes his shoulder. Thoughts run through Gary’s head. Gary does nothing to correct the errors in his thoughts. Gary becomes furious. He swears at Cecilia. A sharp kitchen knife is nearby. Gary picks up the knife and stabs Cecilia, seriously wounding her. (Potter et al., 2001, p. 56; cf. DiBiase, Gibbs, Potter, & Blount, 2012)

Our impression is that aggressive youths seem to identify with Gary. In response to the probe question, “What thoughts do you think ran through Gary’s head?” the juveniles readily and with some genuine feeling offer thoughts such as, “Who does she think she is? She has no right to treat me that way. Nobody hits me. I wear the pants around here. I do what I want. How dare she touch me!” Self-centered and other self-serving cognitive distortions correlate highly with self-reports, parent or peer ratings, and records of violent or aggressive behavior (e.g., Barriga & Gibbs, 1996; Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau, & Gibbs, 2000; Liau, Barriga, & Gibbs, 1998; McCrady, Kaufman, Vasey, Barriga, Devlin, & Gibbs, 2008; Paciello, Fida, Tramontano, Lupinetti, & Caprara, 2008; Shulman, Cauffman, Piquero, & Fagan, 2011; Wallinius, Johansson, Larden, & Dernevik, 2011).

Antisocial youths, then, “generally believe that their entitlements and rights override those of others” (Beck, 1999, p. 27). Accordingly, their egoistic motives gain full sway in their social behavior. Although offenders victimize others, they generally misperceive their victims as the offenders and themselves as victims. After all, they have been thwarted or disrespected and thereby wronged, their (egocentrically elevated) entitlements or rights violated:
Consider the following scenarios. The driver of a truck curses a slow driver ... [or] a large nation attacks a smaller, resistant neighbor for its abundant supply of oil. Interestingly, although there is clearly a difference between victimizer and victim in these examples, the aggressor in each case is likely to lay claim to being the victim: ... The object of their wrath, the true victim (to disinterested observers), is seen as the offender by the victimizers. (Beck, 1999, p. 26, emphasis added)

**Proactive and Reactive Aggression**

This inflated sense of one’s prerogatives and readiness to see oneself as wronged reflect a Self-Centered ego that is either (a) grandiose from a sense of superiority or (b) vulnerable from a sense of potential inadequacy. In the grandiose version of the Self-Centered ego, the individual perceives and treats others as weaker beings who should not dare to interfere and who can be manipulated or controlled through violence. Aggression, then, is part of his basic approach to life. In the vulnerable version of the Self-Centered ego, the individual views the world mainly as a place where people do not adequately respect (and may actively seek to humiliate) him; he becomes violence-prone when he perceives (or misperceives) a threat or insult (Beck, 1999). In the terms we will use, the aggression of the Self-Centered ego is either (a) **proactive** (at clinically severe levels, psychopathic) or (b) **reactive** (Dodge & Coie, 1987; Dodge, Coie, & Lynam, 2006). In either case, the Self-Centered worldview is a risk factor for aggressive or other antisocial behavior.

Both proactive and reactive offenders evidence inflated self-esteem (Baumeister, 1997) or narcissism (e.g., Thomaes, Stegge, Olthof, Bushman, & Nezi, 2011). They “assert their prerogatives—for example, ‘You have no right to treat me that way’” (Beck, 1999, p. 138). The reasons behind such assertions differ, however. The proactive offender “takes for granted that his rights are supreme and confidently imposes them on other people” (pp. 138–139). Following instrumental aggression, he feels “triumphant” (after all, he has righted the wrong of interference or resistance). In contrast, “the reactive offender feels that nobody recognizes his rights and reacts with anger and sometimes violence when others reject him or do not show him respect” (pp. 138–139).

Susan Harter (2012) noted that, in contrast to high self-esteem that is healthy (reality-based, authentic, and relatively secure), the inflated self-esteem associated with aggression tends to be unrealistic, fragile, and defensive (cf. Thomaes, Brummelman, Reijntjes, & Bushman, 2013). In a study of young adolescents, those high in narcissism were especially likely to react to shame or ridicule with “humiliated fury” (Thomaes et al., 2011, p. 786). The reactive aggressor is not only volatile but also vulnerable to bouts of despair. After harming someone, the reactive offender on some occasions may feel vindicated (he, too, has righted a wrong, the wrong of undeserved disrespect). Yet on other occasions, the reactive aggressor “may feel shame or guilt,” suggesting a capacity for empathic distress and self-attribution of blame despite their negative misattributions of others’ intent (Beck, 1999, pp. 138–139; cf. Arsenio, 2010).

Men who are wife-batterers—the Garys of our vignette—may be either reactive or proactive (Chase, O’Leary, & Heyman, 2001). The majority are reactive; that is,
they hit “impulsively, out of rage after feeling rejected or jealous, or out of fear of abandonment” (Goleman, 1995). In contrast, the proactive aggressive men hit in a cold, calculating state…. As their anger mounts…. their heart rate drops, instead of climbing higher, as is ordinarily the case…. This means they are growing physiologically calmer, even as they get more belligerent and abusive. Their violence appears to be a calculated act of terrorism, a method of controlling their wives by instilling fear. (Goleman, 1995, pp. 108–109; see also Gottman et al., 1995)

**Secondary Cognitive Distortions**

To continue his Self-Centered attitude and antisocial behavior, the offender (at least the reactive offender) typically develops protective rationalizations, or what we term *secondary* cognitive distortions. These secondary cognitive distortions protect the offender against certain types of psychological stress that tend to be generated by his (or her) harm to others.

One type of stress, primarily affective, refers to empathic distress and empathy-based guilt that may begin to be aroused by salient victim distress cues (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006; Redl & Wineman, 1957). Psychopaths (or high-end proactive offenders) experience little or no empathic distress as they harm others. Haidt (2012) put it bluntly: “Psychopaths reason but do not feel…. [They] seem to live in a world of objects, some of which happen to walk around on two legs” (pp. 61–62). De Waal (2009) noted that psychopaths can “understand what others want and need as well as what their weaknesses are, but they couldn’t care less about how their behavior impacts them” (p. 212, emphasis added; see also Cullen, 2009). Not all antisocial individuals, however, are psychopaths. Among individuals with ordinary (unconsolidated) egocentric bias, lack of opportunity to use “seemingly reasonable justifications” (p. 1265) reduces antisocial behavior (Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). If the claim of Hoffman, de Waal, and others as to the near-ubiquity of empathy (Chapter 5) is accurate, then endogenous or primary psychopathy should be relatively rare. Even among children with psychopathic tendencies (i.e., with callous and unemotional traits), some potential “capacity for empathy [may] exist” (Kahn, 2012, p. 35) and offer some hope for treatment.

Accordingly, it may be the case that most of those who characteristically do salient harm to others must use protective rationalizations to neutralize incipient empathic distress and even guilt. The implied inverse relationship between use of self-serving distortions and empathy for others is in fact evident in many offender samples (e.g., McCrady, Kaufman, Vasey, Barriga, Devlin, & Gibbs, 2008).

The second type of stress, primarily cognitive (but relating to guilt and moral identity), results from the potential inconsistency with self represented by salient and unfair harm to others (Aronson, 1992). Morality is less relevant to self for those with a preeminent sense of entitlement and who engage in antisocial behavior (Aquino et al., 2007; Barriga et al., 2001). Even so, the impression of many clinicians is that, like most individuals (Epstein & Morling, 1995), antisocial persons (even proactive offenders, if only to avoid scrutiny) seek to retain and maintain a “good” image (Beck, 1999; Samenow, 1984, 2004) in some sense (others are harmed
only for good reason). Accordingly, highly salient, obviously unfair harm to others may contradict the good-person presentation to self and others and thereby generate psychological stress from cognitive inconsistency or dissonance (Blasi, 1995; Kelman & Baron, 1968; Swann et al., 1999; cf. Monin & Merritt, 2012).

Maintaining self-serving cognitive distortions to cope with these stresses often requires cognitive effort (“cognitive resources” in information-processing terms; “psychic energy” in psychodynamic terms). In many cases, one’s distortions (the nobility of one’s actions, the inhumanity or blameworthiness of one’s victims, etc.) must be repeated if the stresses (empathic distress, threat to moral self-image) generated by one’s antisocial behavior are again to be quelled. Experimental work has shown that self-protective (and self-deceiving) distortions attenuate once some of one’s cognitive resources are diverted (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008), or once one is “primed” with salient moral terms (caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, kind, etc.; Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007).

Nonetheless, secondary distortions can function as a pervasively effective coping mechanism. Through their use, the antisocial individual can reduce the stresses of empathy and inconsistency (as well as other stresses, such as humiliation; see below) and preserve his primary Self-Centered orientation as well as self-esteem. Higher self-esteem children with antisocial tendencies are more likely to use self-serving distortions (minimizing the harm of their aggression or blaming their victims; Menon, Tobin, Corby, Menon, Hodges, & Perry, 2007). Also, as noted, self-serving distortions relate inversely to empathy for victims and self-reported delinquency (Larden, Melin, Holst, & Langstrom, 2006; McCrady et al., 2008). Adolescents with high levels of self-serving distortions are more aggressive and subsequently less likely to express feelings of guilt (Paciello et al., 2008). In psychodynamic terms, Fritz Redl and David Wineman (1957) described the “special machinery [that antisocial children have] developed in order to secure their [ego and impulse-gratifying] behavior against . . . guilt” (p. 146). In the language of Albert Bandura’s (1999) cognitive social learning theory, rationalizations permit one to “disengage” one’s unfair, harmful conduct from one’s evaluation of self. In our typology (Barriga, Gibbs, et al., 2001; Gibbs, Barriga, & Potter, 2001), these empathy reducers and protectors of self-centered attitudes and self-esteem are termed Blaming Others, Assuming the Worst, and Minimizing/Mislabeling.

Blaming Others

As Carducci (1980) noted, antisocial or aggressive individuals tend to blame others for their own misbehavior. Blaming Others naturally follows from the self-centered sense of entitlement; in the examples noted earlier, the aggressive truck driver blamed his verbal attack on the slow driving of his victims. In the Gary vignette (above), several of the group members suggested that Cecilia “was asking for it.” “If she bothered to clean up around the kitchen,” one group member opined, “she wouldn’t have gotten hurt with that knife.” Indeed, a man who expected others to accommodate to his every whim flew into a rage and fatally stabbed his wife upon discovering that she and their children had finally started eating dinner without him. He told her as she died, “You pushed me to the limits. You did this to
Understanding Antisocial Behavior

for displacing responsibility for their problems onto some other person or circumstance. When we ask a youth why he got into trouble he will say his parents were messed up, or he had the wrong friends, or the police were out to get him, or the teachers hated him, or his luck turned bad. Projecting, denying, rationalizing, and avoiding, he becomes an expert at escaping responsibility. (p. 37)

Generally, Blaming Others can be defined as “misattributing blame for one’s harmful actions to outside sources, especially to another person, a group, or a momentary aberration (one was drunk, high, in a bad mood, etc.), or misattributing blame for one’s victimization or other misfortune to innocent others” (Gibbs et al., 1995, p. 111). The misattribution of illegitimate aggression to military authorities (“I was just following orders”) has been called “authorization” (Kelman, 1973; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989).

The ego-protective role of secondary cognitive distortions such as Blaming Others means that they serve as strategies for regulating or neutralizing interfering affects in the service of antisocial behavioral goals. Ordinarily, an individual may use cognitive strategies to regulate appetitive affect and thereby achieve prosocial goals (see Chapter 6). In contrast, an antisocial individual may use a cognitive distortion such as Blaming Others to preempt, neutralize, or at least attenuate inhibitory threats such as empathy-based guilt (or the aversive affect generated by inconsistency with self-concept) to achieve or resume the pursuit of antisocial behavioral goals. And as noted, the neutralization of guilt with self-serving cognitive distortions can require mental effort (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008). Looking back on his burglaries and victims, one delinquent reflected, “If I started feeling bad, I’d say to myself, ‘tough rocks for him. He should have had his house locked better and the alarm on’” (Samenow, 1984, p. 115). This delinquent would seem to be saying in effect, “Upon experiencing empathy-based guilt and bad self-concept for causing innocent people to suffer, I would neutralize my aversive affect by blaming the victims; they were negligent in protecting their homes and so deserved whatever happened to them.” Hoffman (2000) concurred with this view of externalizing blame as serving to neutralize, displace, or otherwise regulate affect, noting that it fits my [Hoffman’s 1970] own finding that seventh graders with an external moral orientation (stealing is bad if you get caught) often respond with guilt feeling to story-completion items in which the central figure harms another, but it is only a momentary guilt feeling that is followed quickly by externalizing blame and other forms of guilt reduction. (p. 291, emphases added)

Besides neutralizing empathy-based guilt, externalizing blame can momentarily spare the ego the aversive affect of hurt or humiliation from an offense. This benefit may be especially important in the case of the reactive offender. One of Aaron Beck’s (1999) patients was a mother who “became angry with her children for very minor infractions.” In therapy, she recognized her belief that “If kids do not behave themselves, it means they are bad kids.” The hurt came from a deeper meaning yielded by the belief, “If my kids misbehave, it shows I’m a bad mother.”
The overgeneralized belief led to an overgeneralized interpretation. The mother diverted her attention away from the pain of the negative images of herself by blaming her children. (p. xii, emphasis added; cf. Thomaes et al., 2011)

Although this woman’s blame did not lead to physical child abuse, Blaming Others—especially when the pain experienced includes humiliation or negative self-image—does often eventuate in aggression. Blaming Others can protect the self by preempting psychological stresses (empathy, self-concept dissonance) attendant upon anticipated or enacted aggression. An interpretation that the source of a perceived (or misperceived) slight “is asking for it” or “deserves to be punished” can precipitate or rationalize an assault. If—as in the case of the reactive ego—the insult activates a negative self-image and attendant thoughts generating distress (“everybody thinks they can put me down, that I am weak, powerless, inferior”), that distress can be temporarily neutralized by an externalization of blame and punitive act of aggression. Although momentarily obscured, the underlying sense of inadequacy and vulnerability persists.

For some reactive offenders, “only a violent act would be sufficient to neutralize their deep sense of humiliation. Hitting and killing are strong forms of empowerment and powerful antidotes to a debased self-image” (Beck, 1999, p. 266; cf. Thomaes et al., 2011). So is sexual violence. A sadistic rapist who believed that women deprecated him attributed his criminal “excitement” to “the prospect of having a young, pure, upperclass girl and bring[ing] her down to my level—a feeling like ‘Well there’s one fine, fancy bitch who [has been humiliated]…. Bet she don’t feel so uppity now’” (Groth & Birnsbaum, 1979, pp. 45–46). Timothy Kahn and Heather Chambers (1991) found higher sexual recidivism rates among juvenile sex offenders who blamed their victims for the offenses than among those who did not.

It is worth noting that the victim in the above example had not even known the offender, let alone deprecated him in any way; in the offender’s mind, however, her mere membership in the offending class of humanity (women) was sufficient to justify the assault. Many offenders over-generalize their grievances and targets of vengeance (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). One of Redl and Wineman’s (1957) Pioneer House children “really tried to prove that his stealing [from other House children] was all right because ‘somebody swiped my own wallet two weeks ago’” (p. 150). A 16-year-old who had just fatally shot several classmates explained the violence to the school’s assistant principal (who was holding him until the police arrived): “Mr. Myrick, the world has wronged me” (Lacayo, 1998).

The sense that one has been wronged adds motive power to one’s antisocial behavior. As Beck (1999) noted, an individual who has perceived himself to have been diminished in some way typically perceives that putdown to be unfair, prompting a mobilization of “his behavioral system...in preparation for counterattack” (p. 31). One must rape, steal, or kill not only to neutralize one’s hurt or restore one’s self-esteem but more nobly to reestablish one’s rights, to correct an injustice that has been committed against one, to “get even” or “settle the score.” Hoffman (2000) characterized offenders’ rationalization “that because they have been victimized in the past it is legitimate for them to victimize others” as
representing “an inverted form of [eye-for-eye] reciprocity which... illustrates my claim... that reciprocity... can serve antisocial as well as prosocial purposes” (pp. 292–293). The youth who killed to get even with the world that had wronged him was evidencing both Stage 2 moral judgment and a Blaming Others distortion to cover his highly salient, otherwise obviously unjustifiable harm to innocent others. Moral judgment delay and a tendency to externalize blame can be a deadly combination.

Assuming the Worst

The sadistic rapist who imagined that a young woman “felt uppity” and deprecated him not only evidenced a Blaming Others cognitive distortion (“it was her fault she was raped”) but also an “Assuming the Worst” distortion that she specifically and deliberately meant to offend him (cf. Gannon, Polaschek, & Ward, 2005). We define Assuming the Worst as “gratuitously attributing hostile intentions to others, considering a worst-case scenario for a social situation as if it were inevitable, or assuming that improvement is impossible in one’s own or others’ behavior” (Gibbs et al., 1996, p. 290). Our EQUIP group members’ responses to our “What thoughts went through Gary’s head?” question (see above) included Assuming the Worst distortions such as “she hates me,” “she thinks I’m no good,” “she’s trying to kill me, I have to defend myself” and “she’s going to leave me!” Much like Blaming Others, such exaggerated attributions can then function as facilitative and protective rationalizations for violence against the victim.

Attributing to another, on insufficient grounds, hostile attitudes or negative intentions toward oneself has been linked to antisocial behavior. Kenneth Dodge and colleagues (see Coie & Dodge, 2006; cf. Orobia de Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002) found evidence consistent with the thesis that such misattributions precede aggression: Although the other boys’ intentions were actually ambiguous, highly aggressive (relative to low-aggressive) boys gratuitously attributed hostile intentions to the other’s acts. Dodge and colleagues (Dodge, Price, Bachorowski, & Newman, 1990) found higher levels of hostile attribution among severely reactive-aggressive juvenile offenders.

Extreme levels of Assuming the Worst can be recognized in clinical mental health populations. The psychiatric diagnosis of “delusional paranoid” is applied when individuals assume the worst regarding events and behavior irrelevant to themselves. An agitated paranoid patient of Beck’s interpreted the laughing of a lively group of strangers at a street corner “as a sign that they were plotting to embarrass him” (Beck, 1999, p. 28).

Physical abuse is apparently a risk factor for the development of self-protective or Assuming the Worst biases and aggression. Dodge, Bates, and Pettit (1990) found in a longitudinal study that four-year-olds who were physically abused subsequently evidenced hostile attributional bias and other distortions in a vignette-based assessment, followed by high rates of aggressive behavior in kindergarten. Hence, Assuming the Worst about others’ intentions and other “deviant” modes of social information-processing mediate the relationship between physical abuse and subsequent aggressive behavior. Beck (1999) suggested that “harsh parenting shapes the child’s [over-generalized] imitational views of others and his view of
himself as vulnerable to the hostile actions of others” (p. 134). Beck described the following clinical case of reactive aggression:

Terry, an eight-year-old boy, was referred to the clinic because of a history of demandingness, disobedience, disruptive behavior at school, continuous fights with his younger siblings, and rebellion against his parents and teachers. . . . Spanking and slapping by his father in order to curb his attacks on his younger brother were largely unsuccessful. . . . By the time Terry was six, his father would slam him against the wall, wrestle with him, or drag him to his room and lock the door. . . . One of Terry’s most common complaints was, “Everybody is against me.” This belief shaped his interpretation of other boys’ behavior. If a fellow student walked by without making a sign of noticing him, he took this as a deliberate attempt to put him down. His interpretation was, “He’s trying to show that I’m a nobody, not worth noticing.” . . . After his initial hurt feeling, he felt a craving to salve his injured self-esteem by yelling at the other student, precipitating a fistfight. He regarded his “counterattack” as defensive and justified. (pp. 132–133)

Like Blaming Others, Assuming the Worst distorts in part as it over-generalizes (e.g., “everybody is against me”). Highly aggressive adolescents have frequently been found to endorse statements such as “If you back down from a fight, everyone will think you’re a coward” (Slaby & Guerra, 1988, emphasis added), and “Everyone steals—you might as well get your share” (Gibbs, Barriga, & Potter, 2001; emphasis added). As Beck (1999) observed, “It is obviously far more painful for a person to be ‘always’ mistreated than mistreated on a specific occasion. The over-generalized explanation, rather than the event itself, accounts for the degree of anger” (p. 74).

Among the secondary cognitive distortions, Assuming the Worst is distinctive in that it is not only “aggressogenic” but also “depressogenic”: Antisocial individuals (at least, reactive offenders) often assume the worst not only about others but also about themselves (their capabilities, future, etc.). We (Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau, & Gibbs, 2000) have studied not only self-serving but also self-debasing cognitive distortions (e.g., “I can never do anything right”). The main picture is one of specific cognition-behavior relationships: The more closely matched the cognition to the behavior, the stronger the correlation (Dodge, 1986). In our study, self-serving distortion correlated more strongly with externalizing behavior disorders than it did with internalizing behavior disorders, and self-debasing distortion correlated more strongly with internalizing disorders than it did with externalizing disorders (Barriga et al., 2000). Essentially, exaggerated other-blaming is aggressogenic, whereas exaggerated self-blame is depressogenic. Self-serving cognitive distortions do correlate, however, with internalizing behavior problems; this weak but significant relationship is accounted for, among the self-serving categories, mainly by Assuming the Worst (Barriga, Hawkins, & Camelia, 2008). Hence, although ego-protective like the other secondary distortions, Assuming the Worst can also function as a self-debasing distortion (Barriga et al., 2000; cf. Quiggle, Garber, Panak, & Dodge, 1992), especially among comorbid (aggressive but also self-destructive) individuals.

Minimizing/Mislabeling

Antisocial behavioral tendencies can be protected from inhibiting factors (empathy, inconsistency with or threat to self-concept) not only by blaming or attributing the
worst of intentions to the victim but also by disparaging the victim or minimizing the victimization. The use of minimizing to protect one’s positive self-concept was almost transparent in one offender’s protest: “Just because I shot a couple of state troopers doesn’t mean I’m a bad guy” (Samenow, 2004, p. 172). We (Gibbs et al., 1995) define Minimizing/Mislabeling as “depicting antisocial behavior as causing no real harm or as being acceptable or even admirable, or referring to others with belittling or dehumanizing labels” (p. 113). One of our group members who had grabbed a purse dangling from a supermarket cart recalled thinking that the theft taught the purse’s owner a good lesson to be more careful in the future. Similarly, group members have suggested Gary’s stabbing his girlfriend was good for her, to teach that “bitch” her “place.” Vandalism is sometimes minimized as “mischief” or “a prank” (Sykes & Matza, 1957), and premeditated violent crimes as “mistakes” (Garbarino, 1999, p. 134). Slaby and Guerra (1988) found that highly aggressive adolescents were more likely to endorse statements such as “People who get beat up badly probably don’t suffer a lot.” Beck (1999) noted a common belief among rapists that a woman will “enjoy” being raped (p. 141; cf. McCrady et al., 2008).

“One way to resolve the tension between unethical behavior and moral self-image,” then, “is to creatively interpret an incriminating behavior” (Ayal & Gino, 2012, p. 151). The linguistic abuse entailed in this “creative interpretation” (that phrase itself abuses “creative”) can be quite noticeable for nonviolent as well as violent offenses. A manufacturing company executive and his engineers altered test result data so that a prospective military aircraft brake assembly, which in fact had failed all tests, would nonetheless be approved for production. Borrowing from—and abusing—the notion of poetic license, the executive explained to federal prosecutors that he and his associates were not “really lying. All we were doing was interpreting the figures the way we knew they should be. We were just exercising engineering license” (Vandivier, 2002, p. 163). In a television interview, an incarcerated offender who had murdered a sales clerk explained his lack of remorse: The woman had after all refused to “cooperate” and “follow the rules.” In addition to blaming the victim, he was using certain words to obscure his self-centered aggrandizement: Cooperation, a socially decentered word that means “working together toward a common end,” was abused to mean “giving me what I unfairly want,” and the rules was similarly seized and abused to mean “my desires.”

Minimizing and mislabeling such as dehumanization is a staple feature of ideological “crimes of obedience” (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). A common practice during combat training of soldiers—or, for that matter, of gang members who are to fight another gang—is to use derogatory and dehumanizing labels for the class of human beings who are to be the enemy, so that harming or killing them will be easier. Many government torturers, to be able to continue, must frequently be reminded that their victims are “vermin” (Haritos-Fatouros, 2003; cf. Moshman, 2004, 2007)—perhaps to avoid conscious empathic recognition that their victims are also human beings “with intentions and desires and projects” (Appiah, 2008, p. 145; cf. Batson, 2011, pp. 192–193).

A Nazi camp commandant was asked why the Nazis went to such extreme lengths to degrade their victims, whom they were going to kill anyway. The commandant chillingly
explained that it was not a matter of purposeless cruelty. Rather, the victims had to be degraded to the level of subhuman objects so that those who operated the gas chambers would be less burdened by distress. (Bandura, 1999, p. 200)

In addition to dehumanizing their victims, glorifying or ennobling their behavior may be essential if non-psychopathic individuals are to continue to engage in otherwise obviously immoral acts. Consider the troubled recollection of a Communist activist who aided in the forced starvation of 14 million Ukrainian peasants and had to see and hear “the children’s crying and the women’s wails”:

It was excruciating to see and hear all this. And even worse to take part in it….I persuaded myself, explained to myself I mustn’t give in to debilitating pity. [They were enemies of the Plan.] We were realizing historical necessity. We were performing our revolutionary duty. We were obtaining grain for the socialist fatherland. For the Five-Year Plan. (Conquest, 1986, p. 233)

This former activist’s previous resistance against “debilitating pity” became guilt-wracked, belated compassion as Stalin’s monstrous regime ended and reality sank in. Persistent guilt despite efforts to minimize or mislabel questionable actions can be a factor in post-traumatic stress disorder among military combat veterans (Grossman, 1995).

One can also attempt to minimize and insulate oneself from the enormity of one’s actions through their “routinization” (Kelman, 1973; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989) or “deconstruction” (Baumeister, 1991; Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995); i.e., selective or tunnel-vision attention to concrete details or ordinary, repetitive, and mechanical details of the offending activity. Beck’s term (1999; cf. Hollander, 1995) for this cognitive strategy was *procedural thinking*, which was “typical of the bureaucrats in the Nazi and Soviet apparatus”:

This kind of “low level” thinking is characteristic of [fastidious] people whose attention is fixed totally on the details of a destructive project in which they are engaged…. These individuals can be so focused on what they are doing—a kind of tunnel vision—that they are able to blot out the fact that they are participating in an inhuman action. (p. 18)

### Facilitating Research on Self-Serving Cognitive Distortions: The “How I Think” (HIT) Questionnaire

The primary (Self-Centered) and secondary (Blaming Others, Assuming the Worst, Minimizing/Mislabeling) self-serving cognitive distortions play an important role, then, in the maintenance of antisocial behavior. Accordingly, it is important to have a means of assessing such distortions reliably and validly. Building from previous assessment advances (e.g., Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Paciello et al., 2008), we (Barriga, Gibbs, Potter, & Liau, 2001; cf. Barriga, Gibbs, Potter, Konopisos, & Barriga, 2008) developed the “How I Think” (HIT) questionnaire (Gibbs Barriga, & Potter, 1992, 2001). The HIT questionnaire is a group-administrable, paper-and-pencil measure that is composed of items representing mainly the four categories of self-serving cognitive distortion. To provide broad and meaningful content for the cognitive distortions, these items also refer to one
or another of four main categories of antisocial behavior derived from the conduct disorder and oppositional defiant disorder syndromes listed in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994): disrespect for rules, laws, or authorities (i.e., opposition-defiance); physical aggression; lying; and stealing. For example, the item “People force you to lie if they ask too many questions” represents a Blaming Others cognitive distortion applied to a “lying” category of behavioral referent. Also included were “Anomalous Responding” items (for screening out approval-seeking, impression management, incompetent, or otherwise suspect responding) and positive filler items (e.g., “When friends need you, you should be there for them”), used mainly for camouflaging the distortion items and encouraging full use of the response scale.

The HIT would appear to be a valid and reliable assessment contribution to studies of the role of self-serving cognitive distortions in the initiation and maintenance of antisocial behavior. The factor structure of the HIT questionnaire was supported by confirmatory factor analysis. Internal consistency estimates were very high, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 0.92 to 0.96. The cognitive distortion subscales, behavioral referent subscales, and Anomalous Responding scale were also high, with alphas ranging from 0.63 to 0.92. The measure correlated with self-report, parental report, and institutional indices of antisocial behavior, indicating good convergent validity. It did not correlate with socioeconomic status, intelligence, or grade-point average, indicating good divergent validity. Regarding discriminant validity, the measure consistently discriminated (incarcerated and non-incarcerated) adolescent and adult samples with antisocial behavior problems from comparison samples. Construct validity results have been reported in both U.S. and European samples (e.g., Barriga et al., 2008; Bogestad, Kettler, & Hagan, 2010; Chabrol, van Leeuwen, Rodgers, & Gibbs, 2011; McCrady et al., 2008; Plante et al., 2012; Wallinius, Johansson, Larden, & Dernevik, 2011; see Helmond, Overbeek, Brugman, & Gibbs, 2013).

Social Skill Deficiencies

Recall that Mac neglected to balance his concerns with the legitimate expectations of the staff member. Antisocial youths generally evidence not only moral developmental delays and self-serving cognitive distortions but also social skills deficiencies—the third of the “three Ds” found in the literature. Social skills typically refers to the consolidated and implicit mental schemas that regulate balanced and constructive behavior—especially needed in difficult interpersonal situations. An example is the behavior of a youth who deals constructively with deviant peer pressure by suggesting a non-deviant alternative. Another example is that of a youth who calmly and sincerely offers clarification or apologizes to an angry accuser. Such behavior is “neither aggressive nor obsequious” (Carducci, 1980, p. 161; cf. Jakubowski & Lange, 1978); that is, it achieves a fair balance between one’s own perspective and that of another. Similarly, Robert Deluty (1979) conceptualized social skills as appropriately assertive responses intermediate between threats or aggression, on one hand, and submission or running away, on the other (although calmly leaving the scene can be appropriate or balanced in some circumstances). While
asserting or explaining his or her own perspective, the socially skilled individual also communicates awareness of the other person's viewpoint, feelings, and legitimate expectations. The use of social skills by participants in a dialogue should reduce self-centration and promote mutual respect. Arnold Goldstein and Ellen McGinnis (1997) operationalized various types of balanced, constructive social problem solving in terms of concrete and limited sequences of “steps” or component schemas.

Social Skill Deficiencies as Imbalanced Behavior

Research on social skills has generally found deficiencies among antisocial youths relative to comparison groups, corroborating Carducci’s (1980) impression that these youths typically “do not know what specific steps [in a social conflict]…will result in [the conflict’s] being solved” (pp. 157–158). Such deficiencies are perhaps not surprising given the typical absence of models of constructive problem-solving in the youths’ home environments (Kazdin, 1995). Barbara Freedman and colleagues (Freedman, Rosenthal, Donahoe, Schlundt, & McFall, 1978) found evidence of extensive social skill deficits or deficiencies among male incarcerated juvenile offenders, as measured by a semi-structured interview rating measure, the Adolescent Problems Inventory (API). Lower API scores were found not only for the delinquents overall but also for a delinquent subgroup that frequently violated institutional rules. Relations between social skill deficits and antisocial behavior were replicated by Dishion, Loeber, Stouthamer-Loeber, and Patterson (1984) but not by Hunter and Kelly (1986). We (Simonian, Tarnowski, & Gibbs, 1991) corrected for a procedural flaw in the Hunter and Kelly study and used a streamlined and adapted version of the API, the Inventory of Adolescent Problems–Short Form (IAP-SF; Gibbs, Swillinger, Leeman, Simonian, Rowland, & Jaycox, 1995). Using the IAP-SF, we found that social skills did correlate inversely with numerous indices of antisocial behavior (most serious offense committed, number of correctional facility placements, self-reported alcohol problems, and absent-without-leave [AWOL] attempts and successes). We (Leeman et al., 1993) also found that social skills as measured by the IAP-SF correlated inversely with frequency of unexcused school absences, pre-incarceration offenses, institutional misconduct, and institutional incident reports.

Given our framework for conceptualizing social skills as balanced and constructive interpersonal behavior in difficult situations, socially unskilled behavior involves unbalanced and destructive behavior in two categories of interpersonal situations: (a) irresponsibly submissive behavior in deviant peer-pressure situations (an imbalance that favors others and is tantamount to disrespect for self) and (b) irresponsibly aggressive behavior in anger-provocation situations (favoring self and tantamount to disrespect for the other; more typical and another aspect of pronounced egocentric bias or self-centeredness). Using factor-analytic techniques, Susan Simonian and colleagues (Simonian et al., 1991) confirmed the validity of these categories. They labeled the peer pressure category “Antisocial Peer Pressure” (“peer pressure to engage in serious violation of social norms/legal mandates,” p. 24). The anger provocation category was represented by “response demand” or provocative pressure situations. The “Provocation Pressure” items either required an immediate response in the face of a clear and present provocation or permitted
“more response-planning time” (p. 23; example: one is late for work and knows one will be facing an irate employer). Socially skilled responses to Antisocial Peer Pressure and Provocation Pressure situations correlated inversely with covert and overt forms of antisocial behavior, respectively.

A CASE STUDY

Although atypical in some respects, an antisocial individual introduced in the last chapter—the infamous terrorist Timothy McVeigh—would seem to reflect as a young man in his 20s the problematic tendencies we have discussed under the categories of moral judgment developmental delay, self-serving cognitive distortions, and social skill deficiencies.

McVeigh’s Moral Judgment Developmental Delay

McVeigh, even as a young adult, evidenced both concrete morality and pronounced egocentric bias. As we noted in Chapter 6, eye-for-an-eye reciprocity was “a theme that became McVeigh’s philosophy” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 68). His description of his philosophy—dirty for dirty, you reap what you sow, payback time—is an explicit description of the concrete logic of Kohlbergian moral judgment Stage 2. “Anyone who mistreated McVeigh—or made him think he was being mistreated—was making a formidable enemy with a long memory” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 68). Indeed, anyone who even disagreed with McVeigh was likely to induce in McVeigh a perception of mistreatment and a motive to retaliate.

McVeigh’s moral developmental delay can be understood—but only to some extent—from what we know about his home history. Although McVeigh’s home history did not entail significant abuse, it bordered on neglect and apparently did not provide opportunities to take the perspective of others. McVeigh had “very few memories of interactions” with his parents and “never really felt close” to them or most other relatives (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 21). His father did not offer support or advice even after an incident in which McVeigh was humiliated by a bully. McVeigh did experience some nurturance through a close relationship with his grandfather; their relationship, however, “revolved around an interest the two had in common: their mutual enjoyment of guns” (p. 23).

McVeigh’s Self-Serving Cognitive Distortions

Both primary (Self-Centered) and secondary (Blaming Others, Assuming the Worst, Minimizing/Mislabeling) cognitive distortions were amply evident in McVeigh’s mental life.

Self-Centered

McVeigh’s egocentric bias consolidated into a Self-Centered cognitive distortion. Aspects of his Self-Centered orientation suggested grandiosity or even psychopathy. In quitting college, he declared that he knew more than the teachers and that
the classes were “just too boring” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 38). In the Army, he arrogantly expressed disdain for others—even officers—who seemed less knowledgeable regarding weapons and procedure manuals. Although the Army initially offered “thrills” (p. 103) and glory, McVeigh eventually became “suffocated by the repetition of ordinary life” and “restless, dissatisfied by daily life, increasingly eager to set his own rules” (pp. 112, 196). To impress his younger sister, he fabricated a military adventure. Alluding to the planned bombing, he bragged that “something big is going to happen” (p. 196). His plans were methodical, and he manipulated or intimidated others into helping him. He was convinced that “historians would call him a martyr, maybe even a hero” (p. 166). Incidentally, McVeigh’s anticipated glory of martyrdom belied his self-presentation as a humble, selfless, sacrificial crusader. In David Moshman’s (2004) terminology, McVeigh evidenced a *false moral identity* (Chapter 6).

Yet it is not clear that McVeigh was psychopathic in the classic sense. His absence of guilt over harm to others seemed to stem not from an absence of empathy so much as the effective use of self-righteous, self-serving distortions. As described in the last chapter, he at times seemed to evidence a genuine empathy. He also at times evidenced an insecurity and vulnerability suggestive of the reactive offender. In a rambling letter to his sister, he expressed “an urgent need for someone in the family to understand me.” He even made reference to his “lawless behavior and attitude” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 145), although he quickly attributed it to a (fabricated) encounter with lawless government agents.

McVeigh’s volatile shifts between extremes in self-esteem were also more suggestive of the reactive than the proactive (clinically, the psychopathic) offender. After the thrills and status of the Army, back in his small hometown, McVeigh felt “it was all crashing down . . . the long hours in a dead-end job, the feeling that he didn’t have a home, his failure to establish a relationship with a woman” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 103). After considering suicide, he “regrouped,” taking “to the notion of becoming a hunter—not just any hunter, but one who could kill his quarry with a single long-range shot” (p. 104).

Especially consistent with the interpretation of McVeigh as a reactive offender is his preoccupation with his status, with whether he was receiving respect or humiliation from the world. Upon receiving an invitational magazine-subscription form letter referring to “the readership of leading professionals such as yourself,” McVeigh commented, “It’s about time someone gave me the proper respect” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 376). McVeigh felt humiliated and wronged not only by the bullying incidents of his own childhood but also by government actions against his “people”: “The government, he felt, was laughing at people in the Patriot and gun communities” (p. 167). It was “time to make them all pay” (p. 168), to silence “the laughter of the bully” (p. 167). He wrote to his sister, “My whole mindset has shifted, from intellectual to . . . animal, Rip the bastards *(sic)* heads off and shit down their necks!” (p. 196). Indeed, to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, he wrote, “All you tyrannical motherfuckers will swing in the wind one day” (p. 180).

The nuances of McVeigh’s Self-Centered orientation seemed to reflect, then, a mixture of proactive and reactive features. Such cases of mixture or comorbidity are not uncommon. Although there do seem to be qualitatively distinct types of aggressors, the prevalence of mixed types among aggressive individuals has
prompted some researchers to advocate a continuum-of-features rather than dichotomy-of-types model of aggressive behavior (Bushman & Anderson, 2001 see Thomaes et al., 2011).

**Blaming Others**

The secondary distortions, including Blaming Others, were also thematic. In high school, McVeigh insisted that his flagging interest in academics was “the teachers’ fault” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 32). His list of blameworthy agents included “crooked politicians, overzealous governmental agents, high taxes, political correctness, gun laws” (p. 2). He even blamed “American women” for “sexually shortchanging the opposite sex” (p. 114). At his trial, he sought to present a “necessity defense” to the effect that “Waco, Ruby Ridge, and other government excesses…drove him” to respond in kind (p. 277, emphasis added).

**Assuming the Worst**

Much the way highly aggressive boys point to the hostility they create as proof they were right all along about others’ attitudes toward them (Lochman & Dodge, 1998), McVeigh welcomed execution as proving “that the American government was heartless and cruel” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 350). McVeigh explicitly Assumed the Worst regarding the ostensible threat from the government:

“If a comet is hurtling toward the earth, and it’s out past the orbit of Pluto,…it is an imminent threat.” And if the U.S. government was allowed to get away with what happened at Waco and Ruby Ridge, there was an imminent threat to the lives of gun owners, McVeigh said. (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, pp. 285–286)

McVeigh saw the world as a dangerous place, necessitating constant vigilance and preparedness. He kept guns “all over” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 89) his house and in his car because of the ever-present danger, in his mind, of attack. While in the Army, he rented a storage shed where he stockpiled a hundred gallons of fresh water, food rations, guns, and other supplies in case “all hell broke loose in the world” (p. 60).

McVeigh’s habitual overreaction to perceived dangers or threats may have had a heritable component. Such a possibility is suggested by his mother’s subsequent commitment to a psychiatric hospital in part for paranoid delusions (an extreme level of Assuming the Worst) (Beck, 1999). McVeigh himself

first noticed odd [even for him] behavior in his mother more than two years before the bombing.…She constantly pulled plugs from electrical outlets. At first, he thought she was trying to save electricity; only later did he realize she was afraid of health dangers from electromagnetic fields. (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 381)

**Minimizing/Mislabeling**

Numerous examples were provided in Chapter 6 of McVeigh’s minimizing and mislabeling of his crime. Much of his Minimizing/Mislabeling and prideful ego
strength entailed the abuse of a military metaphor: “War means action. Hard choices. Life and death” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 212). In this hard war, he was a courageous patriot, or perhaps a Robin Hood. At times, he would refer to himself as “we,” as if he were part of a political group or military organization, obscuring the fact that in the end he was alone with his bomb in his truck. The innocent people he killed were, after all, “part of the evil empire” (p. 225), providing the “body count” (p. 300) he desired; the dead babies were “collateral damage” (p. 331). Much as did the Communist activist quoted earlier—and as does the typical ideological terrorist—McVeigh saw himself as having a necessary “duty,” in terms of which empathy for his victims was a sign of debilitating weakness. McVeigh had learned from example in childhood that “the men of the McVeigh family were not supposed to cry” (p. 19). To his victims and their families, he minimized that death “happens every day” (p. 324). In a perverse expression of ego strength, he rejected suggestions that he show empathic distress or guilt for the victims’ losses as a pathetic capitulation: “I’m not going to…curl into a fetal ball, and cry just because the victims want me to do that” (p. 325).

McVeigh also minimized empathic affect in diverting his thoughts and perceptions from the crime. His extraordinary attention to detail preparing the bomb as if it were a “science project” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 288) is suggestive of the tunnel-vision strategy described earlier. Also, after positioning and activating the bomb, he walked briskly away, wearing earplugs and not looking back at the devastation upon hearing the blast. Later, seeing on television the children among his victims “did cause him a moment’s regret.” His overall reaction, however, was disappointment that the effect of his bomb was not more spectacular. “Damn,” he thought, ‘the whole building didn’t come down’ (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 245).

McVeigh’s Social Skill Deficiencies

McVeigh was, to say the least, socially unskilled in difficult interpersonal situations. His biographers (Michel & Herbeck, 2001) do not report a single instance in which McVeigh maintained a balanced perspective to deal with and resolve a problem constructively. Instead, McVeigh would (a) prematurely withdraw, (b) threaten or attack, or (c) strategically withdraw in order to plan an attack. Starting work at a gun shop, McVeigh had a dispute with one of the other workers; “instead of trying to work things out, McVeigh backed off. He quit his job at the gun shop after just a few weeks” (p. 101). Finding resistance to his assertions among people met in mainstream contexts, he gravitated toward gun shows where he encountered fewer challenges requiring him to “justify his positions” (p. 125).

McVeigh would also make threats. Merely disagreeing with him was a provocation for McVeigh. Again, we can speculate that McVeigh was in part a reactive offender, for whom the distorted Assuming the Worst belief, “If people disagree with me, it means they don’t respect me,” is readily activated by provocations (Beck, 1999). As is typical, the hurt quickly transformed into anger. In response to a prank, McVeigh called the prankster’s mother and said in a frightening tone, “Listen very carefully, ma’am,…If your son doesn’t stop this shit—and he knows
what I’m talking about—I know where you live. I’m going to burn your fucking house down” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 98).

McVeigh was perhaps most dangerous when his withdrawal was strategic. After hearing a complaint from a friend, McVeigh became extremely angry but “never said anything. He set his jaw and sat down and picked up a magazine and started reading” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 152). McVeigh might even at that point have been thinking of vengeance; he did subsequently mastermind a brutal and terrifying robbery. Although pleased by the success of the robbery, McVeigh was intensely disappointed that the man had not been murdered but only severely beaten and terrified.

Case Study Summary and Comments

Overall, then, McVeigh was a very self-centered, vindictive, and threatening individual. Among McVeigh’s possessions at the time of his arrest was a copy of the U.S. Constitution, on the back of which McVeigh had written, “Obey the Constitution of the United States and we won’t shoot you” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 228). Translation: “Agree with me and I won’t kill you.” There lies an epitome of McVeigh’s self-centration as manifested in classic limitations characteristic of chronic and serious antisocial youth: the egocentric bias and payback-and-then-some morality (moral developmental delay); the arrogant judge-jury-executioner attitude supported by externalizations of blame, hostile attributions, and euphemisms (self-serving cognitive distortions that support chronic anger); and the habits of threat rather than balanced communication and constructive conflict-resolution (social skill deficiencies).

McVeigh’s self-centration or failure to take others’ perspectives in any adequate sense meant that he was generally neither fair nor empathic in his interactions with others, as per the theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman. Yet McVeigh’s case also presents those theories with some challenges. Consider the implicit challenge to Kohlbergian theory. Given McVeigh’s developmental delay in his moral understanding of fairness, should he not have come from a home more severely deficient in social perspective-taking opportunities—say, a home of abuse and of more serious neglect? Perhaps McVeigh was temperamentally ill-suited to benefit from whatever modest social perspective-taking opportunities might have come his way in school and elsewhere.

Consider as well the challenge (at least at first blush) to Hoffman’s theory. What happened to the multi-layered, near-universality of empathy, especially for those of one’s group? Surely McVeigh was cognizant that his victims were fellow Americans; how could he not have felt empathy for them? Was McVeigh simply a cold psychopath? Again, probably not. His childhood empathic distress for injured animals was noted in Chapter 6. He did have to “brush aside” moments of empathic distress for his victims both before and after the bombing. Indeed, Hoffman might argue cogently that McVeigh’s crime reflected not the absence so much as the presence of empathy. Tragically, McVeigh’s empathy only made things worse: His intense empathic distress at seeing the victims at Waco was structured and channeled into vindictive, self-righteous rage by his “payback” level of moral
reciprocity, cognitive distortions, and habits of threat. For a more mature, veridi-
cal, and balanced individual, the empathic distress would have helped to motivate
a constructive and appropriately targeted response.

Although Kohlberg's and Hoffman's theories can address these challenges to
some extent, their theories must systematically and explicitly include self-serving
cognitive distortions to account for severe or chronic antisocial behavior. With a
sufficient prevalence of such distortions, aggression can be initiated and perpetu-
ated even in empathic individuals from non-abusive homes. Nor do the theories
integrate into their frameworks the positive contribution of social skills to the cul-
tivation of schemas or habits of constructive and balanced social behavior. These
theories need expansion, then, in their application not only to prosocial but also
to antisocial behavior. With the key concepts of moral judgment developmental
delay, self-serving cognitive distortions, and social skill deficiencies in place, we
now shift from understanding to treating antisocial behavior.
In 1993, at a juvenile correctional facility in Columbus, Ohio, a group of eight residents and a staff group leader were having a “mutual help” meeting. The focus of the meeting was the problem reported by 15-year-old Mac, one of the group members. Mac had resisted and yelled profanities at a staff member who, in accordance with institutional policy, had begun to inspect his carrying bag. The group and Mac agreed that Mac’s defiance and profanity represented, in the language of the program, an “Authority Problem”; but the group wanted to know the meaning of that problem, its underlying thinking error or cognitive distortion. Angry as he thought about the incident and his subsequent disciplinary write-up, Mac explained that the bag contained something very special and irreplaceable—photographs of his grandmother—and that he was not going to let anyone take the photos from him. Mac’s peers understood his point of view but saw it as one-sided: Mac thought only of safeguarding his photos, without considering for a moment the staff member’s perspective or the facility’s necessary rules: She was only carrying out institutional policy concerning inspection for possible contraband. Nor did Mac consider that she was not abusive and that he thus had no reason to assume that the photos would be confiscated. Generating the anger and overt behavior identified as an Authority Problem, then, were “Self-Centered” and “Assuming the Worst” thinking errors. The group also criticized Mac’s anger at staff for his subsequent disciplinary write-up: In reality, Mac could blame no one but himself for those consequences. In program terms, Mac also had an “Easily Angered” problem generated by a “Blaming Others” thinking error. Helpful in addressing Mac’s self-centered or one-sided viewpoint were certain tools or “equipment” acquired elsewhere in the program. This equipment included the mature reasons for an institution’s policy pertaining to possible contraband, how Mac could have corrected his thinking errors and used other skills to manage his anger, and how he could have expressed his concern to the staff member in a balanced and constructive fashion.

As the meeting progressed (it lasted more than an hour), Mac’s anger dissipated considerably, and he began to regret his verbal assault on the staff member. He started to take into account her perspective. He could see the unfairness of his behavior toward her and the way the facility she served had to work, empathize with her, and attribute blame to himself (correcting his Blaming Others thinking error). Over the course of subsequent sessions, Mac continued to work on correcting or remediating his cognitive limitations and taking the perspectives of others in various ways, as prescribed in both Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories. With encouragement, accountability, and practice, social perspective-taking became easier, more spontaneous. Constructive and responsible behavior was increasingly evident as Mac’s Authority and Easily Angered problems attenuated. As Mac made gains toward responsible thought, so he also made gains toward responsible behavior.
Processes of treatment for antisocial behavior are more concentrated, systematic, and short-term than are the processes of moral development or socialization. In essence, however, the principle of treatment does not differ from that of moral development: namely, self-centration and its remedy in social decentering through social perspective-taking. As we saw in the last chapter, multiple limitations associated with self-centeredness (moral developmental delays, social cognitive distortions, social skill deficiencies) contribute to antisocial behavior. Accordingly, treatment programs for antisocial youth must be *multicomponential* (Kazdin, 1995) to address these limitations. As we discuss the treatment of antisocial behavior in this chapter, we will focus on a multicomponent treatment program that incorporates a wide variety of social perspective-taking opportunities; namely, our EQUIP program (DiBiase, Gibbs, Potter, & Blount, 2012; Gibbs, Potter, & DiBiase, 2013; Gibbs, Potter, & Goldstein, 1995; Gibbs, Potter, DiBiase, & Devlin, 2009; Horn, Shively, & Gibbs, 2001; Potter, Gibbs, & Goldstein, 2001; cf. Glick & Gibbs, 2011; Goldstein, Glick, & Gibbs, 1998).

EQUIP is multicomponential primarily in the sense that it integrates two basic approaches to treating antisocial behavior: the mutual-help approach and the cognitive-behavioral approach. This latter approach, especially as adapted in EQUIP, aims to facilitate more mature and accurate cognitive habits and behavioral skills. The cognitive behavioral approach is itself multicomponential, encompassing areas that include moral judgment development, anger management (including the correction of cognitive distortion), and social skills training (e.g., see Glick, 2009). Our description of the mutual help and cognitive behavioral approaches and how they are integrated in EQUIP will emphasize the ways in which they induce social perspective-taking. Such inductions should facilitate sociomoral development in a broad sense, that is, should help remedy self-centered cognitive limitations, facilitate growth beyond the superficial in social and moral life, and induce responsible thought and behavior. We conclude the chapter with a consideration of more intensive perspective-taking techniques such as crime reenactment role-play, used with severe offenders.

**THE MUTUAL HELP APPROACH**

The 1993 “mutual help” meeting illustrated mainly one aspect of the EQUIP program; namely, our cognitive version of “Positive Peer Culture” (Vorrath & Brendtro, 1985) or, more generally, what we call the *mutual help approach*. Positive Peer Culture has sought to “make caring fashionable” (p. 21) and thereby motivate erstwhile antisocial youth to help one another change.

Although people have been motivated to help one another in groups for thousands of years, the modern support group or mutual help movement originated in 1935 with the founding of Alcoholics Anonymous. Such groups quickly proliferated. Approximately 500,000 mutual help groups have emerged in the United States alone, involving more than 12 million Americans (Hurley, 1988; Wuthnow, 1994). Like Alcoholics Anonymous, some of these groups address the struggle against an addictive behavior (e.g., Gamblers Anonymous). Other groups are composed of individuals enduring stressful or painful situations (e.g., single parenthood,
widowhood, heart disease, breast cancer, rape or incest, or the murder of one's child). Still other groups (e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous and National Alliance on Mental Illness aim to provide help for friends and relatives of the person with the problem.

Beginning in the 1940s, the mutual help approach began to be applied to individuals who regularly victimize others and society. At a psychiatric hospital in Great Britain, Maxwell Jones (1953) innovated techniques for cultivating a “therapeutic community” among sociopathic patients. Independently and concurrently, in New Jersey, Lloyd McCorkle, Albert Elias, and Lovell Bixby (1958) applied similar techniques to delinquent boys in an intervention they termed guided group interaction. These techniques were subsequently refined by Vickie Agee (1979) for use with violent adolescents and for a broader population of antisocial youth by Harry Vorath and Larry Brendtro (1985). Vorath and Brendtro called their mutual help program Positive Peer Culture.

The Challenge of a Negative Youth Culture

Aggressive and other antisocial youths represent a formidable challenge to the mutual help approach. Unlike most mutual help groups, which are initiated and joined voluntarily by participants, mutual help groups for antisocial youths are initiated by adults and may be mandated by the courts. Hence, forming such groups typically encounters at least initial resistance (“storming” or “limit-testing” is in fact an early phase of group development; Vorath & Brendtro, 1985). Researchers and practitioners have noted the negative (and, we would add, distorted) group norms of antisocial youths: “Drug use is cool [Minimizing/Mislabeling], sexual exploitation proves manliness [Minimizing/Mislabeling], and you have to watch out for number one [Self-Centered]” (Brendtro & Wasmund, 1989, p. 83). In their analysis of the “moral atmosphere” (also called moral climate) of a Bronx, New York, high school, Kohlberg and Higgins (1987) identified certain oppositional or “counternorms” (in our terms, “culturally normative cognitive distortions”) such as Assuming the Worst or Blaming Others; e.g., “Look at me the wrong way and you're in for a fight,” or “It's your fault if something is stolen—you were careless and tempting me” (p. 110). In correctional settings, the negative youth culture is generally characterized by opposition to institutional rules and goals, norms against informing authorities about rule violations, and the use of physical coercion as a basis of influence among inmates” (Osgood, Gruber, Archer, & Newcomb, 1985, p. 71). Although Kohlberg and Higgins (1987) did not explicitly characterize negative or oppositional norms as distortive, they did emphasize that such norms undermine adherents’ “capacity to empathize” or perspective-take (p. 110). In longitudinal studies, the oppositional or “rule-breaking” content of social interactions with antisocial peers predicted subsequent violent behavior, delinquency, and substance abuse (Dishion, McCord, & Poulin, 1999).

Mutual help programs applied to antisocial youths aim to transform this self-centered, distorted, and harmful culture. The aim is to create a caring and positive peer culture2 in which group members work with one another's perspectives and thereby help themselves and one another to change toward responsible behavior.
Techniques for accomplishing this aim include selecting for the initial peer group relatively positive (or at least less limited) peers; the cognitive behavioral technique of relabeling, reframing, or cognitive restructuring (e.g., characterizing helping others as a strong rather than a weak or sissy thing to do); confronting or reversing responsibility (see below); encouraging the honest sharing of personal histories (“life stories”); isolating and redirecting specific negative group members; and providing community service (cf. Hart, Atkins, & Donnelly, 2006) as well as faith-building opportunities (see Vorrath & Brendtro, 1985).

**Mutual Help Perspective-Taking**

The 1993 EQUIP mutual help meeting illustrated some of the features of Positive Peer Culture, especially the problem language. Antisocial youths’ (such as Mac’s) typical problems with authority, anger, stealing, lying, and so forth are identified in terms of a standard “Problem List” (see Table 8.1), one of the most basic of which is being “Inconsiderate of Others”—implying the need for remedial work in social perspective-taking.

A Positive Peer Culture technique particularly relevant to social perspective-taking and inductive discipline (Chapter 5) is called confronting or reversing responsibility (cf. correcting Blaming Others), in which group members (at least in theory) are made aware of the effects of their actions on others. Essentially, the group or group leader respectfully but forthrightly challenges the antisocial group member to put himself or herself in others’ positions, to consider their legitimate expectations, feelings, and circumstances. Vickie Agee (1979) argued that effectively confronting violent offenders typically requires concrete, personal, and “blunt” techniques if they are to grasp the harm their violence has caused others. If a violent offender has a sister and cares about her, for example, that is an opening. The therapist might frame a female victim as someone’s sister and appeal to moral reciprocity: “If it’s okay for you to do that to someone else’s sister, is it okay for them to do it to your sister?” (pp. 113–114). Another example of a concrete, blunt confrontation is provided by a question asked of the then-incarcerated Timothy McVeigh by Oklahoma City psychiatrist John R. Smith several years before McVeigh’s execution:

Smith once tried to confront McVeigh about the pain his bomb had caused others. Smith had noted how much McVeigh seemed to enjoy talking to people, and now he tried to use this quality to provoke a reaction from him. “Instead of the death penalty, Tim, they should put you in a tiny little cell,” Smith said. “You wouldn’t be allowed to talk to anyone, ever again.”

McVeigh looked surprised. He stood straight up from his chair. “You’d put me in a little cell like that?” he said.

“Tim, that’s what you did to your victims and their families,” Smith said. “They’ll never be able to communicate with each other again.” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 289)

Samuel Yochelson and Stanton Samenow (1977) suggested that confrontation should include teaching the “chain of injuries” (p. 223)—extended to absent and indirect victims—resulting from every crime. Similarly, Hoffman (2000) suggested
### Problem Names and Thinking Errors

**Student:** ____________________________________ **Date:** __________________________

#### Problem Names

Social/behavioral problems are actions that cause harm to oneself, others, or property. Of the twelve problems listed on this handout, three are general, and nine are specific.

1. **Has someone else’s problem(s) ever hurt you?**
   - □ Yes □ No
   
   *Think of a time that someone’s problem(s) have hurt you. Choose the best name for that problem and write it here.*

2. **Have your problem(s) ever hurt someone else?**
   - □ Yes □ No
   
   *Think of a time that your problem hurt someone else. Choose the best name for that problem from the list below and write it here.*

#### General Problems

The first three problems are general problems. These general problems may be related to any of the specific problems. When you use one of the general problem names to describe a behavior, to get a good understanding of the situation, you must also name one of the specific problems (Numbers 4–12).

1. **Low Self-Image**
   
   The person has a poor opinion of himself or herself. Often feels put down or of no worth. Quits easily. Plays “poor me” or perceives self as victim even when victimizing others. Feels accepted only by others who also feel bad about themselves.

   *Briefly describe a situation in which you or someone you know showed a Low Self-Image problem.*

   - □ Yes □ No
   
   *Was a specific problem shown at the same time?*
   
   *What was the problem?*

2. **Inconsiderate of Self**
   
   The person does things that are damaging to himself or herself. He or she tries to run from problems or deny them.

   *Briefly describe a situation in which you or someone you know showed an Inconsiderate of Self problem.*

   - □ Yes □ No
   
   *Was a specific problem shown at the same time?*
   
   *What was the problem?*

3. **Inconsiderate of Others**
   
   The person does things that are harmful to others. Doesn’t care about needs or feelings of others. Enjoys putting people down or laughing at them. Takes advantage of weaker people or those with problems.
Briefly describe a situation in which you or someone you know showed an Inconsiderate of Others problem.

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Was a specific problem shown at the same time? □ Yes □ No
What was the problem?

SPECIFIC PROBLEMS

4. Authority Problem
The person gets into major confrontations with teachers, parents or guardians, and others in authority, often over minor matters. Resents anyone telling him or her what to do or even giving advice. Won’t listen.

I know someone who has this problem. □ Yes □ No
I have this problem. □ Yes □ No

5. Easily Angered
The person quickly takes offense, is easily frustrated or irritated, and throws tantrums.

I know someone who has this problem. □ Yes □ No
I have this problem. □ Yes □ No

6. Aggravates Others
The person threatens, bullies, hassles, teases, or uses put-downs to hurt other people. “Pays back” even when others didn’t mean to put the person down.

I know someone who has this problem. □ Yes □ No
I have this problem. □ Yes □ No

7. Misleads Others
The person manipulates others into doing his or her dirty work; will abandon them if they are caught.

I know someone who has this problem. □ Yes □ No
I have this problem. □ Yes □ No

8. Easily Misled
The person prefers to associate with irresponsible peers, is easily drawn into their antisocial behavior. Is willing to be their flunky—hopes to gain their approval.

I know someone who has this problem. □ Yes □ No
I have this problem. □ Yes □ No

9. Alcohol or Drug Problem
The person misuses substances that can hurt him or her and is afraid he or she will not have friends otherwise. Is afraid to face life without a crutch. Avoids issues and people through substance abuse. Usually is very self-centered and minimizes the use of drugs by saying they are not bad or are within his or her control. When the person does something wrong, he or she blames the drugs by saying, “I was high—I couldn’t help it.”

I know someone who has this problem. □ Yes □ No
I have this problem. □ Yes □ No
10. Stealing
The person takes things that belong to others. Does not respect others. Is willing to hurt another person to take what he or she wants.

I know someone who has this problem. □ Yes □ No
I have this problem. □ Yes □ No

11. Lying
The person cannot be trusted to tell the truth or the whole story. Twists the truth to create a false impression. Denies everything when he or she thinks it is possible to get away with it. Finds it exciting to scheme and then get away with a lie. May lie even when there is nothing to be gained.

I know someone who has this problem. □ Yes □ No
I have this problem. □ Yes □ No

12. Fronting
The person tries to impress others, puts on an act, clowns around to get attention. Is afraid to show his or her true feelings.

I know someone who has this problem. □ Yes □ No
I have this problem. □ Yes □ No

How many problems do you have?

_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________

What are your most serious problems?
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________

Number 1 problem?

Number 2 problem?

Number 3 problem?

By correctly identifying your problems, you have taken a big step in helping yourself. Save this handout to use later in the program. You may find it very useful.

THINKING ERRORS
The following terms are used to identify thinking errors. These terms are used throughout the program. When you name your behavioral problem, the thinking error that caused it is also named. Remember: It is your thinking error that led to your social/behavioral problem.

THE PRIMARY THINKING ERROR

1. Self-Centered
Self-Centered thinking means that you think your opinions and feelings are more important than the opinions and feelings of other people. Self-Centered is the primary, or basic, thinking error. The Self-Centered thinking error can severely limit one person’s consideration for the viewpoint of another person.

Does someone you know seem to have a Self-Centered thinking error? How do you know? Explain without using the person's name.
It is important to understand that a person's thoughts cannot be known by anyone other than that person. You can guess what a person is thinking, but you will not know for sure until that person shares his or her thoughts.

Has anyone ever said to you, “I know what you are thinking,” but then was wrong? Explain.

_______________________________________________________________________________  
_______________________________________________________________________________  
_______________________________________________________________________________

If you want to know what another person is thinking, what do you have to do?

_______________________________________________________________________________  
_______________________________________________________________________________  
_______________________________________________________________________________

SECONDARY THINKING ERRORS

The Self-Centered person uses other (secondary) thinking errors to avoid feeling bad (guilt, remorse, low self-concept) about his or her antisocial behavior and to allow the selfish thoughts and behaviors to continue. For example, a 17-year-old used a secondary thinking error (Blaming Others) to make himself feel better about breaking into people’s homes. He said, “If I started feeling bad, I’d say, ‘Tough rocks for him. He should have had his house locked better and the alarm on.’” The Self-Centered person almost always shows his or her basic Self-Centered thinking error and one or more of the following secondary thinking errors.

2. Minimizing/Mislabeling

Example: “He was a fool and got jumped.” What really happened: “I punched and kicked him because he told his neighbor the truth, that I was the person who stole the neighbor’s sound system.” Or what really happened: I brutally beat him because he told the principal that I had a gun and threatened some other kids.

Write another example and explain.

_______________________________________________________________________________  
_______________________________________________________________________________  
_______________________________________________________________________________

3. Assuming the Worst

Example: A guy bumped into you. You think he did it on purpose, instead of thinking it may have been an accident, and you get furious. What really happened: Everyone was late and rushing to get to class on time; the bump was accidental and the guy said “Excuse me.”

Write another example and explain.

_______________________________________________________________________________  
_______________________________________________________________________________  
_______________________________________________________________________________

4. Blaming Others

Example: “I got mixed up with the wrong people.” What really happened: You agreed to help your friend take something that belonged to someone else.

Write another example and explain.

_______________________________________________________________________________  
_______________________________________________________________________________  
_______________________________________________________________________________
Are thinking and behaving connected? Explain.

_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________

How many thinking errors do you have?

_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________

What are your most common thinking errors?

Number 1 thinking error? ____________________________________________________________
Number 2 thinking error? ____________________________________________________________
Number 3 thinking error? ____________________________________________________________

By identifying your thinking errors, you have taken a big step in helping yourself to correct faulty thinking. It takes a strong person to admit to thinking errors and the behavioral problems they cause.


that “these confrontings should also include the other’s life condition beyond the immediate situation,…which the delinquents seem to ignore on their own” (p. 292). Agee’s emphasis on bluntness notwithstanding, Vorrath and Brendtro (1985) stressed that, to be effective, confronting must be done in a constructive and caring fashion.

Value and Limitations of Mutual Help Programs

Outcome evaluation studies of Positive Peer Culture and related programs at schools, juvenile correctional facilities, detention centers, private residential facilities, and community group homes have yielded a mixed picture. Although these programs have generally been found to promote youths’ self-concept or self-esteem, reductions in recidivism were less likely to be found in more rigorously controlled studies (see Gibbs et al., 1996). Worse, some peer group programs have actually increased participants’ delinquency and substance use (see Dishion et al., 1999).

In our view, mutual help—only programs have had mixed success at least partly because they do not adequately address the limitations of antisocial youths (Carducci, 1980; see Chapter 7). Such programs can succeed for a while in inducing erstwhile antisocial youths to become “hooked on helping,” perhaps because, as Vorrath and Brendtro (1985) suggested, the helper in the process “creates his own proof of worthiness” (p. 6) and thereby a genuine basis for self-respect. Furthermore, the “confronting” technique—if done properly—can induce genuine social perspective-taking. Unless they acquire additional skills and maturity for helping recalcitrant peers, however, antisocial youths often eventually become
frustrated in their helping or “confronting” attempts and fall back on what they know best: putdowns and threats. To investigate mutual help problems and needs for improvement, Brendtro and Albert Ness (1982) surveyed 10 schools and facilities using Positive Peer Culture or related programs. Cited as a problem at nine out of 10 centers was “abuse of confrontation” (e.g., “harassment, name-calling, screaming in someone’s face, hostile profanity, and physical intimidation,” p. 322)—going rather beyond Agee’s call for bluntness! The pervasiveness of such abuse should not be surprising: How can a youth with antisocial behavior problems be helped by fellow group members who lack skills and maturity for dealing with such problems—and who have such problems themselves? To promote its effectiveness, then, the mutual help approach needs the helping resources provided by a cognitive behavioral approach.

**REMEDIYING THE LIMITATIONS AND GENERATING SYNERGY: THE COGNITIVE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH**

Mac’s mutual help meeting in 1993 illustrated more than the traditional Positive Peer Culture approach. For example, Mac reported and the group discussed not only Mac’s Authority and Easily Angered problems but also the underlying thinking errors generating those problems—an innovation that deepens Positive Peer Culture problem work. This “deeper” work is our cognitive modification of Positive Peer Culture, which defines our version of the mutual help approach. Even such deeper problem work, however, does not fully address a basic problem: the limitations of antisocial youths (see Chapter 7) and hence their groups. These limitations include not only distorted thinking but, in general, a paucity of skills and maturity needed for behavioral change (cf. Carducci, 1980). In other words, juvenile offenders and other behaviorally at-risk youths must be not only adequately motivated but also adequately equipped if they are to succeed in helping one another and themselves.

Corresponding to the two basic approaches (mutual help, cognitive behavioral) integrated in EQUIP are two basic types of group meetings. Mac and the group learned the thinking errors and other helping-skill tools as part of a cognitive behavioral approach (see Glick, 2009), which strengthens the mutual help approach in the EQUIP program. In the EQUIP program, a cognitive behavioral curriculum (featuring cognitive change, behavioral practice) is designed to remedy the limitations that undermine antisocial youths’ effectiveness as they—both as individuals and collectively as a group—become motivated to try to help one another. Once a group is sufficiently motivated to be receptive, mutual help meetings are supplemented or interspersed with “equipment” meetings, so called because they equip the group with the skills and maturity needed for helping others and themselves to achieve cognitive and behavioral change. One facility conducted its mutual help meetings Monday through Wednesday and its equipment meetings on Thursday and Friday each week.

Whereas a peer culture of caring and mutual help is cultivated during mutual help meetings, then, the needed social perspective-taking skills and maturity are
taught during the equipment meetings. It was during its equipment meetings that the 1993 prototypical EQUIP group was learning relevant insights and tools such as the need for institutions to have rules against contraband, techniques for correcting thinking errors and managing anger, and steps of constructive and balanced social behavior. These resources were crucial as Mac worked on his Authority and Easily Angered problems during the meeting and beyond. Put in general terms, groups in the EQUIP program become equipped with skills and maturity that address the youths’ limitations (see Chapter 7). Hence, the curriculum components include: (1) mature moral judgment (moral education or social decision-making); (2) skills to correct thinking errors and manage anger; and (3) social skills (for constructive and balanced behavior). Hence, in addition to being multicomponential in the sense that mutual help and cognitive behavioral approaches are integrated and expanded (e.g., with attention to the self-serving cognitive distortions), EQUIP is also multicomponential in another crucial respect: Its cognitive behavioral approach entails three interrelated curricula that correspond to the three interrelated limitations of antisocial youths.

Synergy Between Cognitive Behavioral and Mutual Help Approaches in EQUIP and Related Programs

The equipment meetings are introduced to the EQUIP groups with the explanation that what they learn in those meetings will help them help one another more effectively. Given its emphasis on group members’ helping potential rather than on their targeted limitations, this explanation itself tends to promote antisocial youths’ amenability to treatment. Litwack (1976) found that both the juvenile offenders’ motivation to learn constructive skills and the learning itself improved when they were told that they would subsequently be using the skills to help other adolescents. In contrast, traditional or direct psychoeducational teaching or cognitive-behavioral training programs may implicitly stigmatize the learner as dependent and inadequate, thereby eliciting defensiveness and exacerbating resistance and noncompliance problems (Riessman, 1990).

The motivational benefits deriving from introducing the curriculum with the mutual help rationale make the point that the mutual help approach can enhance the effectiveness of the cognitive behavioral approach. Indeed, cognitive behavioral or psychoeducational programs may not accomplish much if young offenders’ resistance to treatment and negative group norms are not addressed; i.e., if a receptive group is not first cultivated. As noted, the contributions flow in the reverse direction as well. If their cultivated good intentions are to fare well, prospective helpers must gain skills, knowledge, and maturity so that they can help constructively. This bidirectionality or interdependence is worth emphasizing: The two approaches need each other. The integration of mutual help and cognitive behavioral approaches can stimulate a kind of positive synergy. And in the positive spiral, the institution (typically a school or correctional facility) becomes safer and more humane.

The synergistic integration of the mutual helping and cognitive behavioral approaches can be discerned in various treatment contexts besides that of EQUIP.
Recovery Training and Self Help (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1993), a program for supporting recovery from alcohol or substance addiction, features “a recovery skills training curriculum in combination with a guided peer support group” (p. 19). The skills training curriculum was added to the support group because “an aftercare group could do more than just talk about whatever came up at a given meeting and need not be limited to the ideas of whoever happened to be at that meeting” (p. 33). Goldstein and colleagues’ skills training program for dysfunctional families of antisocial youths (Goldstein, Glick, Irwin, Pask-McCartney, & Rubama, 1989) takes place in a support-group context. In cooperative learning programs, teaching skills or competence is an implicit component insofar as more-capable students are included in each cooperative learning group (e.g., Carducci & Carducci, 1984). Skills are typically provided in youth-to-youth service programs, wherein motivated older youths are trained in how to help at-risk younger youths. Finally, teaching skills for identifying and correcting “thinking distortions [cognitive restructuring] is now standard practice in PPC [Positive Peer Culture] programs” (Brendtro, Mitchell, & McCall, 2009, p. 66).

Cognitive Restructuring, Social Perspective-Taking, and the Three EQUIP Curriculum Components

In the EQUIP program, cognitive restructuring and social perspective-taking characterize, not only mutual help, but also cognitive behavioral training or facilitating. The three-component EQUIP cognitive behavioral curriculum as taught in the equipment meetings is summarized in Table 8.2 (the sessions progressively build and hence are best conducted in the sequence indicated). Although the self-serving cognitive distortions are assimilated into one component (anger management) of the curriculum, the thinking-error language is crucially important for the entire program, not only for the youth culture but for the staff “culture” as well. Hence, the language is introduced in a preliminary session using a hands-on activity specifically tailored for that purpose (the EQUIPPED for Life game; Horn, Shively, & Gibbs, 2007). The perspective-taking opportunities provided in the EQUIP curriculum are described below in terms of its three components.

Component 1: Equipping with Mature Moral Judgment (Social Decision-Making)

In Kohlbergian theoretical terms, morally delayed youths need an enriched, concentrated “dosage” of social perspective-taking opportunities to stimulate them to catch up to age-appropriate levels of moral judgment. As others’ perspectives are considered in their own right (not just as a means to one’s own ends), more ideal and mutual moral understanding begins to displace superficial and egocentrically biased judgments. A Stage 1- or Stage 2-thinking participant—who may usually dominate peers—may lose in a challenge from a more mature peer and may accordingly experience an inner conflict or disequilibration that could stimulate a more mature moral understanding.

Delayed youths are challenged to consider the perspectives of others in the context of either a macrointervention (involving reform of the institution itself) or microintervention (small-group) program. Broadly, the goal of such prosocial
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Anger Management/Thinking Error Correction</th>
<th>Social Skills</th>
<th>Social Decision Making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Evaluating and Relabeling Anger/Aggression  Reevaluating, relabeling Anger management, not elimination</td>
<td>2 Expressing a Complaint Constructively Think ahead what you’ll say Say how you contributed to problem Make a constructive suggestion</td>
<td>3 Scott’s Problem Situation Key value: Affiliation School A seen as self-centered School B labeled truly strong Guiding students toward School B</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Anatomy of Anger (AMBC) Self-talk (mind) as a source of anger Early warning signs (body) Anger-reducing self-talk</td>
<td>5 Caring for Someone Who Is Sad or Upset Notice and think ahead Listen, don’t interrupt</td>
<td>6 Jerry’s and Mateo’s Problem Situations Key values: Relationship and respect Value of close friendships Breaking up in a considerate way Getting even is immature</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Monitoring and Correcting Thinking Errors Gary’s Thinking Errors exercise Daily logs</td>
<td>8 Dealing Constructively with Negative Peer Pressure Think, “Why?” Think ahead to consequences Suggest something else (less harmful)</td>
<td>9 Jeff’s Problem Situation Key values: Honesty and respect for property Can’t trust friend with a stealing problem Stealing is wrong even if from a stranger</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Relaxation Techniques for Reducing Anger Deep breathing, backward counting, peaceful imagery Anger reducers to buy time</td>
<td>11 Keeping Out of Fights Stop and think Think ahead to consequences Handle the situation another way.</td>
<td>12 Angelo’s and Sabrina’s Problem Situations Key values: Honesty and respect for property Shouldn’t let friend steal Harm from stealing True friend wouldn’t put you on the spot Closing the gap between judgment and behavior (relabeling, using social skills)</td>
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<td>Week</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Thinking Ahead to Consequences</td>
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<td>Gregory's and Lamar's Problem Situations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Thinking ahead (if-then thinking)</td>
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<td><strong>Key values:</strong> Quality of life, life</td>
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<td>Should tell on someone breaking the law</td>
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<td>Others could get hurt or killed</td>
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<td>Important to send drug dealers to jail</td>
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<td>Should tell staff about plans to escape</td>
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<td>Life is precious</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Using “I” Statements for Achieving Constructive Consequences</td>
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<td>Duane's Problem Situation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“You” statements (put-downs, threats)</td>
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<td><strong>Key value:</strong> Quality of life</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Use of “I” statements instead of “you” statements</td>
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<td>Shouldn't deliver drugs for friend</td>
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<td>Sister's life may be at stake</td>
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<td>Closing gap between judgment and behavior (relabeling, correcting thinking errors, exhorting)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Self-Evaluation</td>
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<td>Joe's Problem Situation</td>
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<td>Self-evaluation, self-reflection</td>
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<td><strong>Key value:</strong> Life</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Talking back to thinking errors</td>
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<td>Should tell on suicidal friend</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Staying constructive</td>
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<td>Suicide is Self-Centered error</td>
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<td>Existential/spiritual concerns</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Reversing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Katie's Problem Situation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Things you do that make other people angry</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Key values:</strong> Honesty and respect for property</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reversing exercise (correcting Blaming Others error)</td>
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<td>Should tell on friend who shoplifted</td>
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<td>Important to prosecute shoplifters</td>
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<td>Store owner is not to blame</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Victims and Victimizers</td>
<td>Social Skills</td>
<td>Social Decision Making</td>
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<td>Think of the other person (TOP)</td>
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<td>James's Problem Situation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Consequences for victims</td>
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<td>Key value: Honesty</td>
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<td>Shouldn't help friend</td>
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<td>cheat</td>
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<td>Can't trust “friend”</td>
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<td>with cheating problem</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Grand Review</td>
<td>Responding</td>
<td>Stephanie's Problem Situation</td>
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<td>Learning how to say why you are angry</td>
<td>Constructively</td>
<td>Key values: Quality of life</td>
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<td>without put-downs and what you want</td>
<td>to Failure</td>
<td>and truth</td>
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<td>the other person to do</td>
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<td>Should reveal violent</td>
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<td>Should do what's best</td>
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<td>Wouldn't want someone</td>
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<td>to lie to you</td>
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<td>But mother wrong to</td>
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<td>put Stephanie on spot</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Up or Down?</td>
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<td>Final Session</td>
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<td>Up represents mature, accurate,</td>
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<td>constructive, responsible.</td>
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<td>Down represents immature, inaccurate,</td>
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<td>distorted, destructive, irresponsible.</td>
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<td>Spans all three curriculum components</td>
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<td>motivational comments.</td>
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<td>Tests knowledge of the content of</td>
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<td>curriculum components.</td>
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<td>Encourages the use of concepts or skills</td>
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<td>learned in sessions to help others and</td>
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Note: Numbers at the top of the boxes indicate the order in which the different types of sessions are held.

education is to promote sociomoral development in the context of a moral climate or positive youth culture (Brown, Corrigan, & Higgins-D’Alessandro, 2012). In the macrointervention, or Just Community program, attempts are made to restructure the institution (school or correctional facility) in accord with principles of democracy and justice, such that subjects (students, residents, or inmates) participate as much as is feasible in the rule-making and enforcement processes that affect institutional life (e.g., Power & Higgins-D’Alessandro, 2008). Macrointerventions such as Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST) (Henggeler et al., 1998) have sought to provide services both directly to youths and indirectly at the family and community levels. Particularly promising are Youth Charter Programs in which those who influence the youths in a community (parents, teachers, sports coaches, police, clergy, employers) meet to orchestrate and implement coherent standards and expectations (Damon, 1997; cf. Hart, Atkins, & Donnelly, 2006).

The narrower microintervention programs focus on peer-group discussion of relevant sociomoral problem situations as a stimulus for perspective-taking experiences. Participants must justify their problem-solving decisions in the face of challenges from more developmentally advanced peers (or, in the case of a highly limited group, initially from a group leader; e.g., Gibbs, Arnold, Ahlborn, & Cheesman, 1984; cf. Taylor & Walker, 1997). Although the EQUIP program emphasizes the importance of a just and caring “staff culture” as well as youth culture, along with the system-wide use of the thinking-error vocabulary (Self-Centered, Blaming Others, etc.) and other “equipment,” EQUIP’s focus on the youth group means that it is, at its core, a microintervention.

Moral judgment interventions target basic, long-term developmental processes. Although moral judgment–based macro- and microinterventions generally stimulate more mature moral judgment, reduction of antisocial or aggressive behavior does not necessarily follow (Gibbs, Arnold, Ahlborn, & Cheesman, 1984; Niles, 1986). One intervention that did effect behavioral change, however, was a four-month group program by Jack Arbuthnot and Donald Gordon (1986). Antisocial juveniles (as identified by teachers) showed gains not only in their moral judgment stage but also in their behavior (in terms of disciplinary referrals, tardiness, and grades), both on conduct assessments made two to three weeks after the intervention and on one-year follow-up post-tests, relative to a randomly assigned, passage-of-time control group. Interestingly, subsequent classroom conduct (in terms of absenteeism and teachers’ ratings) did not reveal significant improvement for the experimental group relative to the controls until the one-year follow-up, suggesting a possible “sleeper effect.” In a similar study, we (Leeman et al., 1993) also found a sleeper effect: Although we found no significant moral judgment gains overall for the EQUIP group, individual group members who gained the most in moral judgment were the least likely to have recidivated a year later (at 12 months but not at six months after release from the institution).

It is probably not coincidental that the two moral judgment programs that produced long-term behavioral gains (those of Arbuthnot & Gordon, 1986, and Leeman et al., 1993) were also the ones that were multicomponential, in two senses. First, like EQUIP, the Arbuthnot and Gordon (1986) program worked on peer culture and interaction issues before initiating the moral judgment intervention.
This preliminary group work entailed exercises designed to promote group cohesion, openness, and rapport. Second, also like EQUIP, the Arbuthnot and Gordon program was multicomponential: Beyond moral judgment, several sessions were spent “on active listening and communication ([non-threatening] ‘I’ messages) skills, an unplanned diversion from the dilemma discussions necessitated by the participants’ general lack in these skills, a lack which appeared to impede effective discussions” (p. 210, emphasis added). Arbuthnot and Gordon concluded that a comprehensive program should encompass not only moral discussion but also (a) techniques to promote group cohesion and mutual caring (cf. Positive Peer Culture) and (b) “social skills (for translation of new reasoning into action)” (p. 215).

Some of EQUIP’s equipment meetings pertain, then, to moral education or “social decision-making.” In these sessions, already-motivated group members strive to develop moral reasons, decisions, and values (especially, to develop mature moral reasons for those decisions and values) pertaining to socially relevant problem situations and probe questions. The situational contexts for the problems range from the home to the school, or from the correctional facility to the workplace. The situations themselves are designed to stimulate ethical discussion and perspective-taking and thereby promote a deeper understanding of the reasons for moral values or decisions such as telling the truth, keeping promises, not stealing or cheating, having honest peer and family relationships, resisting drugs, and preventing suicide. Helpful to Mac’s contraband-related problem work in the 1993 meeting, for example, was Juan’s problem situation, pertaining to whether Juan should reveal to a staff member where Juan’s depressed and suicidal roommate Phil has hidden some razor blades (through discussion, the group came to understand and accept the need for an institution’s inspection policy against contraband).

The potential of problem situations to stimulate perspective-taking is exploited through their associated probe questions. The final question for Juan’s problem situation, for example, asks, “Who might be affected (in addition to Phil himself) if Phil were to commit suicide?” (Gibbs et al., 1995, pp. 94–95; see also Potter et al., 2001). This question prompts group members to take the perspectives of loved ones; specifically, to empathize with the distress and grief caused by suicide and hence to identify the Self-Centered thinking error in Phil’s intentions. In another problem situation, Angelo’s (see Table 8.3), Question 7—“Let’s say the car is your car”—directly stimulates the group participants to take the perspective of the prospective victim in the spirit of ideal moral reciprocity. There is a certain clever irony to how this “you’re the victim” technique uses Self-Centered thinking against itself! Other questions stimulate group members to consider possible adverse consequences for Angelo’s friend Ramon (Question 8) as well as Ramon’s family (Question 5). Still other questions remove impediments to perspective-taking in that they “plant” secondary cognitive distortions such as Blaming Others (Question 2) and Minimizing/Mislabeling (Questions 3 and 4) for participants to identify and correct.

Other problem situations and probe questions encourage group members to take the perspective of someone not immediately present in the situation, as when
the group decides that stealing a sound unit is wrong even if from a stranger’s car or—considering that the life of one’s drug-dependent sister may be at stake—decides against making a drug delivery to her neighborhood. Like the “you’re the victim” technique that uses egocentric bias against itself, encouraging participants to imagine harm to someone close to them “is a way of turning empathy’s familiarity and here-and-now biases against themselves and recruiting them in the service of prosocial motive development” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 297; Chapter 6).

Besides the stimulation from the probe questions, challenges to take the perspectives of others are also cultivated through the format of the meeting, specifically its four phases: introducing the problem situation, cultivating mature
morality, remediating developmental delay, and consolidating mature morality (see DiBiase et al., 2012; Gibbs, 2004a, 2004b; Glick & Gibbs, 2011; Potter et al., 2001). In the best group sessions, each phase flows into the next. Once the group understands clearly what the problem situation is and how it relates to their lives (Phase 1), the group’s potential for mature morality can be cultivated (Phase 2); once the group has voiced some degree of mature morality (Phase 2), the group’s mature (or at least less delayed) members are in a stronger “cultural” position to effectively challenge other group members’ delayed and distorted judgments (Phase 3); and, finally, reducing pockets of delay (Phase 3) means the strengthening of mature reasons and decisions that can then be consolidated as the group is helped to achieve some consensus concerning decisions and reasons (Phase 4). In the final phase, the “best” (typically the most mature) reasons for the group’s decision (typically the responsible decision) are underlined, as illustrated for Angelo’s problem situation in Figure 8.1.

### Social Decision-Making and Cultivating a Positive Youth Culture

Cultivating a mature morality through perspective-taking in the social decision-making meeting not only contributes to remedying a limitation of antisocial youth but also contributes “back” to the important foundational need for a culture of caring. In fact, the first problem situation, the “Martian’s Adviser’s Problem Situation,” is designed mainly to facilitate the discovery of common values and to foster a cohesive, prosocial group spirit. It reads as follows:

A man from Mars has decided to move to another planet. He has narrowed his search down to two planets, Planet A and Planet B. Planet A is a violent and dangerous place to
live. People just care about themselves and don’t care when they hurt others. Planet B is a safer, more peaceful place. People on Planet B do care about others. They still have fun, but they feel bad if they hurt someone. Planet B people try to make the planet a better place.

You’re the Martian’s adviser. Which planet should you advise him to move to?

Answer: Planet A/Planet B/can’t decide (circle one)

Through this exercise, a group of antisocial youths can discover that they do after all share values of caring and prosocial behavior. Moving to the prosocial planet, Planet B (alternatively labeled School B in the prevention version of this exercise), is typically the majority decision. When asked for the reasons for their decision, many group members appeal to the respective planet descriptions: There’s not as much violence on Planet B, it’s safer, it’s more peaceful, people have fun without hurting others, and people want to help one another, work to make things better, and feel bad and apologize if they do hurt others. In a poignant moment, a younger group member once wistfully added that, on Planet B, “parents spend more time with their kids.” Planet B offers a concrete representation of the mature moral climate toward which the group should be working.

Component 2: Equipping with Skills to Manage Anger and Correct Thinking Errors

Although egocentric bias is reduced as mature moral judgment is cultivated during the perspective-taking of the Social Decision-Making component, egocentric bias in its consolidated cognitive distortion form, Self-Centered, is such a major, immediate problem that it requires treatment attention in its own right. Aaron T. Beck (1999) was right to characterize righteous self-centeredness (the key problem of the reactive offender) as “the eye (‘I’) of the storm” (p. 25) of anger in antisocial behavior. Fifteen-year-old Mac, with his Authority and Easily Angered problems in the illustrative 1993 mutual help meeting, was typical of this type of antisocial youth. Our description of the 10 sessions of the EQUIP anger management component will refer to relevant previous cognitive-behavioral literature (reviewed by Beck & Fernandez, 1998; see also Dahlen & Deffenbacher, 2000) and will emphasize the perspectives, techniques, and other information pertinent to the management of anger.

Session 1—Reevaluating and Relabeling Anger/Aggression

Like a number of anger control programs, EQUIP anger management begins with a metacognitive discussion of anger and aggression that induces antisocial youths to gain perspective or “distance” on their anger, reevaluate it, and see its disadvantages—insights that often emerge from continued discussion of its superficial and short-term advantages. In EQUIP discussions, some group members mentioned liking the “rush” or feeling of power they get from pushing people around. With continued discussion, however, that sense of power was seen to involve a Self-Centered thinking error and to lead to disadvantages: “You lose friends” because people “can’t trust you”; other people fear you but “don’t respect you, don’t want to be around you.” Similarly, proposed advantages of anger and aggression (that
they enable you to “get even” and “not let others get away with putting me down or pushing me around”) provoked reflection: “Then the other guy would try to get back at you.” As a particularly verbal and morally non-delayed EQUIP group member put it, “The cycle of revenge never stops.”

Beyond the reflective discussion, anger is also reevaluated through relabeling or reframing. The group leader makes the point that a self-controlled, nonviolent individual is not necessarily a loser or wimp by drawing on illustrations from prominent athletes and other popular figures who have succeeded through self-control and self-discipline—or have failed when they have lost control. Group members “are more powerful when they are in control of their reactions to others despite the attempts of others to provoke them” (Goldstein, 1999, p. 83; cf. Feindler & Ecton, 1986). Similarly, to a man who hit his wife because her criticism made him feel like “less of a man,” Beck (1999) made this point: “Is he more of a man by hitting a weaker person? Or is he more of a man by being cool: taking insults without flinching and maintaining control of himself and the problematic situation?” Like group members, the man could then manage his anger partly by reminding himself “that the way to feel more manly was to be cool and masterful [and self-controlled]” (p. 267). A particularly helpful visual exercise provides group members with the image of a provocateur as a clown who “wants to attach his strings to you, pull you into the clown ring with him, and make you a clown, too” (adapted from Feindler & Ecton, 198). Developing nonviolent, self-controlled options is labeled empowering in that it bestows flexibility by reducing one’s dependency on a single (violent) response. Although some situations require self-defense, other situations are better handled through a nonviolent response. The point is the constructive control or management, but not the elimination, of anger.

Session 2—Key Role of Mind in Anger; Monitoring Mind and Body; Reducing Anger

Gaining perspective or distance on the problem of anger continues in Session 2. This session entails teaching the sequential dynamics of anger and aggression: an activating event or provocative “hot spot,” mind activity in response to that activating event, bodily responses (tense muscles, etc.) to that mind activity, and consequences (summarized in the acronym AMBC). The point of the teaching is to convey the key role of the mind—not the outer event—in generating either anger or calm (cf. Novaco, 1975). The group learns to monitor anger-generating thoughts and to displace them with responsible self-talk (e.g., “If he wants to make a fool of himself he can, but he’s not gonna make a fool out of me”) that reduces anger and buys time for more controlled, constructive behavior (see Equipping with Social Skills section). Particularly helpful is self-talk that corrects Self-Centered thinking; that is, promotes social perspective-taking (e.g., “I can’t expect people to act the way I want them to,” or “For someone to be that irritable, he must be awfully unhappy”). Group members also learn to recognize and monitor bodily “Early Warning” signs (rapid heartbeat, flushed face, clenched fists, etc.) that anger is building and must be reduced. Similarly, Beck (1999) teaches clients how to recognize that they are approaching their “red zone” (p. 263) and take corrective action.
Session 3—Monitoring and Correcting Thinking Errors

The third session focuses on mind activity, especially thinking errors. Because anger is caused by the schema-based meaning of the activating event and not the event directly, mind activity deserves special attention in anger management (although techniques such as deep breathing [Session 4] are also valuable, especially as quick and easy buying-time techniques). The group begins use of a structured daily log that helps them monitor and become more aware of their problem behaviors and associated generative thinking errors. The group leader uses the exercise “Gary’s Thinking Errors” (introduced in Chapter 7; see Table 8.4) to bring home the connection between distorted thinking and violence and, accordingly, the importance of correcting thinking errors before it is too late. For example, to correct Self-Centered thinking, one group member at the 1993 meeting suggested that, like the hypothetical Gary, the group member Mac could say to himself, “She has a right to expect better from me.”

If Gary—or group members in such a situation—are to become more fair and empathic, then, they must also learn to identify and “talk back to” or correct their secondary thinking errors. Group members have suggested that Blaming Others thoughts to the effect that violence against Cecilia is her fault could be corrected with self-talk such as, “Nobody’s forcing me to grab that knife—it’s my fault if I do.” Assuming the Worst thoughts of hopelessness can be corrected with, “There’s hope for us if I start treating her decently.” Correcting an intention to “teach her a lesson” (Minimizing/Mislabeling) might be a thought such as, “You don’t teach anybody anything by stabbing and maybe killing them.”

Session 4—Relaxation Techniques for Reducing Anger

A key technique in anger management is engaging in activities incompatible with anger (counter-conditioning). Calming self-talk is one example. Other activities, covered in the fourth session, are breathing deeply, counting backward, and invoking peaceful imagery. These activities are important because they are simpler and therefore more readily used than self-talk. For example, one can prevent anger buildup by starting to take deep breaths even before one begins to deal with thinking errors, thereby “buying time” for cognitive correction.

Session 5—Self-Talk Techniques for Reducing Anger: Thinking Ahead to Consequences, and TOP (Think of the Other Person)

The group leader in this session returns to anger-reducing techniques that involve self-talk. One of the two techniques taught has been called “if-then” thinking or “thinking ahead” (Feindler & Ecton, 1986); its importance is suggested by findings that highly aggressive, poorly adjusted children are poorer at anticipating and describing the possible consequences of a completed action for themselves and others (Spivack & Shure, 1989). To develop an awareness of consequences that can then be used in self-talk, the group leader teaches thinking ahead to consequences in a way that includes systematic discussion of the many ramifications of aggressive or antisocial behavior (immediate and long-term, practical and emotional, for self and for others). With its emphasis on consequences for others, the discussion
TABLE 8.4  Gary’s Thinking Errors

Name ________________________________________________ Date ____________________

Gary is in the kitchen of his apartment. Gary’s girlfriend, Cecilia, is angry at him for something he did to hurt her. She yells at him. She pushes his shoulder. Thoughts run through Gary’s head. Gary does nothing to correct the errors in his thoughts. Gary becomes furious. He swears at Cecilia. A sharp kitchen knife is nearby. Gary picks up the knife and stabs Cecilia, seriously wounding her.

1. What thoughts ran through Gary’s head, do you think, both during the situation and afterward? Suggest some sample thoughts.

____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________

2. What are the errors in these thoughts? Cecilia was mad at Gary because he did something to hurt her. What do you think that might have been?

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____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________

3. What might Gary have told himself in this situation? In other words, how might Gary have “talked back” to his thinking errors? Suggest some things Gary could have said to himself to correct each type of thinking error.

____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________

4. If Gary had corrected his thinking errors, would he still have stabbed Cecilia?

____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________


naturally leads into a second self-talk technique that has the acronym TOP, for “think of the other person.”

Session 6—Constructive Consequences

In this session, group members learn that accurate self-talk enables them to engage in calm, non-inflammatory communication (social skills) that leads to constructive consequences. For example, group members learn to replace “you” statements (e.g., “You jerk—you’d better return my radio”) with “I” statements (e.g., “I need..."
the radio back now") in conflict situations. “I” statements are more likely to induce empathy (in Hoffman’s terms, other-focused perspective-taking; see Chapter 5), whereas “you” statements are more likely to be counterproductive insofar as they provoke defensive responses.

**Session 7—Self-Evaluation**

Self-talk is important not only in correction but also in self-evaluation (self-reward and constructive self-criticism), the focus of this session. Group members’ development of a habit of self-evaluation promotes moral identity (see Chapter 6) and provides an excellent prelude to the more metacognitive or consciousness-raising material encountered in the remaining sessions.

**Session 8—Reversing**

Given the declines in self-righteous defensiveness that should be evident by this point in the program, the eighth session should successfully shift the perspective in anger management from oneself as the victim of provocations to oneself as a provocateur of others. The focus, then, is on group members’ (such as Mac’s) tendencies to ignore their own provocations and to blame others totally when they are in fact partly at fault; that is, to make Self-Centered and Blaming Others thinking errors. Each group member suggests two things he or she does to aggravate or hurt others. Group members then discuss how to correct their Self-Centered and Blaming Others thinking errors and practice the “reversing” technique for helping group members who inappropriately blame others. For example, a group member may say, “I don’t have any problems. You dudes are the ones with the problems, man. The only problem I have is you keep hassling me, man.” A sample “reversing” response: “You know, it’ll be great when you get the courage to face your problems. Then you’ll thank people trying to help you instead of putting them down and blaming them” (cf. Vorrath & Brendtro, 1985). The *Teaching Adolescents* (DiBiase et al., 2012) version of this session includes a supplementary exercise called “A Story from Two Points of View” (upon finishing rewriting a story from the other person’s point of view, the student is asked, “Is the story more complete now that both sides are included?”).

**Sessions 9 and 10—More Consequences for Others; Correcting Distorted Self-Views; Developing Commitment to Change**

The aim of the final sessions is to induce empathy-based guilt and a genuine commitment to maintain the mind of a person who manages anger and lives responsibly. Certain exercises (e.g., “ Victims and Victimizers”; see Table 8.5) are used to make the key points pertaining to the Self-Centered mind of a victimizer: the many ways in which acts of victimization harm others, the fact that most victims are not in turn victimizers, the error of thinking that having been a victim entitles one to “get back at the world” by victimizing innocent others (that deadly combination of moral judgment Stage 2 and Blaming Others), and the acknowledgment by many group members that they have been victimizers more than victims. The group leader expands the meaning of TOP from
### TABLE 8.5 Victims and Victimizers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name ________________________________________________</th>
<th>Date ______________________</th>
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</thead>
</table>

You are attending a family wedding when you are asked to drive your grandparents home. Your grandparents have lived in that home for many years. You arrive home and help your grandparents into the house. When you open the front door, you see that the house has been broken into. Many of your grandparents’ things have been thrown all around. Their crystal glasses have been smashed. The family photo album has been destroyed. Some of their things, like a wedding ring that belonged to your great grandmother, have been stolen.

1. What would be the first thing that you would do?

____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________

2. How do you think you would be feeling? Have you ever had anything stolen from you? How did you feel? Does that help you understand how your grandparents feel?

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____________________________________________________________________________

3. Would you leave your grandparents in the house alone for the night? Why or why not? Do you think your grandparents would feel afraid or worried? When have you felt afraid or worried? Does that help you understand how your grandparents would feel?

____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________

4. Do you think your grandparents will get their things back? Do you think the insurance (if they have any) can make the situation all right? Why or why not?

____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________

5. Who are the victims in this situation? Can you think of any long-term or indirect victims? List some ways that victims suffer (in body, in mind, in money, in daily living, with their friends).

____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________

6. Who are the main victimizers in this situation? If a victimizer were to think ahead to the many ways a victim would suffer, would he or she still go ahead and do the crime?

____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________

7. Have you been a victim? From whom? Have you victimized others? Whom have you victimized? Do most people who have been victimized go on to victimize others?

____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________

8. Which have you been more of, victim or victimizer?

____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________

“think of the other people” to include “think of the pain your actions have caused other people”:

This is self-evaluation on a big scale—evaluating your life, how you’ve harmed others, where you want to go from here. In the Alcoholics Anonymous 12-step program, this step is called “taking a searching and fearless moral inventory.” Now, instead of thinking ahead, you’re thinking back. And that’s the best way to think ahead to consequences for others—to think back to how your past irresponsible behavior has harmed them. Imagine yourself as your victim—the pain, how it feels. Continue to think TOP, to think of the other person and the pain you’ve caused, to stop yourself before you harm yourself or someone else again. (Gibbs et al., 1995, p. 160)

Component 3: Equipping with Social Skills

Anger-managing skills are requisite to the use of social skills: After all, as long as rage grows rather than declines in difficult situations, balanced and constructive behavior is virtually impossible. Following the learning of anger management skills, then, EQUIP group members learn 10 social skills (cf. Goldstein & McGinnis, 1997; McGinnis & Goldstein, 1997) through four phases: modeling or “showing the skill”; role-playing or “trying the skill” (if a group member cannot think of a relevant situation, a list of typical situations is provided); providing feedback on the role-play or “discussing the skill”; and practicing the skill (at the facility or in the community).

Social skills can in many instances be construed as step-by-step, practical training in reducing self-centration or taking the perspectives of others in specific social situations. Perspective-taking is implicitly involved in many of the social skills and is an explicit step in several of them (e.g., “How might the other person feel at the start of the stressful situation? Why?” in the social skill “Preparing for a Stressful Conversation”; or “Think, ‘What is the other person accusing me of? Is he or she right?’” in the social skill “Dealing Constructively with Someone Accusing You of Something”).

Illustration

We can illustrate learning social skills as practical social perspective-taking training with the social skill “Expressing a Complaint Constructively.” This was the social skill recommended to Mac in the 1993 meeting. The steps of this skill operationalize perspective-taking in specific interpersonal situations involving the need to express a complaint.

Step 1: Identify the problem. How are you feeling? What is the problem? Who is responsible for it? Did you contribute—or are you contributing—to the problem in any way?

Step 2: Plan and think ahead. To whom should you express your complaint? When? Where? What will you say? (See Step 3.)

Step 3: State your complaint. Greet the person in a friendly way. Calmly and straightforwardly tell the person the problem and how you feel about it. If you’ve contributed to the problem, mention how you may be partly at fault and what you are willing to do.
Treating Antisocial Behavior

Step 4: Make a constructive suggestion. Tell the person what you would like done about the problem. Ask the other person if he or she thinks your suggestion is fair. If the other person makes a constructive suggestion, say that you appreciate the suggestion or that it sounds fair. (Potter et al., 2001, p. 81)

After seeing the skill modeled, an EQUIP youth named Joe role-played a situation “between me and my father . . . him always wanting to go to the bar instead of spending time talking to me.” Going through the steps, he reported that he was feeling “angry.” He said that his father was responsible for the problem but that he did contribute by trying to avoid it, for example, by “running off and partying” (Step 1). Joe planned to bring the matter up when his dad was “at home when he’s in a good mood and just say it in a polite way” (Step 2). A very touching interchange followed: After acknowledging his own contribution to the problem (running away), Joe constructively expressed the complaint to his “dad” (a fellow group member):

Dad, I’d like to talk to you about how you like to go to the bar and not spend time with me. I feel that I’m coming home from school and you’re at the bar and I’m upset about something and want to talk to you and you’re not there to talk to me.

Joe and his “dad” worked out times when “Dad” agreed to be home and available (Step 3). Furthermore, “Dad” agreed that Joe’s complaint and suggestion were fair, and Joe said that he appreciated “Dad’s” responsiveness (Step 4). The group and group leader gave Joe feedback on his role-play (he did all the steps well). Applied practice of the skill followed group completion of the role-plays (unfortunately, we do not know whether Joe ever found an occasion to express his complaint constructively to his father, but at least he became “equipped” for that and similar situations).

Because they involve maintaining balance through an ongoing social interplay of perspectives, social skills might more accurately be called social interaction skills. For example, Joe considered the moment when his “dad” would be approachable, anticipated and accepted his “dad’s” likely viewpoint by acknowledging at the outset his own runaway behavior, listened openly to his “dad’s” ideas as an understanding was reached, solicited his “dad’s” feelings about the agreement, and expressed appreciation for the “dad’s” cooperation.

Adaptations and Evaluations: Issues of Implementation

Since its introduction in the early 1990s, the EQUIP Program has been implemented, adapted, and (to some extent) evaluated at various facilities or institutions in North America, Great Britain, and Europe. The institutions include juvenile correctional facilities, community-based adult correctional facilities (or halfway houses), and high schools; the young persons served have ranged in age from pre-adolescence through young adulthood.

Implementations of EQUIP typically involve adaptations and include the program in an array of services. Peter Langdon and colleagues innovated an adaptation for adult offenders with intellectual disabilities such as mental handicaps and
Asperger’s syndrome (Langdon, Murphy, Clare, Palmer, & Rees, 2013). Langdon’s and colleagues’ adaptation enhances social perspective-taking for these individuals through the use of interactive video techniques. Another adaptation was implemented at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Red Wing, which provides treatment, education, and transition services for chronic male juvenile offenders. The Red Wing implementation has adapted use of the “Problem Names” (only the generic names “Inconsiderate of Others” and “Inconsiderate of Self” are used) and “Cognitive Distortions” (“Minimizing” is separated from “Mislabeling”). To promote coherence and reduce program isolation, the Red Wing staff uses their adapted version of the EQUIP problem and thinking error language throughout the facility’s Restorative Justice, Reflection Journaling, Substance Abuse Treatment, Sex Offender Treatment, and Relapse Prevention program. Some implementations are only partial; for example, the Alvis House, a halfway house for adults in Columbus, Ohio, does not include Mutual Help meetings in its adaptation.

Some adaptations have modified or even eliminated the EQUIP name. Although Colorado’s Youthful Offender System (YOS) does not identify EQUIP by name, much of the material, in consultation with one of us (Potter), has been assimilated into the YOS core program interventions (the Colorado consultation resulted in our EQUIP Implementation Guide; Potter, Gibbs, & Goldstein, 2001). Potter has also adapted EQUIP for use at Ohio’s Franklin County Community-Based Correctional Facility, where it is called Responsible Adult Culture (RAC; Potter, Gibbs, Robbins, & Langdon, in preparation). Ann-Marie DiBiase and colleagues (DiBiase et al., 2012) innovated a well-crafted prevention version of EQUIP for behaviorally at-risk middle and high school children, a version called Teaching Adolescents to Think and Act Responsibly: The EQUIP Approach.

EQUIP should in theory be at least as effective as other cognitive behavioral programs, given that EQUIP also addresses motivational issues. One-year recidivism at Red Wing declined from 53% to 21% following implementation of EQUIP in 1998 (a contemporaneous comparison sample was not available; Handy, personal communication, February 2, 2008). One-year recidivism following the RAC version of EQUIP was also at 21%, compared to 29% at a facility with a program that was equivalent except that it did not include cognitive restructuring techniques such as correcting thinking errors (see Devlin & Gibbs, 2010). Nonetheless, like that of other cognitive behavioral programs, EQUIP’s effectiveness appears to require high-fidelity implementation. Mark Lipsey and colleagues’ meta-analysis of studies comparing cognitive behavioral with non-cognitive behavior programs (Lipsey, Chapman, & Landenberger, 2001; cf. Landenberger & Lipsey, 2005) found an overall effectiveness for the cognitive behavioral programs; e.g., a mean recidivism rate substantially less than that of the non-cognitive behavioral programs (37% versus 53%, respectively). Lipsey and colleagues noted that the weakest recidivism results were found for cognitive behavioral programs “low in strength and fidelity of implementation” (p. 155); e.g., inadequate staff training, two or three rather than five weekday meetings, and high turnover among participants. Three outcome evaluation studies of EQUIP conform to Lipsey et al.’s pattern: a high-fidelity implementation of EQUIP was found to have substantial institutional conduct and recidivism effectiveness (12-month recidivism rate at 15.0% versus 40.5%
for the control group; see Leeman, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1993), in contrast to weaker or negligible results for lower-fidelity implementations (Liau, Shively, Horn, Landau, Barriga, & Gibbs, 2004; Nas, Brugman, & Koops, 2005; cf. Helmond, Overbeek, & Brugman, 2012). EQUIP can be included among the referents for Lipsey et al.’s conclusion that “a great deal of improvement may be possible in the implementation of [cognitive behavioral] programs” (p. 155).

SOcial pERSPECTIVE-tAKING FOR SEVERE OFFENDERS

The outcome evaluation research on EQUIP suggests, then, that—given adequate implementation—the program can induce responsible behavior among broad groups of initially antisocial youth. To be effective with groups of more serious and chronic offenders, however, EQUIP perspective-taking may require supplementation. EQUIP can be strengthened, in other words, through integration with programs emphasizing even more intensive and extensive modes of social perspective-taking. Quite compatible with EQUIP, for example, are 12 Step and victim awareness programs (e.g., California Department of the Youth Authority, 1994; Hildebran & Pithers, 1989; Mendelson, Quinn, Dutton, & Seewonarain, 1988; Murphy, 1990; but cf. Hilton, 1993). These programs aim to induce perspective-taking and empathy for victims through specific depicted situations (e.g., our “Victims and Victimizers” exercise [see Table 8.5], adapted from the California Department of the Youth Authority [1994] victim awareness program), as well as other stimulations of victim awareness through video or film presentations, newspaper or magazine articles, guest speakers (especially recovering victims or family survivors of murder victims), role-plays, personal journals, homework, and reminder posters.

A particular type of powerful or intense role-play that deserves special attention entails the reenactment of a crime perpetrated by the offender. Reenactive role-play as perpetrator and then as victim has been used in the Texas Youth Commission Capital Offender Group program (Alvarez-Saunders & Reyes, 1994), an intensive four-month therapy designed “to break a participant’s psychological defenses to force him to see his victim’s suffering, to help him discover his conscience and feel remorse” (Woodbury, 1993, p. 58). The juveniles role-play many aspects of their own histories, including family relationships and the homicidal events themselves. In a role-played reenactment of a crime, the perpetrator must remain at the scene even though in the actual event he typically had fled. He must hear the pleas and see the suffering of the victim (played by a group peer), and thereby experience empathic distress and guilt (“great care must be taken,” however, to insure that the role play does not instead elicit violent or predatory desires among the group members; Marshall, Anderson, & Fernandez, 1999). In a second reenactive role-play, the perpetrator must directly put himself in the victim’s place: This time the perpetrator feels what it is like to be the victim by taking the victim’s role (cf. reverse role-play activity in Beck, 1999). Outcome evaluations of the Capital and Serious Violent Offenders Treatment Program have indicated substantial reductions in recidivism (Heide, 2003; Texas Youth Commission, 2011).
Agee and McWilliams (1984; cf. Pithers, 1999) used vivid crime-reenactment role-play (albeit without the victim role-play addition) to achieve therapeutic breakthroughs with violent juvenile offenders in the context of a mutual help program. Particularly powerful and worth quoting at length is the apparent realization of empathic guilt in 14-year-old Larry, a serious sex offender. Larry asked for the agenda. He was committed to the unit for the kidnap and rape of a two-year-old girl. Several times he had attempted to have [a] group [session] on his crime, but was unsuccessful in doing more than a very mechanical, emotionless relation of the details. By prearrangement, he had agreed to act out the crime on a large baby doll in the hopes of bringing out more of the emotion in the situation. Larry proceeded to describe the situation in the room where he kidnapped the baby and [to] talk about what was going through his mind. He saw the sleeping child as a good opportunity to have sex and thought about where he could take her where he would be undiscovered. He left the home with the baby, with his hand over her mouth so she couldn’t cry. He went to a nearby park, and with considerable difficulty, raped the baby, and then left her there injured. He stated he had no interest in whether she lived or died, but did feel a little scared at what he had done.

When the role play with the baby [doll] was acted out, there was clearly shock and disgust among all the group members, both male and female, and also the Group Leader. All of the group members took some physical action wherein they were trying to distance themselves from Larry, such as scooting their chairs back. One girl (who had been sexually abused herself in childhood) screamed when another youth accidentally touched her as he moved his chair back. After some difficulty in getting started, the peers expressed their shock and disgust to Larry. He had frequently stated that he had no feeling for his victim, but in this group, he seemed to be stunned by the enormity of what he had done. He listened mutely to the feelings of his peers and appeared noticeably stricken when the Group Leader also told him of his feelings of disgust for what he had done. The group concluded in somewhat of a shocked state, and one of the girls in the group asked the Group Leader to please take the doll off the unit.

It was not until two or three months later that the effects of this particular group on Larry were seen. At that time, he had a repeat court appearance, and when asked by the judge what he felt for his victim, gave an extremely moving and honest statement which showed much awareness of the harm he had done to his victim. This was in sharp contrast to his earlier behavior in court when he had been very cocky and unrepentant. (Agee, 1979, pp. 292–293)

The contribution of crime reenactment role-play to Larry’s problem work was extraordinary. The vivid reenactment certainly did bring out “more of the emotion” of his horrific crime—first for Larry’s peers and the group leader, and then, as a result, for Larry. Note that once Larry completed his role-play, the reaction of every other person in the room was a shock and disgust so total and profound that it at first could scarcely even be expressed. All of Larry’s peers literally distanced themselves from him. The reenactment using the large doll had communicated the horror of Larry’s crime so effectively that Larry now found himself utterly isolated, with no physical, emotional, social, or other connection to anyone else, not even the group leader—the group leader’s feedback of disgust left Larry “noticeably
stricken.” The deep harm and wrong of Larry’s unconscionable crime pierced through Larry’s callous smugness and cognitive distortions. In a powerful and profound way, he decentered. That is, he saw his crime through clear, third-person eyes and was himself shocked and stricken by what he saw. No longer “mechanical” or emotionless and devoid of feelings for his victim, Larry now “seemed to be stunned by the enormity of what he had done.” At court months later, instead of displaying an unrepentant and even cocky demeanor, Larry evidenced contrition and awareness of the grievous harm. Although Larry continued to need therapy (to consolidate the gain and prevent relapse), a breakthrough was evident.

The chapters in the final section of Aaron Beck’s (1999) *Prisoners of Hate* concern “the brighter side of human nature” and the promise of cognitive therapy as it uses human resources of rationality or social decentration, ideal moral reciprocity, and empathy. Role reversal or crime reenactment role-plays constitute useful supplementary techniques for activating and helping to develop these resources and may be especially needed in working with the severe offender population. Although Larry’s crime shocks and disgusts us in its depravity, Larry’s redemption is inspiring: Through social perspective-taking, conscience finally emerged in the mind of the perpetrator of an unconscionable crime. Larry’s case appears to vindicate not only Beck’s emphasis on rationality but also Kohlberg’s (or Piaget’s) emphasis on social decentration, Hoffman’s emphasis on the reliability of the empathic predisposition, and the emphasis of all three theorists on the attainability of veridical moral perception.

The title of Beck’s (1999; cf. Garbarino, 1999) final section, on change, is “From Darkness to Light.” Does Larry’s change represent a transition from the darkness of distortion to the light of truth in some sense that goes beyond metaphor? In other words, did Larry change in a deeper spiritual sense? In the next chapter, we will go beyond Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories of moral development and behavior to consider their ontological implications and foundations.
Beyond the Theories

A Deeper Reality?

Just why *Homo sapiens* should carry the spark of rationality that provides the key to the universe is a deep enigma. We, who are children of the universe—animated stardust—can nevertheless reflect on that same universe, even to the extent of glimpsing the rules on which it runs. How we have become linked into this cosmic dimension is a mystery. Yet the linkage cannot be denied. (Davies, 1992, p. 232)

As we have seen, growing beyond superficiality characterizes the primarily affective and primarily cognitive strands of human development toward mature moral perception and behavior. Consider first Hoffman's theory of the primarily affective (empathic) strand. According to Hoffman's theory, cognitive development, language acquisition, and socialization enable the child's empathic predisposition to evolve beyond simple attention to the surface cues of another's emotion and thereby to attain a deeper, more veridical or authentic *caring* for others. In Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories of the *cognitive* strand, that evolution beyond simple attention to surface cues is a constructive process leading to a decentered *understanding* of the intangible, ideal bases in mutuality for interpersonal relationships and society. In the related context of non-social cognitive development, simple attention to surface cues gives way to *logical* understanding: The child is said to penetrate through superficial, sometimes misleading appearances by constructing conservation and other “necessary” knowledge of “underlying reality” (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 141).

Flavell et al.'s (2002) characterization of conservation and related necessary logic as a reality that underlies physical appearances and impressions is reminiscent of mathematician Roger Penrose's (1994) reference to “profound mathematical substructure[s]” or “underpinnings” that are “hidden in the very workings of the world” (p. 415). Indeed, conservation, transitivity, class inclusion, and so forth, insofar as their properties are logico-mathematical (see Chapter 10), are integral to these substructures. Perhaps in cognitive development, then, we not only construct and understand but in the final analysis *discover* conservation—and, more systematically, using the methods of science, *discover* in logic and mathematics the very substructures or foundations of the physical world.

We are indeed “linked” to the universe, but what is the ontological significance of that linkage? When we use our “spark of rationality” to discover and thereby “glimpse the rules on which it [the universe] runs,” as astrophysicist Paul Davies put it in the opening quotation, do we in effect glimpse a more fundamental
reality? Penrose’s neo-Platonist answer is “yes.” He argued that the world of tangible impressions and appearances—and in part the rational minds of those who perceive and seek to understand that tangible world—derive ultimately from those underpinnings, that substructural realm of logic and mathematics.

Testifying to this enigmatic linkage of the physical (and, in turn, mental) worlds with a deeper logico-mathematical reality is “the amazing precision and subtle applicability of sophisticated mathematics that physicists continually and increasingly find in their descriptions” of the workings of the physical world (Penrose, 1994, p. 415). Riemannian space and imaginary numbers illustrate constructions that, despite their purely abstract origins in mathematical deduction, subsequently came to “serve as indispensable frameworks for physical phenomena” (Piaget, 1967/1971, p. 341). Davies (1992) asked how such abstract, pure mathematics, “worked out … long before it was applied to the real world,” nonetheless proved to be so “spectacularly successful” once technology permitted its empirical application (p. 151). Penrose answers that logical or mathematical “rules” or necessary relations, regardless of when they are discovered, partake of a primary (“profound, timeless, and universal,” p. 413) reality.1

As we know from Chapter 3, Piaget and Kohlberg argued that morality—especially, the reversibility of ideal moral reciprocity (also called “the condition of reversibility”)—is akin to logic. If so, then might the prescriptive truths of mature morality join those of logic and mathematics in reflecting a deeper reality?2 In an essay aptly titled “Right and Wrong as a Clue to the Meaning of the Universe,” C. S. Lewis (1943) likened the reciprocation of kindesses and unselfishness to necessary and universal truths such as mathematics:

Think of a country where… a man felt proud of double-crossing all the people who had been kindest to him. You might just as well try to imagine a country where two and two made five. Men have differed as regards what people you ought to be unselfish to—whether it was only your own family, or your fellow countrymen, or everyone. But they have always agreed that you ought not to put yourself first. Selfishness has never been admired. (p. 5)

Although the right of reciprocity is distinct from the good of caring (or although betrayal of kindness and trust is distinct from selfishness), Lewis legitimately included both in his universalist appeal. Do not both represent cross-cultural ideals, even if they are honored in the breach?3 And is not the ideal of justice, of mutual respect, of honoring and reciprocating others’ kindesses, intimately congruent with the ideal of unselfishness, of veridical empathy, of, we might even say, love? As Piaget (1932/1965) noted, “Between the more refined forms of justice and love properly so called, there is no longer any real conflict” (p. 324). Ideal moral reciprocity, in other words, formulates what love looks like when the perspectives of all concerned are taken into account. (Granted, how broadly we can or should apply ideal moral reciprocity and love [to one’s own family? fellow citizens? everyone?] can be an issue, one that we will have occasion to visit later in this chapter.)

Perhaps “growing beyond superficiality” toward the right and the good of mature morality, then, has a transcendent significance. Are love and the ethic of mutual respect clues to the meaning of the universe? Do they, like logico-mathematical
knowledge, reflect a primary reality? Can that primary reality be to some extent accessed? Can one thereby gain insight and inspiration for living the moral life? These ontological (nature of reality), existential, and moral questions are addressed in this chapter. To ponder them, we venture beyond Kohlberg’s, Hoffman’s, and Haidt’s theories to explore the relationship of moral development and behavior to a deeper reality.

We need not start from scratch. Although Haidt and Bjorklund (2008b) doubted the existence of “objective [moral] facts” that would be “true for any rational creature anywhere” (p. 214), Hoffman does take an implicitly objective ontological stance in his argument for humans’ potential to overcome biases and to connect veridically with another. Mature caring, after all, is deeply accurate or true. It is Kohlberg, however, who offers the stronger line of continuity from moral to existential and ontological concerns. On the basis of case studies and philosophical literature, as we saw in Chapter 4, Kohlberg answered the ontological question affirmatively: In the throes of existential crisis, perhaps in meditation or prayer, some morally mature persons begin to see daily life from the vantage point of its cosmic “ground.” They begin to sense or identify with a unitary “whole of nature” of which we are individually but parcels. From that vantage point (“Stage 7”), one transcends existential despair and experiences inspiration from a deeper reality for living in the light of love and justice—albeit in a world often dark and divisive from self-centered, angry distortion as well as genuine injustice.

Darkness and light have been used as a metaphor (by Beck, 1999; and see Chapter 8) to characterize the perspective-taking progress of initially antisocial individuals from self-centeredness to the ideals of love and ideal moral reciprocity. Could this progress from “darkness to light,” from self-centeredness and antisocial behavior to love and ideal reciprocity, be more than a metaphor?

As did Kohlberg, we will suggest an affirmative answer to the question of whether there is a deeper reality to the strands of moral development (or, for that matter, the remedial moral development of erstwhile antisocial individuals). If there is a deeper reality represented by love and ideal reciprocity, perhaps it is sometimes glimpsed and even accessed not only through meditation or existential crises but also, serendipitously, through life-threatening crises. In particular, we refer to an extraordinary phenomenon of human perception that has been the subject of increasing attention in the medical literature: the “near-death experience” (Moody, 1975; van Lommel, 2010), defined by psychiatrist Bruce Greyson (2000b; cf. Kelly et al., 2007) as “profound psychological events with transcendent and mystical elements, typically occurring to individuals close to death or in situations of intense physical or emotional danger” (p. 316). Because of its potentially major implications for our understanding of moral development and reality, the phenomenon will be studied here at some length.

**TWO CASE STUDIES**

We will introduce the near-death experience phenomenon through the presentation and extensive study of two independent cases involving life-threatening physical crises (radical surgery and serious accident). The first case, that of
Pamela Reynolds Lowery, was described by cardiologist Michael Sabom (1998); the second, that of Tom Sawyer, by writer Sydney Farr (1993). Tom had not heard of near-death experiences prior to his near-death event; whether Pam had heard of such experiences is not known. Pam and Tom provided the interview and other data for these accounts at least two years after their near-death events. Recollections reported sooner after the events would probably have been highly similar, however. Cardiologist Pim van Lommel and colleagues (van Lommel, van Wees, Meyers, & Elfferich, 2001) found almost no longitudinal difference in survivors’ near-death recollections at three points in time (a few days, two years, and eight years later). Greyson (2007; cf. Long, 2010) found similar results for consistency of reports across two longer time intervals (20 and 40 years later).

Pam Reynolds Lowery’s Near-Death Experience

Starting in the morning of August 15, 1991, at the Barrow Neurological Institute in Phoenix, Arizona, a 35-year-old musical composer and mother of three named Pamela Reynolds Lowery underwent a daring surgical procedure and had a near-death experience. The six-hour surgery was daring in that its aim was to remove a brain aneurysm so large and deep as to be inoperable by traditional procedures. Excision of the giant aneurysm required its collapse (“like a deflated balloon,” Sabom, 1998, p. 45) as the blood in the arteries of the brain was drained “like oil from a car” (p. 43).

Preliminary procedures prepared Pam for surgery. Her eyes were taped shut. Instruments were inserted or attached first to anesthetize Pam intravenously and then to monitor many vital signs: her blood pressure, pulmonary pressure, heart rate and rhythm, blood oxygen level, body temperature, and brain (cerebral cortex, brain stem) electrical activity. The brain stem monitoring device, inserted through Pam’s ear canals, meant that physical hearing was impossible. The surgical scene is depicted in Figure 9.1.

Pam’s near-death experience began as neurosurgeon Robert Spetzler opened her skull with a cranial saw (she was already “under deep anesthesia”: Spetzler, personal communication, July 2, 2002). Pam recounts:

The next thing I recall was the sound: It was a natural D [tone]. As I listened to the sound, I felt it was pulling me out of the top of my head. The further out of my body I got the more clear the tone became…. I remember seeing several things in the operating room when I was looking down. I was the most aware that I think that I have ever been in my entire life…. I was metaphorically sitting on Dr. Spetzler’s shoulder. It was not like normal vision. It was brighter and more focused and clearer than normal vision.…

I thought the way they had my head shaved was very peculiar. I expected them to take all of the hair, but they did not.…

The saw thing that I hated the sound of looked like an electric toothbrush….The [electric saw] blades were in what looked like a socket wrench case…. I heard the saw crank up…. It was humming at a relatively high pitch and then all of a sudden it went Brrrrrrrrrrrr! like that. (Sabom, 1998, p. 41)
Figure 9.1  Diagram of the operating room at the Barrow Neurological Institute.  
The neurosurgeon was cutting through Pam’s skull. Through a cranial opening, a microscope was inserted into Pam’s brain to inspect the aneurysm deep in her brain. The aneurysm’s giant size meant that its reduction through a radical procedure, called hypothermic cardiac arrest, would indeed be necessary. A cardiovascular surgeon began preparing access to Pam’s blood vessels.

Someone said something about my veins and arteries being very small. I believe it was a female voice and that it was Dr. Murray, but I’m not sure. She was the cardiologist [cardiac surgeon]. I remember thinking that I should have told her about that. (Sabom, 1998, p. 42)

The vein and artery in Pam’s left groin area (those in the right groin area had been found to be too small) were connected to a cardiopulmonary bypass machine, so that her blood could circulate through the machine and be cooled by it. The machine lowered Pam’s body temperature to the point that her heart stopped beating and her brain ceased electrical activity. Her blood was then drained from her brain and body and temporarily stored in the cylinders of the machine. Her near-death experience continued:

There was a sensation like being pulled, but not against your will. I was going on my own accord because I wanted to go. I have different metaphors to try to explain this. It was like the Wizard of Oz—being taken up into a tornado vortex, only you’re not spinning around like you’ve got vertigo. You’re very focused and you have a place to go. The feeling was like going up in an elevator real fast. And there was a sensation, but it wasn’t a bodily, physical sensation. It was like a tunnel but it wasn’t a tunnel.

At some point very early in the tunnel vortex I became aware of my grandmother calling me. But I didn’t hear her call me with my ears…. It was a clearer hearing than with my ears. I trust that sense more than I trust my own ears. The feeling was that she wanted me to come to her, so I continued with no fear down the shaft. It’s a dark shaft that I went through, and at the very end there was this very little tiny pinpoint of light that kept getting bigger and bigger.

The light was incredibly bright, like sitting in the middle of a light bulb. It was so bright that I put my hands in front of my face fully expecting to see them [the hands] and I could not. But I knew they were there. Not from a sense of touch. Again, it’s terribly hard to explain, but I knew they [my hands] were there.…

The “incredibly bright” light “was real warm and real comfortable and real loving” (Benz, 2001). Pam began to discern different figures in the light…they were all covered with light, they were light, and had light permeating all around them…they began to form shapes I could recognize and understand. I could see that one of them was my grandmother. I don’t know if it was reality or projection, but I would know my grandmother, the sound of her voice, anywhere.

Everyone I saw, looking back on it, fit perfectly into my understanding of what that person looked like at their best during their lives.

I recognized a lot of people. My uncle Gene was there. So was my great-great-Aunt Maggie, who was really a cousin. On Papa’s side of the family, my grandfather was there….They were specifically taking care of me, looking after me.
They would not permit me to go further. . . . It was communicated to me—that's the best way I know how to say it, because they didn't speak like I'm speaking—that if I went all the way into the light something would happen to me physically. They would be unable to put this me back into the body me, like I had gone too far and they couldn't reconnect. So they wouldn't let me go anywhere or do anything.

I wanted to go into the light, but I also wanted to come back. I had children to be reared. (Sabom, 1998, pp. 44–45)

With the aneurysm sac drained of blood, the neurosurgeon was able to excise it. Then the machine began to warm Pam's blood and reintroduce it into her body; Pam's brain and heart began to resume electrical activity.

Then they [deceased relatives] were feeding me. They were not doing this through my mouth, like with food, but they were nourishing me with something. The only way I know how to put it is something sparkly. Sparkles is the image that I get. I definitely recall the sensation of being nurtured and being fed and being made strong. I know it sounds funny, because obviously it wasn't a physical thing, but inside the experience I felt physically strong, ready for whatever.

Pam “returned” to her physical body:

My grandmother didn't take me back through the tunnel or even send me back or ask me to go. She just looked up at me. I expected to go with her, but it was communicated to me that she just didn't think she would do that. My uncle said he would do it. He's the one who took me back through the end of the tunnel. Everything was fine. I did want to go.

But then I got to the end of it and saw the thing, my body. I didn't want to get into it. . . . It looked terrible, like a train wreck. It looked like what it was: dead. I believe it was covered. It scared me and I didn't want to look at it.

It was communicated to me that it was like jumping into a swimming pool. No problem, just jump right into the swimming pool. I didn't want to, but I guess I was late or something because he [the uncle] pushed me. I felt a definite repelling and at the same time a pulling from the body. The body was pulling and the tunnel was pushing. . . . It was like diving into a pool of ice water. . . . It hurt! . . . When I regained consciousness, I was still on the respirator. (Sabom, 1998, pp. 46–47)

Pam made an adequate recovery from her operation. In addition to citing her children (“I had children to be reared”) as her purpose for returning, she subsequently referred to social harmony as well (expressed in terms of her background in musical composition): “Everyone has a different tone . . . the beauty is in the harmony. . . . My reason for being is to learn to make harmony . . . with all the variables that present themselves in my little world” (Benz, 2001). On May 22, 2010, nineteen years after her hypothermic cardiac arrest surgery and near-death experience, Pam at age 54 died of heart failure.

**Thomas Sawyer’s Near-Death Experience**

On May 23, 1978, in Rochester, New York, Thomas Sawyer, a 33-year-old father of two boys was crushed under his truck and had a near-death experience. Tom
was working under his truck with the help of his older son Todd when a support
gave way; the frame of the truck depressed the center of his chest, rendering him
unable to breathe. Todd screamed and phoned for an ambulance. Hearing Todd's
scream, Tom's wife also arrived, as did neighbors. Tom lost consciousness and
his heart stopped beating. Despite losing consciousness, Tom reportedly heard
“the…rough and hard…conversation of the paramedics getting into the ambu-
lance a couple of miles away…just as though I was with them for the ride” (Farr,
1993, p. 25). He then

had a feeling of absolutely, positively, waking up, very quickly and sufficiently…. All
pain and pressure [were] gone. I felt I could see very clearly, but the problem was I saw
nothing but absolute, total blackness…. I had the desire to look around inquisitively.
What is this place? Where am I?… Instantaneously [with my questions], this darkness
took the shape of a tunnel. It was very vast…. If you took a tornado and stretched it
out straight, it would be similar to that, without the houses and doors floating around
inside…. I had the feeling of floating, or that I was moving through it—and it was okay;
it was comfortable…. I went faster and faster…. The next thing is that way, way off in the distance—to infinity—there appeared this
little speck of light. That light was very special; it was…. extremely bright…. brighter
than something that would immediately blind you…. It was utter beauty…. The light
was way off in the distance and got larger as I got closer to it…. There were such feelings
of warmth and love coming from the light that it made me feel good. (p. 28)

Tom communicated with the light concerning the meaning of his life as
well as the nature of God and the universe. The communication “was not in
words…. Instantaneously it emanated…. thought-pattern to thought-pattern…. As
I thought of and formulated a desire or a question, it would already have been rec-
ognized, acknowledged, and…. answered” (Farr, 1993, p. 28). Tom interpreted the
light as divine, although he found adequate description difficult:

There are characteristics and aspects of that part of my experience that I would really
wish to talk about a little deeper. I’ve not found the words…. Some of the things are
regarding the aspect of, “What is the Light?” Well, the light is God. And what is God?
God is unconditional love. God is total beauty. God is everything! (Farr, 1993, p. 38)

In order to choose “intelligently” whether to return or “become part of the
light” (p. 29), Tom also experienced a “complete” or “total” (p. 29) review of the
events of his life “from the first breath of life right through the accident” (p. 35).
He saw and relived the events simultaneously from multiple perspectives: (a) as
his adult self, observing the events “from a third-person viewpoint” (p. 37) looking
down at the scene; (b) as his self at the time; and (c) as another person involved in
the event. An example is an incident that occurred when he was eight. His father
had told him

to mow the lawn and cut the weeds in the yard…. [Regarding some weeds in the back,
Aunt Gay had said,] “Leave them alone now, Tom… and as soon as they blossom we’ll
make tiaras for all the girls, and flower necklaces for some of the guys.” … We were look-
ing forward to that…. [But] I deliberately decided to be bad, to be malicious…. I called
it “Operation Chop-Chop.” . . . And I went ahead. . . . I thought, “Wow, I got away with it; I did it. And if Aunt Gay ever says anything I’ll just tell her Father told me to do it. Or if Father asks me I’ll say, well that’s what you told me to do.” . . . My Aunt Gay never said a word to me; nothing was ever mentioned; I got away with it totally.

[In my life review] I was observing this entire event. . . . I not only re-experienced my eight-year-old attitude . . . . I also experienced it exactly as though I was my Aunt Gay, several days later after the weeds had been cut . . . “Oh my goodness, what has happened? Oh well, he must have forgotten. But he couldn’t have forgotten, everyone was looking forward to—Oh no, knock it off. Tommy is—he’s—He’s never done anything like that. I love him so—Oh, come on, cut it out. Gee, it was so important. He had to know . . . he couldn’t have known.” . . . I was in my Aunt Gay’s body, I was in her eyes, I was in her emotions, I was in her unanswered questions. I experienced the disappointment, the humiliation. It was very devastating to me. (Farr, 1993, pp. 29–30)

Tom also relived an event that occurred in 1968, when he was 23. Upon arriving at the airport in Chicago for the Olympic trials in cycling, Tom discovered that his racing bicycle had been irreparably damaged by a baggage handler:

I was myself [in the life review] in all of my rage and indignation and righteousness. But I was simultaneously that young kid who had worked his first day at the airport and didn’t know what “Escort Service” meant. It was, to him, simply a canvas bag in the way. He had no idea there was a bicycle in there . . . . He made a mistake through ignorance. Did that help me to understand? Of course it did. I realized that there was, in his life, almost no interaction at all with me, Tom Sawyer. It was only a moment in his life, trying desperately to do a good job. (Farr, 1993, p. 32)

Tom also reviewed an altercation with a man who had darted in front of his truck in the street. The man had almost made contact with Tom’s truck: “Now my attitude in those days was, God forbid that you should put even a smudge on my truck. A smudge made me furious.” In the course of the original altercation, the man swore at and slapped Tom, which “instantly gave me license to annihilate him . . . . I almost killed that man” (Farr, 1993, p. 32). Once again, in the life review re-experiencing of the event, Tom was observing not only himself at the time (at age 19) but also the other person. He experienced

Tom Sawyer’s fist come directly into my face. And I felt the indignation, the rage, the embarrassment, the frustration, the physical pain . . . . I felt my teeth going through my lower lip—in other words, I was in that man’s eyes. I was in that man’s body. I experienced everything of that interrelationship between Tom Sawyer and that man that day . . . .

Okay. He hit me first. Try that in your life review! . . . I wish that I could tell you how it really felt and what the life review is like, but I’ll never be able to do it accurately. (Farr, 1993, pp. 32–34, emphasis added)

Like Pam, Tom wanted to go into the light. Whereas Pam also wanted to return, Tom wanted to stay. Nonetheless, just as he was “becoming homogeneous” and experiencing “total knowledge” (p. 38) with the light, Tom “reversed through the tunnel” (p. 40). Like Pam’s, Tom’s return to his body was jolting: “As I reentered my
body, it was with a bang. It was a very slamming experience, a shocking experience similar to grabbing on to a 220-volt line” (Farr, 1993, p. 40).

Immediately after reentering his body, Tom regained consciousness and could again breathe as the truck was lifted. As Tom was removed from under the truck, paramedics administered oxygen. Tom momentarily lost consciousness again and was taken to the hospital, where X-rays showed no broken bones. He recuperated at home. In retrospect, he described himself as having “abruptly” changed after the accident “from a [self-]righteous, self-motivated person to a spiritually motivated individual who now prioritizes helping others” (Farr, 1993, p. 60).

As did Pam, Tom died in the first decade of this century. On April 28, 2007, nearly three decades after his nearly fatal accident and near-death experience, Tom Sawyer, at age 62, also died of heart failure.

**A DEEPER REALITY?**

What are we to make of such experiences? Interestingly, Pam Reynolds explicitly raises the ontological issue in noting that she did not know whether her perception of her deceased grandmother “was reality or projection.” In Susan Blackmore’s (1993) terms, the near-death experience is basically either “a glimpse…penetrating into [an] underlying reality” of human existence or a composite of “hallucinations, imaginings, and mental constructions” (such subjective mental projections, attributed to a dying brain, presumably “stop when the brain’s activity stops”; pp. 3–4, 161). In Mark Fox’s (2003) stark terms, near-death experiences are either “windows into transcendent realities” or “mere mirrors reflecting nothing more than a bundle of culturally derived fantasies and psychosocial expectations” (p. 100).

A full treatment of this ontological issue is not feasible within the space of this chapter (see literature reviews and related articles of mine: Gibbs, 1985, 1997, 1999, 2005, 2010c; as well as those by Fox, 2003; Greyson, 2000b, 2010a, in press; Greyson, E. W. Kelly, & E. F. Kelly, 2009; Kelly et al., 2007; Long, 2010; Parnia, 2006, 2013; Potts, 2002; Sabom, 1982, 1998; and van Lommel, 2010). “Dying brain” explanations of the phenomenon have included references to endorphins, cerebral hypoxia, hypercarbia, hallucinogenic agents such as ketamine and phencyclidine, serotonin pathways, limbic system activation, and temporal lobe anoxic seizures (Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck, 2002; Fox, 2003; Parnia, 2006, 2013; Parnia & Fenwick, 2002).

Using our case studies and the research literature, we will ponder five ontologically relevant questions: (1) Does the context of the near-death experience influence and even determine its content? (2) Do near-death experiencers interpret the experience as real? (3) Are verifiable aspects of the near-death experience in fact accurate or veridical? (4) Is the likelihood or depth of the experience associated with proximity to physical death? Finally, (5) Does the typical near-death experience actually take place during near-death?

Again, a literature review based on these questions could easily consume a book in its own right; even the “brief” treatment given here will be lengthy. Yet moral
development and reality is a crucial relation to ponder, as Kohlberg recognized. Could it be that the near-death experience does afford some sort of access into a deeper reality, a glimpse that then promotes existential and moral development? Once we attain some tentative closure regarding the ontological significance of this phenomenon, then we will be in a position to move to existential and moral questions.

1. Does the Context of the Near-Death Experience Influence and Even Determine the Content of the Experience?

Near-death experiences have occurred across a broad range of life contexts. A “context” is a relevant background, condition, or surrounding set of circumstances. The immediate context of the near-death experience is a life-threatening situation (in our case studies, radical surgery or serious accident; other near-death circumstances include serious illnesses, suicide attempts, and intense danger). More broadly, however, the context includes everything brought to the experience by the experiencers themselves: their age, gender, educational level, ethnic status, marital status, occupation, culture, religious background, mental health, knowledge of near-death experiences, historical time period, and so on; to say nothing of their particular lifestyles, schemas, and schema-related attitudes, beliefs, needs, desires, hopes, and expectations at that point in time.

Although near-death experience survivors do not differ in most contextual respects from non-experience survivors (Greyson, 2000b, in press; Schwaninger, Eisenberg, Schechtman, & Weiss, 2002), context may nonetheless make a difference in the particular content of the experience or how the experience is interpreted. For example, experiencers may project what they need, hope, expect, or are readily able (have the schemas) to see. Pam’s grandmother was one of the “shapes” (formed from figures in the light) that Pam “could recognize and understand.” Furthermore, each shape “fit perfectly into [Pam’s] understanding of what that person looked like at their best during their lives.” During her life-threatening operation, Pam may have needed to see and so projected an image of her familiar, nurturing, optimally healthy grandmother. Tom, desiring to understand his dark surroundings, may have projected something he could understand (he reported that his surroundings—instantaneously with his desire to understand them—“took the shape of a tunnel”).

Part of the context that Pam and Tom brought to their near-death experiences was their technology- and industry-oriented Western culture. Their references to elevators, light bulbs, electric toothbrushes, lawn mowers, and voltage lines are absent from many non-Western and most historical accounts. The more broadly the features of the near-death experience have been defined, of course, the more they have been evaluated as universal—that is, evident across diverse individual, situational, demographic, and cultural or historical contexts. Allan Kellehear (1996; 2009) found that descriptions such as movement through a tunnel or cylinder (such as a pipe; a truck driver experienced being “shot through a tailpipe toward a brilliant light,” Cox-Chapman, 1995, p. 17) are generally provincial to
Western near-death experiences. Indian, Chinese, Melanesian, and other rural or village cultures described experiences such as walking through dark fields, or emerging through the calyx (throat) of a lotus flower, or traveling through subterranean caves. Although Western and non-Western respondents brought different contexts to their experience, Kellehear (1996; cf. 2008) inferred that respondents in both types of culture were “attempting to describe some kind of movement through darkness” (p. 37) and into some otherworldly, usually bright realm. Based on a study of over 1300 cross-cultural reports (spanning over 110 countries) at his research website, oncologist Jeffrey Long (2010; cf. Parnia, 2013) concluded: “Whether it is a near-death experience of a Hindu in India, a Muslim in Egypt, or a Christian in the United States, the same core elements are present” (p. 149).

Various typologies for classifying and studying core elements or broad features of the near-death experience have been proposed (see Greyson, 2000b; Holden, 2009). The most elegant of these typologies is Sabom’s (1982, 1998) tripartite classification of near-death experiences as (a) autoscopic (literally, self-visualizing; more broadly, perceiving from an elevated vantage point one’s physical body and its surrounding earthly situation), (b) transcendental (or moving through a dark region or void to an otherworldly realm; encountering and mentally communicating in that realm with a being or beings of light, deceased loved ones, or spiritual figures; reviewing events of one’s earthly life; and reaching some border, limit, barrier, or juncture point), and (c) combined or comprehensive, such that “the transcendental portion of the experience followed the autoscopic portion in a continuous, unbroken sequence” (Sabom, 1982, p. 52).

In Sabom’s (1982) Western-culture study of 78 hospital patients who had had a physical near-death crisis event, more than one-third (34) had had a near-death experience (this proportion was also found by Ring, 1980; in prospective studies, however, the incidence rate has been found to range from 10% to 23%; Greyson, 1998; Parnia, Waller, Yeates, & Fenwick, 2001; Schwaninger et al., 2002; van Lommel et al., 2001; see Zingrone & Alvarado, 2009). Slightly more than one-half (38) of the near-death experiences in Sabom’s total collection of 71 such cases were transcendental, slightly less than one-third (21) were autoscopic, and approximately one-sixth (12) were comprehensive. In our case studies, Pam’s category was comprehensive, whereas Tom’s was transcendental (although his reported hearing of the distant conversation in the ambulance might be classifiable as autoscopic, rendering his experience comprehensive as well). In these basic terms, Kellehear (1996, 2009) found autoscopic, comprehensive, and especially transcendental near-death experiences to be broadly evident across diverse Western and non-Western cultural contexts.

The cross-cultural incidence of one feature of the transcendental or comprehensive near-death experience—namely, the life review (such as Tom’s)—is controversial. Kellehear (1996; 2009) found this feature among Western and Asian (Chinese, Indian, Thai, and Tibetan) accounts but not among those from the Pacific Area (such as Hawaii and Guam) and hunter-gatherer societies (Native American, Aboriginal Australian, African). Long (2010), however, found that a life review was consistently and substantially represented (approximately 25%) among near-death
experience accounts submitted at his website in English, Chinese, Indonesian, Arabic, and other languages.

The circumstances occasioning the near-death experience may influence the likelihood of experiencing a life review. In our two cases, the life review occurred for the accident victim but not for the surgery patient; this difference is consistent with findings that life reviews are more likely to occur in the context of serious accidents. In fact, life reviews occur in more than 50% of accident-related near-death experiences, a significantly higher percentage relative to the incidence rate for near-death experiences associated with other types of near-death events (Ring, 1980; cf. Stevenson & Cook, 1995). Ring (1980) speculated that life reviews may be especially needed in such unexpected near-death crises, in which one must suddenly prepare for apparently imminent death (Stevenson and Cook found only a trend in this direction, however). Even given the circumstances of a life-threatening accident, the life review is relatively rare in childhood near-death experiences, perhaps because children “don’t yet have much of a life…to review” (Morse, 1990, p. 142).

Life reviews are not uncommon among the relatively rare (or underreported), “distressing,” “frightening,” or “less than positive” versions of the near-death experience (Bush, 2002; Greyson & Bush, 1992; Rommer, 2000; not included are cases that convert to a positive experience). Bruce Greyson and Nancy Bush (1992) classified these distressing near-death experiences into four categories. First are experiences that have fairly typical broad features, yet are distressing. These respondents seem to have been terrified by their inability to control the anomalous events experienced (Barbara Rommer called these experiences “misinterpreted”; “most” of her experiencers in this category said that they had been “used to being in total control of all situations in their lives,” p. 35). A second category is defined as a void or realm of total blackness, engendering a sense of emptiness, aloneness, and despair (we wonder whether Tom Sawyer was at risk for such affect in his “problem” of “absolute, total blackness” had his experience not converted to movement toward the light). The third category entails hellish imagery idiosyncratic to the experiencer.

Life reviews occurred in approximately one-third of cases in the first (lack-of-control) and second (void/blackness) categories, and in approximately one-fifth of the hellish-imagery cases. Life reviews occurring in the distressing near-death experience tend to be negative or frightening. After finding a number of cases consisting chiefly of a frightening life review, physician Barbara Rommer (2000) proposed this experience as a fourth category of the distressing near-death experience. In this category, the primary transcendental experience is a life review in which the experiencer typically feels negatively judged and then laments his or her earthly actions (cf. near-death experience accounts in medieval folklore; Zaleski, 1987).

In the life review category as well as the other categories of distressing near-death experiences, suicide attempts (“either intentionally or unintentionally, through self-destructive behavior,” p. 41) constituted approximately one-third (on average) of the precipitating situational contexts. A “very frequent” impression gained by survivors of distressing near-death experiences was “that suicide is not
an [acceptable] option” (p. 44), at least for the self-centered sorts of suicidal cases reviewed by Rommer.

Context does make a difference, then, in the content and likelihood of the near-death experience. Although movement through a dark region or void (usually toward a lighter, increasingly bright and dominant realm or being) is universally evident across cultures, the way a person makes sense of and describes that experience will depend partly on cultural context: Characterizations of that dark region in the imagery of a tunnel, cylinder such as a pipe, and so on are more likely in the context of cultures in which those objects are familiar. And although the life review may be a fairly widespread feature, its incidence may be higher in situational contexts such as accidents. So contextual factors do influence the imagery and likelihood of particular features of the near-death experience.

Does context not only influence but also determine the experience? In other words, is the near-death experience entirely reducible to an individual’s imaginal projection of some sort, such as a dream or hallucination? As Fox (quoted earlier) put it, perhaps a near-death experience is “nothing more than a bundle of culturally derived fantasies.” We do know “that the imagination can be made to produce realistic images that can . . . be projected outward as though a part of the perceived world” (Blackmore, 1993, p. 69). Some of the “events” of the experience do seem like imaginal projections (e.g., hellish imagery). The “sparkles” representing “feeding” or “nourishing” of Pam by her loved ones could have been dreamlike imagery epiphenomenal to the fact that her brain and heart were reactivating as the increasingly warm blood circulated through her body.

In general, however, although the near-death experience is context-influenced, we doubt that it is entirely attributable to the projection of contextual factors such as culture, expectation, and situation. Autoscopic, transcendental, and comprehensive near-death experiences have been evident even among persons who (like Tom and perhaps Pam) had not known of near-death experiences. Such experiences have been reported even by two- and three-year-old children—“certainly too young to have had any concept of death or the afterlife” (Parnia, 2013, p. 155; cf. Long, 2010; Morse, 1990). It is intriguing that child survivors whose parents were present and highly salient nonetheless generally report having encountered in the light deceased loved ones (Greyson, 2000b, 2010a, in press; cf. Long, 2010). It is also intriguing that, in Long’s (2010) large cross-cultural database, the age of the NDEr [near-death experiencer] did not make any difference in whether or not they encountered a deceased being. If the deceased relatives encountered during [near-death experiences] were only a product of earthly memory, it would be expected that older individuals, who would have experienced more deaths of people that they knew in their lifetimes, would have encountered more deceased relatives. (p. 132)

Unlike a typical dream or hallucination, then, the near-death experience does not accommodate entirely to the experiencer’s schemas of cultural imagery and personal experiences or psychosocial expectations. Prior to his experience, Tom not only had been unaware of near-death experiences but had regarded notions of spirituality as “hocus-pocus bullshit” (Farr, 1993, p. 55). Tom and Pam were surprised by specific aspects of their experience. Tom expected to stay with the light
but instead found himself returning to his body. Pam knew her hands were there and “fully expected” to see them, yet she could not. And although Pam expected her grandmother to escort her on her return, her grandmother “just didn’t think she would do that” (her uncle instead escorted her and facilitated her return).

Departures from specific personal or religious expectations are not rare in near-death experiences (Abramovitch, 1988; Morse, 1990; Ring, 1984); indeed, such departures were common in the Long (2010) study. Although they do not constitute strong evidence (Blackmore, 1993), unexpected or surprising events—especially those that continue to baffle—do suggest an ontological status beyond that of subjective imagination. An experiencer named Elinor remembered that her father loved having friends and family around. The fact that it still seems odd to Elinor that her father would have turned down her company [“All he said to me was, ‘Sweetheart, don’t come’”] gives credence to the possibility that her vision is not simply a construct of her imagination. (Cox-Chapman, 1995, p. 134)

Another experiencer, a woman who nearly died from sinus infection complications, also experienced surprise at the behavior of a figure encountered. She recalled suddenly leaving her body and feeling “overjoyed to see” the much-beloved (deceased) pastor of her church:

But he seemed very upset and had a very worried face and began waving his arms around, and he was just acting frantic. So I said, “Aren’t you glad to see me? I’ve missed you so much since you died last summer!” And then it hit me, and I said, “If you’re dead and I’m here with you, then…” And he started nodding his head frantically. Just as suddenly, I slammed back into my body. (NDE archives, March 18, 2003)

Also suggestive of something beyond ordinary imagination is the difficulty encountered by experiencers as they seek to communicate their experiences. Pam and Tom found it difficult adequately to convey numerous extraordinary and anomalous aspects of their experiences. An example is their movement through a dark region, channel, or void. Although both Pam and Tom invoked the tunnel imagery, neither was entirely content with that characterization. Declaring that “it was like a tunnel but it wasn’t a tunnel,” Pam also invoked the “metaphors” of tornado vortex and elevator but found nothing quite adequate. Similarly, the dark region only partially took on the character of a tunnel for Tom, who had to add the image of a straightened tornado. Their interchanges with the figures or the light took place through a non-auditory “communication” (“that’s the best way I [Pam] know how to say it”) or instant “emanations” (Tom) of thoughts. Pam found it “terribly hard to explain” how she could sense yet not see her “hands” in the experience. Tom’s particular frustration was in attempting to convey aspects of the light, inadequately communicated with phrases such as “unconditional love” and “total beauty.” (Typical in the literature was Tom’s and Pam’s reference to the light as extremely bright, loving, warm, and “comfortable” such that one “feels good.”)

A near-death experiencer exclaimed of his simultaneous vantage points in his life review: “I don’t know how this works” (see below).

In this connection, we note that a classic criterion of a genuinely transcendent or mystical experience is “ineffability,” that is, that “no adequate report of
its contents can be given in words” (William James, 1903/1958, pp. 292–293). By this criterion, Pam’s and Tom’s experiences were genuinely transcendental. It is perhaps not coincidental that ineffability (as implied in expressions of communicative frustration, surprise, or bafflement) was totally absent from a near-death experience account that was subsequently acknowledged to have been a fabrication (reported by Ring & Lawrence, 1993; see Gibbs, 1997).

2. Do Near-Death Experiencers Interpret the Experience as Real?

Although Pam expressed uncertainty as to whether her encounter with her deceased grandmother was a matter of projection or reality, she also reported her impression that the sound, as it were, of her grandmother’s calling her was extraordinarily clear (“a clearer hearing than with my own ears”) and authentic (“I trust that sense more than I trust my own ears….I would know my grandmother, the sound of her voice, anywhere”). Similarly, the pitch of the cranial saw became “clearer” with her sense of emergence from her physical body. Her visual perception as well was “brighter and more focused and clearer than normal vision.” Tom also referred to “waking up” and seeing “very clearly” (even though all he saw at first was “absolute, total blackness”). Finally, Pam felt that during the experience she “was the most aware that I think I have ever been in my entire life.” Such impressions of heightened conscious awareness and clarity of perception are commonly evident in these experiences (see Kelly et al., 2007; Long, 2010).

Experiencers usually report, not only enhanced awareness and perceptual clarity, but also a sense that their experience was real. In contrast to Pam’s initial uncertainty as to whether her perception of her grandmother was projected or real, Tom was emphatic that his experience was real. Experiencers who remember their dreams or have had hallucinations typically distinguish their near-death experience as neither dream nor hallucination (Ring, 1980; Sabom, 1982; cf. Long, 2010). One respondent said, “It was too real. Dreams are always fictitious. This was me, happening at that time and there was no doubt that it was reality” (Ring, 1980, p. 82).

Regarding the distinguishability of hallucinations as only pseudo-real in comparison, Bruce Greyson (2001; cf. 2010b) recounted an astonishing incident in which a 33-year-old psychiatric patient began a suicide attempt (by overdosing on a medication), changed his mind and dialed the phone for help, started hallucinating (seeing little people in his kitchen and crawling around his legs), and then had an autoscopic near-death experience:

He drew back out of his body and from a position of about 10 feet behind his body he looked at himself holding the phone. He saw his body looking around….He couldn’t see any little people; he was mentally clear. But he remembered being inside the body and he knew that his body was hallucinating. He told me: “I wasn’t hallucinating but my body was!”

“By his account,” then, “his mind could function much more clearly and was not subject to drug-induced hallucinations once it was liberated from the brain” (Greyson, 2010b, pp. 160–161). Like other experiencers, he identified his mind,
self, or identity as “the part that was above, rather than the body” below (Parnia, 2013, p. 125).

Some near-death experiencers even suggest that their experience was more real than is the physical world (Long, 2010). According to Tom, “The reality in which we are currently existing is in fact a lesser reality than the reality of the Light” (Farr, 1993, p. 51). Similarly, one of Sabom’s (1982) patients described the experience as “realer than here” (p. 16). Nonetheless, this “lesser” or less-real reality of earthly existence is evidently of some ontological status and importance in its own right:

An additional common impression of near-death experiencers is that their return has some reason or purpose, typically involving spiritual growth, learning or education, and helping or caring for others, including in some cases broad humanitarian concerns. Although interpreting an experience as real does not make it so (Blackmore, 1993), the “reality” claim does invite investigation as to whether it is to any degree supportable. To that question we now turn.

3. Are Verifiable Aspects of the Near-Death Experience in Fact Accurate or Veridical?

A crucial empirical strategy for assessing whether near-death experiences are purely subjective imagined projections or something more than that is to investigate the empirical accuracy or veridicality of their confirmable features. Most amenable to such investigations are, of course, perceptions reported in the autoscopic near-death experience (or the autoscopic portion of the comprehensive near-death experience).

Vague reports, of course, could derive from purely imaginal projections. In his one possibly autoscopic feature, Tom reportedly heard a distant ambulance conversation that was “rough and hard,” but that report is difficult to evaluate given the lack of specifics or of corroboration. Tom’s claims to paranormal abilities following his experience are more specific, but uncorroborated. Such claims are common in the near-death experience literature, but their validity status remains controversial (e.g., Bem, Palmer, & Broughton, 2001; Bierman, 2001; LaBerge & Gackenbach, 2000; Radin, 2006; Targ, Schlitz, & Irwin, 2000; Tart, 2009).

Pam, however, provides us with more specific and hence more verifiable earthly recollections. Recall that throughout the surgery Pam’s eyes were taped shut, her ear canals occluded, and her body deeply anesthetized. Nonetheless, she reported numerous idiosyncratic visual and auditory details (e.g., the pitch and shape of the cranial saw, her partially shaven head, and surgeons’ comments)—all of which were corroborated by the medical staff. Sabom (1998) was particularly “shocked with the accuracy of Pam’s description of the saw as an ‘electric toothbrush’ with ‘interchangeable blades’…and with a ‘socket wrench’ in which this equipment is kept” (p. 187), although he did also note a minor inaccuracy (Pam mislabeled an overhanging edge along the cranial saw as a “groove” near the “top” of the saw). Sabom tentatively attributed this misimpression to Pam’s viewing the instrument “from a distance” (p. 189).

Pam’s accuracy corroborates an earlier finding by Sabom (1982; cf. Sartori, 2008) of veridicality in autoscopic near-death experiences. Before his first study,
Sabom had been convinced that “the near-death experience, if properly studied, could be reduced to a simple scientific explanation” (Sabom, 1998, p. 175). At the onset of his first near-death experience study of hospital patients, Sabom (1982) was anxiously awaiting the moment when a patient would claim that he had “seen” what had transpired in his room during his own resuscitation. Upon such an encounter, I intended to probe meticulously for details that would not ordinarily be known to nonmedical personnel. In essence, I would pit my experience as a trained cardiologist against the professed visual recollections of lay individuals…. [In so doing,] I was convinced [that] obvious inconsistencies would appear which would reduce these purported “visual” observations to no more than “educated guesses.” (p. 83)

Sabom (1982) interviewed 32 such patients. All of their accounts of hospital CPR procedure were accurate, including six particularly detailed recollections. The recollected details in each case were “fairly specific for the actual resuscitation being described and… not interchangeable with the clinical circumstances of other near-death crisis events” (p. 114). One participant did make apparent errors in his describing the operation of a defibrillating meter—until Sabom, to his astonishment, discovered that that description matched an older model that was “still in common use in 1973, at the time of [the patient’s] cardiac arrest” (p. 104).

To establish a baseline rate of accuracy attributable to educated guesses, Sabom (1982) also interviewed a control group of 25 patients with comparable cardiac-related background and hospital experience but who had not reported a near-death experience. It should be noted that only four of the 25 control group patients had actually been resuscitated from cardiac arrest (Blackmore, 1985). These 25 patients were asked what they would expect to see if they were to watch a hospital CPR procedure. The baseline rate of accuracy was extremely low: only two of these participants avoided making a “major error” (p. 85) in their imaginative descriptions. The accuracy rate of the group reporting specific autoscopy recollections, then, was overwhelming and not attributable to projections from common knowledge.

Other cases of verified perceptual recollections, from experiences apparently taking place during clinical death or coma, have been reported in the literature. Indeed, researchers have reported many cases of verified perceptual recollections from experiences apparently taking place during deep anesthesia or near-death conditions (e.g., Long, 2010), and high proportions of the reported details have been independently corroborated, in many instances by medical professionals (Holden, 2009; Parnia, 2013). In one case, a seven-year-old girl, deeply comatose from having nearly drowned, nonetheless subsequently recalled idiosyncratic details of her emergency care such as her unusual intubation—nasal instead of oral. Much to her parents’ astonishment, she even recalled accurate details concerning her parents’ exact locations, clothing, and activities at home during her hospitalization (Morse, 1990). In another case, a man who remained deeply comatose and under artificial respiration for days, nonetheless upon recovering recognized a nurse who had removed his dentures for intubation. He asked for the return of his dentures, correctly identifying their whereabouts (on a sliding shelf). He also accurately described details of the operating room, the procedure, and the
appearance of other staff members (van Lommel et al., 2001, p. 2041; cf. Parnia, 2013, p. 142). In yet another case, a surgery patient under anesthesia and draped above the neck subsequently described leaving his body and watching the cardiac surgeon “flapping his arms as if trying to fly.” The surgeon verified this description of his movements, explaining that in an effort to prevent contamination after scrubbing in, he directed the preliminary procedures of the surgery team in this way (Cook et al., 1998, pp. 399–400). 9

Psychiatrist Brian Weiss (2000; cf. van Lommel, 2010, pp. 23–26) reported the corroborated recollection of an elderly—and blind—woman who suffered a cardiac arrest during her stay in the hospital where I [Weiss] was the chairman of the psychiatry department. She was unconscious as the resuscitation team tried to revive her. According to her later report, she floated out of her body and stood near the window, watching the resuscitation. She observed, without any pain whatsoever, as they thumped on her chest and pumped air into her lungs. During the resuscitation, a pen fell out of her doctor’s pocket and rolled near the same window where her out-of-body spirit was standing and watching. The doctor eventually walked over, picked up the pen, and put it back in his pocket. He then rejoined the frantic effort to save her. They succeeded.

A few days later, she told her doctor that she had observed the resuscitation team at work during her cardiac arrest. “No,” he soothingly reassured her. “You were probably hallucinating because of the anoxia [lack of oxygen to the brain]. This can happen when the heart stops beating.”

“But I saw your pen roll over to the window,” she replied. Then she described the pen and other details of the resuscitation. The doctor was shocked. His patient had not only been comatose during the resuscitation, but she had also been blind for many years. (pp. 169–170)

In a later publication, Weiss (2004) noted that “the cardiologist was still shaken days later when he told me [Weiss] about it. He confirmed that everything the woman related had indeed taken place and that her descriptions were accurate” (p. 10). Other cases of verified perceptual recollection by near-death survivors blind since birth have also been reported in the literature (Ring & Cooper, 1999).

Although verifiability pertains mainly to the earthly perceptions of the autoscopic near-death experience, it can also apply in an indirect way to transcendental near-death perceptions of deceased loved ones. In the transcendent portion of Pam’s near-death experience, she “recognized a lot of people” (all deceased) among the “figures in the light” that “began to form shapes.” In some cases, experiencers describe encounters with figures whose death is only subsequently revealed or whose identity is only subsequently recognized. For example,

Child near-death experiencers purportedly describe meeting persons, whom they did not know, in sufficient detail to allow their parents to recognize those persons as deceased relatives, or the child may later identify the person from the NDE [near-death
experience] in a family portrait [or photograph] he or she had never seen before. (Greyson, 2000b, p. 341)

An adult whose near-death experience occurred in childhood reported that while in the light, he became aware that

there were some presences there. There were some ladies….I didn't know them at the time….They were so loving and so wonderful and I just didn't want to come back….I didn't see any pictures of them until I was an adult, but then I said, “Oh, yeah.”….They were my great-grandmothers who had died years before I was born. (Wilson, 1995; cf. Greyson, 2010b, in press; Parnia, 2013, pp. 136–137)

An NDE survivor named Sandra, who had contracted encephalitis and had lost (ordinary) consciousness, upon recovery drew a sketch of a girl she met during her coma.

When she told her parents what she was drawing, they became ashen and left the room. Later they returned and told her about the sister she never knew she had, who was struck by a car and died before she [Sandra] was born. (Long, 2010, p. 129; cf. van Lommel, 2010, pp. 32–33)

Such corroboration of encounters that could scarcely be projections of the familiar also sometimes occurs in connection with the related phenomenon of deathbed visions or “nearing-death awareneses” (Callanan & Kelley, 1992), in which the experiencer sees—often with some surprise—recently deceased loved ones whose deaths were unknown to them (Greyson, 2000b). Maggie Callanan and Patricia Kelley (1992) recounted the case of a dying 93-year-old woman, Su, whose visions began to include not only her late husband but also her sister:

“Why is my sister with my husband?” she asked. “They are both calling me to come.”

“Is your sister dead?” I [Callanan] asked.

“No, she still lives in China,” she said. “I have not seen her for many years.”

When I related this conversation to the daughter [Lily], she was astonished and tearful.

“My aunt died two days ago in China,” Lily said. “We decided not to tell Mother—her sister had the same kind of cancer. It was a very painful death; she lived in a remote village where good medical care wasn’t available. We didn’t want to upset or frighten Mother, since she is so sick herself.” …

When Lily tearfully told her mother about her sister’s illness and death, Su said, with a knowing smile, “Now I understand.” Her puzzle solved, she died three weeks later, at peace and with a sense of anticipation. (pp. 98–99)

In sum, although some projective participation does seem to be involved, the findings on balance seem to suggest that there is some noteworthy degree of accuracy or veridicality to verifiable aspects of the perceptions reported in autoscopic and even transcendental near-death experiences. We next consider the questions of whether the accurate recollections are in fact associated with a proximity to physical death and whether they are attributable to perceptions occurring during the near-death time period.
4. Is the Likelihood or Depth of the Experience Associated with Proximity to Physical Death?

Despite her documented condition of clinical brain death, Pam not only felt she experienced extraordinary perceptual awareness and clarity but also reported a comprehensive-type and “deep” near-death experience. Although measures of near-death experience “depth” raise questions of validity (see Greyson, 2000b, pp. 342–345), it is worth noting that Pam’s depth score on Greyson’s (1983) Near-Death Experience Scale was 27 out of a possible maximum score of 32. (She responded, for example, not merely that time “seemed to go faster than usual [1 point],” but that “everything seemed to be happening all at once [2 points];” she felt not only peace or happiness or had unusually vivid senses [1 point each], but “incredibly” so [2 points each]; she not only “lost awareness” of her body [1 point], but “clearly left the body and existed outside it” [2 points]; she was not only in an “unfamiliar, strange place” [1 point] but a “clearly mystical or unearthly realm” [2 points]; she not only “sensed the presence of deceased persons” [1 point] but “saw them” [2 points]; etc; data supplied by M. Sabom, personal communication, November 3, 2001.) Overall, Pam’s total score of 27 far exceeded the mean of 13.3 in Sabom’s (1998) sample of 47 experiencers and in fact was the highest score of anyone in the sample.

The concurrence of a clinically extreme near-death condition with a deep near-death experience is consistent with research findings of an association between proximity to physical death and the likelihood of having a near-death experience. Although many aspects of the so-called near-death experience can occur in deep meditation or “situations of intense physical or emotional danger,” typically it occurs “to individuals [actually] close to death” (Greyson, 2000b, pp. 315–316). It is also noteworthy that, although “near-death” is of course not death per se, the cardiac standstill, brain non-function, and sensory shutdown entailed in clinical death represent “the closest model [we have] to the process of dying” (van Lommel, 2006, p. 136; cf. Greyson, 2010a). Indeed, resuscitation physician Sam Parnia (2013) noted that, “biologically and medically speaking,” cardiac arrest is virtually “synonymous” with death (p. 23). Ring (1980) and Sabom (1982) found that NDE depth or likelihood correlated with closeness to physical death in their samples. Van Lommel and colleagues (van Lommel et al., 2001) partially replicated this relationship in their prospective study. On one hand, unlike those in Sabom’s study, survivors in the van Lommel et al. study who remained unconscious for longer periods were not more likely to have had a near-death experience. On the other hand, van Lommel and colleagues did find an association between NDE likelihood and temporal closeness to physical death. Among their patients, those who died soon—within 30 days—after their cardiac arrests were more likely to have had an NDE (21% versus 9% among matched controls). Intriguingly, the dead-soon-after proportion rose to more than a third—from 21% to 43%—among the patients who had had a “deep” or extensive NDE (p. 2041).
5. Does the Typical Near-Death Experience Actually Take Place During Near-Death?

If near-death perceptions are to some remarkable degree veridical or accurate, experienced as real, and even highly conscious and clear, then how could they be taking place at a time of severe mental and bodily compromise, of proximity to death? One answer attributes the experience to special effects of a dying or severely compromised brain. Blackmore (1993; cf. Blanke et al., 2002; de Waal, 2013) argued that the disinhibited and seizure activity of a dying brain could generate seemingly “real” hallucinations. Sam Parnia and Peter Fenwick (2002) countered that the “disorganized and compromised cerebral function” evident during near-death states is unlikely to produce the “lucid, well structured thought processes” characteristic of the near-death experience (p. 8; cf. Greyson, 2010a; Long, 2010; Owens, Cook, & Stevenson, 1990; cf. Parnia, 2013). In any event, seizures can be ruled out as an explanation at least in Pam Reynolds’s case, where the absence of such activity is documented by the EEG record (Sabom, personal communication, September 20, 2002).

“Compromised” is an understatement as a description of Pam’s brain function. By the time Pam was experiencing the transcendental aspects of her experience, the EEG record was showing that her brain was not only functionally compromised but “dead” by all three of the standard clinical criteria: (a) a “fl at” EEG, indicating non-function of the cerebral cortex; (b) absence of auditory evoked potentials, indicating non-function of the brain stem; and (c) cessation of blood flow to and through the brain (Sabom, 1998, p. 49). Yet Pam’s near-death experience continued during clinical brain death, contradicting the dying-brain hypothesis that the experience should “stop when the brain’s activity stops” (Blackmore, 1993, p. 4).

Another answer challenges the premise of the question. Perhaps the recollections do not in fact derive from the time of the near-death condition. Perhaps these purportedly highly conscious “perceptions” can be accurate because the perceivers were conscious in the ordinary sense. Perhaps their perceptions are actually projections constructed from the informational stimuli of a time period mainly prior to or following the time of the near-death episode, while the person’s mental functioning was unimpaired (indeed, perhaps even from the early moments of near-death, given that the auditory sense often persists even as conscious mental functioning fades). The person’s ostensibly recollected “experience” might then be fabricated from these sources and misattributed to the near-death time period (Blackmore, 1993; French, 2001; Hyman, 2001). For example, Pam’s reference to having heard a “female” voice could have been fabricated from her prior familiarity with a female member (Dr. Murray) of the surgery team.

As Sabom (1998) pointed out, the fabrication hypothesis has difficulty in cases where the reported details were not initially in view. Most of the details reported in Pam Reynolds’s case were of this sort (the pitch and shape of the cranial drill, the partial shaving of Pam’s head hair, etc.). Pam’s surgeon, Dr. Robert Spetzler, commented: “The drill and so on, those things were . . . in their packages. You really don’t begin to open until the patient is completely asleep so that you maintain a sterile environment” (Broome, 2001).
Sabom (1998) was particularly interested in Pam’s auditory recollection of the cardiovascular surgeon’s comment that certain blood vessels were too small. Given her occluded ear canals (“altogether eliminat[ing] the possibility of physical hearing,” p. 184) as well as the obscuring auditory stimuli of the brain stem monitoring devices, Pam could not have physically heard this comment during the operation. As Spetzler commented, “I find it inconceivable that . . . there was any way for her to hear . . . through the normal auditory pathways” (Smit, 2008, p. 309; cf. Smit & Rivas, 2010; but see also Woerlee, 2011). Yet somehow she did hear a specific comment that was corroborated as accurate. Moreover, the comment was reported at the appropriate point in her near-death experience:

Pam stated that she did not hear or perceive anything prior to her out-of-body experience, and that this experience began with hearing the bone saw. At this point in the operation, she had been under anesthesia for about 90 minutes. . . . The [use of] the bone saw was simultaneous with the conversation about Pam’s small blood vessels—and, as it turns out, with her out-of-body experience. This correspondence of Pam’s recollections from an out-of-body experience with the correct bit of intraoperative conversation during a six-hour operative procedure is certainly intriguing evidence. (p. 185)

Pam’s sequence of recollected perceptions corresponded, then, with the actual sequence of steps in the surgical procedure.

The post hoc version of the fabrication hypothesis posits that the “experience” was retrospectively projected from details mentioned afterward. For example, Pam Reynolds might have heard about the details of her operation from medical staff or records (Hyman, 2001). Such a possibility is unlikely, given the idiosyncratic character of many of the recounted details in Sabom’s and other studies. Such idiosyncratic details are “not what would likely be explained to a patient recovering from a cardiac arrest” (Sabom, 1982, p. 114). Cardiac patients might be told that their “heart stopped beating” and that an “electrical shock” was used on the chest to stabilize cardiac rhythm, but there is no conceivable reason to supply the details reported in the typical autoscopic NDE—the insertion of a plastic airway, the checking for a carotid pulse or pupillary response in the eye, the drawing of arterial blood from the hand or the groin, the movement of the needles on the face of the defibrillator, etc. (p. 75; cf. Cook, Greyson, & Stevenson, 1998; Ring, 1980)

In general, then, it would appear that the evident accuracy and perceived consciousness of some near-death recollections cannot be interpreted in terms of remembered auditory or visual pre- or post-episode stimuli, not only for the reasons given but also because loss of consciousness typically induces anterograde and retrograde amnesia (Parnia & Fenwick, 2002). Indeed, from study of his online near-death experience database, Long (2010) concluded that the highest level of consciousness and alertness is usually experienced not at the beginning or end of the NDE but somewhere during or throughout the entire NDE. Very few NDErs [near-death experiencers] describe their highest level of alertness as occurring when they approached or recovered from their time of unconsciousness. (p. 80)
It is also difficult for before- or after-the-fact fabrication explanations to account for correlations between closeness to death and the likelihood or depth of the near-death experience.

A Deeper Reality? Summary and Conclusion

We can reach some tentative closure, then, as to whether the near-death experience is an imaginal projection or a glimpse of a deeper reality: It is evidently some subtle mixture. Perceptions in the experience do seem to entail imaginal projections (or assimilations) based on contextual factors such as the experiencer’s mental schemas of culture or familiar environment. Experiencers are to an extent “participants in creating the specific details of their experience” (Greyson, in press). In other words, the experiencer does seem to influence that which is perceived. Nonetheless, the experience may not reduce entirely to subjective projection, interpretation, and a particular context. The experience is in good measure ineffable and typically elicits surprise or bafflement. The autoscopic, comprehensive, and especially transcendental types of near-death experience are fairly universally evident across personal, situational, cultural, and historical contexts. Experiencers recollect heightened awareness and perceptual clarity and interpret their experience as real; those who can compare their near-death experience to dreams or hallucinations typically insist that the near-death experience is neither a dream nor a hallucination, but reality. There is a remarkable degree of accuracy to autoscopic perceptions, and there are reports of indirect empirical confirmation even for some transcendental perceptions. The experience is more likely to occur, as well as more extensive or profound, for those who are closer to physical death. The accuracy and conscious, clear qualities of the experience are unlikely to be attributable to fabrications from information gained when mental function was unimpaired (prior or subsequent to the near-death event) or from auditory information during the event—impossible in Pam Reynolds’s case. Astonishingly, Pam’s deep near-death experience occurred despite the documented cessation of brain wave activity.

A definitive conclusion regarding the significance of this phenomenon would be premature. At the least, the near-death experience overall would seem to be a challenging anomaly (e.g., Parnia, 2006; Vaitl et al., 2005). Parnia and Fenwick (2002; cf. Greyson, 2010a; Parnia, 2013; van Lommel, 2010) concluded from a research review of cases of cardiac arrest that the near-death experience may point to the need for a new science of consciousness. Similarly, we conclude, given our own review above, that the phenomenon may point to a deeper reality of human existence.

Although tentative, these conclusions suggest that hypothetical (or not so hypothetical) reflection on the phenomenon’s possible implications may be worthwhile. If the near-death experience does glimpse even partially a deeper reality of human existence, what would be the existential and moral implications? Accordingly, we move now from ontological to existential and moral questions.
Kohlberg’s cases of existential crisis and “Stage 7” epiphany seem to access a deeper reality relevant to the moral life. In these cases, morally mature but existentially and ontologically anguished thinkers attain (through deep thought, soul-searching, meditation) a cosmic perspective deriving from “the whole of nature” and thereby lose their angst. They begin to see human life from that primary vantage point, sense an answer to the existential “Why be moral?” question, and are endowed with inspiration to embrace life. But is such insight and inspiration from a deeper reality the exclusive province of the morally mature? Is the soul-searching of existential crises the only way to penetrate this deeper reality with its evident potential to inspire faith in the moral and meaningful life?

Near-death experiencers differ in some ways from Kohlberg’s cases. The very name “near-death experience” reminds us that the crisis is generally physical rather than existential. Also, in contrast to Kohlberg’s cases, near-death experiencers prior to the event—as in the cases of Pam Reynolds and Tom Sawyer—were not necessarily deep thinkers, soul-searchers, or idealists. Despite these differences, the life-changing reality accessed, we suspect, is one and the same. Consider the claims of “Stage 7” individuals that they experienced a cosmic perspective with an associated sense of “union, love, joy, and grace” (p. 347) and that “love is somehow the key which unlocks the door which leads to ultimate reality” (Martin Luther King, Jr., quoted in Kohlberg & Power, 1981). Such claims seem indistinguishable from what many near-death experiencers say and seem to evidence in their subsequent lives. Reminiscent of “Stage 7” experiencers’ identification with “the whole of nature,” Pam responded (on Greyson’s [1983] near-death experience scale) that her experience included “a sense of harmony or unity with the universe.”

The life-changing effects of a near-death experience give new meaning to “growing beyond superficiality” in moral or existential human development. A high school student said his near-death experience stimulated him to realize that “there’s more to life than Friday night movies and the football game” (Moody, 1975, p. 89). One of Sabom’s (1998) patients, after his near-death experience, “no longer had time for…little country club things” (p. 88). Furthermore, such an experience “appears to herald a wide range of pervasive and durable personality transformations, including a decreased interest in materialism and competition and an increased interest in altruism and spirituality” (Greyson, 1992–1993, pp. 81–82; cf. Flanagan, 2008; Noyes, Fenwick, Holden, & Christian, 2009). Relative to a comparison (non–near-death experience) sample of survivors of major cardiac surgery, survivors who had had a near-death experience reported greater post-surgery gains in terms of intrinsic faith (e.g., “inner sense of God’s presence”), meaning in life, family life involvement, and “capacity for love” (understanding of others or insight into their problems; ability to express love and listen to others; compassion, tolerance, and acceptance of others; and desire to help them) (Sabom, 1998). In a recent prospective and controlled study, “people who had NDEs had a significant increase in belief in an afterlife and decrease in fear of death compared with
people who had not had this experience” in their near-death events. Furthermore, “depth of NDE was linked to...showing love and accepting others” (van Lommel et al., 2001, p. 2042; cf. van Lommel, 2010). In his earlier study, Sabom (1982) observed among his near-death-experience patients behavioral changes such as “becoming a hospital volunteer” and a new commitment to “humanitarian concerns,” changes that they “would invariably attribute” to the near-death experience (p. 157). Pam Reynolds came back to care for her children and contribute to “harmony” among people; Tom Sawyer’s new priority was on helping others and on certain global dangers (Tom’s moral transformation is explored below). Helping others, understanding their needs, focusing on humanitarian concerns—life changes in this direction are of particular relevance to the “caring” strand of moral development and behavior.

The Light

When present among the features of the near-death experience, the light plays an “overwhelmingly positive—and hence beneficial—role” (Fox, 2003, p. 302). Indeed, Melvin Morse (1992) argued that the key feature in the near-death experience accounting for moral and personality transformations is the encounter with the light. In his study, experiencers who met the light—even if not physically near death—had significant decreases in death anxiety and increases in zest for life, not only relative to non-experience survivors, but even relative to experiencers whose out-of-body experiences did not include the light.

Two cases from his study illustrate this role of the light in evoking a deeper insight, inspiration, and subsequent life changes, including a new earnestness about life and other people. One case was that of James, an 18-year-old African-American teenager living in the housing projects of St. Louis, Missouri. James nearly drowned and had a comprehensive near-death experience when he was nine years old. Interviewed at age 18 (Morse, 1992), James was actively resisting peer pressure to sell drugs or engage in gang violence and was instead applying himself academically (at least as of Morse’s writing). He attributed his responsible lifestyle to the impact of his near-death experience during the near drowning:

[After I stopped struggling to breathe] I just floated out of my body into a safe place. It was all bright; I felt peaceful....Suddenly, I realized that we are all the same. There ain't no black and there ain't no white. I saw that bright light and I knew it was all the colors there were, everything was in that light....

I feel better about myself. I know that I am different. I don't think about putting people down for fun like I used to....I see life the way it really is. It is not meant to be played with. (Morse, 1992, pp. 17–18)

Whereas James had “put other people down” and was at risk of developing an antisocial lifestyle, Ann, another of Morse’s cases, was depressed and self-destructive (“internalizing” rather than “externalizing” her hurt and anger; see Chapter 7). At a party, upon hearing that her boyfriend was leaving her for another girl, she decided to commit suicide
just the way my mother had. I took a handful of barbiturates and swallowed them with vodka, lots of it…. It took me a while to realize that I was out of my body and floating up by the ceiling…. I remember feeling love and peace and also feeling as though I had escaped from all the tension and frustration in my life. I felt kind of enveloped by light. It was a wonderful feeling…. I was shown the beauty of my body and of every body. I was told that my body was a gift and I was supposed to take care of it, not kill it. After hearing this, I felt very, very ashamed of what I had done and hoped that I would live. I began to beg the light for life. The feeling that came back was the strongest feeling of love I have ever experienced. (Morse, 1992, pp. 152–153)

Annie’s near-death experience abruptly transformed her lifestyle. She stopped thinking about her mother’s suicide and about committing suicide herself, stopped abusing drugs and alcohol, eschewed the old friends and parties, developed more responsible friendships, married, and started a family (Morse, 1992).

Again, these cases illustrate Morse’s point: Encountering the light seems to play the key role in the induction of subsequent major life changes, changes less likely to be seen following non-light experiences. Exceptions should be noted, however. Peter and Elizabeth Fenwick (1995) noted cases in which the survivors’ near-death experiences entailed a sense of transcendent comfort or joy, timeless peace, and familiarity or “coming home”—but no light—and who nonetheless attributed to their experience their subsequent dramatic declines in fear of death. Also, apparently absent from Morse’s non-light near-death-experience cases were “distressing” yet life-changing near-death experiences. In these cases, not experiencing the light induces “loneliness, fear, desolation, alienation, and separation” (Lorimer, 1990, p. 86)—the inverse of the feelings experienced by union with the light. Rommer (2000) pointed out, based on her sample of such cases, that feelings such as fear in the absence of the light can elicit some degree of change as well. Indeed, she concluded that such experiences can be “blessings in disguise” (the title of her book), insofar as they can provide a much-needed wake-up call. A drug abuser named Del who had a distressing life review described the experience and its effect:

The review of my life happened so quick…. It was going so fast, I really couldn’t grasp everything I was seeing, but I knew it was me. It was like my life was just goin’ away, real quick…. What was scary was: This is it! This is the end!…So when I didn’t die, I thought: “Well, I’d better do something different.” (Rommer, 2000, p. 61)

After this “scary” experience of his life as too fleeting and wasted even to grasp or assess, Del stopped abusing drugs and started maintaining stable employment (Rommer, 2000). Del’s moral and existential insight had been simply to see the waste and fleeting insignificance of his life of severe drug abuse. That simple insight was sufficiently frightening to inspire reform.

More positive moral insight and inspiration were engendered in Tom’s near-death experience, which encompassed a beginning hint of a distress experience, the light, and a life review. Prior to his accident and experience, Tom’s lifestyle had been not only superficial but self-centered and arrogant to an extent approaching that of the proactive offender (see Chapter 7). Tom’s wife Elaine recalled that, before the accident, Tom was physically and verbally abusive to her (“stupid” was
one name he had called her), threw shoes and other nearby objects at her, and was very controlling, precipitating a separation at one point. Tom corroborated Elaine’s recollection: “I was the head of my family and I would tell them [including their two sons] what they could do!” He was “blind to her needs” (Farr, 1993, p. 95) and, to some extent, the needs of the family. His Self-Centered cognitive distortion and control extended to his having “a fit” upon learning that Elaine had listened to classical music (which Tom at that time did not listen to) on his radio when he wasn’t home: “On my radio, she was only to listen to my music” (p. 94).

Following his near-death experience, Tom was transformed. His self-centered attitudes, abusive behavior, and rages were replaced by an attitude of love and a priority on helping others. “All of a sudden, he was a different person. He loved everybody!” (Farr, 1993, p. 99), exclaimed Elaine. Tom’s love and altruism included humanitarian concerns: In 1980, several years after his experience, he began to speak against the planetary dangers of chemical pollution and global warming.

The Life Review

Although Tom attributed a “good” feeling to the “warmth and love coming from the light,” he seemed to derive particular moral insights and inspiration from his life review. Speaking to Farr (and to a prospective audience), Sawyer said,

I wish I could tell you how it really felt and what the life review is like, but I’ll never be able to do it accurately. I’m hoping to give you just a slight inkling…. Will you be totally devastated by the crap you’ve brought into other people’s lives? Or will you be…enlightened and uplifted by the love and joy that you have shared in other people’s lives?… You will be responsible for yourself, judging and reliving what you have done to everything and everybody in very far-reaching ways. (Farr, 1993, pp. 34–35; cf. Long, 2010; Parnia, 2013)

The life review clearly merits further study. David Lorimer (1990) suggested that Russell Noyes and Roy Klett’s (1977) term panoramic memory applies to brief visions of one’s life (e.g., the mountain climber who somehow survives a fall during which time seems to slow down as he sees his “whole life pass before” him); Lorimer applied the term life review only to those retrospective experiences that evoke “emotional involvement and moral assessment” (p. 10). Apropos of this distinction, physician Melvin Morse (1992) related the case of a heart patient in the Netherlands who experienced first a panoramic memory and then a life review (in Lorimer’s sense) as his car rammed into the back of a truck:

When he realized that collision was imminent, the patient said that time seemed to slow down as he hit his brakes and went into an uncontrolled slide. Then he seemed to pop out of his body. While in this state, he had a life review [or panoramic memory episode] which consisted of brief pictures—flashes—of his life…. His car struck the truck and the truck bed crashed through the window, causing multiple injuries to his head and chest. Medical reports show that he was in a coma and nearly died. Yet he had a vivid sensation of leaving his physical body and entering into darkness…. He had the feeling of moving up through a dark tunnel toward a point of light. Suddenly a being “filled with
love and light” appeared to him. Now he had a second life review [or life review proper], one guided by the being of light. He felt bathed in love and compassion as he reviewed the moral choices he had made in his lifetime. He suddenly understood that he was an important part of the universe and that his life had a purpose. (pp. 197–198)

Among such moral life reviews, a particularly evocative type is what Lorimer (1990; cf. Long 2010; van Lommel, 2010) termed “empathetic” (p. 20), “in which people relive events through the consciousness of the person with whom they were interacting at the time” (pp. 1–2). Lorimer described several cases of initially rather self-centered individuals who nearly died, encountered a loving light and experienced an empathetic life review (one individual exclaimed, “I was the very people I hurt, and I was the very people I helped to feel good,” p. 21), and dramatically transformed into persons who loved and attempted to help everyone. In another such case (the near-death episode resulted from a severe asthma attack), a man named Steve tried to explain:

I wasn’t just watching the events; I was actually reliving them again, while at the same time I was also re-experiencing the actions from other people’s points of view. I was them….. And at the same time (and I don’t know how this works) I was also experiencing it from a higher reality…. So what I saw was my own lies and my own self deception to myself, which I had used to convince me that doing certain things was okay because people had deserved it. Then I was experiencing the emotional impact it had on other people. I felt their pain. I felt the shock on them…. I felt like I was a failure as a person and I wasn’t the person I thought I was…. I felt really dreadful and it was completely humiliating…. This being that was with me was … sending me comforting messages—thank goodness! (Parnia, 2013, p. 133, emphasis added)

Following the empathetic life review and once he recovered, Steve reportedly became “a caring, truthful, and positive person” (p. 134). So Tom’s empathetic experience and transformation were not unique.

Such life review experiences of another’s consciousness—indeed, of adopting another’s identity—takes “empathy,” “perspective-taking” and “social decentration” beyond the normal ken of Hoffman and Kohlberg! Adam Smith (1759/1965) was writing in a subjective, phenomenological vein when he defined empathy as experiencing another’s emotion through “enter[ing], as it were, into [his] body” and becoming “in some measure the same person with him” (p. 261, emphases added). Tom’s empathetic life review was similar to Steve’s in the passage quoted above. Tom not only “had empathy for” or “took the perspective of” his Aunt Gay seeing the would-be flowers chopped down, or of the baggage handler ignorantly handling his bicycle, or of the man in the street slapping him; instead, he was Aunt Gay, was the baggage handler, was the man in the street! Yet at the same time, he was also still his own self at the time, as well as his older self viewing the scene from a decentered or third-person perspective (cf. Steve’s reference to a “higher reality”).

This extraordinary social perspective-taking would seem to imply that in some ultimate sense, ideal justice or moral reciprocity is not successfully violated, that the “world” in the deepest sense of the word is just after all. Furthermore, the extraordinary perspective-taking seemed to lead to moral insight and transformation. In
comprehensively reliving the flower-killing incident, for example, Tom in effect received the “perfect justice” (Lorimer, 1990, p. 13) of having to be Aunt Gay in her distress; in the final analysis, he did not “get away with” his mischief:

I was in my Aunt Gay’s body. I was in her eyes, I was in her emotions, I was in her unanswered questions. I experienced the disappointment, the humiliation. It was very devastating to me. I changed my attitude quite a bit as I experienced it. (Farr, 1993, p. 30)

Needless to say, Tom could not retain his “arrogance, … snide little thoughts [such as Operation Chop-Chop], [and] excitement [Wow, I got away with it]” (Farr, 1993, pp. 30–31)—what we would call his Self-Centered and other self-serving cognitive distortions—in that light.

Tom’s depiction of the baggage-handling incident suggests that he may have originally Assumed the Worst regarding the handler’s intentions and egocentrically personalized them (“Damn the jerk at the airport that broke my bike,” p. 31). In Tom’s empathetic life review, he saw that the handler actually “had no idea there was a bicycle in there” and “made a mistake through ignorance” but was not maliciously intending to sabotage Tom’s plans (“There was, in his life, almost no interaction with me, Tom Sawyer”). Accordingly, Tom could understand and forgive.

In the street altercation, Tom had Minimized/Mislabeled his near-killing of the man as “self-defense” and engaged in Blaming Others (“he started it”) because the man had slapped him; that action, he had felt, “instantly gave me license to annihilate this man” (Farr, 1993, p. 32). In his self-righteous or “humiliated” rage, Tom was merciless: The man “went straight back [from Tom’s blows] and hit the back of his head on the pavement. And of course I followed him right down; I broke his nose and really made a mess of his face” (p. 34). In the empathetic life review, however, Tom (like Steve) realized the truth; that is, the inadequacy of self-serving rationalizations and immature, egoistically motivated, eye-for-an-eye-and-then-some reciprocity justifications (“Okay. He hit me first. Try that in your life review!”). “The light,” recalled another life review experiencer, “could see into my mind and there was no way I could hide my thoughts” (Parnia, 2013, p. 130). As Lorimer (1990) put it, “There is a kind of spiritual nakedness as dimensions of life and truth are unfurled. Question-begging rationalizations and petty excuses are swept aside” (p. 21).

Prior to the light of this revelation, Tom had been benighted by his self-serving cognitive distortions. Although Tom was not a chronic offender or criminal, his moral and cognitive condition was in principle no different in this respect. Lorimer (1990) observed that, in the absence of an experience with the light, the “hardened criminal is willfully ignorant… [of] what he is creating” (“willfully” may be apt; McVeigh had to dismiss a moment of moral insight into the enormity of what he was about to do). Lorimer asked, “Would the terrorist or criminal really go through with an act of violence if they knew for certain that they would eventually experience the event through the consciousness of the victim?” (p. 286). (Personally, I must admit that Lorimer’s question prompts me to wish near-fatalities upon budding young criminals or
terrorists! Upon realizing the spiritual near-contradiction in this wish, I return to advocacy of the more mundane techniques for inducing social perspective-taking outlined in Chapter 8.) For severe offenders, the experience of vividly reenacting their crime from the perspective of their victim may have a profound significance. Was a glimmer of the transcendent, from darkness to light, evident in the sudden insight and sustained contrition of Larry, the adolescent child-molester?

The Dilemma of Multiple Claimants

Astonishingly, when asked what had been the “hardest thing” for her to “deal with” in her marriage with Tom, Elaine mentioned not the old Tom but the new one! Her response seems counterintuitive. Whereas Tom had previously abused, demeaned, and controlled her, after his near-death experience, he “was suddenly seeing her in a different light” (Farr, 1993, p. 98), loving her as a precious human being, a person in her own right. Recall, however, that now Tom had a humanitarian scale of love: In Elaine’s words, “He loved everybody!” Everybody was precious; to some extent, Elaine was no longer particularly special. To illustrate the problem, Elaine mentioned that when she was ill once and needed Tom to help her, he was not in a position to because he was “on the phone helping someone else” (p. 94).

Elaine’s complaint pertains to Hoffman’s dilemma of “multiple claimants” to one’s love or caring, an issue of positive or distributive justice (Damon, 1977; Eisenberg, 1982), of caveats to the ideal of impartiality or equality. It is the issue touched upon by C. S. Lewis (1943) in the opening quotation: What is the optimal balance of care among the legitimate claimants of family, nation, world? There is no easy answer. In fact, the moral exemplars studied by Colby and Damon (1992; see Chapter 6) “commonly expressed regret” (p. 68) that they had neglected their families. For Tom, it became a critical issue. Piaget or Kohlberg might have said that Tom was extending social decentration to a fault; Hoffman might say Tom was at risk for empathic over-arousal from a loss of empathic bias (Chapter 5); or we might just say that Tom in his universal love and humanitarian compassion was spreading himself too thin and neglecting the needs of his own family.

Greyson (2000b) noted that experiencers often evidence life changes of “unconditional [or agape] love” incompatible with “the conditions and limitations of human relationships. . . . The value incongruities between near-death experiencers and their families” can “lead to a relatively high divorce rate” (p. 329; cf. Christian & Holden, 2013; Noyes, Fenwick, Holden, Christian, 2009). Fortunately, the Sawyer marriage weathered the “pretty hard” times with the new Tom (Farr, 1993; T. Sawyer, personal communication, March 13, 2003).

CONCLUSION

We have explored in this chapter the relationship of moral development and behavior to a deeper reality—in Penrose’s (1994) term, an underpinning or foundation. Our exploration is not without precedent; Kohlberg claimed that moral
Beyond the Theories

inspiration is gained as one sees life from the cosmic perspective of the whole of nature. Furthermore, one sees the ethic of love and ideal reciprocity as (in C. S. Lewis's terms) clues to the meaning of the universe and its evolution. Our investigation of the near-death experience in effect corroborated such a cosmic insight: Near-death experience survivors seem to access a deeper reality wherein the “whole of nature” is “an interconnected web of creation” of which we are “interdependent strands” (Lorimer, 1990, p. 20). Although speculative (Blackmore, 1993), such a view seems indicated by Pam Reynolds's NDE-inspired suggestion that, although “everyone has a different tone,” the “beauty is in the harmony”; the St. Louis youth's experience of seeing “everything”—including the full diversity or “colors” of humanity—encompassed within the light; the instantaneous communication in the deeper realm; the social and moral emphasis in the life review, especially in “empathetic” life reviews such as Tom's bizarre participation in the consciousnesses and feelings of those whom he had hurt or helped; the dramatic shifts, following the experience, from self-centeredness and superficiality to earnest lives of other-understanding and humanitarian dedication; and Tom's conclusion that the choices we make and actions we take have a far-reaching impact.

Accordingly, we tentatively conclude with Lorimer (1990) that “human beings are connected at a deep level which is occasionally experienced by those who transcend the boundaries and limitations of ordinary perception” (p. 104). Perhaps there is a deep significance to the personal impact of our prosocial behavior: “if part of the other resides within us, if we feel one with the other, then improving their life automatically resonates within us” (de Waal, 2009, pp. 116–117). In this resonance, “the feedback of loving thoughts and actions is love and joy, while hatred and bitterness breed isolation and sorrow” (Lorimer, 1990, p. 267). If life is profoundly interrelated, if we are somehow part of each other, then to put oneself in another’s place is to experience not only the other but also part of oneself, and to help or hurt others is ultimately to help or hurt oneself. Put more ideally, acts of love may contribute to the deep flow of life, enriching one and all.
10 Conclusion

If, as some near-death experience survivors (along with an impressive assortment of mystics, poets, religious leaders, moral exemplars, and “Stage 7” thinkers) insist, each individual is in some ultimate sense integral with the whole of humanity, then we are deeply connected with two fellow human beings named Emroz and Bakhtiar:

Emroz Khan destroys for a living. He dismantles car engines, slicing them open with a sledgehammer and a crooked chisel, prying apart the cylinders, tearing out pistons, dislodging screws and bolts and throwing the metal entrails into a pile that will be sold for scrap. He is 21 and has been doing this sort of work for 10 years, 12 hours a day, six days a week, earning $1.25 a day.

His hands and arms are...stained a rich black like fresh asphalt and ribboned with scars....A bulge on his forearm [contains] a stretch of pipe he drove into his body by mistake. He cannot afford to pay a doctor to take it out.

“I’ve had it for three years,” he says.

He opens his left palm and places two fingers alongside what looks like a crease, then pulls apart the crease to reveal a two-inch gash that runs an inch deep....The raw flesh was covered with grease, like the rest of his palm and arm. The wound is two years old.

[Not far from the scrap metal shop where Emroz works is] Bakhtiar Khan, [who] began working in the pits [making bricks] when he was 10. He is now 25 or 26. He isn’t sure, because nobody keeps close track; time passes, that is all. He works from 5:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon, making 1,000 bricks a day, six days a week, earning a few dollars a week. He is thin, he wears no shirt or shoes....

The situation is worse than it appears. [Emroz and Bakhtiar] carry an invisible burden. They don’t earn enough to live on, so they must borrow....They have no hope of paying back the loans. (Maass, 2001, pp. 48 ff.)

Emroz’s and Bakhtiar’s plight exceeds that of Edward, the man whose unfair torment at a summer camp introduced us, by way of negative example, to the non-relative right and good of morality. Emroz and Bakhtiar are “young men for whom life is abuse” (Maass, 2001, p. 50). They live not in the relatively affluent West but in desperate poverty in Peshawar, Pakistan, and they represent all too many among the world’s population. They lack adequate food, clothing, and medical care. They have no way to emerge from debt. Although worse than Edward’s, their plight, too, is one of wrong and harm.

Justice and care—and their development—have defined the themes of this book. We have argued, in fact, that the right and the good, moral reciprocity and empathy, the primarily cognitive and the primarily affective, constitute the chief strands of moral development. We have emphasized the importance of distinguishing moral development from relativistic views such as that evident in Jonathan Haidt’s theoretical and empirical work. We have explored moral development, perception, and behavior in terms of justice and care through the theories of
Lawrence Kohlberg and Martin Hoffman. Especially, we have explored Kohlberg’s
and Hoffman’s thesis that children grow beyond the superficial in moral knowing
and feeling at least partly by taking into account the perspectives and situations of
others. We introduced existential development as part of a new view of Kohlberg’s
theoretical approach and championed “primary” cognitive motivation in our cri-
tique of Hoffman’s theory. Furthermore, we found that both theories needed cer-
tain elaborations in their application to social behavior. In particular, we elaborated
on moral identity in exemplary prosocial behavior and on self-serving cognitive
distortion and social skill deficiencies in chronic antisocial behavior. We identified
an affect-regulating, goal-oriented ability that serves either prosocial or antiso-
cial behavior; namely, ego strength. Finally, we explored the question of a deeper
reality to the moral life, an exploration that brought new meaning to “taking the
perspectives of others” and “growing beyond the superficial.”

Superficial levels of perception do contribute to morality. Think of the wrong
and harm endured by Emroz and Bakhtiar. Most observers, young and old, would
sense a wrong and respond empathically to their highly salient signs of distress: the
metal-induced bulge in Emroz’s forearm, his scars, his open gash of raw flesh; and
Bakhtiar’s gaunt appearance, his lack of shirt or shoes. Such sights would surely
activate at least the automatic, involuntary modes of empathic arousal described
by Hoffman. Were Emroz and Bakhtiar still children, young observers’ empathic
distress for them would be all the more intense, according to the similarity bias
also described by Hoffman.

Young children would be less likely, however, to imagine themselves in the life
conditions of Emroz and Bakhtiar or to understand the deeper and broader con-
text of their injustice. As Peter Maass (2001) noted, Emroz’s and Bakhtiar’s situ-
atation is even worse than it appears. These men’s plight includes an intangible or
“invisible”—and deeply unfair—burden of labor abuse, of hopelessly indebted serv-
vitude. Their crushing debt is not unlike that of the nations where they and others
with similar plights were born.

With cognitive and language development, expanding social interaction, reflec-
tion, and moral socialization, children—while still responding to direct or pic-
tured signs of the distress of similar others—tend to grow beyond the superficial.
They grow especially through social perspective-taking, leading at least potentially
to a deeper understanding of and feeling for others’ plights. And out of that under-
standing and feeling, one hopes, they act.

The Canadian activist Craig Kielburger is in Colby and Damon’s terms (1992;
see Chapter 6) a moral exemplar. Kielburger (1998) reflected on what drove him,
one morning when he was 12 years old, to found his youth-run, now-international
anti–child labor organization Free the Children. “Staring back at” Craig that morn-
ing before school was a front-page newspaper headline (“Battled Child Labor, Boy,
12, Murdered”) and photo of a boy his age who had been murdered in Muridke,
Pakistan, after crusading against child-labor abuses. “It was a jolt.” Craig started
reading the accompanying article, “hardly believing the words.” The murdered cru-
sader had known the problem of child-labor abuse well: His own parents had sold
him into slavery when he was four years old. Until he was freed and his crusade
began at age 10, he had been shackled many hours each day to a carpet-weaving
loom, “tying tiny knots hour after hour.” Craig was shocked. “What kind of parents would sell their child into slavery at four years of age? And who would ever chain a child to a carpet loom?” he asked himself.

After school that day, Craig researched the problem of child-labor abuse at a library. Once home, he found that images of child labour had imbedded themselves in my mind: children younger than me forced to make carpets for endless hours in dimly lit rooms; others toiling in underground pits, struggling to get coal to the surface; others maimed or killed by explosions raging through fireworks factories…. I was angry at the world for letting these things happen to children. Why was nothing being done to stop such cruelty?

That evening I had great difficulty concentrating on my homework…. For some reason these descriptions of child labour had moved me like no other story of injustice…. Perhaps it was because the stories were of people my own age, and many even younger. Perhaps it was because these few words had shattered my ideas of what childhood was all about—school, friends, time to play. I had work to do around my house—carrying out the garbage, cleaning up the backyard—but it all seemed so trivial compared to what these children had to do…. I thought how I would react if I found myself in their place….

As I walked through my middle-class neighborhood, my thoughts were on the other side of the world. And my own world seemed a shade darker…. Do all children, even the poorest of the poor, have the right to go to school? Are all children created equal? If child labour is not acceptable for white, middle-class North American kids, then why is it acceptable for a girl in Thailand or a boy in Brazil? (Kielburger, 1998, pp. 7–8, 12, 297)

“We never quite know,” Robert Coles (1986) once observed, “how an event will connect with ourselves” (p. 29). Craig’s imaginal perspective-taking, empathic anger, and sense of global injustice upon his discovery of child-labor abuse connected with his self-perception and motivation to act. Specifically, the event connected with what he could and could not see himself doing. He reflected, “You begin to believe so deeply in a [moral] cause that you can’t see yourself just standing on the sidelines, waiting for other people to act” (Kielburger, 1998, p. 12, emphasis added; cf. Kielburger & Kielburger, 2006). Craig’s moral perception and goals became so relevant to his self-schema that his identity became, in crucial respects, a moral identity, adding its own power to his moral motivation from the right and the good. Kielburger’s and similar activist organizations have done much to fight against child labor or slavery, promote education and enterprise, and encourage debt relief for impoverished nations.

In this final chapter, we conclude our use of Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories to explore the development of moral perception and behavior; we will close with some final thoughts on moral development and reality. To conclude our case for co-primacy in moral motivation, we relate these theories to the differing motivational properties of fundamentally distinct categories of knowledge. In that light, we see that Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories of the right and the good, respectively, are complementary if not integrable. Finally, beyond the theories, we conclude our use of the near-death experience to explore a love and deep connection that may underlie moral insight and transformation.
Imagine for a moment that the theoretical vehicles of our exploration are tour buses. We are at this moment student tourists, with Kohlberg and Hoffman or Haidt as our prospective guides. Each man is offering an educational tour of the land of moral motivation; in particular, the landscape (or mindscape?) of Craig Kielburger’s moral moment that morning in Toronto. We are intrigued by Haidt’s guided tour program, but we pass by his bus in favor of Hoffman’s and Kohlberg’s. Although Haidt’s guided tour would take us to more sites (we have heard that his commentary on evolutionary foundations, social intuitions, and diverse cultures is very stimulating and make a note to take his tour some time), Hoffman’s and Kohlberg’s are more central to moral motivation and more directly relevant to Craig’s mindscape that morning. So Hoffman and Kohlberg will be our main guides in our moral developmental exploration.

Whether we take Hoffman’s or Kohlberg’s tour first does not really matter, as long as we eventually take both tours. Which tour we take first does affect which site we visit first. Hoffman might take us first to Craig’s involuntary and sudden “jolt” of empathic distress at seeing the picture of a boy his age who had been murdered. After all, for Hoffman, the empathic predisposition is still the primary factor in moral motivation. Kohlberg might take us first to Craig’s shock at the headline and article, at the scarcely believable unfairness of a parent’s or businessman’s so severely exploiting a child. After all, for Kohlberg, the violation or affirmation of ideals of justice is primary in moral motivation.

Were we but casual students, either tour would suffice. After all, we would learn much either way, and each guide would also take us to the (in their view) non-primary site. Nor would our wait be long; the two sites are so near each other and so functionally interrelated that they are nearly one and the same place. But we are in fact not so casual; we seek a fully adequate understanding, and for that we shall require the complementary wisdom of our two guides, their collective expertise. So we take both tours. We learn from Hoffman much of empathic motivation and how exploitation or non-reciprocity (or other cognition) transforms and mediates empathic distress. It is mainly from Kohlberg (or his senior partner Jean Piaget), however, that we learn how knowledge of a reciprocity violation can in, its own right, motivate action. With only Hoffman’s tour (especially its earlier version), we would miss what is special, what is irreducible, what is dynamic and motivating in their own right about structures of logic, consistency, and justice or moral reciprocity. Yet if we take only Kohlberg’s tour, although we would learn much of such motivating structures, we would miss learning about the empathic predisposition, its development and limitations, and its role in the moral internalization of norms of caring. Finally, to learn more about how the event led to Craig’s subsequent moral identity—or, more broadly, about moral identity and consistency with self (see Chapter 6), another can’t-be-missed site in moral motivation—we might seek an extended tour from Anne Colby and William Damon.
The Good, the Right, and Categories of Knowledge

Review our chapters and consider the following statements of knowledge concerning morality, conservation, and mathematics:

♦ Craig Kielburger encountered news of a child crusader’s murder in the *Toronto Star*. He was jolted in part by reading the headline and seeing from the photo that the victim was a boy his own age.

♦ A White student rescued an African-American student from imminent attack by fellow White segregationists in Atlanta, Georgia. The White student knew that he had joined in tormenting the student. That knowledge combined with empathic distress for the victim to create a feeling of guilt. As the rescuer broke up the imminent attack, he blurted out an apology.

♦ The norm of reciprocity, that you should return a kindness, is taught and internalized in many societies.

♦ In a discipline encounter, parents may use other-oriented inductions (proscribing harm to others and prescribing prosocial behavior). Such messages, particularly when the victim’s suffering is salient, can elicit in the child empathic distress and guilt. Infused with such empathic distress, the inductive information thereby becomes “hot” enough to prevail against egoistic motives and motivate prosocial behavior or inhibit antisocial behavior. The child may internalize or appropriate the induction, attributing to himself or herself its origin.

♦ Through social interaction, children actively construct schemas, which encompass affectively charged scripts or heuristics of knowledge such as, “Acting in that way can harm others.”

♦ Water is often the liquid used to fill the containers in the “conservation of quantity” task. The amounts of water are the same in the first comparison of the task but appear to be different in the second comparison.

♦ Different notations can be used in the addition and subtraction of numbers.

Much could be said about the above statements, but for our present purposes, one question is paramount: What do they have in common? Can they all fit under a common rubric, a basic category of knowledge? Especially, are they all distinguishable in some fundamental way from the following statements of knowledge concerning morality, conservation, and mathematics?

♦ It is wrong for one person to exploit another. Seeing or experiencing exploitation tends to motivate an effort to right the wrong.

♦ Bad things should not happen to good people. Those who see themselves as “good” and whose social perspective-taking is generally veridical may feel distress if they do an obviously bad thing to a good person. Also, the appreciation of a good person who remains above the level of trading insults can promote depth or maturity of moral perception (the White student in Atlanta began to see not a “nigger” but a fellow human being).
Through social interaction (social perspective-taking and coordinating), children actively construct schemas, including stages of moral judgment (especially moral reciprocity). At the core of the mature stages is ideal moral reciprocity; namely, that one should take into account others’ perspectives in how one treats others.

A quantity that undergoes neither addition nor subtraction is conserved (or better, “\(x + 0 - 0 = x\)”). Apparent logical violations, contradictions, or inconsistencies can be distressing and can motivate efforts to resolve, explain, or correct.

The combination of two actual quantities is greater than either of the original quantities (in one notation, “\(1 + 1 = 2\)”).

What do these latter instances of knowledge have in common? Can they all fit (more or less) under a common rubric, a basic category of knowledge? Are they all distinguishable in some fundamental way from the first set of statements listed? Obviously, they are more generally formulated than was the first set of statements, but is that all that can be said? Piaget (e.g., Piaget, 1967/1971) and Kohlberg would have claimed that the two sets of statements represent two fundamental and crucially distinct categories of knowledge; namely, “empirical” and “logico-mathematical,” respectively. Under the latter rubric fit not only logic and mathematics but also the kindred themes of justice, reciprocity, or equality; balance or proportion; and consistency, harmony, or non-contradiction.

Logical Ideals, Moral Ideals, and Adaptation

Piaget (1967/1971) suggested that obligatory ideals of logical or moral consistency and necessity suggest the need for a “penetrating analysis”—certainly more penetrating than analyses based entirely on pragmatics, utility, and survival—of evolutionary processes of adaptation:

A precise application of logic presupposes, among other things, the constant obligation not to contradict….Lack of intellectual honesty may be of a certain practical use (it is usually more convenient to be able to contradict oneself)…. [Yet] when scruples about truth finally triumph, it is certainly not because there has been competition or selection in terms of utility alone but rather because of certain choices dictated by the internal organization of thought…. The victory of one idea over another depends, in the final analysis, on the [logical] truth contained in it…. Factors of utility and survival would have led only to intellectual instruments of a crudely approximate kind, loosely sufficient for the life of the species and its individual members, [but] never [directly] to that precision and, above all, that intrinsic necessity which demand a much more penetrating explanation of adaptation. (Piaget, 1967/1971, p. 274)

As we saw, logical-moral ideals such as “intellectual honesty” or “scruples about truth” receive short shrift in Haidt’s (2012) new synthesis (Chapter 2). Haidt’s pragmatic perspective champions precisely the sort of evolutionary account that Piaget rejected as inadequate to account for the precision, non-contradiction, and intrinsic necessity of logico-mathematical knowledge. If Piaget’s critique is valid, then Haidt’s theory is seriously limited in this respect. In David Moshman’s
(2011) terms, Haidt’s perspective reduces reasoning or knowledge to “thinking”: “Whereas thinking generally aims at success, reasoning serves understanding, morality, and truth” (p. 193, emphasis added).

Once we affirm logical-moral ideals such as intellectual honesty, consistency or non-hypocrisy, and scruples about truth, how do we account for their emergence in phylogenetic history? How might we have evolved in our mental functioning from “convenient” pragmatic thinking to moral, mathematical, and scientific reasoning—from the empirical to the logico-mathematical category of knowledge as well? As physicist Paul Davies (1992) put the question: If “our brains have evolved in response to environmental pressures, such as the ability to hunt, avoid predators, dodge falling objects, etc., what has this got to do with discovering the laws of electromagnetism or the structure of the atom?” (p. 149).

Beyond humans’ hunting ability, survival skills, and attendant thinking so functional for pragmatic success, counting ability may have led to reasoning, necessary truth, and logico-mathematical vehicles for scientific discovery. Singer (1981) suggested an evolutionary pathway whereby counting activity in the context of environmental pressures not only conferred survival advantages but also led beyond pragmatic utility:

It is said that if four hunters go into a thicket and only three come out, baboons will keep away…baboons who can count a little may sometimes survive when less gifted baboons perish. The ability to count may have conferred a similar advantage on our own ancestors….Long before writing developed, people made permanent records of their counting by cutting notches on a stick or stringing shells on twine. They had no idea that they had stepped on an escalator of reasoning that leads by strictly logical steps to square roots, prime numbers, and the differential calculus. (Singer, 1981, p. 89; emphasis added)

Thereby constructed, then, was a “level of thought removed from the physical needs of ordinary people” (p. 90), a level that Piaget described as formal operations. Penrose (1994) argued that such reasoning and experimentation have enabled us to discover “a profound mathematical substructure…hidden in the very workings of the world” (p. 415).

As we asked in Chapter 9, might this substructure entail not only logico-mathematical but also moral truth? “Everyone is aware of the kinship between logical and ethical [ideals],” wrote Piaget (1932/1965). “Logic is the morality of thought just as morality is the logic of [social] action” (p. 398). And this logic-related category of morality is in turn intimately related to the empirical category in a way that we have termed, in the context of moral motivation, co-primacy.

Although intimately interrelated, the two categories are distinguishable. We cannot adequately address the issue of moral motivation (or, for that matter, the issue of whether Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories are integrable) unless we grasp this crucial distinction between empirical and logico-mathematical knowledge. So let us revisit the issue of moral motivation through this epistemological exploration. The two categories of knowledge differ in at least three major ways: (a) chance versus necessity, (b) internalization versus construction in the Piagetian sense, and (c) “external” versus “internal” motivation.
1. Chance Versus Necessity

Perhaps the most readily evident distinction between the categories pertains to chance versus necessity. Whereas empirical knowledge happens by chance to be true, logico-mathematical knowledge must be true; it could not be otherwise. It happened to be true that Craig was reading the Toronto Star or that the rescue took place in Atlanta. For that matter, it is true that the liquid in a conservation task was water and that addition can be accomplished in the base 10 system. Those truths could have been otherwise, however. Although less likely, Craig might have been reading the Columbus Dispatch, or the rescue might have taken place in Birmingham. The liquid in the conservation task might have been lemonade, and addition can be done in base 2.

Consider, in contrast, the truths of the second category. Is it ever right (without adding premises) for one person to exploit another or for bad things to happen to good people? Or, for that matter, is it even possible for \( x + 0 = x \) to equal something other than \( x \) (cf. conservation), or for \( 1 + 1 = 2 \)? These latter truths are necessary; although they can be violated in certain respects, they remain true. They are necessarily true (Laupa, 2000; Miller et al., 2000). Unlike the younger child’s continued perceptual judgments in the conservation tasks, the older child’s logical judgment “appears to have a necessity to it that removes it from the sphere of matters requiring empirical verification” (Brown, 1965, p. 201).

2. Internalization Versus Construction in the Piagetian Sense

The happenstance facts of empirical knowledge constitute information abstracted from “objects as such…that is, the experience of external objects or of whatever appertains to them” (Piaget, 1967/1971, p. 266). It is knowledge of the empirical world, the world of liquids, containers, and appearances, of photos, newspapers, and events—even of cities, cultural norms, and conventions of notations. Haidt’s (2012) claim that “cognition just refers to information processing” (p. 44, emphasis added) restricts knowledge to cognition of the empirical world. Surely cognition refers as well to knowledge “of numbers and mathematics. They [numbers and mathematics] can hardly be said to be derived or abstracted from empirical experience;” after all, “where in experience do we find empirical instances of…the square root of minus two?” (Carr, 1991, p. 39). Whereas empirical knowledge is abstracted or internalized, logico-mathematical knowledge is constructed.

The epistemological meaning of “construction” is elusive. In a broad sense, the abstraction or acquisition of empirical or contingent knowledge can be depicted as a process of “construction.” After all, “to construct” means simply “to build.” The child can be said to build schemas through interaction with the environment (cf. Neisser, 1976). This interaction might even be described à la Piaget as an assimilation-accommodation interplay, involving the activation of schemas that are then refined or built up by accommodation of new information from the environment. For example, over the course of moral socialization, the child’s causal schemas build in a moral dimension to become something like, “My actions
can harm others” (Hoffman, 2000). That such schemas can be called “scripts” of generic events, however, connotes their empirical character. Such knowledge has been inductively abstracted from the given empirical world of social interaction, perhaps from among the norms of a particular culture. Although construction even in the broad sense is helpful to remind us of the active child (whose acquisitions do not purely copy environmental events or elements), one would not lose much accuracy in stating rather that the child acquires or internalizes scripts (or, for that matter, inductive teaching) from patterns in the prior givens of the empirical world. Hoffman (1983) wrote that the problem of moral socialization is that of how an “initially external” prescriptive norm becomes internalized or self-attributed (p. 236). Moral reciprocity is interesting in that it is both a norm that is in many societies taught and internalized and an ideal that is constructed (in Piaget’s more specific sense of the term) through social interaction.

Let us elaborate on this Piagetian sense of “construction.” As we discussed in Chapter 3, “construction,” as in the construction of an ideal, can have a special meaning. In a classic series of experiments with dyads of preconservational children, for example, two conflicting “wrongs” (a quantity is now greater vs. a quantity is now less) in effect made a “right” (a quantity is conserved). Although the epistemology of conservation knowledge is a major topic in its own right, one thing is certain in these experiments: The children did not acquire the right answer from each other (they both started with wrong answers), from the experimenter (who refrained from modeling an answer), or from some other source of information in the environment. Nor was the knowledge inborn or innate (Moshman, 2011). Rather, they constructed the knowledge through a dialectic of thesis and antithesis, a mental coordination or equilibration of opposing centractions on partial features. Analogously, although justice (in the form of ideal reciprocity) can and should be socialized as a cultural norm, it also tends naturally to be constructed as an “ideal [and necessary] equilibrium…born of the actions and reactions of individuals upon each other” (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 318; again, see Chapter 3). Piaget (1965/1971) argued that logico-mathematical and related knowledge is neither invented, nor internalized, nor discovered, but rather constructed (following the “bursting” of instinctual programming and the emergence of “complete rather than approximate reversibility” in humans) from the “general coordinations of action” of the living system (pp. 366–367). Construction in this special sense is not reducible to internalization.

### 3. External Versus Internal Motivation

Whether empirical or logical or whether pertaining to the good or the right, knowledge can imply obligation. We may experience an obligation (or, more loosely, a moral motivation) to help others, just as we may experience such a motivation to right a wrong. And of course, moral motivation in either case may or may not prevail against egoistic motives in a particular individual in a particular situation.

Yet there is a crucial epistemological difference in moral motivation between the good and the right. In the former case, knowledge concerning beneficence per se is inert; the cognition per se entails no inherent property of motivation.
Such information (an inductive message, causal attribution, script, heuristic, etc.) motivates only insofar as it is infused, charged, or rendered hot by an affect such as empathic distress (cf. classical conditioning). Accordingly, Hoffman’s theory champions the empathic predisposition as the basic “infuser” of knowledge with moral motivation (affective primacy). As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, Haidt’s affective primacy theory posits other such “infusers” (purity, loyalty, authority, even justice).

In contrast, in the case of the right, the motivation is in some sense inherent or internal to the exploratory or “eff ectance” motive, which eventually leads, with expanding working memory and experience, to the coordination of perspectives or relations and the construction of “necessary” logico-mathematical knowledge. Decades ago, Leon Festinger (1957) argued that “the existence of nonfitting relations among cognitions [or cognitive dissonance] is a motivating factor in its own right” (p. 143); inconsistency or dissonance intrinsically motivates efforts to reduce inconsistency. “Cognitive primacy in motivation” means that “the recognition of inconsistency comes first, and the feeling that this [inconsistency] should be avoided [or reduced] follows from it” (Singer, 1981, p. 142, emphases added). In other words, the feeling to avoid or correct an inconsistency partly “derives [in the first place] from our capacity . . . to recognize [the] inconsistency” (p. 142, emphasis added) or logical contradiction. As we saw in Chapter 3, violations of necessity—of reciprocity, logical consistency, condition of reversibility—tend to generate in their own right an affect of distress and a motivation to explain, resolve, or correct.

There need be no delay in action from primary cognition of this category. That the motivation to right a wrong or correct a logical violation can spur action quickly is suggested by the Atlanta youth’s sudden intervention or the promptness with which a conservation-judging child typically justifies a conservation evaluation (Brown, 1965). Thus, the emphases of Haidt and other non-developmental theorists (e.g., Krebs & Denton, 2005) notwithstanding, established rational judgments of logic or justice can and do participate in the “quick” or “hot” response system.

We have labeled these positions, respectively, affective primacy and cognitive primacy in moral motivation. In philosophical terms, the issue is in general terms that of deontology versus utilitarianism, and, in particular, that of whether motivation is external or internal to obligatory knowledge (Frankena, 1958; Straughan, 1983; see Wren, 1991). The external associationism of affective primacy means that knowledge is secondary in the sense that it is motivationally dependent on some prior force. In contrast, the internal pull of cognitive primacy means the affect is secondary in the sense that it owes its very existence to the knowledge that a “necessary” truth or ideal has been violated. Hoffman (2000) pointed out that the latter motivation can be de-confounded from the former when a good thing happens to a bad person: Empathy is generally not generated in such a case, yet we still feel some moral motivation (to correct the violation).

“External” or extrinsic (primarily affective) and “internal” or intrinsic (primarily cognitive) sources of moral motivation typically cohere and jointly motivate. Indeed, in the usual ecology of the moral life, they are difficult to disentangle. Some confluence of empathic and violation-of-fairness distresses seemed to motivate Craig as well as the Atlanta rescuer, for example. Moreover, the guilt that
prompted the Atlanta rescuer to blurt out an apology was attributed in our view not only to the affective charge of his self-attribution (he had joined in the tormenting), but also to a consistency violation (his prior behavior contradicted not only fairness but also his putative self-schema as one who does not unjustifiably harm others). Our epistemological analysis has led to support, then, for co-primacy in moral motivation.

So Are Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s Theories Integrable?

The logical and the empirical are intimately interrelated. For example, the logic of imaginary numbers is “at the very foundational structure of the actual physical world in which we live” (Penrose, 1994, p. 256; emphasis added). And in the other direction, empirical statements refer to the logical sooner or later. (I found it difficult to craft the first set of statements above without making even implicit reference to fairness, logic, or consistency.) Yet as noted, for all their intimacy, the two categories of knowledge remain fundamentally distinct. The categories are not integrable (at least not in the sense that happenstance could acquire an intrinsic necessity or that necessity could ever reduce to happenstance).

This point corresponds to the mutual irreducibility of the right and the good (as discussed in Chapter 1) and bears a major implication for the corresponding theories of moral development. Are Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories integrable? Well, no. They are as mutually irreducible as are the right and the good, the logical and the empirical. Do the theories complement one another? We hope that the answer to that question is at this point clear: Yes, they intimately interrelate and complement each other quite nicely. Like the right and the good for morality, Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories need to be taken together for a comprehensive understanding of basic moral development. Furthermore, despite its limitations, Haidt’s theory can play a role in a comprehensive understanding of the development, socialization across cultures, and behavioral expression of moral (as well as “moralized”) evaluations and feelings.

We end this study of morality and epistemology with a section regarding its implications for moral ontology; that is, moral development and reality. Our concluding section will clearly take us beyond skeptical views that see “no reason to think that our current sense of right and wrong would reflect any deeper understanding about the nature of reality” (Harris, 2010, p. 50). Haidt (2012) doubted that moral truths “actually exist, like mathematical truths, sitting on a cosmic shelf next to the Pythagorean theorem just waiting to be discovered by Platonic reasoners” (p. 32). Pinker (2011), too, doubted (less playfully) the claim “that moral truths are out there somewhere for us to discover, just as we discover the truths of science and mathematics” (p. 694). Yet Pinker also suggested that “the principle behind the Golden Rule and its equivalents”—namely, “the interchangeability of perspectives”—has “been rediscovered in so many moral traditions.” The repeated discovery pertains to an

*aspect of reality* that informs our conceptions of morality and purpose…. Our cognitive processes have been struggling with these *aspects of reality* over the course of our
history, just as they have struggled with the laws of logic and geometry.” (pp. 694–695, emphases added)

Relatedly, Roger Brown (1965) suggested that to infer conservation is to “transcend immediate perception” and “discover a deeper reality” (p. 222, emphasis added). Piaget’s emphasis on construction notwithstanding, discovery may indeed also be involved in the inference of necessary, internally motivating knowledge. Did the sudden moral perception and action of Craig Kielburger or the Atlanta youth also represent, in effect, the discovery of a deeper reality? Might we discover or resonate with a deeper reality that pertains not only to logic and mathematics but also to the interchangeability of perspectives—indeed, to love and connection?

**Moral Perception and Reality**

Our phenomenally local world is in actuality supported by an invisible reality [of non-local connection] which is unmediated, unmitigated, and faster than light. (Herbert, 1985, p. 227)

Reality involves a paradox. Although the objects of this world interrelate, their connections are “local” (i.e., mediated, mitigated, and temporal). Electromagnetism and other forces that connect the parts of this world are mediated (through field waves or particles). They mitigate (i.e., weaken with distance from one another) and take time (albeit often infinitesimal). Yet one implication of mathematical and experimental work deriving in part from certain predictions of quantum mechanics (Aspect & Grangier, 1986; Bell, 1966; Bouwmeester et al., 1997) is that our world of “local” events and connections that mitigate across time and space—the train whistle’s sound waves take time to reach our ears, growing faint as the waves travel—is somehow supported by a totally different, non-local reality. This supportive reality is one of immediate connections or relations, a realm that mathematical physicist Roger Penrose calls “profound, timeless, and universal” (Penrose, 1994, p. 413). Is it not surprising and even paradoxical that this profound reality of non-local connection supports—even though it contradicts—our phenomenally local world of mediated connections? The parts of our underlying, subatomic reality are interconnected, even interpenetrative: “The mechanism for this instant connectedness is not some invisible [classical] field that stretches from one part to the next, but the fact that a bit of each part’s ‘being’ is lodged in the other” (Herbert, 1985, p. 223).

Physical reality’s ontological paradox—mediated connections between separate parts of the phenomenal world somehow supported by immediate connectedness—perhaps pertains as well to human social and moral reality. Are we humans—despite our individuality—deeply connected? It would certainly seem nonsensical to say that a bit of each human being is somehow lodged in others, that an affluent Westerner is somehow deeply connected with an Emroz or a Bakhtiar, living in crushing poverty in Pakistan halfway around the world. Even in largely collectivist cultures such as Pakistan’s, each individual is separate: Although we socially decenter and feel emotionally close to others or integral...
with the group (socialization or enculturation, resulting in group solidarity and identity), we do also differentiate ourselves as separate and independent individuals:

It seems obvious and fundamental that the human brain and its associated cognitive structures guarantee at the very least that all humans are aware of the continuous kinesthetic sensations from their own bodies. This continuing kinesthetic awareness not only provides infants with an early sense of separation of self from other . . . but also continues past infancy to ensure a certain minimum of separation of self from others through a person's life . . . It should therefore be impossible for an adult with a normal brain to feel that his or her self is merged with others. (Hoffman, 2000, p. 276, emphases added)

Moreover, throughout life we remain egocentrically biased at least to some extent and engage to varying degrees in self-centered and self-serving cognitive distortions. Hence the importance of self-corrective and social skills (as discussed in Chapter 8), as well as cultural support for social perspective-taking and mature moral judgment (as discussed in Chapter 3).

And is not our world of separate individuals one of mediated interactions, processes, and effects? Whether the emphasis is on justice or empathy, the point remains: Moral development, perception, and behavior normally take place over time through mediating processes (neural, maturational, social perspective-taking). Even sudden moral acts take place in time and are often “primed” by earlier real-time attributions, inferences, and other empirical and logical schemas (as we saw in the Atlanta rescue). And empathic distress generally mitigates or weakens where the distressed other is different, a stranger, or distant in location or history (empathic bias, gradient of caring).

It would appear that the locality of this phenomenal world does impose some practical moral constraints. Although Hoffman stresses the need to reduce egoistic motives and empathic bias through socialization and education, he also notes a “virtue” of empathic bias: It does afford a kind of protection. Were we to empathize equally with everyone, with no gradient of caring, we might affectively overload (empathic over-arousal) and would chronically experience the paralysis and agony of not knowing whom to help first. We would be victims of the so-called multiple-claimants dilemma.

Common-sense observations and practical constraints notwithstanding, let us consider the possibility that our ostensible human state of individual separation and local effects belies a deeper interconnectedness. Does not our phenomenally local world sometimes hint of something deeper? Consider, for example, that “the way our bodies—including voice, mood, posture, and so on—are influenced by surrounding bodies is one of the mysteries of our existence” (de Waal, 2009, p. 63). Perhaps such influence serves “infants' fundamental motive for connectedness” (Davidov, Zahn-Waxler, Roth-Hanania, & Kjnafo, 2013, p. 128). Perhaps, just as justice presupposes caring (Frankena, 1973), individuality presupposes relatedness. Is morality ultimately love and connection? Although Kohlberg's and Hoffman's generally are local theories, Kohlberg did go beyond his own six-stage theory to claim that some reach a holistic perspective (his metaphorical “Stage 7”). In that ultimate “stage” of moral development, as we have seen, the existentially
anguished soul-searcher morally revives after seeing human life from the perspective of the cosmos or the “whole of nature.”

Relevant to a realm that supports yet contradicts ordinary human experience is the near-death experience (Chapter 9). This remarkable phenomenon may have enormous implications for our understanding of “the relationship between the mind and the brain, the possible nature of consciousness, and even the nature of reality itself” (Parnia, 2006, p. 97). The experience often has a major impact upon the experiencer. CHERIE SUTHERLAND (1992) suggested that “the experiencer has undergone an ontological shift” (p. 193), having encountered to some extent in an anomalous deeper reality. Certainly, the near-death experience is rife with (for the local realm) bizarre anomalies: seeing despite closed eyelids, observing one’s own three-dimensional body, moving through a tunnel that’s not actually a tunnel, seeing a blinding light that does not blind, encountering love beyond earthly description, meeting dead-yet-alive loved ones, speaking without audibly speaking, hearing without audibly hearing, communicating instantaneously, experiencing oneself as another, and so forth. Near-death experiencers’ continuing surprise, puzzlement, and difficulties in conveying their experience stem in part from such violations in their ordinary anticipations of, or schemas for, reality (GIBBS, 1997).

Like anyone, these persons can only process and describe their experience through the personal and cultural schemas they bring to the encounter. Yet to adapt, they must not experience only what they can anticipate, make ready sense of, or control (highly controlling individuals may have frightening near-death experiences). Beyond assimilating, they must somehow accommodate to the bizarre anomalies—even if the resulting disequilibration is severe. Finally, they must resist the temptation either to over-assimilate (i.e., to misperceive or minimize as ordinary the ontological challenges of their experience) or to over-accommodate (i.e., to change so radically as to lose any sense of continuity with their erstwhile identity and life contexts).

One can scarcely assimilate and accommodate to these anomalies adaptively without some disequilibration and reequilibration, some transformation of life and worldview. Somehow, “meaning has to be re-created, renegotiated within the context of this changed worldview” (Sutherland, 1992, p. 193). Sutherland discussed the social and personal aspects of typical renegotiations of meaning in this disequilibration–reequilibration process.

Certain anomalies of the near-death experience especially suggest that we phenomenally separate humans can nonetheless partake of non-local (instantaneous, unmediated, unmitigated) connection and perception under certain extraordinary conditions or circumstances. Pam Reynolds reported that, in her comprehensive near-death experience, she felt “a sense of harmony or unity with the universe” (cf. Kohlberg’s Stage 7 “cosmic perspective”) and that “everything seemed to be happening all at once” (unpublished data, Sabom, November 3, 2001). In Thomas Sawyer’s transcendent near-death experience, the light

instantly began communicating with me…emanating to me, thought-pattern to thought-pattern…. It was pure communicating that was complete in every respect…. As
I thought of and formulated a desire or a question, it would already have been recognized, acknowledged, and therefore answered…. The dialogue… took place in no time. (Farr, 1993, p. 28)

By “pure” communicating, Tom seems to refer to an interaction that is neither mediated nor sequential in time (at the point of asking or even intending to ask, questions have already been answered)—and yet, by definition, communicating entails causal signals propagated in time. That Tom must in effect reduce non-local phenomena to local language (e.g., “communicating”) perhaps accounts for his expressive frustrations. In any event, Tom not only engaged in this “pure” interaction but even “became” other interactors in his empathetic life review. Relatedly, another experiencer recollected: “I not only saw everything from my own point of view, but I also knew the thoughts of everybody who’d been involved in these events, as if their thoughts were lodged inside me” (van Lommel, 2010, p. 36). Thanks perhaps to such bizarre convergences, Tom saw his self-serving or “local” excuses for acts such as assault to be benighted and utterly futile: “OK. He hit me first. Try that in your life review!” (see Chapter 9).

So perhaps, in some ultimate sense, some aspect of each of us is lodged in others. Perhaps, on some fundamental level, we are not so separate and independent after all. Consider that “the very atoms of our bodies are woven out of a common superluminal fabric” (Herbert, 1985, p. 250). By extension, then, could our phenomenally local world of individual persons be supported by a reality of connection and commonality? Could not such an insight foster existential and spiritual growth beyond the superficial? In Tom’s empathetic life review, as noted, he deeply connected with, even “became” others: the drunk man he assaulted and nearly killed, the shocked and bewildered Aunt Gay, the well-meaning airport baggage-handler he had hated but had never actually met, and so forth. Connection and commonality were also evident in the life-transforming experience of James, the St. Louis youth who saw racial distinctions of color as superficial and contained within the loving light he encountered. Connection and commonality certainly characterized the experience of Pam Reynolds, for whom figures of loved ones formed in the light, and who saw in the different “tones” of human individuality the potential for social harmony.

What about social harmony not only for different individuals but for diverse cultures? Haidt (2012) may be correct in his suspicion that a world without borders “would quickly descend into hell” (p. 307). We need not attempt to eliminate borders and diverse cultures, however, to promote a broad awareness of interconnected spirituality—and thereby to encourage “cross-cultural understanding and dialogue” (Long, 2010, pp. 3, 150–151; cf. Parnia, 2013). Would not such an awareness, understanding, and dialogue help us “to move beyond moral parochialism,” to “expand morality’s reach” (de Waal, 2013, p. 235)? Indeed, the implications of modern physics, the near-death experience, and commonalities of mystical experience could be used as the “empirical soil” for a new ethic of connection—specifically, of profound love and universalized ideal reciprocity (Lorimer, 1990, p. 1). Such an ethic would encourage cultivation of what Robert Enright has called “the forgiving life” (Enright, 2012). Supporting a new ethic of connection, physicist Henry P. Stapp (2006) suggested that “non-local connectedness… opens the
way to the construction of science-based ethical theories” that emphasize each person’s “deep connectedness to the community of human beings, and to nature itself” (pp. 619–620). David Fontana (2004) urged the replacement of our materialist “philosophy of separation” with a “recognition of the interconnectedness of all things” (p. 158). Arguing for a non-materialist view of mind, consciousness, and self, Mario Beauregard and Denyse O’Leary (2007) proposed “a new scientific frame of reference” that could “significantly contribute to the emergence of a planetary type of consciousness. The development of this type of consciousness is absolutely essential if humanity is to successfully solve the global crises that confront us” (pp. 294–295).

But how could consciousness, mind, or self ever function apart from the mediating processes of biology? Has not “modern neuroscience” established that sufficiently complex coordinations of neural circuitry give “rise to consciousness—to the mind, to the soul, to the spirit, to whatever you choose to call that invisible, intangible part of us that truly makes us who we are” (Alexander, 2012, p. 34)? Did not Hoffman and others identify certain prerequisites in the structures and pathways of the brain for moral and other experiences of consciousness? Are not our bodies and even our minds adequately “understandable as a collection of cells, blood vessels, hormones, proteins, and fluids—all following the basic laws of chemistry and physics” (Eagleman, 2011, p. 223)? Indeed, is not consciousness merely “the smallest bit-player in the brain” (p. 99)? Materialist philosophers have even asserted that consciousness is nothing but a “successful illusion” generated in the “humming” of neural “machinery” (Dennett, 2005, p. 23).

If so, exactly how does our humming neural machinery generate conscious perception and thought? After all, “neurons are not themselves thinking” (Eagleman, 2011, p. 218). We must ask in earnest: “How can the electrical activity of a few pounds of grey goo produce the blue of the sky and the song of the dove?” (Gopnik, 2009, p. 107). “Where in the midst of all this electrical activity and chemical processes”—evident in those few pounds of grey goo (the brain)—“do thoughts lie?” (p. 106). This question pertains to what David Chalmers (1996) called “the hard problem” of consciousness. Although hard, the problem is worth studying—considering that its solution could “profoundly affect our conception of the universe and of ourselves” (p. xii).

The problem gets even harder as we take seriously the anomaly implied by the near-death experience: conscious awareness even without biochemical and electrical activity; that is, continued mental perception and identity even when the neural machinery is not humming—“when the brain circuits that modulate consciousness are down” (Parnia, 2013, p. 225). How could Pam Reynolds Lowery—with no detectable brain waves, little blood in the brain, not even any brain stem response—have been “the most aware” of her “entire life”? How could she have seen and heard details of her operation despite the unavailability of sensory organs (eyes blindfolded, ear canals totally occluded)? Moreover, how could individuals blind since birth nonetheless accurately see during their near-death experience (Ring & Cooper, 1997, 1999; cf. Fox, 2003)? It would appear that brain activity is not after all an absolute prerequisite for consciousness. Although brain
activity ordinarily modulates consciousness, perhaps consciousness “can itself independently modulate brain activity” (Parnia, 2013, p. 282).

That the conscious mind and identity can somehow function apart from brain activity is suggested by a psychiatric patient's having been “mentally clear” while out of his body even as he knew that his brain was still projecting hallucinatory images (Chapter 9)! Perhaps Penrose (1989) is correct that “there must always be something missing” from the notion of the mind as merely an epiphennemon of “extraordinarily complicated” computational activity of the brain (p. 447; cf. Neisser, 1992; Penrose, 1994). Mind–body and other issues stimulated by the near-death experience may even go to “the very heart” of our “understanding of what it is to be human, and what it is for human beings to die” (Fox, 2003, p. 5; see Gibbs, 2010c).

At the very least, the anomaly—however disequilibrating it may be—must be faced. Pam's chief neurosurgeon, Robert Spetzler, declared,

> It struck me that this [Pam's near-death experience] was incredibly perplexing and not understandable with what we know about the brain. Without any brain wave activity, it is inconceivable to me that the brain can receive, internalize, and maintain a memory. But at the same time, I think it is the height of egocentrism to say something can't happen just because we can't explain it. (Benz, 2001)

Ultimately incompatible with local morality is the profound sense of love often seen in the aftermath of a “deep” near-death experience. The urgently needed “planetary consciousness” notwithstanding, we are back to the multiple-claimants dilemma. Shouldn't a balance be struck between a global morality and caring for one's local loved ones? Bruce Greyson and Barbara Harris (1987) suggested that it is not always easy for the experiencer to find “a way to actualize in daily life the love he or she received in the NDE [near-death experience]” (p. 51; cf. Christian & Holden, 2012; Noyes, Fenwick, Holden, & Christian, 2009). As described in Chapter 9, Thomas Sawyer's empathy for years after his return was non-local. His caring for others lost all similarity-familiarity bias; that is, was unmitigated with distance: Tom wanted to help any needy person he encountered, whether friend or stranger, and did—even when that meant at one point his unavailability to his wife who was ill and also needed his care. Reestablishing some gradient of care, some empathic bias as Hoffman calls it, was part of Tom's reequilibration process back into our local world of separate selves (Sawyer, personal communication, March 13, 2003).

Let us finally suggest, however, a less than total divorce in this paradoxical state of affairs between our local world and its non-local underpinnings. Although Tom was “back” and had to adjust to some extent, his inspiration and deeper understanding of life endured. Indeed, perhaps “a unity with the workings of Nature is potentially present within each of us,” our insights and sensitivities resonant with those workings (Penrose, 1994, p. 420). The inference through misleading superficial appearances to discover an underlying necessity of conservation-related logic is a humble example in non-social cognitive development. Plato declared, and Penrose suspects, that ultimate reality encompasses the moral (and aesthetic) along with the mathematical. We have had occasion to cite numerous epiphanies
of profound moral insight in our exploration of the right and the good strands of moral development and behavior. Some veridical insights and feelings have been heartbreakingly sabotaged by self-serving cognitive distortion, as in the case of the 17-year-old burglar who recollected, “If I started to feel bad [for one or another of my victims], I’d say tough rocks for him, he should have had his house locked better and the alarm on” (Samenow, 1984, p. 115). Presumably, Timothy McVeigh summoned some such dark externalization of blame to sabotage what we might call his moment of light, of insight into the enormity of what he was about to do.

Other moments of profound moral perception were more successful, sometimes resulting in total, life-changing moral transformations. Short of a near-death or even a meditative “Stage 7” experience, perhaps ordinary local processes can inspire insights that resonate with the non-local underpinnings of the moral life. The moment may be powerful and even “strange” (to use the Atlanta rescuer’s word), as one finds oneself changed. Larry, the severe sex offender studied in Chapter 8, seemed to experience a shift abruptly out of darkness and into a transforming epiphany through group processes we can understand: He vividly role-played his crime in his adult-led peer group and, through connecting with human revulsion, decentered from self and felt with intense remorse the deep harm of his crime. Other cases of deep and transformative perception through local processes have included not only those of the Atlanta rescuer but also those of Mark Mathabane (the South African whose appreciation of a past kindness enabled him to see humanity within the individuals of an oppressive out-group), the Yanomamo villager (who discovered and excitedly begged for legal institutions so his people could grow beyond the mentality of blood vengeances), 15-year-old Mac (who began to regret his verbal assault as he saw its roots in self-serving distortions), a reminiscing former ideologue (who, stripped of his old distortions, reexperienced empathic distress and felt guilt over having starved to death countless innocent women and children), and a girl who gained in moral identity as she reflected on how her stealing had disappointed her parents’ expectations. Featured in this chapter has been the transformation of Craig Kielburger, whose life as a moral exemplar started with a jolt and shock at the news of brutal exploitation and murder in Pakistan, the land of our fellow human beings Emroz and Bakhtiar. Perhaps every deep moral perception offers at least a glimmer of insight into the deeper reality of human connection.
Moral Development and Reality explores the nature of morality, moral development, social behavior, and human connection. By comparing, contrasting, and going beyond the prominent theories mainly of Lawrence Kohlberg, Martin Hoffman, and Jonathan Haidt, the author addresses fundamental questions: What is morality, and how broad is the moral domain? Can we speak of moral development (Kohlberg, Hoffman), or is morality entirely relative to diverse cultures (Haidt)? What are the sources of moral motivation? What factors account for prosocial behavior? What are the typical social perspective-taking limitations of antisocial youths, and how can those limitations be remedied? Does moral development, including moments of moral inspiration, reflect a deeper reality? Exploring these questions elucidates the full range of moral development, from superficial perception to a deeper understanding and feeling. Included are: foundations of morality and moral motivation; biology, social intuitions, and culture; social perspective-taking and development; the stage construct and developmental delay; moral exemplars and moral identity; cognitive distortions, social skills deficiencies, and cognitive behavioral interventions or moral education; and, finally, near-death experiences and the underpinnings of our social and moral world.

Below is a chapter summary followed by study questions for each chapter.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces not only the social perspective-taking central to morality, but also our theory-based exploration of moral development, behavior, and reality. Perspective-taking relates to both “the right” (justice, reciprocity, equality; Kohlberg’s theory) and “the good” (welfare, beneficence, empathy; Hoffman’s theory) of morality. The right (condition of reversibility; cf. Pinker’s “interchangeability of perspectives”) provides an objective basis for morality not recognized in relativistic moral theories such as Haidt’s (Chapter 2). The good may provide the broad moral referent for differentiated intuitions (e.g., loyalty, authority, purity) specified by Haidt. Chapters 3 and 4 address “the right” or the cognitive strand of moral motivation and development, whereas Chapter 5 addresses “the good” or the affective strand. Subsequent chapters (6 through 10) relate the theories of moral development to social behavior (prosocial, antisocial) as well as to a deeper reality of human connection.

- In what sense can morality be objective? How does this conception differ from other views of morality?
- What are the foundations of the moral domain, according to Gibbs? What is their relationship? What should one do when the foundations conflict?
- Illustrate (in terms of Edward’s victimization) the two main strands or motivational “primacies” of moral development as “growing beyond the superficial.”
Antisocial behavior is evidenced even among those who may not be delayed in moral judgment development. What are three possible explanations in terms of the camp incident?

CHAPTER 2. BEYOND HAIDT’S NEW SYNTHESIS

This chapter reviews—and moves beyond—Haidt’s new synthesis of trends in disciplines (such as social psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology) pertinent to morality and enculturation. Reviewed are his major themes: in-group solidarity, intuitive primacy, and social persuasion (rather than truth or objectivity as the function of moral reasoning). His work reminds us of our pretensions and the role of innately prepared, fast, preconscious intuitions in morality. He discusses the phylogenetic history and neurology of those intuitions and their refinement through culture. We are also reminded of the values of phylogenetic humility, scientific description, and cultural diversity. In the final analysis, however, three serious limitations of Haidt’s theory—a negative skew or inadequacy in descriptive work; an unwarranted exclusion of the prescriptive implications of the higher reaches in morality; and moral relativism—overshadow its contributions.

- In what sense does Haidt present his new synthesis as a “dose of reality”? What are its three themes?
- How does Gibbs evaluate (valuable aspects, limitations of) Haidt’s theory? Why does Gibbs suggest a need to “move beyond” it?

CHAPTER 3. “THE RIGHT” AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: FUNDAMENTAL THEMES OF KOHLBERG’S COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

This chapter explicates cognitive developmental themes in moral development. The attention of young children is readily captured by or centered on that which is immediate and salient in their sociomoral and non-social worlds. Just as centrations and superficiality characterize early childhood moral judgment, “decentration” and depth can be said to characterize the moral competence constructed in the school years and beyond. We relate morality to logic (cf. Piaget); explain that the ideals of justice or moral reciprocity are constructed, not merely enculturated, socialized, or internalized; explicate the role of peer interaction and social perspective-taking opportunities in this moral constructive process across diverse cultures; argue that justice can be a moral motive in its own right; and ponder issues in the concept and assessment of “stages” in the development of moral judgment.

- What accounts for early child superficiality (including egocentric bias)? Illustrate in terms of social cognition.
- What, in Piagetian terms, accounts for the young child’s pre-conservation responses? How might pre-conservation responses relate to the “caprice” of early childhood?
How have experiments using the conservation task helped to distinguish construction from internalization?

What is the “crucial difference” between pre-conservation and conservation responses?

What conditions promote the likelihood that peer interaction will “work as a constructive process”?

Are logical necessity and cognitive primacy discernible in social cognitive development and behavior? Explain.

Is moral reciprocity a uniquely human phenomenon? What stage-related distinction is important in this connection? What role might “reflective abstraction” play?

What difference does ideal moral reciprocity make in moral motivation? Does Hoffman specifically identify ideal reciprocity? How does ideal reciprocity help us evaluate norms of blood vengeance?

How does moral judgment develop beyond Stage 3 in the Gibbs et al. view? Can Stage 3 represent sufficient moral judgment maturity? What social perspective-taking opportunities seem to be important for advanced development?

Briefly describe immature and mature moral judgment stages in the Gibbs typology. How are they assessed by the Sociomoral Reflection Measure—Short Form (SRM-SF)? How must “stage sequence” be understood in moral development?

Briefly describe processes of development in terms of Piagetian theory. What is “important to note”?

CHAPTER 4. KOLBERG’S THEORY: A CRITIQUE AND NEW VIEW

Given the cognitive-developmental concern with superficiality-to-depth in moral judgment or understanding, Kohlberg was particularly concerned to discover and articulate an age trend and possible sequence of qualitative developmental advances or stages that may be universal. Our critique of Kohlberg's theory notes that, although his specific stage typology was misguided, he almost single-handedly put cognitive moral development on the map of American psychology. He encouraged attention to the continued development of moral judgment beyond the childhood years. Finally, he speculated from case studies of mature moral thinkers in existential crisis that there may be a deeper reality (“cosmic perspective”), one that underlies profound moral perception and can support the moral life. Building from Kohlberg's and others' contributions, we propose in this chapter a new view of lifespan sociomoral development.

In what sense were Kohlberg’s claims regarding age trends in moral judgment “bolder” than Piaget’s?

How did the Deweyan influence “distort” moral judgment development in Kohlberg’s overhaul of Piaget’s moral judgment phases or stages? What was “lost” as a result? What “irony” was evident?

Violations of invariant-sequence expectations were discovered in the course of Kohlberg’s longitudinal research. In Kohlberg’s stage revisions to restore
invariant sequence, what two new problems for Kohlberg’s stage typology were created? These problems both reflect what generic problem, according to Gibbs?

- Regarding adult moral development in Kohlberg’s theory, what is Gibbs’s critique?
- What is Gibbs’s “two-phase” view of lifespan moral judgment development? What is the role of formal operations in this view?

### CHAPTER 5. “THE GOOD” AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: HOFFMAN’S THEORY

Social perspective-taking and development beyond the superficial also entail caring or feeling. Accordingly, we shift from the right to the good, from justice to empathy, from the primarily cognitive to the primarily affective strand of moral motivation and development. We draw heavily in this chapter on Hoffman’s theory, even as we also consider recent refinements, expansions, and issues (de Waal, Decety, Zahn-Waxler). Much more than did Haidt, Hoffman has focused our attention on the role of empathy in moral development. Thanks to cognitive development, language development, and moral socialization, empathy evolves from biologically based responses to surface cues to a more complex and veridical emotional responsiveness to the joys, sufferings, and life situations of others. Attributions and inferences influence whether empathy eventuates in prosocial behavior. Within moral socialization, Hoffman focuses on parental practices of discipline (especially, “inductions” that make salient the perspectives of others hurt by the child’s transgression). The chapter concludes by arguing for co-primacy (both empathy and justice) in moral motivation.

- What is the functional importance of the empathic predisposition for human society?
- Is empathy unique to the human species? In your answer, refer to modes of empathic arousal and the complexity of the “full-fledged” empathic predisposition.
- What is Hoffman’s conception of “fully mature” perspective-taking?
- What is the meaning of “growing beyond the superficial” in Hoffman’s (especially vis à vis Kohlberg’s) theory?
- Briefly describe Hoffman’s immature stages of empathic development (refer to the pertinent empathic arousal modes).
- What are Hoffman’s mature stages of empathic development (refer to the pertinent empathic arousal modes)?
- Is self-awareness crucial for advanced prosocial behavior? To what fundamental issue does this question pertain?
- What cognitive processes “complicate” the relationship between the empathic predisposition and social behavior? Can these processes undermine the empathy–prosocial behavior relationship? If so, give an illustration.
- What are two factors that limit empathy’s status as the “bedrock” of prosocial morality? How can these limitations be remedied?
• Socialization (in particular, moral internalization) is crucial if the empathic predisposition is to eventuate in prosocial behavior. Regarding discipline and moral internalization, how does the parent give effective inductions?
• Regarding two empirical studies of Hoffman’s moral socialization theory, in what ways were the results supportive? What might parents’ expression of disappointment/higher expectations foster in the adolescent?
• What is the role of nurturance in moral socialization, according to Hoffman?
• What is Gibbs’s critique of Hoffman’s theory (pay particular attention to the issue of moral motivation)?

CHAPTER 6: MORAL DEVELOPMENT, MORAL IDENTITY, AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR

This chapter focuses on some of the variables accounting for individual differences in the likelihood of prosocial behavior. “Prosocial behavior” can range from a particular intervention to a lifetime dedicated to just and good causes. Highly prosocial individuals (moral exemplars) tend to be morally mature and highly empathic but field-independent (Moral Type B, internal locus of control, high self-efficacy) persons who perceive morality as central to their sense of self (high moral identity). Moral identity can join the main primary (affective and cognitive) sources of moral motivation. Finally, to take effective sustained action, even highly prosocial individuals need ego strength, defined in terms of affect-regulating goal attainment skills. Distinguishing features of genuine (versus spurious) moral exemplars are considered at the end of the chapter.

• Briefly depict the issue regarding the motivation of prosocial behavior in terms of the presented case study of a rescue. How has Hoffman’s position on moral motivation differed from that of Gibbs?
• What variables help account for individual differences in the likelihood of prosocial behavior? What factors are involved in clear or accurate moral perception?
• How may the self and morality relate in human development?
• What are strengths and weaknesses of information-processing models of social behavior? Can such models account for quick behavioral responses?
• How is “ego strength” defined, and how does it relate to honesty and prosocial behavior?
• What three points regarding prosocial behavior are highlighted by considering a spurious “moral exemplar”?

CHAPTER 7: UNDERSTANDING ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR

The referent for social behavior shifts in this chapter to antisocial behavior and how to account for it. Most offenders, from petty pranksters to ideological terrorists, fail (except for self-serving purposes) to take the perspectives of their victims. Social perspective-taking limitations pervade the “three Ds” of antisocial
youth: moral developmental delay, self-serving cognitive distortions, and social skill deficiencies. The latter two variables are needed to supplement Kohlberg's and Hoffman's emphasis on developmental delay if we are to adequately account for antisocial behavior. The chapter concludes with the powerful illustrative case of Timothy McVeigh. This case makes particularly clear how cognitive distortions can insulate a self-centered worldview (itself a primary distortion, linked to feeling superior or inadequately respected); that is, can preempt or neutralize social perspective-taking, moral understanding, and veridical empathy.

- Briefly describe the limitation of moral judgment developmental delay among antisocial youths.
- Regarding the limitation of self-serving cognitive distortions among antisocial youths, what are the four categories of distortion? What is the relationship of the primary distortion to proactive versus reactive aggression? What is the function of the other three categories?
- Briefly describe the limitation of social skill deficiencies among antisocial youths.
- How does the case study (Timothy McVeigh) illustrate the three main limitations of antisocial youths? How does the case relate to Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories?

CHAPTER 8: TREATING ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR

If multiple limitations contribute to antisocial behavior, then an adequate treatment program must be correspondingly multi-componential. Adequate social perspective-taking—in particular, perspective-taking that is profound or mature; rationalization-busting, adequately informed, and hence discerning; reciprocally ideal and balanced; and socially expansive or inclusive—should pervade the components of any effective treatment program. This chapter focuses on a multi-component treatment program that incorporates a wide variety of social perspective-taking opportunities pertaining to the remediation of moral developmental delay, social cognitive distortions, and social skill deficiencies; namely, the EQUIP program. High-fidelity implementations of EQUIP can stimulate a positive synergy through EQUIP’s integration of mutual help and cognitive behavioral approaches. Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion of adaptations and outcome evaluations, and illustrates social perspective-taking treatments available for severe offenders.

- What is the aim of the mutual-help (in particular, Positive Peer Culture) approach to treating antisocial behavior? How does it provide social perspective-taking opportunities? Why has it had only mixed success, according to Gibbs?
- How does EQUIP integrate the mutual-help with the cognitive-behavioral approach to treating antisocial behavior? What does each approach contribute to the other?
- What opportunities are entailed in the EQUIP curriculum? Illustrate how its three components are designed to remedy, respectively, the three main limitations of antisocial youth.
• Briefly describe some adaptations of the EQUIP program. Under what conditions is the program effective?
• Illustrate social perspective-taking for the severe offender.

CHAPTER 9. BEYOND THE THEORIES: A DEEPER REALITY?

This chapter goes beyond Kohlberg’s, Hoffman’s, and Haidt’s theories to consider the question of a deeper reality. As noted, Kohlberg argued that existential thinkers in their soul-searching sometimes come to see their earthly moral life from an inspiring “cosmic perspective.” Perhaps such a reality can be glimpsed not only through existential crises but also through physically life-threatening ones. Accordingly, we study in this chapter cases of persons who have had a so-called near-death experience, or a set of “profound psychological events with transcendental and mystical elements, typically occurring to individuals close to death or in situations of intense physical or emotional danger” (Greyson). A review of the literature—especially, recent medical research literature—suggests that the experience entails a transcendent significance congruent with Kohlberg’s cosmic perspective. In this light, “growing beyond the superficial” and “taking the perspectives of others” take on radical new meaning.

• How does the chapter go “beyond” Kohlberg with respect to moral development and reality?
• Briefly describe the near-death experience, its three types, and whether it pertains to a deeper reality. What does Gibbs conclude, in terms of what five ontologically relevant questions?
• What feature or features of the near-death experience might be especially important for moral transformation? What moral issue is often raised by one of the experience’s typical after-effects?

CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION

The final chapter concludes our use of Kohlberg’s, Hoffman’s, and Haidt’s theories to ponder the moral domain and explore growth beyond the superficial in morality. We recap our critique of Haidt’s theory. We culminate our argument for a co-primacy in moral motivation by relating Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories to motivationally and qualitatively distinct categories of knowledge (logico-mathematical, empirical). We relate logical-moral ideals to an analysis of adaptation and evolution (Piaget, Singer) that is less reductionist than the pragmatic version offered by Haidt and others. Completing this concluding chapter are some final reflections on moral development, perception, and behavior vis-à-vis a deeper reality of human connection.

• How do Hoffman’s and Kohlberg’s theories differ with respect to the main sources of moral motivation? Describe the respective categories of knowledge to
which the theories refer. How does this epistemological difference relate to the issue of moral motivation?

- Are Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories integrable? What is Gibbs’s view?
- Regarding moral perception and the question of a deeper reality, what paradox seems to be involved?
Chapter 1

1. In the physical sciences, post-modernist or subjectivist critiques of objectivity and rationality have lost considerable credibility (Gross & Leavitt, 1994; Sokol & Bricmont, 1999).

2. Applying the condition of reversibility by taking another’s perspective means, according to Baier (1965), that one should reflect on whether one would like it if one’s act were done to oneself; i.e., that one should imagine oneself in the place of the other person(s). But such reversibility, taken at first blush, would work “only if all people are of the same age, sex, and health status with identical preferences and aversions” (de Waal, 2013, p. 182). Myers (1986) pointed out that adequate application of the condition or principle generally requires not only a projection of self into the other’s situation, but also “some understanding of the thoughts and feelings of the other person” (p. 21) as well as situational context (see Batson, 2011, pp. 188–189). Hoffman (2000) termed these two versions of social perspective-taking “self-focused” and “other-focused.” Both versions may be needed for optimal application of the condition of reversibility (see Chapter 5).

Myers (1986) identified a problem with other-focused perspective-taking: namely, that in some cases, for various reasons, it may be “impossible for you to imagine what it is like to be the other” (p. 21) and thereby appreciate their thoughts and feelings. Nonetheless, “though we could not possibly be the horse whom we are whipping, or the trapped and starved animal whose fur we are wearing, we can imagine such things well enough for moral purposes” (Parfit, 2011, p. 329).

3. Impartiality, consistency, or equal treatment is sometimes criticized as a problematic principle or unfeasible ideal, especially given what Hoffman (2000) called the “multiple claimants dilemma.” For example, an impartiality-minded, universalizing parent of a college-bound child might ask: “If I pay my child’s tuition, [must I also] pay every other’s child’s tuition?” Does impartiality or equality, then, “ask too much of us”? (Frankena, 1973, p. 53). Frankena’s answer is: Not necessarily. In the example, perhaps other parents can “do likewise [pay tuition] for their children” (p. 54). If not, impartiality does obligate one to make a good-faith effort “to help other children, too, either directly, or by seeking to improve the system”; i.e., to render society more equitable for all legitimate claimants (Frankena, 1973, p. 54). The multiple-claimants dilemma is further considered in later chapters.

4. Moral objectivity (as a criterion of moral as distinct from social conventional events) is linked instead to the good; that is, to “intrinsic effects [of an act] for others’ rights and welfare” (Smetana, 2006, p. 121). Insofar as social conventions (and their violation) also have welfare effects, social domain theorists may have overstated the independence of social conventions from the moral domain (see critiques by Fowler, 2007; Gibbs, 2010a; and Royzman, Leeman, & Baron, 2009). Turiel (2008) is correct that unjust or oppressive (and, we would add, harmful) social conventions and power structures must be clearly identified and resisted.

5. Haidt (personal communication, July 30, 2012) commented that this relativistic statement, meant “fully descriptively,” was “ill-considered” and “not representative” of his
“whole approach” as explicated in his more recent works. Haidt also characterized, however, as “gingerly” (delicate? cautious?) his transition toward the end of his recent work Righteous Mind from descriptively relativistic to normative or prescriptive considerations (specifically, his advocacy of a Durkheimian version of utilitarianism). Steven Pinker (personal communication, April 22, 2012) commented that Haidt does not “distinguish carefully enough between descriptive [or] psychological… and normative characterizations of morality.” In any event, Haidt’s normative considerations notwithstanding, the quoted passage would appear to be consistent with his main approach to morality (see Chapter 2).

6. Moral judgment or evaluation must be distinguished from moral reform. Although moral judgment can be valid, effective moral reform does not necessarily follow. Well-intentioned initiatives may only provoke hostility. For example, a doctor in Italy who served Somali immigrants was reluctant (having treated serious medical complications from the procedure) to mutilate the genitalia of their daughters. He proposed to parents that he use a pin-prick procedure as a harmless symbolic alternative. The proposal outraged both culturally embedded immigrants as a travesty of their tradition, and reformist immigrants as an implicit approval of their culture’s subjugation and brutalization of women (Bruni, 2004). The pin-prick (“ritual nick”) proposal by the American Academy of Pediatricians provoked similar outrage (Belluck, May 6, 2010; see Benatar, 2012). Unfortunately, then, attempts at moral reform may, at least for a while, only make things worse. (Interestingly, if we seek to specify “worse,” we find ourselves back at the right and the good.) Kwame Appiah (2010) suggested strategies for effective moral reform (reviewed by Gibbs, 2011).

7. Practitioners may appeal to various demonstrably erroneous cultural beliefs concerning harm, such as that clitorises left intact grow hideously long or sprout branches that prevent conception, consigning an un-excised female to a childless future (Ali, 2008; Lacey, 2002; see also Kopelman, 2001; Nussbaum, 1999). Prospective victims who have been taught to accept such erroneous ideas are not in a position to give informed consent (James, 1994; Kopelman, 2001). Taking the perspective of “the victim” presupposes that the actual victim is adequately informed. As for victimizers, Cecilia Wainryb (2000) called for research on the conditions under which appeals to erroneous beliefs are seen as legitimate excuses.

8. Note the contradiction between the relativistic premise and the non-relative appeal:

Relativists who say it is wrong to eliminate rituals that give meaning to other cultures [or]...make [other] intercultural judgments about tolerance, group benefit, intersocietal respect, or cultural diversity... are... inconsistent in making a judgment that presumes to have genuine cross-cultural moral authority. (Kopelman, 2001, pp. 319–320)

Similarly inconsistent are “students who reject the language of morality [yet] have no qualms about expressing their disapproval of sexual harassment, child labor in sweatshops, and unfair treatment of graduate teaching assistants” (Bloom, 2004, p. 130). Colby (2008) also noted that college students’ overall ethical nihilism or relativism does not appear to deter their willingness to take “normative positions on specific ethical questions” (p. 399).

9. Along with justice, “respect for the person” is often deemed to be integral to intrinsic, right-or-wrong-in-itself considerations in morality. Intrinsic moral considerations are typically termed deontological and qualitatively distinguished from approaches that posit morality to reside, not in the right or wrong of the act itself, but instead in its human social utility or consequences. Joshua Greene (2008a) has argued against this distinction, suggesting instead an empathy–reasoning distinction in which “respect for the person” (and
deontology generally) reduces to “up close and personal” (p. 70); i.e., pertains to primary “emotional moral intuitions” (Greene, 2008b, p. 105). Deontology only seems “rational” given post hoc cognitive reconstructions of these emotional intuitions (p. 105). Whereas “deontological judgment is affective at its core” (Greene, 2008a, p. 65), utilitarian calculations of greatest-good consequences for the group are seen as “grounded in moral reasoning” (p. 36).

Greene’s claims are questionable. Is deontology primarily affective and utilitarianism primarily cognitive? More specifically: Is the deontological wrong of harming an innocent individual primarily a matter of the “up close and personal” emotion of empathic distress for the imagined victim? Is the motive to consider consequences for others or identify the greatest good of the group primarily a matter of (“grounded in”) moral reasoning, fundamentally distinct from “up close and personal” empathy for the individual? Greene’s distinction relates to the observation that “our feelings of benevolence and sympathy are more easily aroused by specific human beings than by a large group in which no individuals stand out” (Singer, 1981, p. 157; Slovic, 2007; see Chapter 5). Regarding group welfare, computing what is collectively more beneficial presumably does entail some low-affect utilitarian calculations, as evidenced in greater working-memory than emotion-related brain-neuronal activation (e.g., Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; but see Miller, 2008; Sauer, 2012).

The distinction between less and more “easily aroused,” however, is merely quantitative. Although less intense than for the individual, empathy (affective primacy) can also ground concern for the group (see Chapter 5). As Vivek Viswanathan (2008) put the point: “It is not a lack of empathy that brings about utilitarianism. It is full empathy” (Viswanathan, February/March, 2008, p. 35). Jeremy Bentham’s cold temperament (Haidt, 2012) notwithstanding, “even the ‘rational’ utilitarian wants to make people happy” (Gopnik, 2009, p. 215). Michael Gill and Shaun Nichols (2008) considered it “likely that compassion played a critical causal role in the cultural success of... the utilitarian rule to minimize suffering” (p. 159). Indeed, empathy or the “feeling of unity” with others” may constitute the very basis of utilitarian morality (Hoffman, 1982, p. 88).

Greene and colleagues’ argument may be characterized as a “dual process” model (e.g., Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013), but it is one that clearly differs from ours. We will argue in this book for a formulation of “dual process” (we prefer the term co-primacy) that takes seriously the traditional deontological-consequentialist distinction in ethics. In these terms, we have posited a distinction between the right (fairness, consistency, impartiality, equality, respect for the person in his or her own right) and the good (benevolence, welfare, caring for the individual or group). Although often coextensive with “up close and personal” caring, respect for the person does have a place along with justice under “the right” rubric. This placement is justified given that disrespect is logically inconsistent and unfair; i.e., fails the condition of reversibility: Treating another person as a means to one’s own selfish ends is morally wrong insofar as it contradicts how the emotionally healthy person expects to be treated by other persons. Hence, both justice and respect for the person may be considered to be deontological or rational (cf. Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). Greene does not consider the referent for “deontological” used in this book and elsewhere; namely, the condition of reversibility or interchangeability of perspectives (e.g., Pinker, 2011). Insofar as it relates to the condition of reversibility (and rationality generally), deontology per se is not empathic but cognitive “at its core” or foundation.
10. Actually, Beauchamp and Childress (2009) keep these concepts distinct on the grounds that conflating non-maleficence and beneficence into a single principle obscures important distinctions. Obligations not to harm others (e.g., those prohibiting theft, disablement, and killing) are distinct from obligations to help others (e.g., those prescribing the provision of benefits, protection of interests, and promotion of welfare) (p. 150).

11. Like the right and the good, cognition and affect “always remain indissociable although distinct” (Piaget, 1973/1972, p. 47; cf. Cowan, 1982). This thesis relates to motivational co-primacy (see Chapter 6) and represents an intermediate position in the literature. Some argue that cognition and affect (and, for that matter, overt behavior) are so intimately interrelated in so many diverse ways that the very distinction, even for heuristic purposes, is spurious, and therefore that human functioning should be conceptualized anew using distinctions and constructs that may be more tenable (e.g., Damon, 1977; Haidt, 2012; Rest, 1983). For example, Haidt (2012) suggested that we conceptualize human functioning in terms of “kinds of cognition” (p. 45); specifically, automatic versus deliberate information-processing or “intuition versus reasoning” (p. 46). (This cognitive emphasis does not represent the thrust of Haidt’s theory; see Chapter 2.) Others (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Zajonc, 1984) argue that affect is a separate system that can function prior to and independently of cognition. Again, we retain affect-cognition as validly capturing motivational aspects of human psychological functioning that are distinguishable yet intimately interrelated.

Chapter 2

1. These three themes represent the three “principles that have emerged as unifying ideas” described in Haidt and Kesebir (2010, p. 798). Haidt (personal communication, August 26, 2012) suggested that I “take [his] principles verbatim.” This I have done with respect to “intuitive primacy” (although I also refer to this theme as that of “affective primacy,” a characterization that I explain elsewhere). My reference to Durkheimian in-group solidarity is adapted from, but, I believe, captures the spirit of Haidt’s “morality binds and builds” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 814; cf. “morality binds and blinds,” Haidt, 2012, p. 187); as does “social persuasion” for “moral thinking is for social doing” (“moral thinking is done in order to help the social agent succeed in the social order”; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 808). I address Haidt’s (2012) broad descriptivist view of morality (“there’s more to morality than harm and fairness”) in Chapter 1.

2. Haidt (personal communication, July 30, 2012) objected that “internalization” of cultural norms does not capture the prior role of modules, which “develop … in variable ways depending on cultural and individual experience.” Haidt and Bjorklund (2008a) even suggested that moral development is a matter of “assisted externalization,” whereby cultural guidance and examples enable a child’s innate morality to emerge and “configure itself properly” (p. 206). A more cautious formulation is that biologically prepared predispositions (especially empathy) are recruited to foster the child’s internalization of prosocial norms (see Damon, 1988; Hoffman, 2000; see also Chapter 5).

3. The intuitions may number more than five (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) or six (Haidt, 2012). Haidt (2012) suggested the possibility of “additional innate modules that give rise to additional moral intuitions” (p. 150). Contested is whether such additions reflect a process of scientific discovery or of ad hoc invention (see Suhler & Churchland, 2011; versus Haidt & Joseph, 2011). As of late 2012, Haidt (personal communication, November 9, 2012) and colleagues were preparing a set of formal criteria for identifying moral modules.
4. Haidt’s preference (personal communication, July 30, 2012) is for the term intuitive primacy. The preference is understandable. Yet the more generic term affective primacy would seem to capture more aptly Haidt’s (2012) endorsement of David Hume’s characterization of reason as serving “the passions” or sentiments. Although Haidt has sought to conceptualize intuition as a kind of cognition, his experimental work has been more Humean (affective) in intent, “meant to erode [the] assumption [of] many intuitionists [such as] Aristotle and Hutcheson and Whewell and Ross and Moore… that your intuitions have given you some kind of knowledge” (Appiah, 2008, p. 149, emphasis added). Nor does Haidt’s work comprehensively represent “intuition” as “a wide-ranging phenomenon, incorporating both snap visual judgments and mathematical insights” (Lynch, 2012, p. 26).

5. Piaget’s (1972/1973) explicit discussion of the influential role of “the cognitive unconscious,” as well as his discussion of implicit social cognitive modes evident in game-playing behavior (Piaget, 1932/1965), discredits claims that Piaget “failed to consider the possibility that the knowledge driving…behavior is unconscious” (Hauser, 2006, p. 170). Haidt referred “to Kohlberg, Piaget, and Turiel as rationalists to highlight their contrast with intuitionism” (p. 324); yet “rationalist,” with its conscious-deliberation connotation, belies Piaget’s thoughtful articulation of unconscious cognitive processes and structures. Haidt did acknowledge that Kohlberg described himself as a constructivist, not as a rationalist.

6. The “legacy of moral reasoning that had taken place beforehand” refers not only to benefits of prior private and mature moral reflection such as the rescuer’s, but to the collective heritage of moral achievements in human history as well. Our “intuitions” today, for example, that we should not “burn heretics, keep slaves, whip children, or break criminals on the wheel” owe much to “ferocious” moral reasoning debates and eventual moral revolutions that took place centuries ago (Pinker, 2011, p. 644; cf. Appiah, 2010).

7. In Chapter 1, we identified social perspective-taking and reversibility as central to morality, and thereby distinguished sociomoral development from Haidt’s relativistic processes of enculturation (see also Gibbs, 2013).

Chapter 3

1. Kohlberg and colleagues’ Moral Judgment Interview (MJI; Colby et al., 1987) and related measures (e.g., the Sociomoral Reflection Measure–Short Form; Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992) emphasize moral values (e.g., contract, truth, and property) that tend to “pull” for justifications of right and wrong. Beneficent moral values (e.g., helping others and saving another’s life) are also addressed, however, in these measures (cf. Eisenberg, 1982). These moral values of the right and the good have generally been rated as “important” or “very important” in diverse cultures (see Gibbs et al., 2007). In these measures and the cognitive developmental approach, moral judgment refers to a reasoned or justified and prescriptive social evaluation or decision. It should be noted that “moral judgment” is used interchangeably with “moral evaluation” in the social intuitionist approach (e.g., Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008a, 2008b). Augusto Blasi observed (personal communication, September 12, 2012) that (prior or current) “reasoning is essential for Kohlberg’s and Piaget’s [conceptualization of] moral judgment, but not for Haidt’s.”

2. Piaget generally took a strong domain-general view, depicting cognitive development as one and the same phenomenon whether viewed socially or non-socially. In technical terms, inter-individual mental operations of a certain stage were seen as isomorphic to
intra-individual operations of that stage (Piaget, 1967/1971). Kohlberg was initially sympa-
thetic to Piaget’s broad or domain-general view. In fact, he (Kohlberg, 1964) initially exam-
ined moral judgment trends that seemed to reflect cognitive development. Subsequently,
however, Kohlberg (1984) came to stress temporal orders of parallel construction across
subdomains (with each latter construction emerging contemporaneously or later in time,
if at all): A given non-social cognitive stage is seen as necessary but not sufficient for the
attainment of a parallel social perspective-taking stage, which in turn is necessary but not
sufficient for the attainment of a parallel moral judgment stage. William Damon (1977) pro-
posed an intermediate position: Although a certain logical operational construction may
be necessary but not sufficient for a certain social cognitive construction, the logical con-
struction may emerge in the social subdomain before it does in the non-social subdomain
(which could happen if a child has, for example, “some kind of block against mathematical
problems,” p. 322). Damon’s may be the most defensible position, given the problem of stage
mixture discussed later in the chapter.

3. Although mature moral judgment is primarily governed by intentions rather than
consequences, consequences of course remain relevant to some extent—especially insofar
as they may reflect negligence (in effect, an inadequate intentionality). Decades ago, Roger
Brown (1965) observed that moral judgments acknowledge

something that might be called the seriousness or importance of what happens….If
a pedestrian is killed by a motorist, that is more serious than if a pedestrian is only
knocked down….The law…often punishes in terms of the objective event rather than
the intention….It gives people a reason [or incentive] to acquire knowledge and control
their intentions [or negligent behavior]. (pp. 239–240)

4. Seemingly contradictory to Flavell et al.’s description is Alison Gopnik’s (2009) sug-
gestion that babies and young children have a “lantern consciousness” such that they “are
vividly aware of everything without being focused on any one thing in particular” (p. 129).
Flavell’s suggestion may be closer to the mark, given its consistency with the considerable
evidence (partially reviewed in this chapter) concerning the unidimensional cognitive ten-
dency and limited working memory of young children. Their quickly fluctuating shifts of
attention to various salient or interesting features in their surroundings (hence their greater
tendency to pick up peripheral or incidental information) may mean, however, that their
awareness is in effect lantern-like.

5. **Social construction** in the Piagetian sense differs almost diametrically from some
other usages. For example, in the 1960s, Foucault, Derrida, and other post-modernists used
social construction or social constructivism to characterize the scientific process as having
more to do with social convention, contingency, and political power than with rational-
ity, logical necessity, or an objective knowledge of nature (these critiques lost considerable
credibility in subsequent years; see Gross & Leavitt, 1994; Sokol & Brimont, 1999). Social
psychologists such as Haidt have similarly critiqued moral development, equating “social
construction” with relativistic enculturation processes and expressing skepticism regard-
ing rationality, objectivity, and moral knowledge (e.g., Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Bjorklund,
2008a, 2008b).

6. Although this condition is fascinating for its elucidation of construction as de-
confounded from internalization, experimental conditions in which one disputant in the
dyad is at a slightly more advanced level often stimulate greater gains in both logical and
moral judgment (e.g., Kuhn, 1972; Murray, 1982; L. J. Walker, 1983). In Vygotsky’s (1930–1935/1978) terms, optimal growth typically takes place within the child’s “zone of proximal development.”

7. Although qualitative and crucial, the difference depicted by Brown (1965) does not reflect abrupt change. Through the child and adolescent years, understanding and appreciation of the logical–empirical distinction gradually becomes “more stable, more generalizable, and more imbued with feelings of necessity” (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 146; cf. Miller et al., 2000; Morris & Sloutsky, 2001; Winer & McGlone, 1993; Winer, Craig, & Weinbaum, 1992). The epistemological and ontological significance of the logical–empirical distinction is explored in Chapter 10.

8. Although one can violate logical or moral necessity in thought or speech, the ideal remains: “Thinking or saying that one plus one equals three or that it is right to gratuitously harm someone does not make it so.” The logical–moral parallel stops there, however: “Although a moral rule violation may be wrong, it is nonetheless possible to commit it (to gratuitously harm someone); but in some sense [despite tricks] it is not actually possible to violate logic (to add one plus one and actually produce three)” (Laupa, 2000, p. 30).

9. Retributive justice can have a more mature aim than that of mere retaliation or “getting even.” If mixed with ideal reciprocity, revenge seeks to educate the offender, or shatter his or her self-centeredness and other self-serving cognitive distortions, as when the prospective avenger wonders “how he’d [the offender would] like it if the same thing were done to him” (Lewis, 1962, p. 94; cf. Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009). Moral education and the correcting of self-serving cognitive distortions are discussed in Chapter 8.

10. Appeals to the futility of cycles of vengeance and to forgiveness do not necessarily imply unqualified tolerance or pacifism. Some situations are accurately perceived as requiring defense of self or others.

11. In contrast to this tribesman’s enthusiasm for social institutions of law and conflict-mediation, a New Guinea Highlands tribesman who worked for a multinational corporation was more ambivalent (Diamond, April 21, 2008). The New Guinea tribesman acknowledged that “Letting the government settle disputes by means of the legal system [is] better [than being] trapped in our endless cycles of revenge killings” (p. 84). Yet the New Guinea tribesman also expressed euphoria, pride, relief, and a sense of satisfaction in having accomplished a revenge killing, and regretted that he would not be allowed to continue such activity.

Particularly thoughtful was a former boy soldier’s conclusion that

revenge is not good. We are all brothers and sisters. I joined the army to avenge the deaths of my family and to survive, but I’ve come to learn that if I am going to take revenge, in that process I will kill another person whose family will want revenge, then revenge and revenge and revenge will never come to an end. (Beah, 2007, p. 199)

12. Such lead-in statements were as effective as moral dilemmas, a finding (see Basinger, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1995; Gibbs et al., 2007) that obviated various criticisms of Kohlberg’s theory that were based on his use of dilemmas in stage assessment. For example, referring to the cognitive demands of dilemmas, Haidt (2012) attributed resulting age trends to increasing verbal sophistication: “If you force kids to explain complex notions, such as how to balance competing concerns about rights and justice, you’re guaranteed to find age trends because kids get so much more articulate with each passing year” (p. 9). Identification
of the common age trend across dilemma and non-dilemma methods undermines this argument and supports a cognitive developmental interpretation of the age trend (Gibbs et al., 2007).

13. The active and intrinsic-motivation character of the child’s “exercise” of schemas in transactions with the environment was aptly described decades ago by Robert White (1959) as an “effectance” motive. The child selects for continuous treatment those aspects of his environment which he finds it possible to affect in some way. His behavior is selective, directed, persistent—in short, motivated…. The [intrinsically motivated] behavior exhibits a little of everything [e.g., play, curiosity, exploration, boredom relief, stimulus hunger or sensation-seeking, and mastery or competence motivation]… [In] playful exploration [the child is] constantly circling from stimulus to perception to action to effect to stimulus to perception, and so on around [cf. Neisser, 1976]…. Satisfaction [or a “feeling of efficacy”] has to be seen as lying in a considerable series of transactions, in a trend of behavior rather than [in drive or tension reduction or in] a goal that is achieved. (pp. 320–322, emphases added)

Effectance activity or the playful exercise of schemas makes at least two important theoretical contributions. First, this championing of human curiosity helps counter overly pragmatic or instrumental accounts of human reason (e.g., Haidt; see; s Chapter 2; Krebs & Denton, 2005) and evolution (see Chapter 10). Second, the point that effectance-motivated schemas can in their own right generate affect (satisfaction, feeling of efficacy, distress over logic violation) introduces an important motivational distinction into Cowan’s (1982) suggestion that schemas “vary on a continuum from those which appear as primarily affective [cf. affective primacy] to [those] which appear highly cognitive [cf. cognitive primacy]” (p. 59). Although Haidt (2006) did not note these contributions, he did note that effectance and mastery opportunities foster human flourishing in personal and cultural contexts.

14. Despite criticism (e.g., Klahr, 1982), Piaget’s concept of adaptation as entailing a dynamic balance of assimilatory and accommodative aspects—and in particular, of mal-adaptation in terms of over-assimilation or over-accommodation, stimulating, in some cases, disequilibration and reequilibration—has continued to find valuable application in identity development (e.g., Whitbourne & Connolly, 1999), ego development (Rathunde & Czikszentmahlyi, 2006), parenting interventions with disturbed children (Cowan, Powell, & Cowan, 1998), and other areas of developmental psychology. Siegler and Svetina (2006) found some cases of instability (interpretable as disequilibration) in their cognitive developmental facilitation study.

■ Chapter 4

1. Roger Bergman (2006) correctly pointed out that the three-level typology was a minor element in Dewey’s overall constructivist philosophy of development, and that Kohlberg was also inspired by Dewey’s constructivism. The fact remains, however, that Kohlberg (1991/1985) did explicitly attribute his preconventional-conventional-postconventional scheme to Dewey (Gibbs, 2006a).

2. Despite his own caveat regarding variability in usage, Piaget (1932/1965) did at numerous points refer to his overlapping phases as “stages.”

3. Colby (2008) urged college educators to move beyond a laissez-faire attitude:
College students’ moral relativism ought to be cause for concern among educators, because beliefs such as “everyone is entitled to his own opinion and there is no way to evaluate the validity of those opinions,” prevent students from engaging fully in discussions of ethical issues, learning to articulate and effectively justify their views, and adopting new perspectives when presented with high quality evidence and arguments. (p. 399)

4. As indicated later in the chapter, Moral Type B also entails some moral independence vis-à-vis “customary morality.”

5. Stage 6’s suspension was only temporary. Despite its empirical rarity, Stage 6 was subsequently revised further and reintroduced as the philosophical end state of moral judgment development (Reed, 1997; see Kohlberg, Boyd, & Levine, 1990).

6. Haidt (2006) doubted the value of such existential questioning. He suggested instead an emphasis on fulfilling social relationships and cultural contexts: “I don’t believe there is an inspiring answer to the question, ‘What is the purpose of life?’ Yet by drawing on ancient wisdom and modern science, we can find compelling answers to the question of purpose within life” (p. 238).

7. Although our reconceptualization offers a new view of lifespan moral judgment and reflection, the view derives from an initial formulation in the late 1970s (see Gibbs, 1977, 1979).

■ Chapter 5

1. The more widely noted of Gilligan’s (1982) claims, that female respondents are artificially downscored in Kohlberg’s stage system, has been generally disconfirmed (Walker, 1995). In fact, females are often found to be more advanced than males in moral judgment during early adolescence (e.g., Garmon, Basinger, Gregg, & Gibbs, 1996; Gibbs et al., 2007; Silberman & Snarey, 1993). Gilligan also claimed that males favor justice and rights in their moral judgment, whereas females favor care-related concerns. There is some support especially for the latter part of this claim: Care-related concerns are more prevalent in the moral judgments of females than males, especially when open-ended assessment methods are used (Garmon et al., 1996; Gibbs, Arnold, & Burkhart, 1984; Gielen, Comunian, & Antoni, 1994; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000; cf. Hoffman, 1975b, 1976, 1977, 2008). This gender difference disappears when participants are asked to recollect “personal” (care-related) moral dilemmas and make moral judgments in that context (Walker, 1995), indicating that males can, but tend not to, use prominent levels of care-related concerns in their moral judgment (cf. Moshman, 2011). The reference to moral judgment more than moral feeling renders Gilligan’s work a less suitable vehicle than Hoffman’s for exploring the affective-primacy strand of moral development.

2. Prosocial behavior refers to beneficence, or acts intended to benefit another. In our usage of prosocial behavior, we imply further that the acts are altruistic; that is, motivated by a justice- and/or welfare-based concerns for others despite personal costs. This further implication is often difficult to establish in practice, however (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006). Exemplary prosocial behavior appears, at least from the outside, to entail substantial personal cost (see Chapter 6).

3. Particularly suggestive of such a biological substratum are case studies of the behavior of patients with brain damage in these areas. Patients who had sustained damage to the ventromedial prefrontal region of their brains no longer showed empathy or other feelings,
rendering their emotions shallow and their “decision-making landscape hopelessly flat” (Damasio, 1999, p. 51). They could formulate plans but not implement them and could not maintain gainful employment (in our Chapter 6 terminology, they had lost all “ego strength”). One patient’s lack of moral enactment was evident despite his mature level of moral judgment, as measured by Kohlberg et al.’s Moral Judgment Interview (Colby et al., 1987). Haidt (2012; and see Chapter 2 herein) interpreted Damasio’s findings as support for his Hume-inspired affective-primacy (rather than cognitive-primacy or co-primacy) view of moral motivation:

Here were people in whom brain damage had essentially shut down communication between the rational soul and the seething passions of the body…. Yet the result of the separation was not the liberation of reason from the thrall of the passions. It was the shocking revelation that reasoning requires the passions…. The collapse of decision-making, even in purely analytic and organizational tasks, was pervasive. The head can’t even do head stuff without the heart. (p. 34)

Besides “the passions,” what else has “shut down” in Damasio’s brain-lesion patients? Elsewhere (see Chapter 3 notes) we describe an intrinsic motivation to explore (“effectance motive”). This basic exploratory tendency accords to reasoning a more fundamental motivational status (cognitive primacy) than that of servant to “the thrall of the passions” (affective primacy). The patients’ brain lesions may have been so severe as to extinguish even the neural prerequisites for exploratory behavior, reasoning, concern for consistency or rationality, and other “head stuff” (executive function, decision-making, etc.). Instead of support for exclusively affective primacy in morality, the more cautious conclusion from Damasio’s findings is simply that certain brain lesions can shut down both affective and cognitive sources of motivation needed for sociomoral and goal-directed behavior.

4. Although their underlying emotions are more complex, even “decentered” adults can be captured for a while by the salience of familiar cues. One of Hoffman’s close friends, who had cancer,

just wanted to talk as usual about sports and the stock market, and with the usual gusto—about anything but his condition. Had I been openly empathic it could have disrupted his denial, so I went along, got lost in conversation and enjoyed myself; empathic distress was kept under control in the back of my mind, but it returned afterward. (Hoffman, 2000, p. 81, emphasis added)

5. Perspective-taking is the more general term (“children may be able to understand another’s perspective without knowing anything about the person’s role [in a social structure];”, Maccoby, 1980, p. 317). Hence, Hoffman (personal communication, September 19, 2002), since the publication of his book (Hoffman, 2000) has dropped the role-taking term and uses perspective-taking exclusively (e.g., Hoffman, 2008).

6. Batson (2011) argued that “valuing the other’s welfare” is “a more fundamental source of empathic concern,” partly because perspective-taking spontaneously flows from other-valuing (p. 228). A fundamental valuing of another’s welfare relates to the basic arousal modes in Hoffman’s theory.

7. An interesting question pertains to the degree of effectiveness of blaming the victim and other cognitive distortions in preempting or neutralizing empathy and guilt. Maintaining self-serving cognitive distortions may require the expenditure of cognitive
resources (see Chapter 7). That the success of such rationalizations is less than complete for many antisocial individuals offers some hope for intervention (see Chapter 8).

8. Hoffman derived this now-widely used discipline typology (induction, power assertion, love withdrawal) from his (and others’) extensive socialization research findings (e.g., Hoffman, 1960, 1963, 1970; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967). Krevans, Patrick, and I (in consultation with Hoffman) updated and revised Hoffman’s original parental discipline questionnaire. The result, termed the Perceived Parental Discipline (PPD) questionnaire, is available from Patrick or me.

9. Intense conflicts involving a recalcitrant child are sometimes handled with the consistent, sustained application of a “time-out” technique whereby the child is sequestered (e.g., placed in a “naughty corner,” or, for older children, “reflection chair”) for a period of time. As a popular television show *Supernanny* (Powell, 2008) demonstrated, the time-out consequence works best when it is framed in moral or social perspective-taking terms (the sequestered child is reminded in clear, simple terms of why their act was wrong or harmful, and a “sorry” is elicited and accepted; older children may progress from the “reflection chair” to the “communication couch” eventuating in [one hopes] an apology and parent–child reconciliation).

10. Krevans and I first presented our work as a conference paper in 1991 (Krevans & Gibbs, 1991) and subsequently published it in 1996. We were unaware of Janssens’ and Gerris’s (1992) research report, nor were they aware of ours (Janssens, personal communication, December 5, 2002). That two independent studies using different methods found such similar results bolsters confidence in the validity of the support for Hoffman’s inductive discipline theory.

11. Where power assertion is less harsh, corporal punishment is culturally normative, and the physical punishment is not interpreted as rejection by the child, the negative relationship between power assertion and children’s empathy or prosocial behavior may not hold (Dodge, McLoyd, & Lansford, 2005).

12. It is even possible that other-oriented inductions can be counterproductive by pre-adolescence. Some mothers commented to researcher Julia Krevans that their early-adolescent children were often already aware of how a transgression of theirs had harmed another and would have felt hurt, scolded, or “talked down to” by an explicit description (Krevans, personal communication, December 30, 2002). Perhaps expressing disappointed expectations and confidence in the prospect of better future conduct is more effective once children reach adolescence, as a recent study (Patrick & Gibbs, 2012) suggests.

Chapter 6

1. Interestingly, Hoffman (2000) suggested that not only the basic but even the advanced arousal modes (verbally mediated association, perspective-taking) can contribute to sudden responding: “If one is paying attention to the victim, they too can be fast-acting, involuntary, and triggered immediately on witnessing the victim’s situation” (p. 61). This point challenges relegations of complex cognitive processes to “slow” and “cool” mental systems (e.g., Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008a; cf. Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).

2. Marta Laupa (2000) suggested that “2 plus 2 equals 4” involves symbolic notation and hence does not illustrate numerical or logical necessity as well as do propositions such as “the combination of two actual quantities is greater than either of the original quantities” (p. 22).
3. Anthropologist Robert Edgerton (1992) provided a poignant example of profound moral perception of common humanity (and moral courage):

Some time in the early nineteenth century, Knife Chief, the political leader of the Skidi Pawnee and a greatly respected man, decided that human sacrifice was cruel and unnecessary. . . . He began to speak against the practice, and in 1817 he attempted to halt the sacrifice of a captive girl. Just before the torture of the young victim was about to begin, Knife Chief’s son, by all accounts the most honored warrior among the Skidi Pawnee, stepped in front of the girl and declared that it was his father’s wish that she be set free. As the Pawnee audience looked on in amazement he freed the girl, threw her on his horse, and delivered her safely to her own people. A year later, father and son again prevented a sacrifice—this time of a ten-year-old Spanish boy—by ransoming the captive from a warrior who was determined to offer the child for sacrifice.

As courageous, determined, and influential as Knife Chief and his son were, their efforts to put an end to the practice of human sacrifice failed. Led by their priests, the Skidi Pawnee continued to propitiate the Morning Star by sacrificing human captives at least until 1834 and perhaps much longer. Knife Chief and his son had failed, but they stand as striking examples of individuals who did everything in their power to change a custom that they found abhorrent, even though that custom was held sacred by the rest of their society. (p. 143)

4. We posit moral identity as a major motivational primacy mainly in individuals for whom personal and moral goals are highly integrated (although salient wrong and harm to others can pose a problem of inconsistency and guilt for those with even modest moral self-relevance; see Chapter 7). In contrast, Damon (1996) saw a more widespread impact on motivation: “Toward the end of childhood, . . . children . . . begin thinking about themselves in terms of how kind, just, and responsible they are. . . . This [closer link between their moral interests and their self-concept or identity] leads to a bit more predictability between children’s moral judgment and their conduct” (p. 221; cf. Patrick & Gibbs, 2012).

5. Perhaps not totally realistic or veridical. Some studies suggest that seeing one’s self and capabilities or prospects for success as “slightly better than they are” may be adaptive and mentally healthy (Baumeister, 1989, p. 182, emphasis added; cf. Haaga & Beck, 1994; Taylor & Brown, 1994).

Chapter 7

1. Self-Centered on the group level is termed in-group or ethnocentric bias (cf. empathic bias). Although in-group bias or favoritism does not necessarily lead to out-group derogation or hostility (Brewer, 2007; Haidt, 2012; and see Chapter 2), it often does. As Edgerton (1992) noted, “People in many [tribal] societies refer to themselves as ‘the people’ and regard all others as alien and repellent, if not downright subhuman. . . . Many people believe that their way of life is the only one” (p. 148). Where the group’s beliefs are perceived to be uniquely pure and superior (as in ideological extremist groups), group members may even consider it a “duty” to kill outsiders. After all, the very existence of these impure inferiors—especially if they seem to be flourishing—is in effect an affront to the superior group and its rightful domination (Husain, 2007).

Interestingly, Edgerton noted the dangers to a group that does not even try to rationalize or ennoble its ethnocentric aggression as a religious or ceremonial duty:
Unlike most of the North American Indian societies that practiced cannibalism, the Tonkawa ate people without religious justification or ceremonial purpose. The open gusto with which they consumed human flesh was offensive to neighboring tribes, and the frequent Tonkawa raids in search of more captives were so threatening that in 1862 a coalition of six disparate tribes, united only by their detestation of the Tonkawa, attacked them and killed half the people in the tribe. (p. 100)

2. The dynamics of harm and self-protective distortion do not always start with Self-Centered presumptions (whether proactive or reactive). Rather, the start may be the ensnarement of an ordinary person in a self-centered (exploitative, corrupt, coercive) culture—evident all too often across financial (Toffler, 2003), competitive-sport, corporate, military, and other institutional contexts. David Moshman (2004, 2007) described such dynamics among soldiers indoctrinated and pressured to commit atrocities. Many crimes of obedience are accomplished by “otherwise considerate people” (Bandura, 1999, p. 205; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989) who ignore or rationalize the harmfulness of their compliant actions. To Edmund Burke’s famous statement that “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing,” Bandura added: “The triumph of evil requires a lot of good people doing a bit of it in a morally disengaged way with indifference to the human suffering they collectively cause” (p. 206).

3. Edgerton (1992) evaluated as maladaptive the cultural belief among the Ojibwa and North American Indian tribes that serious “acts committed while drunk were not intended” and hence were excusable. Such cultural extenuations, Edgerton argued, can jeopardize group survival:

By excusing drunken acts such as murder, rape, incest, and child abuse, the Ojibwa can only have encouraged such acts to take place…. When a society adopts a belief that… no one is to be blamed for anything done while drunk, it has adopted a fully warranted prescription for self-destruction. (p. 185)

4. Interestingly, individuals with pronounced self-debasing cognitive distortions and internalizing disorders evidence higher levels of ego development than do individuals with pronounced self-serving cognitive distortions and externalizing disorder (reviewed by Noam, 1998).

Chapter 8

1. Although social perspective-taking ordinarily promotes empathic concern and inhibits aggression (Chapter 5), this link cannot be presumed among antisocial individuals. Youths high in callous and unemotional traits (a risk factor for, or precursor to, psychopathy), for example, may learn merely to “talk the talk” of adequate social perspective-taking without actually experiencing empathy for others’ feelings (Dadds, Hawes, Frost, et al., 2009). Hope of genuine change in these individuals is not baseless, however. Given brain neural plasticity (especially at younger ages), it is possible that even among children with callous and unemotional traits, some weak “capacity for empathy [may] exist” and be strengthened by appropriate social perspective-taking intervention (Kahn, 2012, p. 35). In any event, Max’s gains in empathy and perspective-taking seemed genuine, as evidenced by his subsequent prosocial behavior even when not under surveillance.
Although Haidt (2012) has generally been reluctant to transition into normative considerations, he does prescribe Durkheimian cultural solidarity toward the end of his *Righteous Mind*. The mutual-help approach in EQUIP is consistent with Haidt’s Durkheimian emphasis on the importance of a traditional holistic culture or community for human flourishing. A key caveat for genuine flourishing is that the culture cultivated must be morally mature and responsible. (Hence the *just* community emphasis in Kohlberg’s embrace of Durkheimian group solidarity; Snarey, 2011.) Furthermore, a cognitive-behavioral curriculum emphasizing cognitive restructuring is typically needed if the just (fair, balanced, legitimate) community or positive mutual-help group is to become an effective helping vehicle for its (behaviorally at-risk) members.

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The provision of faith-building opportunities in Positive Peer Culture adds crucially to the cognitive-behavioral approach in EQUIP, addressing James Garbarino’s (1999) concern that cognitive behavioral programs [by themselves] are not enough to initiate and sustain the deep changes necessary for rehabilitation in the long run. Conventional programs may succeed in providing some of the needed psychological and social anchors, but they are unlikely to provide the spiritual anchors that are required for success with the most traumatized, troubled, and violent boys. (pp. 216–217)

Cultivating a positive or receptive group “culture” for caring and change is important even for younger or more mainstream groups that are merely at risk. Fortunately, such groups may be less recalcitrant and hence may require less group-building work (see DiBiase et al., 2012).

Because a cycle of lethal revenge continues indefinitely, the ultimate consequence is death to all or most of the disputants. To make this point with a gang member who was plotting revenge at the funeral of his murdered brother, a youth worker asked: “Look around, do you see any old guys here?” (many of the older youths had already been murdered in cycles of revenge; Kotlowitz, May 4, 2008, p. 54). Fortunately, in this case, the appeal to ultimate consequences was successful and cycles of retaliatory killings thereby preempted.

Where self-centered orientations in the group have *not* declined, introducing this session may be counter-productive. One still Self-Centered youth remarked with respect to a victim-awareness program: “What about me, man? What about what I have gone through? I mean, I want to talk about what hurts me, and all they want to talk about is the people I hurt. I won’t do it. The whole program stinks” (Garbarino, 1999, p. 139).

A personal note: I experience some pride or satisfaction (and relief from guilt) as I reflect that—so many years after I failed to intervene against the victimization of Edward (see Chapter 1)—I have spearheaded an intervention program that colleagues have adapted both to reduce victimizations and to facilitate the social competence of (otherwise) vulnerable individuals such as Edward.

Although “disgust” intensifies the negative moral evaluation of the act, its immorality stems from its violation of the condition of reversibility (see Chapter 1).
astonishing, effortless abilities of mathematical savants (see Davies, 1992). Just as knowledge is not only “necessary” but also contingent or empirical (see Chapter 10), however, primary reality is not only timeless or eternal but also dynamic and evolving. Paul Davies (1992) noted “the paradoxical conjunction of the temporal and atemporal, of being and becoming” in the nature of ultimate reality (p. 38).

2. This question of objective or deeply true morality is controversial (see Chapters 1, 10). Haidt and Bjorklund (2008b) explicitly discounted any notion of objective morality: “Moral facts are facts only with respect to a community of human beings that have created them…. [There are no] objective [moral] facts which would be true for any rational creature anywhere in the universe” (p. 214). Piaget (1932/1965) suggested that ideal moral necessities of reciprocity and equality are akin to their counterparts in logic or mathematics. Penrose (1994) accorded ontologically real (Platonic) foundational status to mathematical (and possibly moral) truths “discovered” by the human mind.

3. Whether some cultures lack these ideals altogether is debated. Even blood-vengeance cultures, insofar as positive social exchanges are normatively prescribed in some circumstances, can be said to partake of moral ideals to some extent. Genuine exceptions are not known. In the famous case of the Ik tribe of East Africa, selfishness and cruelty were not only common but, according to Turnbull (1972), normative. The Ik “culture” was viewed as having degenerated as a result of severe food shortages, however (de Waal, 1996; Edgerton, 1992). Other degenerative cases are discussed by Robert Edgerton (1992). No such degenerative conditions were attributed to the Sawi, a tribe of headhunting cannibals in New Guinea known for their idealization and practice of treachery and deceit (specifically, “fattening with friendship” a prospective victim before slaughtering him). Yet even the Sawi prescribed genuine intergroup friendship, trust, and peace under certain conditions (following an exchange of babies for rearing in one another’s villages and a joint celebration featuring an interweaving non-cannibalistic “you-in-me-I-in-you” dance) (Richardson, 2005, p. 174).

4. Of 37 patients not reporting a near-death experience one to three days after the near-death event, four reported at Time 2 (2 years later) that they did have a near-death experience; such cases raise the question of susceptibility to false memories (French, 2001).

5. Administration of certain drugs also contributed to the cessation of brain wave activity (Robert Spetzler, personal communication, June 2, 2002).

6. Two possible exceptions have been reported. Greyson (2000a, in press) found elevated but subclinical levels of dissociation among near-death experiencers. Because the study was correlational, however, the direction (or directions) of causation between near-death experiences and dissociative tendencies (daydreaming, etc.) could not be determined. Fenwick and Fenwick (1995) pointed out that the affectless and dreamlike qualities of dissociated states contrast with the intense emotions and vividly perceived reality of the near-death experience. A second possible exception: Near-death experiences may be more likely if the near-death condition occurs at younger ages (studies reviewed by van Lommel, 2001; cf. Long, 2010).

7. Intriguingly, although judgment and penitence are much more prominent in medieval narratives, in accounts of the light, contemporary testimony bears a striking resemblance to medieval narratives. Both medieval and modern descriptions of otherworld light blend visual qualities such as splendor, clarity, and transparency with sensory/emotional effects such as warmth and energy. . . . This mixture of imagery suggests a convergence of knowledge
and love. . . . The visionary may behold a light that is at once all-knowing and all-loving. (Zaleski, 1987, p. 125)

8. A particularly dramatic instance of returning from an NDE to care for others was reported by Sabom (2008). During a devastating fire aboard an airplane (the accident occurred on December 17, 1973), a flight attendant, struggling for breath, “crawled onto” the two remaining seats not yet on fire. She recounted:

That’s when I had my experience. It was just all light. It was just incredible happiness and joy! It was indescribable. I saw myself. I was lying there in my uniform. I could see myself clearly through the smoke and I thought, “Why aren’t I moving?” There was fire everywhere. . . . But I really didn’t care because I was so happy where I was. . . .
And I am looking at myself and I’m lying there with my eyes closed because I couldn’t breathe. All of a sudden a passenger screamed “Open the window. Somebody open the window. Help me!” I thought “I have to help that lady.” The next thing I knew, I was back in my body. (p. 106)

9. Noteworthy are the comments of the operating cardiovascular surgeon at Hartford Hospital, Hiroyoshi Takata, and his colleagues. Dr. Takata commented: “I cannot explain how he [Al Sullivan, the patient] saw these things under the complete sleep of anesthesia.” Dr. Takata’s colleague, Dr. Anthony F. Lasala, commented: “Al Sullivan would not know of this peculiar behavior of Dr. Takata. I did not tell him [Al] that. . . . Even if he was conscious, it would be impossible for Al to see Dr. Takata’s stance or arm movement because Al [was] behind the drape that blocks the vision of the patient and his eyes [were] taped shut.” Another colleague, Dr. Kathy E. Maliato, Director of Women’s Cardiac Services at Saint John’s Health Center, exclaimed almost in exasperation: “So explain that to me. Explain that, through chemicals or some other scientific explanation. Please explain to me why that man knows that” (Ling, 2008).

10. Since Pam was not yet clinically dead and may have still had some residual (if undetected) brain activity during the autoscopic portion of her experience, perhaps brain activity somehow generated these aspects. Yet the “how” is problematic: She had “no sight (eyes taped shut), no hearing (ear canals plugged), no touch (arms secured under drapes), no taste (endotracheal tube in mouth . . . ), no seizure activity, and was under anesthesia deep enough to allow for the painless removal of the top of her skull” (Sabom, personal communication, September 20, 2002). Parnia (2006) pointed out that thought processes are normally mediated by interacting neural regions in the brain, and that any such “minute” residual activity “would be unlikely to lead to adequate electricity being generated for the brain cells to communicate with each other” (p. 94).

11. Ray Hyman (2001) suggested that Pam Reynolds had “the complete report of the proceedings” of her operation, from which she could have reconstructed her “experience.” In fact, however, Pam had only a five-page summary of the operation, which made no mention of the idiosyncratic details that she accurately reported (concerning the appearance of the cranial saw and instrument case, surgery team conversation, etc.; Sabom, personal communication, September 20, 2002).

12. One is reminded of the influence of the observer on what is observed at the atomic and subatomic levels. The influence is not totally determinative, however. The restriction of observational or measurement influence to certain ranges within a subatomic “wave” of
probability (Lindley, 1996, 1998), reflecting the “precise ... mathematical laws that govern the quantum world” (of probability of wave collapse or particle manifestation at a given location), suggests that subatomic reality is not totally a function of the subjective observer (Penrose, 1994, p. 313; see Chapter 10).

Chapter 10

1. Kielburger (1998) found that, to be taken seriously as a social activist, he had to deal with issues such as whether eliminating child labor would “send local currencies plummeting, causing unemployment and economic chaos” in those countries, and whether children freed from child labor might end up in even worse circumstances (p. 22). David Brooks (April, 2012) commented that “it’s hard not to feel inspired” by such “refreshingly uncynical” young idealists seeking to do good in underdeveloped countries. Nonetheless, “there’s only so much good you can do unless you are willing to confront corruption, venality, and disorder head-on” (p. A31). Brooks’s complaint is reminiscent of Inhelder and Piaget’s (1958) reference to early formal operational thinkers’ disinclination to accommodate their ideals to the constraints of practical reality; only after such accommodation is the visionary formal operational thinker “transformed from an idealistic reformer into an achiever” (p. 346). Fortunately, decades after his early-adolescent idealism—and perhaps precisely because of his willingness to deal with stubborn constraints (Streeter & Manning, 2012)—Kielburger’s work has achieved lasting results.

2. Although drawing on cognitive and affective primacies, moral identity may be best seen as constituting in its own right a source—a “meta-” primacy, if you will—of moral motivation.

3. Empathic distress may be activated even in this case if one thinks of others who may be left out and hurt because of the undeserving individual’s benefits (Hoffman, 2000).

4. Physicist John Polkinghorne (1984) suggested that this “unexpected degree of [subatomic] togetherness” is “particularly surprising for so reductionist a subject as physics, [which] is always trying to split things up into smaller and smaller constituents with a view of treating them independently of each other” (p. 76). As Dean Radin (2006) put the point: “One of the most surprising discoveries of modern physics is that objects aren’t as separate as they seem. When you drill down into the core of even the most solid-looking material, separateness dissolves” (p. 1). Surprising though this discovery may be, the evidence for basic non-local interconnectedness (at least of electrons or photons whose waveforms have been entangled) is compelling. “Until a measurement has actually been performed, it is wrong to think of the two [elementary particles] as having a completely independent existence” (Lindley, 1996, p. 146). Although counterintuitive, this “unexpected togetherness” as well as other properties of subatomic non-locality support “the transistor (the heart of our electronics industry), lasers, magnetic resonance imaging, diodes, and the memory in USB flash drives—and may soon deliver the revolutions of quantum computing, tunneling, and teleportation” (Eagleman, 2011, p. 196). Subatomic togetherness may even characterize the ultimate reality of the cosmos: “born of a single quantum event, the Universe is at some basic level a single interconnected quantum system” (Lindley, 1998, p. 60; cf. Laszlo, 2003).


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### Author Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abelson, R. P., 56, 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abramovitch, H., 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abrams, D., 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ackerman, P., 133, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams, E., 44–46, 58, 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adelson, J., 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agee, V. L., 177–178, 183–184, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahlborn, H. H., 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldeguer, C. M., 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleva, A. E., 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander, E., 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander, R. D., 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali, A. H., 5, 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alibali, M. W., 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Krenawi, A., 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Krenawi, S., 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aloise, P. A., 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aloniz, V., 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvarado, C. S., 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvarez-Saunders, C., 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ames, G., 52–53, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsel, E., 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, C. A., 146, 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, D., 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, R., 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, S., 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrews, E. L., 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrews, G., 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoni, G., 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appiah, K. A., 5, 7, 28, 30, 34, 165, 266, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquino, K., 141, 159–160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbuthnot, J., 190–191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archer, M. A., 177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold, K. D., 72, 190, 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold, M. L., 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aronson, E., 56, 141, 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsenio, W. E., 44–46, 58, 61, 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspect, A., 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkins, R., 141, 178, 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayal, S., 142, 165, 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayer, A. J., 26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Babcock, J., 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachorowski, J. A., 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badzinski, D. M., 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baier, K., 2–3, 95, 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baillargeon, R., 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin, M. W., 77, 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balota, D. A., 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banaji, M. R., 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandura, A., 118, 144, 160, 166, 277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbaranelli, C., 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargh, J. A., 22, 145–146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baron, R., 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baron, R. M., 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baron, R. A., 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrett, 53, 145, 284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriga, K. T., 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry, B., 8, 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basinger, K. S., 39, 72–73, 75–76, 95, 116, 154–155, 271, 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bates, J. E., 152, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batson, J. G., 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baumeister, R. F., 9, 142, 146, 158, 166, 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baumrind, D., 126, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavelas, J. B., 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beah, I., 271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauchamp, T. L., 4, 8, 9, 117, 268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauregard, M., 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bebeau, M. J., 5, 70, 72, 77, 84, 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becchio, C., 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beck, A. T., 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beck, R., 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Begue, L., 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behne, T., 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beilin, H., 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell, J. S., 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell, R., 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belluck, P., 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bem, D. J., 222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Benatar, D., 266
Benz, G. R., 211, 212, 254
Bereby-Meyer, Y., 159
Bergman, R., 142, 272
Bering, J. M., 42
Berk, L., 44, 60, 111, 128
Berkowitz, L., 25
Berkowitz, M. W., 39, 58
Bernhard, H., 23
Bernstein, S., 60
Bertonson, G., 62
Bidell, T. R., 76, 78, 83
Bierman, D. J., 222
Bigler, R. S., 42
Birbaumer, N., 229
Birch, S. A. J., 46, 48
Birnsbaum, J. J., 162
Bixby, F. L., 177
Black, A., 103
Blair, R. J. R., 101
Blanke, O., 215, 227
Blason, L., 110
Blatt, S. J., 68–69
Blount, M. R., 157, 176, 183, 189, 192–193, 198, 202, 278
Bogestad, A. J., 167
Boom, J., 63, 79
Borduin, C. M., 190
Bornstein, M. H., 68, 128, 152
Bosch, J. D., 163
Bouwmeester, D., 249
Bower, T. G. R., 107
Bowlby, J., 77
Bowles, S., 34, 67
Boyd, D. R., 273
Boyd, R., 34, 67
Boyes, M. C., 87–88
Boysen, S. T., 62
Brabeck, M., 143
Braeckman, J., 67
Brandt, R. B., 97
Brehl, B. A., 42, 58, 61
Brendtro, L. K., 161, 176–178, 183–184, 186, 198
Brenner, J., 62
Brewer, M. B., 6, 18, 276
Bricmont, J., 265, 270
Bromley, D. B., 42, 45
Bronfenbrenner, U., 139, 152
Brooks, D., 281
Broome, K., 227
Brosnan, S. F., 24
Brothers, L., 101
Broughton, R. S., 222
Brown, J. D., 276
Brown, P. M., 190
Brown, R., 32–33, 37, 48, 53–54, 81, 116, 245, 247, 249, 270, 271
Brownrigg, S., 36
Brugman, D., 63, 79, 153–154, 167, 203
Brummelman, E., 158
Brummeth, B. H., 116
Bruneau, E. G., 16
Bruni, P., 266
Buchner, A., 24
Bugeental, D. B., 126
Bukowski, W., 59
Burger, J. M., 140, 143–144
Burgess, R. L., 67
Buriel, R., 124
Burkhart, J. E., 273
Bush, N., 218
Bush, N. E., 218
Bushman, B. J., 146, 158, 162, 171
Bussey, K., 41

C
Calitri, R., 137
Call, T., 21
Callanan, M., 225
Caltran, G., 107
Camelia, C. R. T., 164, 167
Camerer, C., 34
Campbell, D. T., 99
Campbell, R. L., 3
Candee, D., 141–142, 144, 146
Cantor, J., 45
Caprara, G. V., 157, 166
Carducci, J. B., 186
Carlo, G., 143
Carlson, R., 137
Carnevale, J. J., 147
Carpendale, J., 34, 45, 47
Carpendale, J. I. M., 45
Carpendale, J. I., 76
Carpenter, J., 20
Carr, D., 245
Carr, M. B., 157
Case, R., 44, 50, 53
Cason, D. R., 77
Castiello, U., 110
Cauff man, E., 157
Chabrol, J., 167
Chagnon, N. A., 69
Chaiken, S., 24
Chalmers, D., 253
Chambers, H. J., 162, 166
Chandler, M., 45, 87, 88
Chang, L., 128
Chapman, G. L., 202
Chapman, M., 53, 216
Charbonneau, L., 167
Chartrand, T. L., 22
Chase, K. A., 158
Chatham, C. H, 43, 48, 50
Chaudhary, N., 111, 208, 215, 221
Cheesman, F. L., 190
Childress, J. F., 4, 8–9, 117, 267–268
Chiong, C., 23–24
Chovil, N., 103
Christian, S. R., 230, 236, 254
Christie, S., 47
Christopher, J. C., 3
Churchland, P., 8, 136, 268
Cikara, M., 116
Clare, I. C. H., 75, 202
Clark, C. L., 77
Clark, M. C., 61
Clark, P. M., 13, 137–138, 143
Clark, R. D., 107, 110
Cohen, J. D., 101, 267
Coie, J. D., 127, 158, 163
Coles, R., 17–18, 21, 29, 21, 133, 137–138, 140, 142, 148, 240
Collins, N., 77
Collins, W. A., 68, 128, 152
Colombo, M., 24
Comunian, A. L., 71, 139, 143, 273
Conquest, R., 166
Cook, E. W., 218, 224, 227–228
Cooper, S., 224, 253
Corby, B. C., 160
Correll, J., 119
Corrigan, M. W., 190
Corriveau, K. H., 19
Cosmides, L., 61
Cowan, C. P., 272
Cowan, P. A., 49, 135, 268, 272
Cox-Chapman, M., 216, 220
Craig, R. K., 271
Crick, N. R., 145
Cullen, D., 159
Cunningham, M. R., 25
Cunningham, P. B., 190
Custer, W. L., 54–55, 245, 271
Czikszentmahlyi, 272

**D**
Dadds, M. R., 277
Dahl, M., 24
Dahlen, E. R., 194
Daigle, M. S., 167
Damasio, A., 25, 122, 274
Darley, J. J., 100, 144
Darley, J. M., 101, 267
Darling, N., 130
Davidov, M., 108, 110–111, 250
Davies, P., 206–207, 244, 279
Davis, M. H., 2
Day, J. M., 3
De Schrijver, J., 67
Deater-Deckard, K., 128
Deff enbacher, J. L., 194
Dekovic, M., 153–154
DeLoache, J., 23–24, 50
Deluty, R. H., 167
Dennett, D., 253
Denton, K., 3, 20, 27, 29, 63, 67, 76, 247, 272
Denzler, M., 271
Dernevik, M., 157, 167
DeSteno, D., 47, 150, 160–161, 267
Devlin, R. S., 157, 159–160, 165, 167
Devlin, R., 176, 202
Dewey, J., 81–86, 90–91, 97, 259, 272
Diamond, J., 69, 271
Dias, M., 26
DiBiase, A. M., 16, 157, 176, 183, 189, 192–193, 198, 202, 278
Dishion, T. J., 168, 177, 183
Dodd, J., 154
Dodge, K. A., 126–127, 144, 148, 152, 158, 163–164, 171, 244–275
Doherty, M. J., 45
Doise, W., 52
Donahoe, C. P., 168
Donnelly, T. M., 141, 178, 190
Dover, A., 54
Dovidio, J. F., 119
Duckworth, A. L., 146
Dunfield, K., 99
Dunlop, W. L., 136
Dunn, J., 23, 58, 153
Dupoux, E., 19
Durkheim, E., 5, 21, 32, 36, 37, 85, 266, 268, 278
Dutton, S., 203
Duvall, J., 133, 135

E
Eagleman, D. M., 25, 253, 281
Ecton, R. R., 195–196
Edelstein, W., 143
Edgerton, R. B., 5, 69, 276–277, 279
Edwards, A., 143
Edwards, C. P., 70
Eibl, M., 249
Eisenberg, N., 45, 95, 98, 108, 112, 121, 130, 143, 159, 236, 269, 273
Eisenberg, P. R., 216–217
Eldar, O., 159
Elf erich, I., 209, 226, 231
Ellis, A., 156, 218–219
Engle, 53, 145, 284
Enright, R. D., 252–253
Epstein, S., 77, 159
Evans, J. St. B. T., 267

F
Fabes, R. A., 45, 95, 121, 130, 159, 273
Fagan, J., 157
Fazio, R. H., 26
Feffer, M., 44, 77
Fehr, E., 21, 23, 34, 67
Feigelson, L. F., 30
Feindler, E. L., 195–196
Fenwick, E., 279
Fernandez, E., 194
Fernandez, Y., 203
Ferrari, M., 139
Festinger, L., 247
Fida, R., 157, 160, 166
Figley, C. R., 116
Fischer, K. W., 76, 78, 83
Fiske, A. P., 63
Planagan, C. E., 230
Florsheim, P., 153, 157
Fontana, D., 253
Fowers, B. J., 5
Fowler, R. C., 265
Fox, M., 215, 219, 231, 253–254
Frank, M. J., 43, 49–50, 52
Franken, W. K., 8–9, 247, 250, 265
Franklin, S., 93, 202
Frederick, S., 30
Fredmore, S. C., 160
Freedman, B. J., 168
Freeman, D., 141, 159–160
French, C. C., 227, 279
Fried, R., 25
Frimer, J. A., 136, 141
Fromm, E., 69, 91, 94
Frost, A. D. J., 277
Fujita, K., 147
Fuller, D., 72, 73, 76, 95, 153, 168, 190, 203, 269, 271

G
Gachter, S., 21
Gackenbach, J., 222
Gaertner, S. L., 119
Gaines, B., 160
Gannon, T. A., 163
Garbarino, J., 165, 205, 278
Garber, J., 164
Garmon, L. C., 273
Gentner, D., 47, 49
Geraci, 24
Gergen, K. J., 3
Gerris, J. R. M., 127, 129, 275
Gershoff, E. T., 128
Gielen, U. P., 71, 139, 143, 273
Giesbrecht, N., 141
Gill, M. B., 267
Gilligan, C., 98, 273
Gino, F., 165
Gintis, H., 34, 67
Girgis, Z. M., 140, 143–144
Glachan, P., 52
Glazer, M. P., 140
Gleichgerrcht, E., 116, 118
Glick, B., 176, 184, 186, 193
Gnepp, J., 45
Gold, J., 44–46, 58
Golding, W., 59
Goleman, D., 159
Gollwitzer, M., 30, 145, 271
Gollwitzer, P. M., 30, 145, 271
Goodall, J., 100
Goodenough, D. R., 139
Goodrick, T. S., 13, 137–138, 143
Gopnik, A., 33, 45, 50, 64, 77, 112, 117, 253, 267, 270
Gordon, D., 145, 190–191
Gottman, J. M., 159
Gottschling, V., 17
Gouldner, A., 55–56, 62
Graham, J., 18–19
Granger, P., 249
Green, B., 94
Green, J. L., 13, 70, 137–138, 143
Green, J. D., 101, 266–267
Greenwald, A. G., 26
Gregg, V. R., 154–155, 273
Grimm, J. Jr., 160
Grim, P., 147
Grime, R. L., 13, 39, 72–73, 75, 95, 154, 271, 272
Grogan-Kaylor, A., 128
Gross, P., 265, 270
Grossman, D. L., 166
Groth, A. N., 162
Gruber, E., 177
Grusec, J. E., 126
Gruselier, J., 229
Guerra, N. G., 164–165
Guisinger, S., 68–69
Gustafson, P., 77
Guthrie, I. K., 130

H
Haaga, D. A., 276
Habermas, 3
Hafer, C. L., 114
Hagan, M. P., 167
Haggblom, S. J., 81
Halford, G. S., 53
Hambrick, D. Z., 53
Hamilton, V. L., 161, 165–166, 277
Hamilton, W. D., 100
Hamilin, J. K., 19, 24
Hammock, G. S., 60
Hardy, S. A., 143
Hare, B., 63
Hargreaves, D. J., 25
Haritos-Fatouros, M., 165
Harkness, S., 70
Hassin, R. R., 30, 34
Harris, B., 254
Harris, P. L., 19, 50
Harris, S., 8, 15, 21, 32, 34–35, 79, 248
Hart, D., 42, 141, 178, 190
Harter, S., 18, 33, 42, 44, 46, 58, 77, 139, 141, 158, 190
Harvey, O. J., 20, 69
Author Index

Hassin, R. R., 30, 34
Hastings, P. D., 127, 130
Hauser, M. D., 7, 67, 99, 269
Havighurst, H. J., 137
Hawes, D. J., 277
Hawkins, M. A., 164, 167
Hay, D. E., 108
Haye, H., 24
Heide, K. M., 203
Heider, F., 56
Helmond, P., 167, 203
Helwig, C. C., 3, 41–42
Henggeler, S. W., 190
Hennig, K. H., 77, 125
Henrich, J., 34, 67
Herbeck, D., 148–151, 169–178, 178
Herbert, N., 67, 249, 252
Herrnstein, R. J., 32–33, 37, 81, 162
Hersh, M. A., 26
Hetherington, E. M., 68, 128, 152
Heye, M., 66
Heyman, R. E., 158
Hickling, A. K., 114
Higgins, A., 177
Higgins-D’Alessandro, A., 190
Hildebran, D., 203
Hill, T. E. Jr., 10
Hilton, N. Z., 203
Hodges, E. V. E., 160
Hoffman, M. L., 1–2, 8–10, 12–17, 19, 22,
25, 30, 36–38, 40, 59, 67–68, 78, 85,
93, 95, 98–135, 142, 149, 151–152,
157, 159, 161, 173–175, 192, 198,
205–206, 208, 234, 236, 239–41, 244,
246–248, 250, 253–254, 257, 259–265,
267–268, 273–275, 281
Hoffner, C., 45
Holden, J. M., 217, 223, 230, 236, 254
Hollander, P., 166
Hollin, C. R., 154–155
Holst, U., 153, 160
Hood, W. R., 20, 69
Horn, M., 176, 186, 203
Howard, L. H., 101
Hudson, J. A., 123
Hudson, S. M., 166
Huerta, S., 143
Hughes, C., 58, 153
Hummel, R. C., 90
Hunter, N., 168
Hurley, D., 176
Husain, E., 276
Huston, T. L., 67
Hyde, J. S., 273
Hyman, R., 227

I
Imuta, K., 24
Inhelder, B., 281
Inzlicht, M., 146
Irwin, H. J., 222
Irwin, M. J., 186
Isen, A. M., 25

J
Jackson, P. L., 102–103, 105, 107
Jacobson, D., 5–6, 36
Jacobson, N. S., 159
Jaffee, S., 273
Jakubowski, P., 167
James, S. A., 266
James, W., 221
Jamieson, G. A., 229
Janssens, J. M. A. M., 127, 129, 275
Jaycox, C., 168
Jensen, L. A., 67
Johansson, P., 157, 167
Johnson, J., 119
Jones, M., 177
Jones, V. K., 81
Joseph, C., 8, 24, 268
Joseph, J. A., 13, 137–138, 143

K
Kahn, J., 159, 277
Kahn, T., 162
Kahneman, D., 30, 46
Kane, R., 2, 4, 14, 120
Kardes, F. R., 26
Kartner, J., 111
Kasachkoff, T., 35
Kaufman, K., 157, 159–160, 165, 167
Kazdin, A., 152–153, 155, 168, 176
Keasy, C. B., 71
Keenan, T., 77
Kegan, R., 66, 91
Kellehear, A., 216–217
Keller, H., 111, 208, 215, 221
Kelley, E., 99
Kelley, P., 225
Kelly, C. K., 168
Kelly, D. R., 146
Kelly, E. F., 208, 215, 221
Kelly, E. W., 208, 215, 221
Kelly, G., 141
Kelman, H. C., 139, 160–161, 165–166, 277
Kenwood, B., 24
Kerr, D. C. R., 127
Kesebir, S, 3, 6, 17–20, 24–27, 32, 34, 268
Kettler, R. J., 137
Kielburger, C., 239, 241–242, 249, 255, 281
Kielburger, M., 240
Killen, M., 59, 119
Kinzler, K. D., 19
Klahr, D., 272
Kletti, R., 233
Knafo, A., 110, 111
Kochanska, G., 126
Koenig, M. A., 50
Koller, S., 26
Komolova, M., 153, 157
Konopisos, M., 166
Koopman, R., 155
Koops, W., 163, 203
Kopelman, L. M., 5, 266
Kotchoubey, B., 229
Kotlowitz, A., 278
Kramer, R., 86–87
Krebs, D. L., 3, 20, 27, 29, 63, 67, 76, 247, 272
Krettenauer, T., 58, 125, 141, 143, 153
Krevans, J. A., 12, 127–128, 143, 275
Kruger, A., 58, 70
Kruger, A. C., 52, 57–58, 62, 91
Kubler, A., 229
Kuhmeier, V. A., 99
Kuhn, D., 65, 93, 271
Kunda, Z., 26
Kushner, H., 94
Lacayo, R., 140, 162
Lacey, M., 5, 266
Lamm, C., 114
Landau, J. R., 157, 164
Landau, J., 203
Landenberger, N. A., 202
Landenberger, N., 202
Landis, T., 215, 227
Langdon, P., 75, 201
Langdon, P. E., 75, 201–202
Lange, A. J., 167
Langstrom, N., 153, 160
Lansford, J. E., 126, 128, 275
Lapsley, D. K., 3
Lapsley, D. R., 141
Larden, M., 153, 157, 160, 167
Laszlo, E., 281
Latane, B., 100, 144
Laupa, M., 245, 271, 275
Lawrence, J. A., 125, 221
Lazarus, R. S., 26
Leavitt, N., 265, 270
Leeman, L. W., 153, 168, 190, 203
Leeman, R. F., 265
Lemery, C. R., 103
Lepage, J.-F., 110
Lerner, M. J., 114
Levin, P. F., 25
Levine, C., 273
Levitt, M. J., 61
Lewis, C. S., 60, 207, 236–237, 271
Lewis, J., 45, 47
Liau, A. K., 141, 153, 156–157, 159, 163–164, 166, 183, 203
Liben, L. S., 42
Liberman, Z., 19
Lickona, T., 63, 129, 138, 155
Lieberman, M., 76, 87, 89
Lift on, R. J., 119
Light, M., 52
Light, S., 99, 107, 110
Lillard, A. S., 43
Lindenburger, U., 53
Lindley, D., 281
Ling, L., 280
Lipsey, M., 202–203
Lipsey, M. W., 202–203
Litwack, S. E., 185
Livesley, W. J., 42, 45
LoBue, V., 23–24
Livesley, W. J., 202–203
Lipsy, M. W., 202–203
Littwack, S. E., 185
Livesley, W. J., 42, 45
LoBue, V., 23–24

L
La Taillade, J. J., 159
LaBerge, S., 222
Lochman, J. E., 171
Loeber, R., 168
Lopez, N. L., 127
Losoya, S. H., 130
Lourengo, O., 7, 40
Lowenberg, K., 267
Lupinetti, C., 157, 160, 166
Lytken, D. T., 142
Lynam, D., 127, 158
Lynch, M. P., 26, 30, 34, 269
M
Maass, P., 238–239
Maccoby, E. E., 68, 119, 128, 130, 152, 200
Machado, A., 40
MacIntyre, A., 3
Maclean, P. B., 24, 101
Mahajan, N., 19
Mahapatra, M., 63
Makowski, D. G., 13, 137–138, 143
Malti, T., 58
Manning, C. C., 140, 143–144
Manning, T., 281
Markus, H. R., 141
Marshall, W. L., 166
Martin, C. L., 141
Martin, G. B., 107, 110
Mason, M. G., 71
Mathabane, M., 119–120, 148, 255
Matthews, M. D., 146
Mettle, K., 249
Matwin, S., 42, 58, 61
Matza, D., 165
Maymon, Y., 69
McCabe, D. P., 53
McCall, H. J., 186
McCord, J., 177, 183
McCook, L. W., 177
McCready, F., 157, 159–160, 165, 167
McDaniel, M. A., 53
McDonnell, P., 61
McDougall, W., 32, 135
McFall, R. M., 168
McGinnis, E., 168, 200
McGlone, D., 271
McGuire, W. J., 56, 141
McKoy, V. C., 126, 275
McWilliams, B., 204
Meichenbaum, D. H., 77
Melin, L., 153, 160
Melfis, A. P., 63
Mendelson, E. F., 203
Menon, M., 160
Menon, M., 160
Merritt, A., 160
Metcalfe, J., 25, 147, 268, 275
Meyers, V., 209, 226, 231
Michalska, K. J., 102
Michealieu, Q., 45
Michel, L., 148–151, 169–73, 178
Mitchell, M. L., 186
Miller, G., 267
Miller, J. G., 42
Miller, K. F., 50
Miller, M., 52
Miller, P. H., 41–43, 45–48, 50–51, 53–54, 76, 91, 94, 206, 271
Mischel, H. N., 148
Mischel, W., 25, 147–148, 268, 275
Moll, H., 21
Monin, B., 160
Monsheure, J. J., 163
Moody, R. A., 208, 230
Moore, B., 25, 269
Morelli, S. A., 267
Morgan, C., 72, 140
Morling, B., 77, 159
Morris, B. J., 271
Morris, P. A., 139, 152
Morrison, E. M., 141, 153, 159
Morse, M., 218–220, 223, 231–233
Moskowitz, G. B., 30, 145
Much, N. C., 63
Mueller, E., 62
Mugny, G., 52
Muller, U., 34
Mullett, J., 103
Munakata, Y., 44, 49–50
Munn, P., 23
Murphy, G. H., 75, 202
Murphy, W. D., 203
Murray, F. B., 53, 78, 211, 227, 271
Mustakova-Possardt, E., 91
Myers, D. B., 265

N
Narvaez, D., 3, 5, 24, 34, 70, 72, 77, 84, 141, 144, 146
Nas, C., 203
Nassau, G., 54–55, 245, 271
Neisser, U., 77, 245, 254, 272
Nelini, C., 110
Nelson, E. E., 103
Nelson, J. R., 154
Nelson, K., 78, 123
Newcomb, T. M., 56, 141, 177
Newcombe, N. S., 40
Newman, J. P., 163
Newton, E. K., 50, 59, 111
Nezlek, J. B., 158, 162
Nichols, S., 267
Nickerson, R. S., 26
Niles, W. J., 190
Nishida, T., 23–24
Noam, G. G., 277
Noddings, N., 98
North, A. C., 25
Nosek, B. A., 26
Novaco, R. W., 195
Noyes, R., 230, 233, 236, 254
Nucci, L., 143
Nucci, L. P., 3
Nussbaum, M. C., 266
Nyman, M., 45
Nystrom, L. E., 101, 267

O
O’Connell, L., 99
O’Leary, D., 158, 253
O’Neil, R. P., 70, 94
Oliner, P., 139, 143
Oliner, S., 139, 143
Olson, S. L., 127
Olthof, T., 158, 162
Oroboio de Castro, B., 58, 135
Ortigue, S., 215, 227
Osgood, D. W., 177
Overbeek, G., 167, 203
Owens, J. E., 227

P
Paciello, M., 157, 160, 166
Palmer, E. J., 75, 154–155, 202, 222
Pan, J. W., 249
Panak, W., 164
Parfit, D., 3, 265
Paris, S., 42
Park, L., 63
Parke, R. D., 124
Parker, J. G., 59
Pask-McCartney, C., 186
Pastorelli, C., 166
Patrick, R. B., 12, 129, 141, 276–276
Patterson, G. R., 168
Pellegrini, A. D., 62
Penrose, R., 207, 244, 248–249, 254, 279, 281
Perry, D. G., 160
Peterson, J. L., 41–42, 46
Peterson, C. C., 41, 46, 146
Petitt, G. S., 152, 163
Phon, Y. P. L., 75
Pierrouxtsakos, S. L., 50
Piquero, A. R., 157
Pithers, W. D., 203–204
Pizarro, D. A., 30, 33–34, 145–146
Plante, N., 167
Polaschek, D. L. L., 163
Polkinghorne, J. C., 281
Potts, M., 215
Poulin, F., 177, 183
Powell, D., 272
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author Name</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Powell, M. C.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powell, N.</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power, C.</td>
<td>92, 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premack, A. J.</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premack, D.</td>
<td>24, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prencipe, A.</td>
<td>41, 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price, J. M.</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quiggle, N.</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quigley, K. S.</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quinn, M.</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radin, D.</td>
<td>222, 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rai, T. S.</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rathunde, K.</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratner, H. H.</td>
<td>52, 62, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawls, J.</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redl, E.</td>
<td>155–156, 159–160, 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reed, A. II.</td>
<td>141, 159–160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reed, R. C.</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rees, J.</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reijntjes</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reiser, M.</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repacholi, B. M.</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resick, P. A.</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest, J. R.</td>
<td>5, 63, 70, 72, 76, 83, 144, 146, 268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reyes, L. S.</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson, D.</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson, D. R.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson, F. C.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riessman, F.</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ring, K.</td>
<td>217–218, 220–221, 224, 226, 228–235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ripley, A.</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbins, M.</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts, J. C.</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts, W. L.</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson, J. L.</td>
<td>101, 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson, R.</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockenbach, B.</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodgers, R. F.</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roediger, H. L.</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogoff, B.</td>
<td>52, 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rommer, B. R.</td>
<td>218–219, 232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosen, S.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosenberg, M. J.</td>
<td>56, 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosenhan, D. L.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosenthal, L.</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotenberg, K. J.</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roth-Hanania, R.</td>
<td>108, 110, 111, 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowland, M. D.</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowland, S.</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royzman, E. B.</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubanga, I.</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubin, K. H.</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rushe, R. H.</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell, T. M.</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutland, A.</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutter, M. L.</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rynearson, R. A.</td>
<td>92–93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagai, A.</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saguy, T.</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltzstein, H. D.</td>
<td>35, 128, 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samenow, S. E.</td>
<td>156, 159, 161, 165, 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sameroff, A. J.</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanbonmatsu, D. M.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandel, M. J.</td>
<td>3, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sartori, L.</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sartori, P.</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sauer, H.</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxe, R. R.</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarf, D.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schaal, B.</td>
<td>30, 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schechtman, K. B.</td>
<td>216–217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schiltz, M.</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schlundt, D. G.</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schmeichel, B. J.</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schnell, S. V.</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoenwald, S. K.</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schonert-Reichl, K. A.</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwanger, J.</td>
<td>216–217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz, D.</td>
<td>144, 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedikides, A.</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeck, M.</td>
<td>215, 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeto, D.</td>
<td>41–42, 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seewonarain, K.</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seider, S.</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selman, R. L.</td>
<td>3, 30, 42–44, 46, 61, 63–64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shalvi, S.</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaver, P. R.</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaw, L. L.</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherif, C. W.</td>
<td>20, 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherif, M.</td>
<td>20, 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shively, R.</td>
<td>176, 186, 203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shnabel, N., 119
Shortt, J. W., 159
Shreyn, T. A., 157
Shultz, L. H., 46
Shultz, T. R., 54
Shure, M. B., 196
Shutts, K., 19
Shweder, R. A., 3, 26, 32, 63
Siegler, R. S., 40, 44, 49–50, 57, 76, 78–79, 83, 272
Sigelman, C. K., 42, 64
Signorella, M. L., 42
Silberman, M. A., 273
Simion, F., 107
Simmel, G., 100
Simmer, M. L., 107
Simonian, S. J., 168
Simonian, S. S., 168
Sinclair, S., 5
Singer, P., 14, 37, 65, 69, 119–120, 154, 244, 247, 263, 267, 269, 271, 273
Skitka, L. J., 148
Slaby, R. G., 164–165
Sloane, S., 24
Slonim-Nevo, V., 69
Sloutsky, V., 271
Slovic, P., 117, 267
Smedslund, J., 55, 57, 60, 79, 136
Smetana, J. G., 3, 265
Smit, R. H., 228
Smith, A., 3, 99, 161, 234
Smith, D. J., 154
Snarey, J. R., 13, 73, 95, 154, 269, 272–273, 278
Sokol, A., 265, 270
Sokol, B. W., 34, 58, 153
Sommerville, R. B., 101, 267
Spelke, E. S., 19
Spinrad, T. L., 95, 108, 121, 159, 273
Spivack, G., 196
Stams, G. J., 153–154
Stanwick, K. E., 267
Stapp, H. P., 253
Staub, E., 100
Stegge, H., 158, 162
Steinberg, L., 68, 128, 130, 152
Sternberg, K., 20
Sternberg, R. J., 20, 138
Stevenson, I., 218, 225, 227–228
Stinson, B. L., 157, 164
Stouthamer-Loeber, M., 168
Straughan, R., 247
Strayer, J., 155
Streeter, R., 281
Suhler, C. L., 8, 268
Sullivan, C., 127, 130, 280
Super, C., 70
Surian, 24
Sutherland, C., 251
Svetina, M., 57, 79, 272
Swann, W. B. Jr., 160
Swillinger, A., 168
Sykes, G. M., 165
T
Taba, H., 137
Tajfel, H., 18
Tannenbaum, D., 34
Tannenbaum, P. H., 56, 141
Tappan, M. B., 3
Targ, E., 222
Tarnowski, K. J., 168
Tarrant, M., 25, 137
Tart, C. T., 222
Taylor, J., 58–59, 190
Taylor, S. E., 276
Thau, S., 141, 159–160
Theoret, H., 110
Thomaes, S., 158, 162, 171
Thompson, R. A., 50, 59, 111
Thorson, E., 45
Thoma, S. J., 5, 70, 72, 77, 84, 146
Tierny, J., 146
Tobin, D. D., 160
Todd, R. M., 116
Toffl r, B. L., 277
Tomasello, M. M., 14, 20, 52, 57, 62–63, 91, 109
Tooby, J., 61
Tramontano, 116, 157, 160, 166
Trivers, R. L., 67, 100
Trope, Y., 24
Trzelpinski, J., 77
Tufts, J. H., 83
Tugade, 53, 145, 284
Turriel, E., 1, 3, 27, 30, 31, 41–42, 63, 86–87, 140, 145, 265, 269
Turnbull, C. M., 279
Turner, J. C., 18
Tversky, A., 46

U
Underwood, B., 25
Upton, L., 42
Utendale, W. T., 127, 130, 160, 166

V
Vaish, A., 100, 109
Vaitl, D., 229
Valdesolo, P., 47, 150, 160–161, 267
Valsiner, J., 125
Van der Heijden, P. G. M., 63, 79
Van der Laan, P., 153–154
Van Leeuwen, N., 167
Van Rosmaelen, L., 153–154
Van Wees, R., 209, 226, 231
Vandivier, K., 165
Varshney, A., 69
Vasey, M. W., 157, 159–160, 165, 167
Vasudev, J., 90
Veerman, J. W., 163
Vermuelen, S. C. A., 76
Verplaetse, J., 67
Viswanathan, V., 267
Vorrath, H. H., 161, 176–178, 183, 198
Vygotsky, L. S., 66

W
Wainryb, C., 42, 153, 157
Waitzman, K. A., 42, 64
Wallen, D. G., 217
Wallin, C. A., 157, 167
Walsh, M. W., 140
Walton, G. E., 107
Ward, T., 163, 166
Warnken, E., 100, 109
Warnick, J. E., 81
Warnick, R., 81
Wasel, W., 30, 145
Wasmund, W. C., 177
Weaver, T. L., 77
Weber, R. A., 61
Wegner, D. M., 146
Weinbaum, E., 271
Weiner, B., 114
Weinfurter, H., 166, 249
Weiss, A. N., 216–217
Weiss, B. L., 224
Wellman, H. M., 77, 114
Westen, D., 137
Wheatley, T., 26
Whitbourne, S. K., 272
White, B. J., 20
White, R. W., 272
White, S., 147
Whiteford, M. G., 71
Wilson, D., 225
Wilson, E. O., 32
Wilson, J. Q., 3, 162
Wilson, T. D., 25
Wineman, D., 155–156, 159–160
Winer, G. R., 271
Witkin, H. A., 139
Woerlee, G. M., 228
Woodbury, R., 203
Wren, T. E., 247
Wright, R., 67
Wurf, E., 141
Wuthnow, R., 176
Wynn, K., 19, 24
Wynne, C. D. L., 24

Y
Yarbrough, G. L., 81
Yeates, R., 217
Yochelson, S., 156, 178
Youniss, J., 56
Yovsi, R. D., 111

Z
Zajonc, R. B., 21, 25–26, 116, 122, 268
Zaleski, C., 218, 280
Zeilinger, A., 249
Zelli, A., 128
Zhou, Q., 130
Zola, S., 110
A
Abuse, physical, 13, 163, 173
See also cognitive distortions or thinking errors, self-serving or aggressogenic under Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior
Adaptation, evolutionary, 243–244
See also Haidt’s new synthesis or social intuitionist theory
Adolescent Problems Inventory-Short Form (API-SF), 168
Adult moral development. See Kohlberg’s moral theory
Affective primacy. See Moral motivation
Aggression, proactive or reactive. See Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior
Altruism. See Prosocial behavior
Anger
management, 157, 176, 185–189, 194–200
empathic, 6, 12, 102, 114–115, 149, 151, 240
See also Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior; EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior; cognitive complications under Hoffman’s moral theory
Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior
aggression, proactive or reactive, 15, 158–159, 164, 170, 172, 262, 277
brain damage and, 25, 273–274
case study
summary and comments, 173–174
cognitive distortions or thinking errors, self-serving or aggressogenic, 13, 15, 26, 34–35, 47, 97, 134, 153, 155–167, 169–172, 174, 185, 235, 239, 250, 252, 271
assuming the worst, 160, 163–164, 166, 169, 171–172, 175, 177, 182, 196, 235
dehumanization and, 165–166
eo, self-concept, or self-esteem protected by, 158–162, 164–166, 170, 172
empathy or guilt neutralized by, 13, 15, 102, 114, 123, 151, 158–159, 161, 255, 274
physical abuse as a risk factor, 13, 163, 173
secondary, 159–166, 191
limitations or problematic tendencies, 152–153, 173, 175–176, 183–185, 257, 261–262
moral judgment delay, superficial social cognition or pronounced and prolonged egocentric bias, 13, 95, 149, 151–156, 163, 167, 169, 173–174, 176, 186, 193, 195, 262
negative or antisocial peer pressure, 152, 168–169, 187
psychopathy or callous and unemotional traits, 142, 156–159, 166, 169–170, 173, 277
self-esteem, inflated, or grandiosity, 158, 169–170
social skill deficiencies, 167–168, 172–173, 257, 262
wife batterers, 158–159
See also Bias; EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior; How I Think (HIT) questionnaire; Moral judgment or evaluation
Attachment, secure, and constructive peer interaction, 59
See also attachment or infant care under Empathy or empathic predisposition

Authoritative parenting. See Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization

Autoscopic near-death experience. See definition and types under Near-death experience

B
Balancing and moral type B, 138–140
See also Kohlberg's moral theory
Beck, Aaron T., 161, 194, 205

Benevolence or beneficence. See Character ideals, qualities, or virtues; Morality or moral domain
Bias
See also Cognitive-developmental approach to morality; Social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives
empathic. See empathy's limitations and their remedy under Hoffman's moral theory
Blaming others. See cognitive distortions or thinking errors, self-serving or aggressogenic under Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior
Bloom, Paul, 7, 19, 30, 34, 44, 46, 119, 136
Bystander guilt. See cognitive complications under Hoffman's moral theory

C
Centrations or unidimensional thinking. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality
Character ideals, qualities, or virtues, 1, 3–4, 6, 8, 28, 73, 135, 141–143, 146–147
Child labor abuse, 238–240

Classical conditioning as basic mode of empathic arousal. See Empathy or empathic predisposition
Cognitive behavioral approach. See EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior
Cognitive developmental approach to morality
critiques of, 40–41
cultural support for, 15, 57, 68–69, 124, 250
development or construction as distinct from socialization or internalization, 11, 35, 37, 39–40, 52–53, 56–57, 75, 78–79, 81, 84–86, 125, 131, 238, 245–246, 270–271
evolutionary heritage or germinal roots, 23, 33, 35, 61–62, 67–68
formal operations or hypothetical-deductive thinking, 57–58, 64–65, 81, 83, 87, 92, 94–95, 244, 260, 281
Haidt's challenge, evaluation, 3–8, 79
happy victimizer phenomenon, 44–46, 50, 58, 79
invariant sequence, 75–76, 82–84, 86–89, 91, 96–97, 259–260
logic or logical necessity and morality, 49–51, 54–55, 57, 59–60, 79, 136, 244, 247, 259, 270, 271, 275
moral judgment, definition, 39, 269
reciprocity norm, 55–57, 68
reflective abstraction, 65
social play, 41, 49
stages, 11, 40, 60–79, 84–97
stage mixture, 75–77, 83, 270
themes, 39–41, 80
working memory or executive attention, 39, 46, 50, 53, 96, 146–147, 247, 267, 270
Subject Index

See also Bias, egocentric or confirmation; Conservation knowledge/task; Gibbs’ lifespan view and critique of Kohlberg’s theory; Kohlberg’s moral theory; Moral judgment or evaluation; Moral identity; Moral motivation; Piaget’s theory; Reciprocity; Social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives

Cognitive dissonance. See Festinger, Leon, cognitive dissonance theory; ego, self-concept, or self-esteem, protected by, under Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior

Cognitive distortions or thinking errors self-debasing or depressogenic, and internalizing problem behavior, 164, 277

self-serving or aggressogenic. See Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior; EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior

Cognitive primacy. See Moral motivation Columbus Dispatch, 245

Condition of reversibility. See Moral judgment or evaluation

Confirmation bias. See Bias

Conscience and Moral Type B, 138–139 See also Kohlberg’s moral theory

Consciousness or mind brain and, 224, 226–229, 250–254, 273–274, 279–280 See also Near-death experience

Conservation knowledge/task, 47–49, 51–57, 78, 136, 140, 145, 206, 242, 245–247, 249, 254, 258–259 See also Cognitive-developmental approach to morality; Prosocial Behavior; Reality

Construction. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Social construction

Conventional level. See Kohlberg’s moral theory

Co-primacy. See Moral motivation

Cosmic perspective or Kohlberg’s “Stage 7.” See Kohlberg’s moral theory; Near-death experience

Cultural psychology, 3–4
See also Haidt’s new synthesis or social intuitionist theory; Moral relativism

Culture. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality; negative youth culture under EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior; Moral judgment or evaluation; moral reciprocity as internalized norm under Reciprocity

D

Death, concept of, and early childhood superficiality, 42
See also Cognitive developmental approach to morality

Decentration or multi-dimensional thinking. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Empathy or empathic predisposition

Delusional paranoia and assuming the worst, 163, 171

Deontology. See Greene’s argument; Morality or moral domain

Depression or internalizing problem behavior. See self-debasing or depressogenic under Cognitive distortions or thinking errors

de Waal, Frans, 6, 12, 19–20, 38, 61, 98

Dewey, John, 81–84, 90–91, 272

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), 167

Discipline, parental (Cont.)
nurturance or parental warmth, 126, 129–130, 169, 261
optimal pressure and, 125–126
permissive parenting and, 126, 130
power-assertion, 59, 125, 127, 129–130, 155, 275
See also Hoffman's moral theory
Dual process models. See Moral motivation
Durkheimian theory or group solidarity.
See Haidt's new synthesis or social intuitionist theory

E
Effectance motive, 247, 272, 274
See also Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Moral motivation;
Rationality or rational agency
Egocentric or confirmation bias. See Bias;
centrations or unidimensional thinking under Cognitive developmental approach to morality
Egocentric or quasi-egocentric empathic distress, 107, 109
See also stages, immature and mature under Hoffman's moral theory
Egoistic drift, 105, 115–116
See also Empathy or empathic predisposition; Hoffman's moral theory
Egoistic motives or desires, 10, 14–15, 32, 41, 59, 100, 114, 123, 127, 130–131, 155–157, 235, 242, 246, 250
See also Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior
Ego strength, willpower, or self-control. See Prosocial behavior
Emotivism. See Haidt's new synthesis or social intuitionist theory
Emotions, understanding mixed, 44, 50, 58
See also centrations or unidimensional thinking under Cognitive developmental approach to morality
Empathic bias. See empathy's limitations and their remedy under Hoffman's moral theory
Empathic over-arousal. See Hoffman's moral theory
Empathy or empathic predisposition
aggression inhibition, 108, 119
attachment or infant care and, 59, 102, 111, 130
biological substratum or brain neurology of, 101, 273–274
bystander intervention or guilt, 100, 102, 114, 123
cognition and, 106–123
compassion fatigue and, 116–118
complexity or full capacity of, 101–102, 105–106, 113
conditioning and, 101–103, 107, 116, 124, 247
definition, 99
discipline encounters and, 124–129
empathetic life review, 234–235, 237, 252
guilt, empathy-based, 1, 12, 15, 25, 50, 123, 127–128, 134–135, 151, 161, 198
human societal requirements and, 100
justice or the right and, 8–9, 115
mammalian, 101–102
moral circle and, 14, 119
moral principles and, 115, 118, 120–121, 123, 131, 134, 142, 145
preconcern, 102, 109
psychic numbing, 118–119
reframing or relabeling and, 119–120, 147, 178, 195
regulating or remediying limitations of, 100, 110, 115, 117–121
sympathy, 7, 98, 102, 104, 112, 126, 145, 267
synchrony with mother or group and, 101–103
See also cognitive distortions or thinking errors, self-serving or aggressogenic, under Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior; Attachment, secure, and constructive social interaction;
Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization; EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior; Hoffman's moral theory; Moral Motivation;
Prosocial behavior
Empirical knowledge. See Moral motivation
Equality. See Cognitive-developmental approach to morality; Reciprocity
Equilibration/disequilibration. See Piaget’s theory
EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior adaptations, 201–202
cognitive behavioral approach, 176, 184, 262
anger management, 157, 176, 185–189, 194–200
curriculum, 184–187, 189, 262, 278
equipment meetings, 184–201
EQUIPPED for Life game, 186
moral judgment and Social Decision-Making meetings, 185–187, 189, 191, 193–194
relaxation techniques, 187, 196
cognitive restructuring, reframing, or correcting cognitive distortions or thinking errors, 178, 186, 202, 119–120, 278
evaluations of, 201–203
multi-component, 176, 186–189
Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST), 190
mutual help approach
confronting, 178, 183–184
evaluation of, 183–184
faith-building opportunities, 178, 278
just community, 190, 198
mutual help meetings, 175–176, 178, 184, 194, 202
negative youth culture, 152, 177
Positive Peer Culture or Guided Group Interaction, 176–178, 183–184, 191, 262, 278
problem names, 179, 202
relabeling, 178, 187, 194–195
Responsible Adult Culture, 202
social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives in, 16, 175–178, 183–184, 186, 190–195, 198, 200–203, 205, 262
severe offenders, 36, 203–205, 236, 262–263
synergy of, 184–186
Think of the Other Person (TOP) technique, 196–197, 200
See also Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior; Bias; Social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives
Ethic of autonomy or divinity. See Haidt’s new synthesis or social intuitionist theory
Ethnocentric bias or conceits, 4, 276
See also Bias, egocentric or confirmation; cognitive distortions or thinking errors; self-serving or aggressogenic, under Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior
Eudaimonia, human flourishing, or the good life, 7, 27, 38, 272, 276, 278
Evolution or phylogeny. See Haidt’s new synthesis or social intuitionist theory and Hoffman’s moral theory
Existential development. See Gibbs’s two-phase lifespan view and critique of Kohlberg’s theory
Externalizing problem behavior. See Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior

F
False moral identity. See Moral identity; Prosocial behavior
Female genital mutilation, 4–6, 20, 33, 37, 266
See also Moral mutilation
Festinger, Leon, cognitive dissonance theory, 247.
See also ego, self-concept, or self-esteem protected by, and empathy or guilt neutralized by, under Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior
Field dependence/independence or psychological differentiation, 4–5
Moral types A/B and, 138–139
veridical moral perception and, 139–140
See also Prosocial behavior
Formal operations. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality
Freud or Freudian psychology 26, 32, 36, 81, 131
Fundamental or universal valuing and moral type B, 138
See also Moral judgment or evaluation

G
Gender differences. See Moral judgment or evaluation
Gibbs’s two-phase lifespan view and critique of Kohlberg’s theory
construction confused with internalization, 84–86, 97
conventional level and internal contradiction, 88–89
ethical philosophy and basic stages, 93–94
post-conventional level, rarification, 89–91
standard development, 94–96
Golden Rule, 3, 64, 68, 95, 248
See also condition of reversibility, interchangeability of perspectives, moral point of view, or third-person perspective under Moral judgment or evaluation
Gradient of caring. See empathic bias and multiple claimants dilemma under Hoffman’s moral theory
Greene’s argument, 266–267.
See also deontology under Morality or moral domain; Utilitarianism or utilitarian philosophy
Group solidarity. See Haidt’s new synthesis or social intuitionist theory
Guilt. See Empathy or empathic predisposition; Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization

H
Haidt’s new synthesis or social intuitionist theory
analogies, 26–27, 32, 37
assisted externalization, 268
authority, 6–7, 14, 17–18, 21, 32
care, 18, 22, 25
confабulation, 26, 29, 134
conscience, view of, 28–29
critique, 4–7, 16, 29–38
culture or cultural diversity, 17–19, 32–33, 37–38, 63, 73, 81, 258, 266
descriptive inadequacy or negative skew, 33–35, 268
dumbfounding, 26, 29–31
emotivism, 26
enculturation or internalization, 18–19, 35, 37, 55, 79, 250, 258, 269, 280
ethic of autonomy or divinity, 63
evolution or phylogeny, 7, 17–18, 20, 22, 24–25, 28, 32–33, 37, 241, 243–244, 258, 263
group or in-group solidarity or favoritism, 14, 17, 19–22, 31, 36, 38
higher reaches of morality, neglect of, 33–36, 96, 258
inequality aversion, 24
intuitive or affective primacy, 17, 21–22, 24–25, 31, 38, 269
justice, equality, or reciprocity, view of, 17, 22–24, 79
loyalty or social conformity, 6, 17–19, 22, 31, 147
modules, biological, 17, 22, 27, 32, 79, 268
moral relativism, 3, 33, 36–37, 265, 266, 270
moral reasoning, role or view of, 22, 29–31
nativist or neo-nativist view, 3, 10, 22–24, 61–62, 79, 110–111
out-group, hostility against, 18, 20, 29–30, 36
pragmatic functionalist perspective, 20, 28, 37
prescriptivity, exclusion of, 20, 35–36
prosocial behavior, view of motivation for, 25
purity or disgust, 6–7, 17
rationality, reason, or truth, view of, 17, 22, 24–27, 31–34, 36–37
social persuasion and success, 17, 20, 27–29, 33, 73
themes, 17–29, 31
triune brain, 24
See also brain damage under Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior; Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization; Durkheimian theory or group solidarity; Female genital mutilation; Moral motivation; Moral relativism

Happy victimizer phenomenon. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality.

Here-and-now empathic bias. See affective primacy under Moral motivation; Hoffman’s moral theory

Heteronomous morality. See centractions or unidimensional thinking under Cognitive developmental approach to morality

Hobbesian philosophy, 93, 96

See also Gibbs’s lifespan view and critique of Kohlberg’s theory

Hoffman, Martin L., 1–2, 37–38, 98

See also Hoffman’s moral theory

Hoffman’s moral theory

affective primacy in, 98–99, 121–122
arousal modes, 101–105, 274

cognitive complications

bystander intervention or guilt, 102, 114
causal attribution, 102, 114
empathy-based guilt, 102, 114
empathy, cognitive regulation of, 120–121
empathic anger, 102, 114
injustice inference, 102, 114–115
critique of, 130–132, 173–174
construction, decenctration or mental coordination and, 98, 101, 104, 110, 112–114, 118 123–125, 130–131
empathy’s limitations and their remedy

empathic bias (here-and-now, familiarity-similarity), 12, 14, 19, 104–105, 113, 115–117, 119, 136, 250, 254, 260, 276
empathic over-arousal, 12, 114,115–116, 118, 121, 136, 250, 260
remedying, 117–121, 260
evidence for Hoffman’s moral socialization theory, 126–128
evolution or phylogeny, 98, 100, 103, 110, 112, 119

Haidt’s theory, comparison with, 98

Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories, comparison or question of integration, 1, 106–107, 130–131, 248, 263–264

moral principles, role of, 120–121
multiple claimants dilemma, 117, 207, 236, 250, 254, 265
nurture, role of, 130
parental discipline techniques, 123–130

Perceived Parental Discipline (PPD) questionnaire, 275

self-other distinction, self-awareness, or self-recognition, 109–111
stages, mature and immature, 106–113, 260
sympathy, 102, 112, 114

Timothy McVeigh, 173–174

See also affective primacy under Moral motivation; Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization; Empathy or empathic predisposition; Moral motivation; Prosocial behavior

How I Think (HIT) questionnaire, 166–167

See also cognitive distortions or thinking errors, self-serving or aggressogenic, under Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior; EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior.

I

Ideal moral reciprocity. See Kohlberg’s moral theory; stages of under Moral judgment or evaluation; Reciprocity

Ideal speech, 3


See also Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior; Moral identity; Near-death experience

Impartial spectator. See condition of reversibility, interchangeability of perspectives, moral point of view, or third-person perspective under Moral judgment or evaluation

Inductive discipline. See Discipline, parental, and socialization or moral internalization
Information-processing models. See Prosocial behavior
Interconnectedness, human, 16, 95–96, 240, 249–253, 281
See also Morality or moral domain; Near-death experience; Reality
Internalization. See Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization
Integrity. See Character ideals, qualities, or virtues

J
Just World Hypothesis or belief in a just world. See Reciprocity
Just Community programs, 190, 278
See also EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior
Justice. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Moral motivation

K
Kant or Kantian ethics, 3, 14, 33–34, 37, 91–93, 95–97
See also Morality or moral domain
Kaszynski, Theodore, 151
Kielburger, Craig, 220, 239–242, 249, 255, 281
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 230
Knowledge, categories of. See Moral motivation
Kohlberg, Lawrence, 1, 10, 37, 39, 81, 97
See also Kohlberg’s moral theory
Kohlberg’s moral theory
adult moral development in, 91, 93–94, 260
background, 81–84
contribution to field of moral development, 11, 81
conventional level, 83–85, 88
Dewey’s emphasis on reflection and trichotomy of levels, 81–84, 90, 97
elitism, 89–90
formal philosophy, 91
gender differences in moral judgment, 273
Heinz dilemma, 83, 87, 89

invariant sequence, 82–84, 86–89, 91, 95–97, 259–260
lifespan moral judgment development, 94–97
longitudinal research, discoveries of, 86–90
moral principles, 84, 91–92, 95, 145
moral types A/B, 88–89, 138–140, 144
Piaget’s phases, overhaul of, 84–86
preconventional level, 84, 90, 272
postconventional or principled level or post-skeptical rationalism, 84, 86, 88–90, 93, 97, 272
“Stage 7” or cosmic perspective, 1, 11, 16, 91–93, 95, 208, 230, 237–238, 250–251, 255, 259, 263
stages as schemas, 77–78
transition 4 ½, 86–87, 92, 95
universality claims, 1, 73–75, 81–83, 86, 90
See also Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Cosmic perspective or Kohlberg’s “Stage” 7; Gibb’s lifespan view and critique of Kohlberg’s theory; Moral motivation; Social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives

L
Language-mediated association as mature mode of empathic arousal, 102, 104–105, 275
See also Empathy or empathic predisposition; Hoffman’s moral theory
Lewis, C. S., 60, 207, 236
Life review. See Near-death experience
Logic or logico-mathematical knowledge. See Morality or moral domain; Moral judgment or evaluation; Moral motivation; Reality
Locality/non-locality. See Moral perception, reality and
Locus of control, internal, or self-efficacy theory. Prosocial behavior
Lord of the Flies (Golding), 59
Love
cosmic perspective or deeper reality and, 92–93, 136, 207–208, 237, 240, 249
ideal moral reciprocity or justice and, 8,148, 207–208, 236, 250, 252
empathic bias, 19, 236
See also Hoffman’s moral theory

Love-withdrawal discipline. See Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization

Loyalty or authority, morality and virtue of, 6
See also Haidt’s new synthesis or social intuitionist theory; Moral relativism

M
Mathematical substructures hidden in the workings of the world. See Reality

Maturity. See Empathy or empathic predisposition; EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior; Moral Judgment or evaluation

See also Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior

Member-of-society perspective. See conventional level under Cognitive developmental approach to morality

Metacognition. See Empathy or empathic predisposition; Moral judgment or evaluation

Might-makes-right philosophy, 93, 95–96
See also Gibbs’s two-phase lifespan view and critique of Kohlberg’s theory

Milgram experiment resisters. See Prosocial behavior

Mimicry as basic mode of empathic arousal, 101–104, 107–108, 116
See also Empathy or empathic predisposition

Moral circle, 4, 14, 119

See also empathic bias and multiple claimants dilemma under Hoffman’s moral theory; Social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives

Moral courage. See Prosocial behavior

Moral or sociomoral development. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Empathy; Moral judgment or evaluation; Social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives

Moral or prosocial education, 36, 115, 119, 185, 190–191, 257, 271
See also EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior

Moral exemplars. See Prosocial behavior

Moral identity. See Moral motivation; Prosocial Behavior

Moral internalization. See Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization

Moral Judgment Interview (MJI). See Moral judgment or evaluation

Moral Judgment of the Child (Piaget), 82–83

Moral judgment or evaluation assessment of stages, 71–74
condition of reversibility, interchangeability of perspectives, moral point of view, or third-person perspective, 2–6, 11 13–14, 35, 64–65, 69, 93, 205, 257, 265, 271
cross-cultural age trends, 73–75 definition, 39
developmental delay, 13, 169, 153–155, 169, 186
forgiveness and, 66, 148–149
gender differences in, 273
Moral Judgment Interview, 86, 269, 274
moral reform and, 266
moral values, 82–3, 86, 90, 144–145, 191, 269
retributive justice or vengeance, 61, 69, 95, 148–149, 162, 173, 255, 259, 271, 279
social institutions and the development of, 70
Moral judgment or evaluation (Cont.)
Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF), 72–76, 259
value of avoiding dilemma use, 271–272
stages, 40, 50, 60–79, 84–97
See also Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior; Cognitive developmental approach to morality; EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior; Kohlberg’s moral theory; Reciprocity; Social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives;
Moral Life of Children, the (Coles), 17, 133
Moral motivation
cooprimacy or dual-process models, 3, 6, 24, 30, 134–137, 240, 244, 248, 260, 263, 267, 274.
effectance motive, 247, 272, 274
empirical knowledge and, 54, 78, 125, 242, 245–248
Kohlberg and Hoffman as guides to, 241
logico-mathematical or necessary knowledge and, 54–55, 78–79, 242–248
moral identity as a source of, 13, 130, 138, 142–143, 240, 276, 281
See also Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Empathy or empathic predisposition; Haidt’s new synthesis or social intuitionist theory; Hoffman’s moral theory; Moral judgment or evaluation; Reciprocity
Moral perception
information-processing models of, 144–146
non-local reality and, 249–255, 279
See also Prosocial behavior; Reality
Moral point of view or third-person perspective. See condition of reversibility, interchangeability of perspectives, moral point of view, or third-person perspective under Moral judgment or evaluation
Moral principles. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Empathy or empathic predisposition; Kohlberg’s moral theory
Moral reciprocity. See Reciprocity
See also Morality or moral domain, objective basis of
Moral types A/B. See Kohlberg’s moral theory
Moral values. See Moral judgment or evaluation
Morality or moral domain, ambiguity or conflict in, 9–10
beneficence as a principle, 8–9, 14, 117, 246, 257, 268, 269, 273
definition, 6–10, 269
deontology, 247, 267
Greene’s argument, 266–267
logic or logical ideals and, 59–60, 207, 243–244, 271
meta-ethical reflection, 95
objective basis, 2–3, 5, 37, 17, 265, 279
panoramic memory 233,
purity (vs. disgust) and, 7–8
reality and, 249–255
social domain theory and, 265
twofold representation or the right and the good, 8–10, 79, 268
See also Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Empathy or empathic predisposition; Hoffman’s moral theory; Kant or Kantian ethics; condition of reversibility, interchangeability of perspectives, moral point of view, or third-person perspective under Moral judgment or evaluation; Moral motivation; Reality; Reciprocity; Utilitarianism or utilitarian philosophy
Motivation. See Moral motivation
Multiple claimants dilemma. See Hoffman’s moral theory
Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST), 190
  See also EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior
Mutual help approach. See EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior

N
Narrative psychology, 3
  See also Moral relativism; Vygotskian theory
Near-death experience
  accurate, verifiable aspects or veridical perception, 222–225, 280
  after effects, 212, 215, 230–233, 235–236, 254
  anomalies of, 218, 220, 229, 251, 253–254
  Asian accounts of, 217
  case studies
  contextual or cultural influence on content, 216–221
  death, does near-death experience happen during near-death experience, 227–229
definition and types, 16, 208, 217–219
dissociation and, 279
distressing versions, 218, 232
dying brain explanations of, 215, 224, 227
dying brain explanations of, 215, 224, 227
dying brain explanations of, 215, 224, 227
dying brain explanations of, 215, 224, 227
dying brain explanations of, 215, 224, 227
empathy and, 207, 254
ewxternal crisis or development and, 11, 16, 33, 91–92, 94, 95–97, 188, 208, 216, 229–230, 232, 239, 250, 252, 259, 263, 273
fabrication hypothesis, 227–229
forgiving life and, 252
hallucinations or dreams and, 215, 219–222, 224, 227, 229, 274
incidence rate, 217
identity or self-concept, 221–222, 250–251, 253–254
ineffability, 213, 220–221, 229, 280
light, 211, 213, 231–232, 279–280
oxygen deprivation or cerebral hypoxia, 215, 224
panoramic memory, 233
proximity to death and, 226
real, do near-death experiencers interpret the experience as, 221–222, 229
surprise in, 219–220
  See also Consciousness or mind;
    Empathy or empathic predisposition; multiple claimants dilemma
under Hoffman’s moral theory; Love; Reality; “Stage 7” or cosmic perspective under Kohlberg’s moral theory
Negative youth culture. See EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior
Neo-nativist or nativist views. See Haidt’s new synthesis or social intuitionist theory; moral relativism
Newborn reactive cry as immature stage of empathic distress, 102, 107
  See also Empathy or empathic predisposition; Hoffman’s moral theory
Nietzschean perspectivism, 4, 14, 28
  See also Moral relativism
Nonsocial cognition. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Conservation knowledge/task
Nurturance or parental warmth. See Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization

O
Objectivity. See Rationality or rational agency; Morality or moral domain

P
Paranoid behavior and assuming the worst, 163, 171
  See also Cognitive distortion or thinking errors, self-serving or aggressogenic
Parental discipline. See Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization

Peer interaction. See Piaget’s theory; Social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives

Perspective-taking. See Social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives

Piaget, Jean. See Piaget’s theory

Piaget’s theory
adaptation and development, 78–79, 243–244, 263
construction or social construction, 1, 29, 40, 51–53, 55–61, 63, 65, 69, 78–81, 84–85, 93, 97, 125, 131, 135, 142, 166, 207, 215, 244–247, 249, 253, 259, 267, 270
critiques of, 40
decentration or mental coordination, 3, 11, 30, 34, 40, 43–44, 48–49, 51–52, 55, 61, 79, 85, 95, 114, 147, 246
domain-general view, 270
equilibration/disequilibration, equilibrium, assimilation, or accommodation, 56–57, 62, 65, 76–78, 88, 186, 246, 251, 254, 272
heteronomy, 41, 84
influence on Kohlberg, 81–84
invariant sequence, 82–84, 86–89, 91, 96–97, 259–260
logic or rationality inherent in social relations, 39, 78
moral judgment phases, 75–77, 82–83, 106, 259, 272
peer interaction, 56–59, 69–71, 96
reflective abstraction, 65
See also Bias, egocentric or confirmation; Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Social construction; Kohlberg’s moral theory; Schemas

Positive Peer Culture. See EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior

Postconventional level. See Kohlberg’s moral theory

Power-assertive discipline. See Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization

Pragmatic moral reciprocity. See Moral judgment or evaluation, stages of

Preconventional level. See Kohlberg’s moral theory

Primacy in moral motivation. See Moral motivation

Proactive aggression. See Aggression, proactive or reactive, under Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior

Prosocial behavior
case study, 133–137, 140
definition, 133, 273
go strength, willpower, or self-control and, 13, 16, 130, 143–144, 146–148, 151, 172, 239, 261, 274
empathy and, 99–100, 121–122, 143, 151
false or spurious “moral” exemplars, 148–151, 170
field independence, Moral Type B, or veridical moral perception and, 139–146, 276
individual differences in, 137–144
information-processing models and, 144–146
locus of control, internal, or self-efficacy belief, 118, 139, 143–144, 146, 148, 261
Milgram experiment resisters, 140, 143–144
moral exemplars, moral courage, or whistle-blowers, 13, 31, 34, 90, 100, 113, 119, 136–151, 236, 238–239, 255, 257, 261, 273, 276
moral judgment stage and, 143–144, 148–149
social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives and, 121–122,
See also Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization; Empathy or empathic predisposition; moral Types A/B under Kohlberg’s moral theory; Moral motivation
Psychopathy or callous and unemotional traits. See Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior

Purity (vs. disgust), 5–8, 17–18, 20–24, 26, 32, 34, 37, 204–205, 247, 257, 278. See also Moral relativism

Q

Quantum reality. See local and nonlocal, subatomic, or quantum under Reality

R


See also rationality, reason, or truth, view of, under Haidt’s new synthesis or social intuitionist theory; objective basis under Morality or moral domain

Rationalism

critiques of Piaget’s theory as conscious, 269
post-skeptical, 88

Rawls’s theory of justice, 90, 93

See also Gibbs’s two-phase and lifespan view and critique of Kohlberg’s theory

Reactive aggression. See Aggression, proactive or reactive, under Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior

Reality
cognitive developmental approach to morality and a deeper, 1, 53, 239
conservation knowledge and perception of a deeper, 53, 140, 248–249
ideal moral reciprocity and a deeper, 207–208

Kohlberg’s, Hoffmann’s, and Haidt’s theories, venturing beyond, 208
local and non-local, subatomic, or quantum, 249, 250–255, 281
substructures or logico-mathematical underpinnings, 82, 206–207, 236, 244, 248, 254–255, 257, 278–279
moral perception or inspiration and a deeper, 249–255
paradox of, 249, 252, 254, 264, 279

See also Kohlberg’s “Stage 7” or cosmic perspective under Kohlberg’s moral theory; Near-death experience;

Reciprocity
activation of, 145
equality and, 2, 53–54, 56–57, 136
germinal roots or precursors, 23, 35, 61
Just World Hypothesis or belief in a just world, 102, 105 114–115
ideal moral reciprocity or reciprocity as constructed ideal, 3–4, 11, 29, 56, 63, 67–70, 72 80, 84–85, 93, 95–96, 105, 133, 136, 142, 145, 149, 151, 191, 205, 207–208, 237, 243, 246, 252, 259, 271
moral reciprocity as societal norm, 55–57, 68, 266
non-social cognition and, 55–56
primate societies and, 61–63
strong, 67

See also stages under Cognitive-developmental approach to morality; Morality or moral domain; cognitive primacy or violations of justice under Moral motivation

Reframing, aggression inhibition, and moral development, 119–120

See also EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior

Relativism, moral or cultural. See Moral relativism

Relaxation techniques. See cognitive behavioral approach under EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior

Reversibility, condition of. See Moral judgment or evaluation

Reynolds, Pam. See Near-death experience, case studies.

“Right and Wrong as a Clue to the Meaning of the Universe” (Lewis, C. S.), 207

Rural or village cultures and the near-death experience, 217

See also Near-death experience

S

Sawyer, Thomas. See Near-death experience
Subject Index

See also Effectance motive; stages under Moral judgment or evaluation
Self-awareness. See self-other distinction, self-awareness, or self-recognition under Empathy or empathic predisposition; existential development under Gibbs’s two-phase lifespan view and critique of Kohlberg’s theory
Self-control. See ego strength, willpower, or self-control under Prosocial behavior
Self-efficacy. See locus of control, internal, or self-efficacy theory
Self-serving or aggressogenic cognitive distortions or thinking errors. See Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior
Social construction, 40, 51–53, 56–59, 65, 85, 125, 142, 259, 270
See also development or construction as distinct from socialization or internalization under Cognitive developmental approach to morality
Social contract or libertarian theories, 86, 88, 91, 93–95
Social domain theory or social conventions, 3, 8, 265
Social intuitionist theory or cultural psychology. See Haidt’s new synthesis or social intuitionist theory
Social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives
appreciation of human diversity and, 4 definition, 1–2, 157
empathy or caring and, 15, 101–102, 122,151, 203–205, 212, 275, 277
inadequate, self-serving, or manipulative, 131, 156–158
expansion of moral circle or scope and, 1–2, 69–71
near-death experience or deeper reality and, 16, 208, 234–236
role-taking, opportunities for, 68, 70–71, 104–105, 274
research evaluation, 70–71
time-out technique and, 275
See also cognitive distortions or thinking errors, self-serving or aggressogenic, under Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior;
Bias, egocentric or confirmation;
Social construction; Empathy or empathic predisposition;
EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior; Moral judgment or evaluation; Theory of mind
Socialization. See Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization
Social skills, 13, 133, 167, 174
See also Antisocial or externalizing problem behavior; EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior
Sociomoral Reflection Measure—Short Form (SRM-SF). See Moral judgment or evaluation
Spetzler, Robert, 209, 227, 254, 279
Stages. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality; Empathy or empathic predisposition; Kohlberg’s moral theory; Moral judgment or evaluation
Sympathy. See Empathy or empathic predisposition

T
Texas Youth Commission Capital Offender Group program, 203
See also EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior
Theory of mind, 45
See also Social perspective-taking or coordination of perspectives
Thinking errors and antisocial behavior. See cognitive distortions or thinking errors, self-serving or aggressogenic, under Antisocial or
externalizing problem behavior; EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior

Time-out technique, 255, 275

Toronto Star, 242, 245

Transcendental near-death experience. See definition and types under Near-death experience

Transgression guilt. See Discipline, parental, or socialization and moral internalization

Turiel, Elliot, 1, 3, 32, 86

See also Social domain theory

12-Step programs, 200

See also EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior

U

Unidimensional thinking. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality

Utilitarianism or utilitarian philosophy, 3, 8, 37, 81, 247, 266–267

See also Greene’s argument.

Universal morality, Kohlberg’s search for, 11, 73, 81–82, 86

See also Kohlberg’s moral theory; Morality or moral domain; Moral judgment or evaluation

V

Victim Awareness programs, 203, 278

See also EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior

Virtues. See Character ideals, qualities, or virtues

Vygotskian theory, 3, 65–66, 85, 125, 271. See also Zone of proximal development

W

Willpower. See ego strength, willpower, or self-control under Prosocial behavior

Working memory or executive attention. See Cognitive developmental approach to morality

Y

Yanomamo Indians, 69, 255

Youth Charter Programs, 190

Youth culture or Positive Peer Culture. See EQUIP and related programs for treating antisocial behavior

Z

Zahn-Waxler, Carolyn, 12, 98, 111

Zone of proximal development, 85, 271